area handbook series 

Laos 

a country study 




Laos 

a country study 



Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Edited by 
Andrea Matles Savada 
Research Completed 
July 1994 




On the cover: Boats tied up on the Mekong River, at the 
foot of wide steps leading to Wat Xieng Thong in 
Louangphrabang 



Third Edition, First Printing, 1995. 

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 

Laos: a country study / Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress ; edited by Andrea Maties Savada. — 3rd ed. 

p. cm. — (Area handbook series, ISSN 1057-5294) 
(DA Pam ; 550-58) 

"Supersedes the 1971 edition of Area Handbook for 
Laos. 

"Research completed July 1994." 

Includes bibliographical references (pp. 313-338) and 
index. 

ISBN 0-8444-0832-8 

1. Laos. I. Savada, Andrea Mades, 1950- . II. Library of 
Congress. Federal Research Division. III. Series. IV. 
Series: DA Pam ; 550-58 

DS555.3.L34 1995 95-1 7235 

951.93— dc20 CIP 



Headquarters, Department of the Army 
DA Pam 550-58 



For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 



Foreword 



This volume is one in a continuing series of books prepared 
by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress 
under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program spon- 
sored by the Department of the Army. The last two pages of this 
book list the other published studies. 

Most books in the series deal with a particular foreign coun- 
try, describing and analyzing its political, economic, social, and 
national security systems and institutions, and examining the 
interrelationships of those systems and the ways they are 
shaped by cultural factors. Each study is written by a multidisci- 
plinary team of social scientists. The authors seek to provide a 
basic understanding of the observed society, striving for a 
dynamic rather than a static portrayal. Particular attention is 
devoted to the people who make up the society, their origins, 
dominant beliefs and values, their common interests and the 
issues on which they are divided, the nature and extent of their 
involvement with national institutions, and their attitudes 
toward each other and toward their social system and political 
order. 

The books represent the analysis of the authors and should 
not be construed as an expression of an official United States 
government position, policy, or decision. The authors have 
sought to adhere to accepted standards of scholarly objectivity. 
Corrections, additions, and suggestions for changes from read- 
ers will be welcomed for use in future editions. 

Louis R. Mortimer 
Chief 

Federal Research Division 
Library of Congress 
Washington, DC 20540-5220 



iii 



Acknowledgments 



This edition supersedes the Area Handbook for Laos, pub- 
lished in 1971. Various members of the staff of the Federal 
Research Division of the Library of Congress assisted in the 
preparation of the book. Sandra W. Meditz made helpful sug- 
gestions during her review of all parts of the book. Robert L. 
Worden also reviewed parts of the book and made numerous 
suggestions and points of clarification. Tim L. Merrill checked 
the contents of all the maps and reviewed the sections on geog- 
raphy and telecommunications. Thomas D. Hall also assisted 
with some of the maps. Thanks also go to David R Cabitto, who 
managed graphics production; Marilyn L. Majeska, who man- 
aged editing and production and edited portions of the manu- 
script; Andrea T. Merrill, who provided invaluable assistance 
with regard to tables and figures; and Barbara Edgerton, 
Alberta Jones King, and Izella Watson, who did the word pro- 
cessing. 

The authors also are grateful to individuals in various United 
States government agencies who gave their time and special 
knowledge to provide information and perspective. These indi- 
viduals include Ralph K. Benesch, who oversees the Country 
Studies/Area Handbook Program for the Department of the 
Army, and the staff of the Embassy of the Lao People's Demo- 
cratic Republic to the United States. 

Others who contributed were Joel Halpern, who reviewed 
the text and also offered many valuable suggestions and points 
of clarification; Ly Burnham, who reviewed the portions of the 
text on demography; Harriett R. Blood, who prepared the 
topography and drainage map; Maryland Mapping and Graph- 
ics, which prepared maps and charts; Teresa Kemp, who 
designed the cover and chapter art; Juliet Bruce, who edited 
chapters; Sheila L. Ross, who performed the final prepublica- 
tion editorial review; Joan C. Cook, who compiled the index; 
and Stephen C. Cranton, David P. Cabitto, and Janie L. Gil- 
christ, who prepared the camera-ready copy. The inclusion of 
photographs was made possible by the generosity of individuals 
and the Embassy of the Lao People's Democratic Republic. 



Contents 



Page 

Foreword iii 

Acknowledgments v 

Preface xiii 

Table A. Chronology of Important Events xv 

Country Profile xxi 

Introduction xxix 

Chapter 1. Historical Setting 1 

Arthur J. Dommen 

EARLY HISTORY 5 

Power Centers in the Middle Mekong Valley 5 

Mongol Influence 7 

The Founding of Lan Xang 8 

The Division of Lan Xang 9 

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 10 

TheHoldofSiam 10 

The Eviction of Siam 15 

Laos under the French 16 

WORLD WAR II AND AFTER 19 

The French Protectorate and Direct 

Administration 20 

Nationalist Stirrings 21 

Events in 1945 22 

The Lao Issara Government 26 

A Confusing Situation 27 

THE COMING OF INDEPENDENCE 30 

The Kingdom of Laos 30 

The PathetLao 31 

TOWARD NEUTRALITY: THE FIRST COALITION 34 

Initial Difficulties 35 

Renewed Negotiations 37 

A Fragile Unity 39 

vii 



The 1958 Elections 40 

North Vietnamese Invasion 42 

The Army Enters Politics 44 

THE ATTEMPT TO RESTORE NEUTRALITY 45 

A Deepening Split 47 

The Battle of Vientiane 51 

The Widening War 52 

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND THE ADVENT OF 

THE SECOND COALITION 54 

Expansion of Pathet Lao Influence 55 

Protracted Diplomacy 56 

Renewed Strains 57 

The "Secret War" 58 

THE THIRD COALITION AND THE LAO PEOPLE'S 

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 61 

The Vientiane Agreement 62 

The Origins of the Prisoner of War/Missing 

in Action Question 63 

Formation of the Third Coalition 65 

The Communist Seizure of Power 66 

Establishment of the Lao People's 

Democratic Republic 67 

"Seminar Camps" and the Death of King 

Savang Vatthana 68 

Postwar Relations with the United States 70 

Developments in the Lao People's 

Democratic Republic 72 

Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 77 

W. Randall Ireson 

THE PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT 81 

Topography 81 

Climate 82 

Transportation Routes 85 

Natural Resources 86 

POPULATION 86 

Ethnic Diversity 87 

The Refugee Population 91 

Rural-Urban Distribution 93 

RURAL LIFE 94 

Lowland Lao Society 95 



viii 



Midland Lao Society 104 

Upland Lao Society 110 

The Pattern of Rural Life 119 

URBAN SOCIETY 120 

RELIGION 124 

Buddhism 124 

Animism 130 

EDUCATION 133 

Education Prior to the Lao People's 

Democratic Republic 133 

Education since 1975 134 

HEALTH AND WELFARE 137 

Public Health 137 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 140 

Health Infrastructure . . 141 

Social Welfare 142 

FUTURE TRENDS 144 

Chapter 3. The Economy 149 

Susannah Hopkins 

AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY 153 

Agriculture in the Economic System 153 

Crops and Farming Systems 155 

Fishing 160 

Forestry 160 

Agricultural Policy 162 

Environmental Problems and Policy 163 

INDUSTRY AND SERVICES 166 

Industrial Output and Employment 166 

Services 172 

Industrial Policy 173 

TRANSPORTATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS .... 1 74 

Roads 175 

Motor Vehicles 178 

Inland Waterways 178 

Civil Aviation 179 

Telecommunications 179 

PUBLIC FINANCE. 180 

The Budget Deficit 180 

Government Revenue 180 

Government Expenditure 182 

IX 



Policy 182 

THE FINANCIAL SECTOR . 183 

The Banking System 183 

Money and Prices 184 

Money Supply and Inflation 186 

THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 187 

The Foreign Exchange Rate 187 

Foreign Trade 187 

Direct Foreign Investment 194 

Foreign Aid 196 

External Debt 199 

PROSPECTS FOR GROWTH 199 

Chapter 4. Government and Politics 203 

MacAlister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff 

THE LAO PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 206 

Origins of the Party 206 

Party Structure 208 

Semisecrecy of the Lao People's 

Revo lutionary Party 212 

Ideology of the Lao People's 

Revolutionary Party 213 

Leadership 214 

THE CONSTITUTION 219 

Development of the Constitution 219 

Highlights of the Constitution 221 

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 227 

Bureaucratic Culture 227 

Executive 228 

Legislature 229 

Judiciary 232 

CHALLENGES TO THE REGIME 233 

Human Rights 233 

Insurgents 234 

Refugees 235 

Political Opposition 235 

MASS MEDIA 236 

FOREIGN POLICY 239 

Basic Goals 241 

Bureaucratic Complications 242 

Economic Factors 242 



x 



Bilateral Relations 244 

Chapter 5. National Security 259 

Nicholas C. Auclair 

THE ARMED FORCES 262 

Historical Background 262 

Structure and Administration of 

the Armed Forces 270 

Manpower and Conditions of Service 274 

The Defense Budget 276 

THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 276 

Internal Threats and Resistance Movements 276 

Foreign Military Presence 283 

The Confrontational Relationship with Thailand. . 284 

Relations with the United States 286 

NATIONAL POLICE AND PARAMILITARY FORCES 287 

THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 288 

Civil Liberties and Human Rights 288 

Detention Centers 290 

NARCOTICS AND COUNTERNARCOTICS ISSUES 292 

Appendix. Tables 297 

Bibliography 313 

Glossary 339 

Index 345 

Contributors 363 

List of figures 

1 Administrative Divisions of Laos, 1994 xxviii 

2 Administrative Organization and Territorial 

Changes, 1895-1947 18 

3 Laos in Its Southeast Asian Setting, 1994 80 

4 Topography and Drainage 84 

5 Population by Age and Gender, 1985 88 

6 Ethnic Groups, 1992 90 

7 Transportation and Selected Industrial and 

Agricultural Activity, 1994 176 

xi 



8 Organization of the Lao People's Revolutionary 

Party (LPRP), 1993 210 

9 Structure of the Government, 1993 230 



xii 



Preface 



This edition of Laos: A Country Study replaces the previous 
edition, published in 1971, prior to the establishment of the 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, which came into being in 
December 1975. Like its predecessor, this study attempts to 
review the history and treat in a concise manner the dominant 
social, political, economic, and military aspects of contempo- 
rary Laos. 

Sources of information included books, scholarly journals, 
foreign and domestic newspapers, official reports of govern- 
ments and international organizations, and numerous periodi- 
cals on Asian affairs. A word of caution is necessary, however. 
The government of a closed communist society such as Laos 
controls information for internal and external consumption, 
limiting both the scope of coverage and its dissemination. And, 
data from and on Laos are, on the whole, limited, and often 
contradictory. 

Chapter bibliographies appear at the end of the book, and 
brief comments on some of the more valuable sources recom- 
mended for further reading appear at the end of each chapter. 
A glossary and chronology (see Table A) also are included. 

A word must also be offered on the use of the terms Lao and 
Laotian. The term Lao refers to people who are ethnic Lao; it is 
not used to refer to those living in Laos who are members of 
other ethnic groups, for example, Vietnamese, Chinese, or 
Hmong. The term Laotian is used to refer to all the people liv- 
ing in Laos, regardless of ethnic identity. 

Spellings of place-names used in the book are in most cases 
those approved by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names. However, as internal divisions have been drawn and 
redrawn, place-names within Laos have also changed. Insofar 
as possible, the present volume reflects these changes. 

Measurements are given in the metric system. A conversion 
table is provided to assist readers unfamiliar with metric mea- 
surements (see table 1, Appendix). 

The body of the text reflects information available as of July 
1, 1994. Certain other portions of the text, however, have been 
updated. The Introduction discusses significant events that 
have occurred since the completion of research, the Country 
Profile includes updated information as available, and the Bib- 



xiii 



liography lists recently published sources thought to be partic- 
ularly helpful to the reader. 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



ca. 2,000 B.C.-A.D. 500 

First century B.C.-fifth century 
A.D. 

Mid-sixth century 
Early eighth century 
717 

Eighth-twelfth centuries 



Tenth-twelfth centuries 



Twelfth century 

1271-72 
1279 



1353-73 
1373-1547 

1574-78 
1603 

1621-1713 



Eighteenth century 

1772 
1778 

1867^87 



1890 

May 1893 
July 1893 



Early pottery and bronze culture, middle Mekong Valley. 

Early mandala (see Glossary) formed in middle Mekong 
Valley. 

Zhenla established, centered on Champasak. 

Zhenla divided into "Water Zhenla" and "Land Zhenla." 

First tributary mission from Land Zhenla to Tang China. 

Mon mandala of central Mekong region fall under 
Khmer domination; Theravada Buddhism spread by 
Mon monks. 

Muang Sua (Louangphrabang) , renamed Xieng Dong 
XiengTong; mandala infiltrated by Lao descending the 
Nam Ou. 

Candapuri mandala in Vientiane region absorbed within 
Khmer Empire. 

Panya Lang rules Xieng Dong Xieng Thong. 

Tai mandala of Sukhotai founded by King Ramkham- 
haeng; Xieng Dong Xieng Thong and Muang Vieng 
Chan Vieng Kham (Vientiane) briefly incorporated 
into Sukhotai mandala. 

Reign of Fa Ngum, king of Lan Xang; beginning of 
recorded Laotian history. 

Successors of Fa Ngum continue to organize Lan Xang; 
Phetsarath (r. 1520-47) involves Lan Xang in battles 
against Burma and Siam lasting two centuries. 

Lan Xang reduced by Burma to vassal state. 

Lan Xang renounces tributary ties to Burma. 

Succession struggles for throne of Lan Xang result in 
accession of King Souligna Vongsa (r. 1633-90); his 
death engenders succession struggle among his neph- 
ews, culminating in division of Lan Xang into king- 
doms of Louangphrabang and Vientiane; south further 
divides into Kingdom of Champasak in 1713. 

Lao states of Louangphrabang, Vientiane, and Cham- 
pasak try to maintain independence from Burma and 
Siam but eventually come under Siamese control. 

Suryavong seizes throne of Louangphrabang. 

Beginning of Siamese domination of Champasak, Vien- 
tiane, and Louangphrabang. 

Mekong expedition of Doudart de Lagree and Francis 
Gamier arrives in Louangphrabang, 1867; Siam con- 
tends with France, which establishes protectorate over 
Vietnam, to extend influence in Indochina; France 
eventually installs Auguste Pavie in Louangphrabang as 
first vice consul, February 1887. 

French colonial rule begins, lasts until 1953. 

French military occupation of Lao territories east of the 
Mekong. 

"Paknam incident" gives France excuse to demand ces- 
sion of east bank territories. 



XV 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



October 1893 
1895 

January 15, 1896 

April 19, 1899 
1902-07 

1925-26 

June 5, 1930 

1931-32 
1940-45 



1946 



1947 



1949 



February 1950 

August 1950 
February 1951 



Treaty concluded on October 3, 1893, between the Gov- 
ernment of the French Republic and the Government 
of His Majesty the King of Siam formalizes Siamese 
acceptance of French seizure of east bank territories. 

Laos, as French protectorate, divided into Upper Laos 
and Lower Laos. 

Anglo-French Convention defines British and French 
spheres of influence in mainland Southeast Asia. 

Laos reorganized under resident superieur in Vientiane. 

France pacifies unrest in Bolovens Plateau; Sisavang 
Vong becomes king (r. 1904-59); annexation of Lao- 
tian territories completed by treaties with Siam (1904, 
1907), acquiring borders of contemporary Laos. 

Further treaties and agreements finalize border ques- 
tions and establish permanent Franco-Siamese High 
Commission of the Mekong. 

Laos designated French colony by French Legislative 
Council. 

Louangphrabang confirmed as protectorate of France. 

August 30, 1940, Matsuoka-Henry Pact ending Franco- 
Thai War gives all Lao territories west of the Mekong to 
Thailand; May 9, 1941, Peace Convention between 
France and Thailand; August 29, 1941, Treaty of Pro- 
tectorate between France and the Kingdom of Louang- 
phrabang; Laos occupied by Japan, March 9, 1945; 
Laos "independent"; after surrender of Japan, Sisavang 
Vong proclaims continuation of Laos as a French pro- 
tectorate; Lao Issara (see Glossary) activists seize power 
in Vientiane, Savannakhet, and other Laotian towns, 
establish provisional government. 

Sisavang Vong deposed; French begin reoccupation of 
Laos, March; Sisavang Vong reinstated as king by Lao 
Issara government; French retake Vientiane, and Lao 
Issara government flees to Thailand; Franco-Lao 
modus vivendi establishes unity of Kingdom of Laos; 
Thailand returns former Laotian territories of Xaigna- 
bouri and Champasak to Laos. 

Constitution promulgated, making Laos a constitutional 
monarchy; elections held for National Assembly; 
Prince Souvannarath forms government of Kingdom of 
Laos. 

Kaysone Phomvihan forms Latsavong detachment, 
armed forces of Pathet Lao, the genesis of Lao People's 
Liberation Army (LPLA); Franco-Lao General Conven- 
tion grants Laos limited self-government within French 
Union; Lao Issara government-in-exile dissolves, and 
members return to Laos or join newly formed Pathet 
Lao on Vietnam border. 

United States and Britain recognize Laos as an Associ- 
ated State in French Union. 

Pathet Lao form "resistance government." 
Indochinese Communist Party dissolves; separate parties 
established in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period 



Description 



October 22, 1953 



May-July 1954 



March 1955 

December 14, 1955 
1956-57 
January 1956 

September 1956 

November 1957 
May 1958 

July 1958 

August 1958 

July-August 1959 

October 1959 

January 1960 

April 1960 
August 9, 1960 



Franco-Lao Treaty of Amity and Association transfers 
remaining French powers to Royal Lao Government 
(RLG) — while retaining control of military affairs — 
and completes independence of Laos. 

Laos participates in Geneva Conference on Indochina; 
under armistice agreements signed by French and Viet 
Minh on July 20, Viet Minh agree to withdraw from 
Laos, and Phongsali and Houaphan provinces are des- 
ignated regroupment areas for Pathet Lao; RLG 
pledges to integrate Pathet Lao fighters; International 
Control Commission established to implement agree- 
ments. 

Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party — LPP) estab- 
lished; first congress held. 

Laos admitted to the United Nations. 

Negotiations between RLG and Pathet Lao. 

Pathet Lao congress establishes Lao Patriotic Front 
(LPF). 

Constitution amended to allow formation of coalition 
government. 

First coalition government formed. 

LPF and allies win partial elections for National Assem- 
bly. 

Souvanna Phouma government resigns following cabinet 
crisis caused by rightists. 

Rightist government of Phoui Sananikone formed, 
excluding LPF. 

Fighting breaks out in northern Laos; UN subcommittee 
investigates charges of North Vietnam's involvement; 
LPF deputies arrested. 

KingSisavang Vong dies; Savang Vatthana succeeds to the 
throne, rules until 1975. 

Kou Abhay forms provisional government following coup 
attempt by army. 

Elections for National Assembly believed rigged. 

Kong Le carries out successful Neutralist coup d'etat 
against rightist government of Prince Somsanith; 
General Phoumi Nosavan forms countercoup commit- 
tee in Savannakhet and declares martial law; Kong Le 
hands over power to Souvanna Phouma's third govern- 



December 1960 
January 1961 

May 1961-June 1962 
July 1962 



Phoumi Nosavan captures Vientiane; Soviet airlift begins 
to Kong Le and Pathet Lao troops. 

Souvanna Phouma government recognized by commu- 
nist bloc; Prince Boun Oum's Vientiane government 
recognized by West; heavy fighting breaks out; North 
Vietnamese troops involved. 

Second Geneva Conference on Laos; agreements among 
Neutralist, Pathet Lao, and rightist factions prepare 
way for second coalition government. 

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Protocol 
signed in Geneva. 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period Description 



1963-May 1964 



1968-74 



August 1974-November 1975 



December 1975 



May 1976 

July 1977 

February 1979 

January 1978 
January 1981 
April 1982 
May 1984 
March 1985 
January 1986 
November 1986 

1988 
1989 



April 1990 
March 1991 



Laos increasingly linked with developments in Vietnam; 
North Vietnamese troops fail to withdraw; Ho Chi 
Minh Trail expanded; second coalition government 
collapses; Pathet Lao offensive against Neutralists on 
Plain of Jars succeeds; International Control Commis- 
sion proves ineffective; bombing by United States 
begins. 

Fighting escalates between Pathet Lao's LPLA and Royal 
Lao Army; Hmong under Vang Pao resist Pathet Lao- 
North Vietnamese advances; Second Party Congress 
held, 1972; LPP renamed Lao People's Revolutionary 
Party (LPRP); RLG and Pathet Lao begin negotiations 
for cease-fire in 1972, resulting in Vientiane Agree- 
ment signed in February 1973; cease-fire proclaimed, 
bombing by United States ends; protocol forming third 
coalition government signed September 1973; govern- 
ment takes office by royal decree April 1974 as Provi- 
sional Government of National Union. 

Fighting resumes; Vang Pao flees to Thailand; senior 
rightist ministers and generals leave for Thailand; 
LPLA "liberates" provincial capitals; reeducation cen- 
ters or "seminar camps" opened; "Revolutionary 
Administration" takes power in Vientiane; elections 
held for local people's councils. 

Provisional Government of National Union dissolved; 
King Savang Vatthana abdicates; Lao People's Demo- 
cratic Republic (LPDR) proclaimed; Souphanouvong 
becomes first president (in power until 1991); Kaysone 
Phomvihan, first prime minister. 

LPRP Central Committee passes Third Resolution, 
guidelines for establishing the socialist revolution. 

Twenty-Five -Year Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation signed. 

Lao Front for National Construction established; 
replaces LPF 

Interim three-year economic development plan begins. 

First Five-Year plan begins. 

Third LPRP Congress held. 

Constitution drafting committee named. 

First national population census taken. 

Second Five-Year Plan begins. 

Fourth LPRP Congress held; Kaysone Phomvihan gen- 
eral secretary LPRP; New Economic Mechanism for- 
malizes reforms. 

First elections since 1975 held; at district level in June, 
provincial level in November. 

National elections held in March; delegates elected to 
first Supreme People's Assembly; opening session held 
May-June; last Vietnamese troops reportedly leave 
Laos. 

LPRP approves draft constitution for discussion. 

Fifth LPRP Congress held, Secretariat abolished; Kay- 
sone Phomvihan chairman, LPRP; Souphanouvong 
retires. 



XV111 



Table A. Chronology of Important Events 



Period Description 

August 1991 New constitution endorsed by Supreme People's Assem- 

bly and adopted; Kaysone Phomvihan becomes presi- 
dent of LPDR; Khamtai Siphandon, prime minister. 

1992 Kaysone dies in November; replaced as president by Nou- 

hak Phomsavan; Khamtai becomes chairman, LPRP, 
and prime minister, LPDR; elections to National 
Assembly (renamed Supreme People's Assembly) held 
in December. 

1993 * Nouhak and Khamtai reelected as president and prime 

minister in February; Council of Ministers reorga- 
nized. 

1994 Phoumi Vongvichit, former acting president and high- 

ranking party figure, dies in January 



XIX 



Country Profile 




COUNTRY 

Formal Name: Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR, or 
Laos). 

Note — The country Profile contains updated information as available. 

xxi 



Short Form: Laos. 

Term for Citizens: Laotian (s). 

Capital: Vientiane. 

Date of Independence: July 19, 1949, from France. 

Geography 

Location and Size: Landlocked nation of approximately 
236,800 square kilometers in center of Southeast Asian 
peninsula, bordered by China to the north, Burma to the 
northwest, Thailand to the west, Vietnam to the east, and 
Cambodia to the south. 

Land Boundaries: 5,083 kilometers total; Burma, 235 
kilometers; Cambodia, 541 kilometers; China, 423 kilometers; 
Thailand, 1,754 kilometers; Vietnam, 2,130 kilometers. Most of 
western border demarcated by Mekong River. 

Topography and Drainage: Largely mountainous, with 
elevations above 500 meters typically characterized by steep 
terrain and narrow river valleys. Only about 4 percent of total 
land area arable. 

Climate: Tropical monsoon; rainy season from May through 
October, cool dry season from November through February, 
and hot dry season March and April. 

Society 

Population: Estimates vary; approximately 4.7 million in July 
1994. Growth rate estimates range from 2.6 to 2.9 percent per 
year. More than 85 percent population rural, early 1990s. 
Approximately 9,000 Laotians — mostly Hmong — in refugee 
camps in Thailand according to United Nations Office of the 
High Commissioner for Refugees, January 1995; approximately 
1,500 refugees in southern China, late 1994. 

Ethnic Groups: Officially multiethnic nation with more than 
forty ethnic groups, classified into three general families: Lao 
Sung (upland Lao), 10 percent of population in 1993; Lao 
Theung (midland Lao), 24 percent; and Lao Loum (lowland 
Lao), 66 percent. The term Laotian is used for the national 
population; Lao for the ethnic group. 

Language: Lao, official language; also French, English, various 



xxii 



highland ethnic languages. 

Religion: Provision for religious freedom in constitution; 
almost all Laotians Buddhist. Theravada Buddhism 
predominant among Lao Loum and some Lao Theung; 
animist beliefs widespread. 

Education and Literacy: Universal, compulsory education after 
establishment of LPDR in 1975 but limited resources. 
Enrollments: estimated 603,000 primary school students, 
almost 130,000 secondary school students — including lower- 
and upper-secondary school — in 1992-93. Universal primary 
education goal for 2000. Nine-month school year includes five 
years primary school, three years lower-secondary school, and 
three years upper-secondary school. Those able to read and 
write estimated by United Nations at 84 percent (92 percent of 
men and 76 percent of women) ages fifteen to forty-five as of 
1985; other figures cite only 45 percent total literacy; 
government acknowledges need for improved literacy. 

Health: Health and health care poor. Chronic moderate 
vitamin and protein deficiencies common, especially among 
upland ethnic groups. Poor sanitation. Number of health care 
personnel increasing; concentrated in Vientiane area, where 
population per physician 1,400:1 versus national ratio of 
10,000:2.6 in 1989. Birth rate 43.23 per 1,000; death rate 14.74 
per 1,000 (1994 estimates). Life expectancy at birth 50.16 years 
male, 53.28 years female (1994 estimates). 

Economy 

General Character: Predominantly rural and agricultural; 
market-oriented economic liberalization measures beginning 
in 1986 stimulated economic growth. Policy reforms continue, 
including decentralizing and expanding private-sector 
economy; reversing agricultural collectivization policy and 
ending cooperatives; introducing foreign investment code; and 
restructuring banking system. Agriculture accounts for almost 
56 percent gross domestic product (GDP) and approximately 
85-90 percent of workforce (1993 estimate). Unemployment 
21 percent (1989 estimate). 

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): Estimates vary. US$989 
million, US$295 per capita income (1993 estimate); from 
US$295 to US$335 per capita (1994 estimate); real growth rate 
from 4.5 percent to 5.9 percent. Composition of GDP: 



xxiii 



agriculture and forestry, approximately 56 percent; industry 
including construction, approximately 17 percent; services, 
approximately 25 percent; and import duties, 2 percent (1993 
estimate) . GDP growth targeted at 7 percent for fiscal year (FY) 
1993-94. US$4.1 billion purchasing power equivalent (1993 
estimate). 

Industry: Almost no industrial production outside Vientiane 
area. 

Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing: Rice main crop; corn, 
tobacco, coffee also grown. 

Resources: Tin and gypsum most important mineral resources 
although exploitation on a small scale; electrical energy from 
hydroelectric power; electricity exported to Thailand. 

Foreign Trade: Total exports US$133 million — free on board 
(f.o.b.) (1993 estimate); primarily to France, Germany, Japan, 
Russia, Thailand, Vietnam, and United States. Principal 
exports — timber and wood products, US$42 million; textiles 
and garments, US$27 million; assembled motorcycles and 
other items, US$20 million; electricity, US$16 million (1993 
estimate). Total imports US$266 million — cost, insurance, and 
freight (c.i.f) (1992 estimate); primarily from China, France, 
Italy, Japan, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam; increased by 
approximately 20.5 percent in 1993. Principal imports — 
petroleum, food, vehicles, machinery, consumer goods. 
US$353.2 million total (1993 estimate). 

Balance of Payments: Record trade deficit of estimated US$150 
million in 1993. Foreign debt US$1.1 billion (1992 estimate). 

Foreign Aid: Approximately US$167 million in 1992. Almost 
totally dependent on foreign assistance for development and 
financing deficit on current account balance. Major foreign aid 
partners formerly communist countries, particularly Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) members until 
1990; since then, Australia, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and multilateral agencies, primarily the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank. 

Currency and Exchange Rate: Kip (K). In 1992 exchange rate 
averaged US$1 = K705; in June 1994, estimated average US$1 
=K721. 



xxiv 



Fiscal Year: October 1 to September 30. 

Transportation And Telecommunications 

Roads, Railroads, and Ports: Landlocked; no ports, but some 
inland waterways, primarily on Mekong River and its 
tributaries. Poorly developed road system although greater 
infrastructure development, particularly as result of foreign 
aid; few reliable transportation routes because of mountainous 
topography and lack of development. No railroad system 
although memorandum signed with Thailand in November 
1994 to conduct six-month survey on possibility of construction 
of railroad from middle of Friendship Bridge connecting Laos 
and Thailand to a station in Laos. 

Civil Aviation: Lao Aviation, state airline. Wattai Airport, 
Vientiane, planned for upgrade to international standard. 
Louangprabang Airport targeted for refurbishment and 
expansion beginning May 1994. Lao People's Army building 
new airport in Oudomxai. Main international routes to 
Bangkok, Guangzhou, Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Kunming, 
and Phnom Penh. Limited internal air service includes flights 
to Louangphrabang, Pakxe, Savannakhet, Vientiane, and 
Xiangkhoang. 

Telecommunications: Limited domestic and international 
telecommunications links. Four government-owned television 
channels (1994); ten medium-wave AM radio stations, seven 
short-wave AM radio stations, and one FM radio station (1994). 
One ground satellite station linked to Intersputnik system 
(1994); all other international telecommunications go by 
antiquated high-frequency radio to Hong Kong and short-wave 
link to Bangkok (1987). Approximately 8,000 telephones, 
largely limited to government users in capital (1986). 

Government And Politics 

Government: Lao People's Democratic Republic proclaimed 
December 2, 1975, abolishing monarchy of Royal Lao 
Government. New constitution unanimously endorsed by 
unicameral eighty-five-member Supreme People's Assembly, 
August 14, 1991; renamed National Assembly (1992); exercises 
power according to principle of democratic centralism. 
National Assembly elected December 1992; inaugural session, 



xxv 



February 1993. As legislative organ, oversees judiciary and 
activities of administration. President head of state, elected by 
National Assembly for five-year term; also commander in chief 
of armed forces. Council of Ministers highest executive organ; 
chairman is prime minister; vice chairmen oversee work of 
ministers. Real power exercised by members of the ruling 
party, Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP), particularly 
Political Bureau (Politburo) and Central Committee. 

Politics: LPRP only legal party. Party conference held late 
November 1993 to include representatives of provincial party 
units, Central Committee members, secretaries of party 
committees in ministries, departments, factories, and schools. 
Speeches on neglect of party activities and quality of 
membership hint at concern with corruption and need to 
build party at grass-roots level. 

Judiciary: Comprises Supreme People's Court, provincial and 
municipal courts, people's district courts, and military courts. 

Administrative Divisions: Divided into sixteen provinces 
(khoueng): Attapu, Borikhan, Bokeo, Champasak, Houaphan, 
Khammouan, Louang Namtha, Louangphrabang, Oudomxai, 
Phongsali, Saravan, Savannakhet, Xaignabouri, Xekong, 
Xiangkhoang, and Vientiane; one municipality (ka?npheng 
nakhon) , Vientiane; two special zones, Xaisomboun in 
northeastern Vientiane Province (established June 1994), and 
Xianghon-Hongsa, formerly two districts in Xaignabouri 
Province (established mid-1992); districts (muang); and villages 
( ban) . 

Foreign Affairs: "Special relationship" — twenty-five-year mutual 
security treaty signed 1977 — with Vietnam continues, although 
intensity lessening. Relations with Thailand — primary 
economic partner, particularly in hydroelectricity — improved 
after period of distrust punctuated by border clashes. 
Increased intra-regional ties; observer status, Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), since 1992. United States 
granted Laos national interest waiver in April 1994 for 
counternarcotics cooperation; determined necessary for 
continued cooperation on issue of unaccounted-for United 
States military personnel. 

National Security 

Armed Forces: Total strength approximately 37,000 in 1994: 



xxvi 



33,000 Lao People's Army; 3,500 Lao People's Air Force; 500 
Lao People's Navy. Approximately 49,000 reach military age 
annually (1994 estimate). 

Internal Security Forces: Paramilitary self-defense force, or 
Irregular People's Army, acts as lightly armed local defense 
force organized at provincial level for territorial defense and at 
local levels. Most members retired military personnel; 
approximately 100,000 persons. Also acts as reserve for regular 
armed forces. Police force under jurisdiction of Ministry of 
Interior. 

Major Equipment and Military Expenditures: End of military 
support from Russia and Vietnam combined with lack of 
domestic funding inhibits needed modernization of aging 
equipment, much of it from former Soviet Union and Vietnam. 
Military expenditures — including public security budget — 
approximately US$104.9 million (1993 estimate). 
Degenerating capabilities because of poor state of equipment 
and personnel skills. 



xxvii 



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VIENTIANE/ i 



Vientiane. 



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% BOLIKHAMXAI »» 

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KHAMMOUAN 1 



THAILAND 



International boundary 

Province boundary 

® National capital 

• Province capital 

NOTE— Vientiane is both a province 
and a municipality. 

50 100 Kilometers 



Savannakhet 




\^ Thakhek 

Y '1 

\ SAVANNAKHET \ 



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Figure 1. Administrative Divisions of Laos, 1994 



xxviii 



Introduction 



A LANDLOCKED NATION in the center of the Southeast 
Asian peninsula, the country that is now the Lao People's Dem- 
ocratic Republic (LPDR, or Laos), is bordered by Cambodia, 
China, Burma, Thailand, and Vietnam (only Cambodia is 
smaller), neighbors which, to varying degrees, have influenced 
Laotian historical, cultural, and political development. Slightly 
smaller than the state of Oregon, Laos is largely mountainous 
and forested; only about 4 percent of its total land area is ara- 
ble. The tropical monsoon climate is a major determining fac- 
tor in agricultural productivity and transportation. 

Laos was inhabited five or more millennia ago by Austroasi- 
atic peoples. From the first century A.D., princely fiefdoms 
based on wet rice cultivation and associated with the pottery 
and bronze culture of Ban Chiang developed in the middle 
Mekong Valley. Various other kingdoms reflecting the cultures 
of Cham and Mon peoples existed in the region; the fiefdoms 
were subject to the influence of mandala (see Glossary) in the 
central Mekong region. Migrations in the seventh century con- 
tinued to expand both the various influences and the cultural 
mix of the region. By the eighth century, the Mon mandala 
were under Khmer domination. 

Beginning in the thirteenth century, Mongols exercised a 
decisive political influence in the middle Mekong Valley; dynas- 
tic conflicts associated with their intervention led to the found- 
ing of the Kingdom of Lan Xang (Kingdom of the Million 
Elephants). At that time, the beginnings of a multiethnic 
state — in the configuration of small confederative communi- 
ties — were evident. The recorded history of Laos began in the 
fourteenth century with Fa Ngum (r. 1354-73), the first king of 
Lan Xang. Under Fa Ngum, the territory of Lan Xang was 
extended; it remained in these approximate borders for 
another 300 years. 

The reign of King Souligna Vongsa (r. 1633-90) — a time 
when the kingdom was united and ruled by its own king — has 
been referred to as the golden age of Laos. With the death of 
Souligna Vongsa, however, succession struggles led to the divi- 
sion of Lan Xang. Conflicts with Burma, Siam, Vietnam, and 
the Khmer kingdom continued in the eighteenth century, cul- 
minating in Siamese domination. 



xxix 



Early in the nineteenth century, Siam held hegemony over 
much of the territory of contemporary Laos, which then con- 
sisted of the principalities of Louangphrabang, Vientiane, and 
Champasak. Siam faced contention from France — which had 
established a protectorate over Vietnam — and sought to 
extend its influence in Indochina. By the end of the nine- 
teenth century, France had supplanted Siam as the dominant 
power. Laos was integrated into the French colonial empire of 
Indochina as a group of directly ruled provinces, except for 
Louangphrabang, which was ruled as a protectorate. 

Laos remained under French administration from about 
1890 until World War II, when Japan occupied French 
Indochina. Japanese military authorities induced King 
Sisavong Vong of Louangphrabang to declare the indepen- 
dence of his kingdom from France in April 1945, prior to 
Japan's surrender in the war. In September 1945, an "indepen- 
dent" government under the Lao Issara (Free Laos — see Glos- 
sary) defied the king and declared the union of Vientiane and 
Champasak with Louangphrabang. The following year, French 
troops reoccupied the country, conferring limited autonomy 
on the unified Kingdom of Laos within the French Union. A 
constitution was promulgated in 1947, and elections were held 
for a National Assembly. The independence of Laos was for- 
mally recognized within the French Union in 1949; Laos 
remained a member of the union until 1953. 

The 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina provided for 
the cessation of hostilities in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam — 
the first Indochina War — the struggle for independence 
against French colonial forces, and the withdrawal of foreign 
forces. The Royal Lao Government (RLG — see Glossary) 
agreed to include the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation — see Glossary; 
Pathet Lao became the generally accepted term for the com- 
munist-led guerrilla movement) in the government coalition. 
Phongsali and Houaphan (Sam Neua) provinces were desig- 
nated areas of regroupment for Pathet Lao forces, "pending a 
political settlement." 

Negotiations between the RLG and the Pathet Lao contin- 
ued from 1955 to 1957. The Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic 
Front — LPF; superseded by the Lao Front for National Con- 
struction in 1979), established in 1956, served as a political 
front for the Pathet Lao and was secretly guided by the Lao 
People's Party, which was established in 1955 as part of the 
Indochinese Communist Party. In 1972 the Lao People's Party 



xxx 



changed its name to the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 
(LPRP). Since 1975 it has been the ruling party. 

A coalition government, including some Pathet Lao person- 
alities, was formed by Prince Souvanna Phouma in 1957. It col- 
lapsed the following year, and rightist politicians took over. 
United States aid increased greatly. The communist insurgency 
resumed in northern Laos in 1959. 

In 1960 Kong Le, a young Royalist paratroop captain, led a 
coup d'etat to install a Neutralist government under Souvanna 
Phouma — neither rightist nor Pathet Lao — which would end 
the fratricidal fighting. But within a year, rightist forces under 
General Phoumi Nosavan drove Souvanna Phouma's govern- 
ment from Vientiane. The Neutralists then naively allied them- 
selves with the Pathet Lao and received airlift support from the 
Soviet Union. North Vietnamese troops intervened in Laos in 
regular units for the first time, inflicting heavy losses on the 
rightists receiving military and economic aid from the United 
States. 

A Second Geneva Conference on Laos was held in 1961-62. 
Agreements provided for the independence and neutrality of 
Laos — something realized only on paper. A second coalition 
government formed in July 1962 proved to be equally short- 
lived. The civil war quickly resumed and continued into the 
1970s, with each side — backed either by the United States or 
Vietnam (supported by the Soviet Union) — trading accusations 
of violating the agreements. Souvanna Phouma, prime minister 
in the first coalition government in 1957, again following Kong 
Le's coup in 1960, and again in July 1962 following that year's 
Geneva agreements, became prime minister of a third coalition 
government, or Provisional Government of National Union, 
with the participation of the LPF in 1974. (He resigned upon 
the establishment of the LPDR in 1975.) 

The collapse of South Vietnam and Cambodia in mid-1975 
played into the hands of the LPF and hastened the decline of 
the third coalition government. The LPRP, the mastermind 
behind the Lao Patriotic Front, dismissed the Provisional Gov- 
ernment of National Union and persuaded King Savang Vat- 
thana to abdicate. 

The Lao People's Democratic Republic was proclaimed on 
December 2, 1975, ending the era of a conservative monarchy 
dominated by a few powerful families. Souphanouvong became 
the first president of the LPDR. A half-brother of Souvanna 
Phouma, cousin of Savang Vatthana, one of the original 



xxxi 



founders of the Neo Lao Hak Xat, and the titular head of the 
LPF, Souphanouvong was known as the "red prince" because of 
his royal lineage and communist associations. The LPDR has 
been a single-party communist government since its proclama- 
tion. 

Ethnically diverse, Laos has more than forty ethnic groups. 
Lao is the distinction for some of the ethnic groups; Laotian is 
the term used to refer to all people of Laos, or the national 
population. The Lao, descendants of the Tai peoples who 
began migrating from China in the first millennium A.D., con- 
stitute approximately half the people of Laos. Although gov- 
ernment rhetoric celebrates the multiethnic nature of the 
nation and asserts that it wishes to reduce the favoritism histor- 
ically extended toward the "lowland" Lao Loum (see Glossary) 
and the discrimination against the "midland" Lao Theung (see 
Glossary) and "upland" Lao Sung (see Glossary), the ethnic 
minorities are underrepresented in the LPRP Central Commit- 
tee, the National Assembly, and in government offices. (Some 
of the ethnic minorities have populations of only a few hun- 
dred persons.) 

Although the different ethnic groups have different residen- 
tial patterns, agricultural practices, and religious beliefs, for all 
groups the village community has a kinship nexus, which may 
also differ in form. The mountainous topography, which has 
inhibited roadbuilding and limited exchanges among villages 
and ethnic groups, has contributed to maintaining distinctions 
among ethnic groups. 

Buddhism was the state religion of the Kingdom of Laos; the 
present constitution formally proclaims religious freedom. 
Although many communist nations do not look favorably upon 
the practice of religion — constitutional stipulations notwith- 
standing — this is not necessarily the case in Laos, where 
approximately 85 percent of citizens are Buddhist. Theravada 
Buddhism is predominant among the Lao Loum and some Lao 
Theung groups; animist beliefs are widespread among the 
entire population. The wat, the Buddhist temple or monastery 
complex, is a central fixture of village life, and the site of major 
religious festivals, which occur several times a year. Since the 
LPDR's establishment in 1975, the government has attempted 
to manipulate Buddhism to support its political goals, although 
without provoking a schism in the sangha, or clergy. 

The population as of mid-1994 was estimated at approxi- 
mately 4.7 million people. The population growth rate is rela- 



xxxii 



tively high — estimated at approximately 2.9 percent per year. 
But, child and infant mortality rates are also high, and life 
expectancy averages less than fifty-two years. Laos has a rela- 
tively low population density; more than 85 percent of the pop- 
ulation is rural, living in small villages of typically fewer than 
1,000 people. Rural life is tied to the changing agricultural sea- 
sons. Of the "urban" areas, most people live in the Mekong 
River valley towns and those of its tributaries. Vientiane, the 
capital and largest city, is also the center of a very limited indus- 
trial sector. The reach of recent economic reforms — and the 
change and opportunity they offer — has not extended much 
beyond the Vientiane plain. 

Education and social services are rudimentary, although 
some improvements have been made. The LPDR has made a 
commitment to five years of universal primary education, but 
limited financial resources and a lack of trained teachers and 
teaching materials have restricted educational opportunities. 
Enrollments have increased, however. Western health care is 
largely confined to the more "urban" areas, dictated in part by 
the difficulties of transportation. Similarly, improvements in 
health care are constrained by finances and the limited num- 
bers of trained health care workers. 

Presenting a clear quantitative economic profile of Laos is 
complicated by the lack of recent (or other) statistics, as well as 
by reliability, as there are internal contradictions in many statis- 
tics. Nonetheless, Laos is clearly one of the poorest countries in 
the world, with per capita GNP estimates ranging from US$295 
to US$350 per annum. A rural, subsistence, agricultural econ- 
omy heavily influenced by weather — that is, conditions of 
drought or flood — Laos still has not met self-sufficiency in food 
production. LPDR officials frequently note that Laos remains 
"underdeveloped," has a largely unskilled work force, and 
needs infrastructure development. Such advancements are rec- 
ognized as particularly important in such fields as agro-forestry 
and hydropower, two areas with potentially high foreign 
exchange earnings. Imports far outpace exports. Even primary 
exports — hydroelectricity, timber, and coffee — are limited. The 
potential for the exportation of mineral resources, particularly 
tin and gypsum, has not yet been realized. 

Centralized economic measures of a command economy 
were instituted when the LPDR was proclaimed in 1975. Begin- 
ning with the New Economic Mechanism in 1986, however, and 
with various other reform measures since then, Laos has 



xxxiii 



opened up to market forces. The government has also encour- 
aged both foreign and domestic investment — especially for the 
private sector. Reforms have abolished agricultural coopera- 
tives, privatized most state enterprises while encouraging pri- 
vate-sector initiatives, and revised the taxation system. 
Although still dominated by the agricultural sector, the econ- 
omy has been stimulated and the availability of goods has 
increased. However, Laos remains dependent on continued 
foreign aid and concessional loans. 

As it came to power in late 1975 on the coattails of commu- 
nist victories in Vietnam and Cambodia, the LPDR naturally 
turned to the communist bloc for economic support and 
received aid from both the Soviet bloc countries and China. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Soviet bloc aid 
has halted and Vietnamese patronage has diminished, necessi- 
tating a search for other investors and aid donors. 

The situation with regard to economic assistance from Rus- 
sia has begun to change. During 1994 Laos and Russia signed 
two cooperation agreements. In March the Lao National Coun- 
cil of Trade and Industry and the Russian Council of Trade and 
Industry signed documents on scientific and technical cooper- 
ation. Laos will receive technical assistance from Russia and 
funds from third countries, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary), and interested businessmen for programs 
to protect the environment, conserve and restore forests, raise 
harvest efficiency, eradicate crop pests, and increase mining 
and exploration efforts. In August, Laos signed a trade proto- 
col with Russia for economic and trade cooperation. According 
to its terms, Laos will buy construction materials, electric appli- 
ances, spare parts for aircraft, and other items; Russia will pur- 
chase tin, coffee, tropical wood products, and clothing from 
Laos. 

In the early 1990s, Laos received increased aid from Japan 
and from Western nations — including Australia, France, and 
Sweden — as well as increased support from international and 
regional organizations. Foreign assistance in 1993-94 was esti- 
mated at US$211.7 million, of which US$141.4 million was 
gratis aid and US$70.3 million was in the form of loans bearing 
low interest rates. 

Assistance from the World Bank (see Glossary), the IMF, and 
the Asian Development Bank has both guided and been predi- 
cated upon reform measures. Their programs, however, have 
tended to be concentrated in Vientiane and the Mekong Valley 



xxxiv 



centers, with improvements in infrastructure thus benefitting 
only the urban areas; rural areas have lagged behind on the 
developmental scale. 

The LPDR's Socio-economic Development Plan 1993-2000 
emphasizes the production of foodstuffs, commercial products, 
rural development, human resources development, and the 
exploitation of natural resources in conjunction with con- 
certed efforts to protect the environment. It also calls for an 
expansion of economic relations and cooperation with the out- 
side world. The importance of infrastructure development is 
also recognized. Roadbuilding is seen as strategically important 
for socioeconomic development — especially with regard to 
programs for public health and education — particularly for 
rural areas and areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. The Pub- 
lic Investment Programme (PIP), a part of the plan, is to be 
supported by donors for as much as US$1.4 billion. PIP targets 
include irrigating unused land, planting forests, and moving 
away from subsistence production and slash-and-burn agricul- 
ture toward sedentary market agriculture and a more diversi- 
fied economy. 

As elsewhere, foreign and economic relations are linked; for 
Laos, this is particularly true with regard to Thailand, its pri- 
mary trading and investment partner. Laos and Thailand must 
constantly negotiate a variety of political and economic issues, 
including the status of Lao refugees and refugee camps in 
Thailand as well as LPDR claims that Thailand is sheltering Lao 
insurgents. Laos has pressed for additional border crossing 
points and clearer border demarcation; free and fair competi- 
tion in providing transport services for cross-border trade; 
cooperation in various economic and technical projects and 
joint trade and investment enterprises; and cooperation 
between banks and customs services. Thailand is the primary 
purchaser of timber and hydroelectricity from the LPDR; the 
export of hydroelectric power is paradoxical given the low level 
of electrification in Laotian villages. 

Notwithstanding several border incidents in the late 1980s, 
relations between Laos and Thailand have improved over the 
past decade. More recently, the April 1994 opening of the 
Friendship Bridge linking the two countries has provided for 
greater commercial potential — increased trade, tourism, and 
transit. And, in July 1994, a joint venture agreement was signed 
to allow a Thai company to build and develop a special eco- 
nomic zone — with nine projects — in Vientiane Municipality. 



xxxv 



The two countries have also agreed in principle to establish 
consular missions outside each others' capitals. Insurgent raids 
in rural areas, primarily from the Hmong, but also from 
smaller Lao resistance groups based in Thailand, complicate 
Lao-Thai relations and are an annoyance, but not a threat, to 
the stability of Laos. 

The improved investment climate in Laos has also raised the 
possibility of building a rail line; currently there is none. In 
November 1994, Thailand was granted permission to conduct a 
six-month feasibility study on a railway line between Vientiane 
and Nong Khai, Thailand, via the Friendship Bridge. Forty-two 
percent of the cost of the survey will be paid by the British gov- 
ernment, the remainder by a Thai company. If it is found eco- 
nomically feasible to develop a railway, and the Thai company 
decides to invest in its construction, the National Railway Com- 
pany, Limited, of Laos will be established. The LPDR will hold 
25 percent of the railroad company, the Thai company the 
remaining 75 percent. 

As noted, the LPDR was established following communist 
party victories in Vietnam and Cambodia. Similarities with 
other one-party communist states exist. The party dominates 
the government and still operates under relative secrecy. High- 
ranking party members occupy high-level posts in the govern- 
ment, military, and mass organizations, and there is a distinct 
overlap of military personnel. In fact, the ministers of interior, 
agriculture and forestry, and national defense are army gener- 
als, as is the prime minister. At the third congress of the Lao 
People's Revolutionary Youth Union held in May 1994, 214 of 
247 delegates were LPRP members. 

Even though the party's role and powers are scarcely men- 
tioned in the constitution, the LPRP determines national poli- 
cies through its nine-member Political Bureau (Politburo) and 
fifty-two-member Central Committee. A constitution was not 
adopted until 1991 — sixteen years after the LPDR's founding. 
The executive branch retains the authority to issue binding 
decrees, but the party retains the power to make critical deci- 
sions. 

The legislative branch is by constitutional provision the high- 
est organ of state. Elections are held by secret ballot. The first 
elections to the Supreme People's Assembly were held in 
March 1989, almost fourteen years after the LPDR's proclama- 
tion; the opening session was in May-June. Elections to the 
National Assembly (the renamed Supreme People's Assembly) 



xxxvi 



for five-year terms were held in December 1992; the first ses- 
sion did not convene until February 1993. Although more than 
150 candidates vied for eighty-five seats in the assembly, most 
candidates belong to the LPRP — as it is the only legal party — 
and most are approved by the LPRP prior to the elections. 
Although the National Assembly seemed to be playing a larger 
role in the passage of legislation in the early 1990s, in reality 
the assembly merely "discusses and endorses" all laws in con- 
trolled policy debates during the twice-yearly plenary sessions. 

The LPRP grew from approximately 25,000 members at its 
inception in 1975 to approximately 60,000 members at the 
time of the Fifth Party Congress in March 1991. (By contrast, in 
1993 there were more than 70,000 Lao Federation of Trade 
Union members.) During the Fifth Party Congress, the LPRP 
removed several elder statesmen from the Politburo and 
elected some slightly younger cadres to a new Central Commit- 
tee. The party is not immune to internal criticism and has 
acknowledged official corruption (and nepotism) as a serious 
and continuing problem. 

Formal avenues of information and communication have 
been limited by lack of funds since French colonial rule and 
are now tightly controlled. Dissemination of information is spo- 
radic and further restricted by controls on the distribution of 
printing materials. Radio and television services are also 
monopolized by the party. Broadcasts from Thailand, however, 
have a large audience in Laos. 

Broad security measures limit freedoms as under other com- 
munist regimes; freedoms may be guaranteed in the constitu- 
tion, but in reality they are quite restricted. After the 
communist victory in 1975, many members of the previous 
Royal Lao Government and military who had remained in the 
country instead of fleeing were placed in reeducation centers 
or "seminar camps." "Social deviants" as well as political oppo- 
nents were held in these centers; these camps have been closed 
and most "political prisoners" have since been released. How- 
ever, Amnesty International continues to press for the release 
of persons still in detention. 

After the LPRP seized power, and during its consolidation of 
the government, some 350,000 persons — of whom many were 
Hmong belonging to Vang Pao's United States-funded irregu- 
lars — fled the country. Many persons remained in refugee 
camps in Thailand; some departed from there to third coun- 



xxxvii 



tries; still others resided in southern China. The refugee situa- 
tion has recently changed significantly. 

Although there are variations in the numbers of refugees 
repatriated and/or remaining in the camps according to the 
sources reporting, it can be said that a significantly larger num- 
ber of refugees have been repatriated or resettled in a third 
country compared with those who remain in Thailand. The 
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR— see Glossary) began a voluntary repatriation pro- 
gram in 1980. Ten years later, fewer than 6,000 refugees had 
been repatriated under UNHCR supervision. Approximately 
15,000 refugees had returned to Laos independently, and the 
vast majority — approximately 300,000 — had resettled abroad. 
In 1989 there were an estimated 90,000 Lao refugees in Thai- 
land; as of June 1991, an estimated 60,000 refugees remained. 
This number was further reduced by half at the end of 1993. As 
of January 1995, UNHCR estimates were that only 9,000 refu- 
gees, mainly Hmong, remained in Thai camps. Vientiane esti- 
mated that the more than 8,000 refugees remaining in 
Thailand at the end of 1994 would be repatriated by the end of 
1995. Laos, Thailand, and the UNHCR have agreed to resettle 
or repatriate all remaining Lao refugees by the end of 1995. 

The foreign relations of Laos have in large part been deter- 
mined by the country's physical location and its desire to main- 
tain national security. During the communist revolutionary 
struggle in Indochina, Laos had close ties with Vietnam — a 
"special relationship" — which was formalized by a twenty-five- 
vear treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in 1977. More 
recently, Laos has sought to improve relations with China, an 
ally during the Indochina Wars, but with whom relations dete- 
riorated following the 1979 China-Vietnam conflict. Trade 
between the two countries has increased, and Laos has received 
some economic and military aid. In May 1994, a high-level 
LPDR military delegation paid an official \isit to China to pro- 
mote relations of friendship and "all-around solidarity between 
the two armies." 

The end of the Cold War, concomitant with the limited abil- 
ity of the former Soviet bloc and Vietnam to offer economic 
assistance, has influenced the LPDR to become more flexible 
in its foreign policy in the 1990s. Since 1992 Laos has held 
observer status with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN — see Glossary); this has been viewed as a likely precur- 
sor to membership in that organization. And, despite various 



xxxviii 



cooperation projects with the Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (North Korea) during the 1980s, in January 1994 Laos 
contracted with a Republic of Korea (South Korea) construc- 
tion company to build a hydropower dam on the Ho River in 
Champasak Province. Laos resumed diplomatic relations with 
Israel in December 1993. The LPDR minister of foreign affairs 
visited Israel in August 1994; and Israel has agreed to provide 
training grants to LPDR officials. In September 1994, Laos 
established diplomatic relations with South Africa and Lithua- 
nia. 

Diplomatic relations between the United States and Laos 
were maintained upon the proclamation of the LPDR in 1975, 
and the two countries have seen a slow, but steady, improve- 
ment in relations since 1982. Two key — and intertwining — 
components have dominated the United States relationship 
with Laos: accounting for those Americans classified as prison- 
ers of war (POW) or missing in action (MIA) at the end of the 
Indochina Wars, and controlling the growth of, and trafficking 
in, narcotics. Cooperation in one area begets cooperation in 
the other. 

As a measure of sincerity for improving relations, the United 
States has sought greater LPDR cooperation in providing infor- 
mation on the fate of POW/MIAs and in searching for their 
remains. As of September 1994, thirty-three joint missions of 
field searches and excavations of crash sites had been con- 
ducted. In August 1994, the two sides agreed to carry out six 
joint field activities in the future, and the United States was per- 
mitted to increase the number of personnel on its teams. In 
counternarcotics cooperation, Laos agreed to step up its efforts 
to combat the cultivation, production, and transshipment of 
opium, heroin, and marijuana. Crop substitution programs in 
conjunction with the United States and the United Nations 
Development Programme, as well as narcotics training pro- 
grams and improved law enforcement measures, have been 
instituted. In 1994, after four years of United States certifica- 
tion (with explanation) for counternarcotics cooperation, Laos 
was granted a national interest waiver in lieu of full certifica- 
tion because of poor counternarcotics performance. (Certifica- 
tion is dependent on counternarcotics cooperation either with 
the United States or with the LPDR taking steps on its own to 
achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives of the 
1988 United Nations Convention on Illicit Traffic in Narcotic 
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances). In 1995 Laos was again 



xxxix 



certified as cooperating fully. If the United States were to deny 
certification, continued efforts in counternarcotics coopera- 
tion and cooperation in POW/MIA accounting would be jeop- 
ardized. Counternarcotics efforts have made limited progress, 
constrained in part by limited training, management and 
administrative skills, and law enforcement, as well as by LPDR 
finances and higher priorities. A decline in opium production 
in the 1993-94 growing season was a result of adverse weather 
rather than decreased areas under cultivation. 

The LPDR is poorly equipped in the national security arena, 
and the need for modernization is evident. Constrained by its 
economic limitations and foreign assistance geared toward eco- 
nomic (primarily infrastructure) improvements, the Lao Peo- 
ple's Army has been unable either to modernize its outdated 
equipment or to elevate the level of training. 

The primary mission of the armed forces has been to main- 
tain national defense and public security, political stability, and 
social order. However, national defense objectives and the secu- 
rity environment have changed. The armed forces are no 
longer fighting a war of national liberation, although their war- 
time exploits are still extolled in the official media. Domestic 
opposition is contained by the police and a system of party con- 
trol. External opposition, in particular resistance elements 
based in Thailand, is limited. Each of these factors has contrib- 
uted to a reduction in the size of the armed forces in the 1990s. 
In 1991 there were approximately 55,000 persons in the armed 
forces; by 1994 armed forces personnel reportedly totaled 
37,000. 

The armed forces now have the additional assignment of 
contributing to socioeconomic and rural development, with 
the aim of achieving greater self-sufficiency. Thus, the military 
is ordered to check and boost crop cultivation and monitor 
livestock transport; grow vegetables for daily meals; and create 
favorable conditions for promoting poultry and fish breeding. 
In 1989 the Corporation for Agro-Forestry Development and 
Service was established. Connected to the Ministry of National 
Defense, the corporation is responsible for improving and 
building the agricultural base and engaging in public security 
activities in three southern districts of Xaignabouri Province. 
In the five years since its establishment, the corporation has 
repaired and paved roads and built irrigation systems. In 
another venue, the Lao People's Army began a joint venture in 
1994 with the Chinese People's Liberation Army to produce 



xl 



pharmaceuticals for the Lao People's Army as well as for 
domestic and foreign markets. 

The military relationship with Vietnam has also evolved. In 
July 1994, it was noted that the Political and Military Institute 
of the People's Army of Vietnam had accepted more than 400 
students from the LPDR since 1978. Nonetheless, Laos cannot 
rely on Vietnam for military assistance and equipment to the 
extent it had previously. 

Since its inception in December 1975, the LPDR has been 
notable for its remarkable stability and continuity. For almost 
twenty years, the same few men have been in power. The lead- 
ership core, an elite group of founding members of the LPRP, 
hold key positions in the party, government, and military 
organs. The majority of the members of the Politburo and the 
Central Committee are people who participated in the revolu- 
tionary struggle. 

In the early 1990s, the deaths of high-ranking leaders — a nat- 
ural consequence of an aging leadership — have meant a 
reshuffling of positions. Of note is the fact that no power strug- 
gles were in evidence. Rather, leaders simply moved up in rank. 
The death in November 1992 of Kaysone Phomvihan, who had 
been active since the 1940s in the resistance forces, then pro- 
claimed the LPDR's first prime minister, and finally elected 
president in 1991, left no gap in the leadership. Nouhak Phom- 
savan was elected to the largely ceremonial position of presi- 
dent. A close comrade of Kaysone, and similarly a veteran of 
the revolution, Nouhak was a former minister of finance and a 
deputy prime minister. Nouhak will be eighty-one years old in 
April 1995. Khamtai Siphandon, another leader in the early 
resistance efforts, and a former minister of national defense 
(1975-91) and deputy prime minister, moved up to the prime 
minister's post in 1991. Supposedly ten years younger than 
Nouhak, Khamtai's "youth" was seen by some as the reason for 
his appointment to the more active role of prime minister. 

Other elder statesmen also died in the early 1990s. Former 
Politburo member Phoumi Vongvichit, acting president of the 
LPDR from the retirement of Souphanouvong in 1986 — until 
his own retirement in 1991 — died in January 1994. Among 
other Politburo members who have died are deputy prime min- 
ister Phoun Sipraseut, who was also chief of the Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee, LPRP Central Committee, and "official in 
charge of guiding foreign affairs" (and former minister of for- 
eign affairs), who died in December 1994; Somlat Chanthamat, 



xli 



who died in 1993; Sisomphon Lovansai, who died in 1993; and 
Sali Vongkhamsao, who died in 1991. Some of these leaders 
had already retired and held largely ceremonial posts at the 
time of their death. 

Coming full circle, with a royalist heritage but communist 
sympathies, was Prince Souphanouvong. President from the 
founding of the LPDR until he withdrew for health reasons in 
1986, his position was not officially relinquished until March 
1991 at the Fifth Party Congress, when he was also removed 
from the Politburo. His death in January 1995 ended the last 
direct link between the monarchy established in the mid-four- 
teenth century by Fa Ngum and the single-party communist 
regime, that is the LPDR. (Two of Souphanouvong's sons, how- 
ever, are active in the government, one in the Ministry of 
Finance, the other in the Social Science Commission.) 

Almost twenty years after the LPDR's founding, Laos is, once 
again, as during many prior kingdoms, dominated by a small 
and powerful elite marked by nepotism. The country will have 
to deal with several significant issues in the years ahead even as 
the remaining aging leaders continued to govern in early 1995 
as a cohesive group without active opposition. These issues 
include: How effectively will the LPDR use the assistance prof- 
fered by various international banks, friendly aid donors, and 
foreign investors? How will Laos deal with its considerable eco- 
nomic potential but also considerable educational deficits? 
When will students begin to seek greater opportunities for 
advancement outside the single-party system? Will the party 
remain in full control and will there be a regularized political 
succession? These are but some of the issues regarding the 
future direction of Laos as the nation responds to the chal- 
lenges presented by economic reform and progress. 

March 1, 1995 

* * * 

Since the Introduction was written, the work of the party and 
government have continued as usual. The sixth ordinary ses- 
sion of the National Assembly closed and the tenth plenary ses- 
sion of the LPRP's Fifth Central Committee was held. The 
National Assembly endorsed a ministerial reshuffle involving 
lateral personnel changes. Meetings between the foreign minis- 
ters of Laos and Thailand discussed the need to resolve the still 
unsettled 1987 border dispute. 



xlii 



Of economic significance, was the April 5 signing of the 
Agreement on Cooperation for the Sustainable Development 
of the Mekong River Basin. The agreement, supported by the 
United Nations Development Programme, replaces a 1957 pact 
among Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam, and took two 
years to negotiate. The agreement establishes the Mekong 
River Commission as an institutional body and legal framework 
with which to promote basin-wide studies and joint develop- 
ment projects in the lower Mekong River basin; China and 
Burma are expected to join the commission at some point. Five 
areas of cooperation have been delineated: hydropower gener- 
ation, irrigation, fisheries, navigation, and tourism. Plans for a 
series of dams on the Mekong, however, have been contested 
by various environmental groups although the agreement pur- 
portedly takes environmental protection into account. 

April 26, 1995 

* * * 

On May 12, 1995, the United States removed Laos from its 
list of countries prohibited from receiving foreign assistance 
funds for reasons of national interest, making development aid 
an option. 

June 22, 1995 Andrea Matles Savada 



xliii 



Chapter 1. Historical Setting 



Detail from a door of Wat Ba Khe in Louangphrabang shows courtier 
blowing conch shell 



HISTORICAL RESEARCH SHOWS that the rudimentary 
structures of a multiethnic state existed before the founding of 
the Kingdom of Lan Xang in the thirteenth century. These pre- 
thirteenth-century structures consisted of small confederative 
communities in river valleys and among the mountain peoples, 
who found security away from the well-traveled rivers and over- 
land tracks where the institutions and customs of the Laotian 
people were gradually forged in contact with other peoples of 
the region. During these centuries, the stirring of migrations as 
well as religious conflict and syncretism went on more or less 
continuously. Laos's short-lived vassalage to foreign empires 
such as the Cham, Khmer, and Sukhothai did nothing to dis- 
courage this process of cultural identification and, in fact, 
favored its shaping. 

In the thirteenth century — an historically important water- 
shed — the rulers of Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang) consti- 
tuted a large indigenous kingdom with a hierarchical 
administration. Even then, migratory and religious crosscur- 
rents never really ceased. The durability of the kingdom itself is 
attested to by the fact that it lasted within its original borders 
for almost four centuries. Today, the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic (LPDR, or Laos) covers only a small portion of the 
territory of that former kingdom. 

Internecine power struggles caused the splitting up of Lan 
Xang after 1690, and the Lao and the mountain peoples of the 
middle Mekong Valley came perilously close to absorption by 
powerful neighboring rivals, namely Vietnam and Siam 
(present-day Thailand); China never posed a territorial threat. 
Only the arrival of the French in the second half of the nine- 
teenth century prevented Laos's political disintegration. In a 
"conquest of the hearts" (in the words of the explorer and colo- 
nist Auguste Pavie) — a singular event in the annals of colonial- 
ism in that it did not entail the loss of a single Lao life — France 
ensured by its actions in 1893 that Laos's separate identity 
would be preserved into modern times. During the colonial 
interlude, a few French officials administered what their early 
cartographers labeled, for want of a better name, "le pays des 
Laos" (the land of the Lao, hence the name Laos), preserving 



3 



Laos: A Country Study 



intact local administrations and the royal house of Louang- 
phrabang. 

Laos's incorporation into French Indochina beginning in 
1893 resulted, however, in Vietnamese immigration, which was 
officially encouraged by the French to staff the middle levels of 
the civil services and militia. During the few months in 1945 
when France's power was momentarily eclipsed, the conse- 
quences of this Vietnamese presence nearly proved fatal for the 
fledgling Lao Issara (Free Laos — see Glossary) government. 
The issue of Vietnamese dominance over Indochina remained 
alive into the postindependence period with the armed rebel- 
lion of the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation — see Glossary), who pro- 
claimed themselves part of an Indochina-wide revolutionary 
movement. The Royal Lao Government (RLG — see Glossary) 
grappled with this problem for ten years but never quite suc- 
ceeded in integrating the Pathet Lao rebels peacefully into the 
national fabric. 

By the 1960s, outside powers had come to dominate events 
in Laos, further weakening the Vientiane government's 
attempts to maintain neutrality in the Cold War. For one thing, 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the 
most powerful entity left in Indochina by the 1954 Geneva 
armistice and the exit of France, cast a large shadow over the 
mountains to the west. Also, the United States, which had 
exerted strong pressure on France on behalf of the indepen- 
dence of Laos, became involved in a new war against what it 
regarded as the proxies of the Soviet Union and China. Even 
then, however, high-level United States officials seemed ambiv- 
alent about Laos's claim to national sovereignty, and Laos 
became the country where the so-called "secret war" was 
fought. 

In late 1975, months after the fall of Cambodia and the 
Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) to the communists, the 
Pathet Lao came to power in Laos, proclaiming that Laos's ter- 
ritorial integrity, as well as its independence, sovereignty, and 
solidarity with other new regimes of Indochina, would be 
defended (see fig. 1). In a demonstration of this determina- 
tion, Laos fought a border war with Thailand in 1988, and pro- 
tracted negotiations were necessary to demarcate the border 
between the two countries. Internallv, the regime proved ruth- 
less in stamping out political and armed opposition. Only since 
the introduction of the New Economic Mechanism in 1986 has 



4 



Historical Setting 



the government made some headway in the long and difficult 
process of bettering the lives of its citizens. 

Early History 

The original inhabitants of Laos were Austroasiatic peoples, 
who lived by hunting and gathering before the advent of agri- 
culture. Skilled at river navigation using canoes, Laotian trad- 
ers used routes through the mountains, especially rivers, from 
earliest times. The most important river route was the Mekong 
because its many tributaries allowed traders to penetrate deep 
into the hinterland, where they bought products such as carda- 
mom, gum benzoin, sticklac, and many foods. 

Power Centers in the Middle Mekong Valley 

A number of princely fiefdoms based on wet rice cultivation 
and associated with the pottery and bronze culture of Ban 
Chiang developed in the middle Mekong Valley from the first 
century A.D. These fiefdoms exercised power over their neigh- 
bors, in circumstances of generally sparse populations, through 
expanding and contracting spheres of influence best described 
by the term mandala (see Glossary). Commerce, marriage con- 
tracts, and warfare served to expand the mandala. 

Thus, a plurality of power centers occupied the middle 
Mekong Valley in early times. Sikhottabong was a mandala 
whose capital was located on the left bank of the Mekong at the 
mouth of the Xe Bangfai and then moved westward as a result 
of the expansion of Champa, an Indianized state on the coast 
of Vietnam founded in A.D. 192. Cham, descendants of 
Champa, were present at Champasak (Bassac) in the fifth cen- 
tury. The Mon kingdom of Candapuri, the earliest name of 
present-day Vientiane (Viangchan), was another mandala. The 
social structure of Sikhottabong and Candapuri appears to 
have been strongly hierarchical, with an aristocracy, a com- 
moner class, and a slave class. The fact that some kings came 
from the commoner class appears to indicate the presence of 
some sort of consensus in effecting royal succession. At its 
peak, another important regional power, Funan, had its man- 
dala incorporate parts of central Laos. The smaller, but also 
important, Mon kingdom of Dvaravati (through which Thera- 
vada Buddhism — see Glossary — reached Laos in the seventh 
and eighth centuries) was centered in the lower Menam Valley 
beginning in the fifth century (see Buddhism, ch. 2). 



5 



Laos: A Country Study 

In the seventh century, a northwesterly migration of Thais 
from their region of origin in northwestern Tonkin brought to 
the Ta-li region (in what is present-day Yunnan, China) a suc- 
cessor state to the Ai Lao kingdom. This new kingdom, Nan- 
chao, expanded its power by controlling major trading routes, 
notably the southern Silk Road. Culturally, this polyethnic, 
hierarchical, and militarized state was to have a great influence 
on later societies in Indochina, transmitting the Tantric Bud- 
dhism of Bengal to Laos, Thailand, the Shan state, and possibly 
Cambodia, as well as the political ideology of the maharaja 
(protector of Buddhism). Nan-chao was organized administra- 
tively into ten prefectures called kien. This term seems to be the 
origin of place-names keng (for example, Kengtung), chiang 
(for example, Chiang Mai), and xiang (for example, Xiang- 
khoang). Moreover, the population and army of Nan-chao 
were organized in units of 100, 1,000, and 10,000, a form later 
found in Indochina. Also, the title chao (prince) appears to 
have been of Nan-chao origin. Another branch of this same 
migration began at the headwaters of the Nam Ou and fol- 
lowed it downstream to Louangphrabang, continuing on 
through Xaignabouri to Chiang Mai. 

As a result of the expansion and contraction of mandala, 
places of importance were known by more than one name. 
Muang Sua was the name of Louangphrabang following its 
conquest in A.D. 698 by a Thai prince, Khun Lo, who seized 
his opportunity when Nan-chao was engaged elsewhere. Khun 
Lo had been awarded the town by his father, Khun Borom, who 
is associated with the Lao legend of the creation of the world, 
which the Lao share with the Shan and other peoples of the 
region. Khun Lo established a dynasty whose fifteen rulers 
reigned over an independent Muang Sua for the better part of 
a century. 

In the second half of the eighth century, Nan-chao inter- 
vened frequently in the affairs of the principalities of the mid- 
dle Mekong Valley, resulting in the occupation of Muang Sua 
in 709. Nan-chao princes or administrators replaced the aris- 
tocracy of Thai overlords. Dates of the occupation are not 
known, but it probably ended well before the northward 
expansion of the Khmer Empire under Indravarman I (r. 877- 
89) and extended as far as the territories of Sipsong Panna (see 
Glossary) on the upper Mekong. 



6 



Historical Setting 



In the meantime, the Khmers founded an outpost at Xay 
Fong near Vientiane, and Champa expanded again in south- 
ern Laos, maintaining its presence on the banks of the Mekong 
until 1070. Canthaphanit, the local ruler of Xay Fong, moved 
north to Muang Sua and was accepted peacefully as ruler after 
the departure of the Nan-chao administrators. Canthaphanit 
and his son had long reigns, during which the town became 
known by the Thai name Xieng Dong Xieng Thong. The 
dynasty eventually became involved in the squabbles of a num- 
ber of principalities. Khun Cuang, a warlike ruler who may 
have been a Kammu (alternate spellings include Khamu and 
Khmu) tribesman, extended his territory as a result of the war- 
ring of these principalities and probably ruled from 1128 to 
1169. Under Khun Cuang, a single family ruled over a far-flung 
territory and reinstituted the Siamese administrative system of 
the seventh century. Muang Sua next became the Kingdom of 
Sri Sattanak, a name connected with the legend of the naga 
(mythical snake or water dragon) who was said to have dug the 
Mekong riverbed. At this time, Theravada Buddhism was sub- 
sumed by Mahayana Buddhism. 

Muang Sua experienced a brief period of Khmer suzerainty 
under Jayavar man VII from 1185 to 1191. By 1180 the Sipsong 
Panna had regained their independence from the Khmers, 
however, and in 1238 an internal uprising in the Khmer out- 
post of Sukhodaya expelled the Khmer overlords. 

Mongol Influence 

Recent historical research has shown that the Mongols, who 
destroyed Nan-chao in 1253 and made the area a province of 
their empire — naming it Yunnan — exercised a decisive politi- 
cal influence in the middle Mekong Valley for the better part 
of a century. In 1271 Panya Lang, founder of a new dynasty 
headed by rulers bearing the title panya, began his rule over a 
fully sovereign Muang Sua. In 1286 Panya Lang's son, Panya 
Khamphong, was involved in a coup d'etat that was probably 
instigated by the Mongols and resulted in the exile of his 
father. Upon his father's death in 1316, Panya Khamphong 
assumed the throne. 

Ramkhamhaeng, an early ruler of the new Thai dynasty in 
Sukhothai, made himself the agent of Mongol interests, and 
from 1282 to 1284 eliminated the vestiges of Khmer and Cham 
power in central Laos. Ramkhamhaeng obtained the allegiance 



7 



Laos: A Country Study 



of Muang Sua and the mountainous country to the northeast. 
Between 1286 and 1297, Panya Khamphong's lieutenants, act- 
ing for Ramkhamhaeng and the Mongols, pacified vast territo- 
ries. From 1297 to 1301, Lao troops under Mongol command 
invaded Dai Viet but were repulsed by the Vietnamese. Troops 
from Muang Sua conquered Muang Phuan in 1292-97. In 1308 
Panya Khamphong seized the ruler of Muang Phuan, and by 
1312 this principality was a vassal state of Muang Sua. 

Mongol overlordship was unpopular in Muang Sua. Internal 
conflicts among members of the new dynasty over Mongol 
intervention in their affairs resulted in continuing family 
upheavals. Panya Khamphong exiled his son Fa Phi Fa and 
most likely intended to leave the throne to his younger grand- 
son, Fa Ngieo. Fa Ngieo, involved in various coups and coup 
attempts, in 1330 sent his two sons to a Buddhist monastery 
outside the Mongol realm for safety. The brothers were kid- 
napped in 1335 and taken to Angkor, where they were 
entrusted to King Jayavarman Paramesvara, whose kingdom 
had acknowledged Mongol suzerainty since 1285. 

The Founding of Lan Xang 

It was as a result of these family conflicts that the Kingdom of 
Lan Xang — the name still carries associations of cultural kin- 
ship among the Lao — was established. The younger brother, Fa 
Ngum, married one of the king's daughters and in 1349 set out 
from Angkor at the head of a 10,000-member Khmer army. His 
conquest of the territories to the north of Angkor over the next 
six years reopened Mongol communications with that place, 
which had been cut off. Fa Ngum organized the conquered 
principalities into provinces {muang — see Glossary), and 
reclaimed Muang Sua from his father and elder brother. Fa 
Ngum was crowned king of Lan Xang at Vientiane, the site of 
one of his victories, in June 1354. Lan Xang extended from the 
border of China to Sambor below the Mekong rapids at Khong 
Island and from the Vietnamese border to the western escarp- 
ment of the Khorat Plateau. 

The first few years of Fa Ngum's rule from his capital Muang 
Sua were uneventful. The next six years (1362-68), however, 
were troubled by religious conflict between Fa Ngum's 
lamaistic Buddhism and the region's traditional Theravada 
Buddhism. He severely repressed popular agitation that had 
anti-Mongol overtones and had many pagodas torn down. In 



8 



Historical Setting 



1368 Fa Ngum's Khmer wife died. He subsequently married the 
ruler of Ayuthia's daughter, who seems to have had a pacifying 
influence. For example, she was instrumental in welcoming a 
religious and artistic mission that brought with it a statue of the 
Buddha, the phrabang, which became the palladium of the 
kingdom. Popular resentment continued to build, however, 
and in 1373 Fa Ngum withdrew to Muang Nan. His son, Oun 
Huan, who had been in exile in southern Yunnan, returned to 
assume the regency of the empire his father had created. Oun 
Huan ascended to the throne in 1393 when his father died, 
ending Mongol overlordship of the middle Mekong Valley. 

The kingdom, made up of Lao, Thai, and hill tribes, lasted 
in its approximate borders for another 300 years and briefly 
reached an even greater extent in the northwest. Fa Ngum's 
descendants remained on the throne at Muang Sua, renamed 
Louangphrabang, for almost 600 years after his death, main- 
taining the independence of Lan Xang to the end of the seven- 
teenth century through a complex network of vassal relations 
with lesser princes. At the same time, these rulers fought off 
invasions from Vietnam (1478-79), Siam (1536), and Burma 
(1571-1621). 

The Division of Lan Xang 

In 1690, however, Lan Xang fell prey to a series of rival pre- 
tenders to its throne, and, as a result of the ensuing struggles, 
split into three kingdoms — Louangphrabang, Vientiane, and 
Champasak. Muang Phuan enjoyed a semi-independent status 
as a result of having been annexed by a Vietnamese army in the 
fifteenth century, an action that set the precedent for a tribu- 
tary relationship with the court of Annam at Hue. 

Successive Burmese and Siamese interventions involved 
Vientiane and Louangphrabang in internecine struggles. In 
1771 the king of Louangphrabang attacked Vientiane, deter- 
mined to punish it for what he perceived to be its complicity in 
a Burmese attack on his capital in 1765. The Siamese captured 
Vientiane for the first time in 1778-79, when it became a vassal 
state to Siam. Vientiane was finally destroyed in 1827-28 follow- 
ing an imprudent attempt by its ruler, Chao Anou, to retaliate 
against perceived Siamese injustices toward the Lao. 

The disappearance of the Vientiane kingdom and the weak- 
ened condition of Louangphrabang led to a period of direct 
Siamese rule on the left bank of the Mekong and to the virtual 



9 



Laos: A Country Study 

annexation of Xiangkhouang as well as part of Bolikhamxai by 
the Vietnamese. Moreover, the Siamese soon became more 
directly involved with the Kingdom of Louangphrabang, whose 
ruler, Manta Thourath (r. 1817-36), had sought to preserve 
neutrality in the conflict between Siam and Vientiane. The 
Siamese intervention was caused by an appeal by King Oun 
Kham (r. 1872-94) for help in clearing his northeastern terri- 
tories of the Ho (Haw), bands of armed horsemen who had 
fled the bloody Manchu campaign to pacify Yunnan. 

The last major migration into Laos in the nineteenth cen- 
tury was that of the Hmong (see Glossary). Accustomed to 
growing crops of dryland rice and maize at the highest eleva- 
tions in mountainous southern China, where they had lived for 
centuries, the Hmong practiced a peaceful coexistence with 
their neighbors at lower elevations. Their major interaction 
with others occurred in selling their chief cash crop, opium. 

Developments in the Nineteenth Century 

The French, in their early forays into the interior of 
Indochina, had stuck mainly to the rivers, looking for access 
routes to China. An April 1867 expedition led by Ernest Dou- 
dart de Lagree and Francis Gamier visited the ruins of Vien- 
tiane. In 1869 an expedition led by Rheinart and Mourin 
d'Arfeuille traveled up the Mekong without penetrating the 
mountains. Although another explorer, Jules Harmand, a 
French army physician, reached Attapu on the Xe Kong, these 
forays provided the French with only a superficial knowledge 
of the peoples of the interior. What these early French explor- 
ers and scientists did find, however, were the Siamese and the 
Vietnamese already contesting for suzerainty over the territory 
between the mountains and the Mekong. 

The Hold of Siam 

This conflict had a long history. At the time of Siam's retrib- 
utive campaigns against Vientiane in 1827-28, relations 
between Vientiane and Annam were good. The Vietnamese 
called Vientiane Van Tuong (the Kingdom of Ten Thousand 
Elephants). But when Vientiane's ruler, Chao Anou, sought ref- 
uge in Hue following Siam's destruction of his capital, it caused 
serious embarrassment to the Vietnamese. King Rama III of 
Siam wrote to the Vietnamese emperor, Minh Mang, explain- 
ing that Chao Anou had refused obedience to him and had 



10 



* 



Stone jars dating back to 
prehistoric times, Plain of 
Jars, Xiangkhoang Province 
Courtesy Embassy of the Lao 
People's Democratic 
Republic, Washington 



started hostilities. Minh Mang, pursuing a consistently cautious 
policy toward Rama III, lent Chao Anou two companies of men 
to escort him back to Vientiane, instructing them to return 
immediately after accomplishing their mission. Siamese and 
Vietnamese sources — the Laotian primary sources having for 
the most part disappeared — give conflicting versions of what 
happened next. In any event, in mid-October 1828, Chao Anou 
found himself once again engaged in hostilities with a stronger 
Siamese force. He again fled to safety, this time to Muang 
Phuan because a Siamese force was encamped at Nakhon Pha- 
nom, blocking the Mekong downstream. 

The arrival of Chao Anou on their doorstep with a Siamese 
army in pursuit confronted the leaders of Muang Phuan with a 
dilemma. When the Siamese commander issued an ultimatum 
to surrender Chao Anou under penalty of an attack on 
Xiangkhoang, the leaders of Muang Phuan quickly accepted. 
The Siamese took Chao Anou to Bangkok and kept him cap- 
tive. 

What followed was illustrative of the consequences of the 
constant meddling in each other's affairs that went on among 
the Laotian principalities. The reigning prince of Muang 
Phuan was Chao Noi, son of the ruling family. Vientiane had 



11 



Laos: A Country Study 



attempted to take advantage of Chao Noi's youth when his 
father died to install Chao Xan, the head of a rival family from 
Muang Kasi. The Phuan elders of Xiangkhoang refused to 
accept this candidate, so power was shared under a compro- 
mise arranged with help from Hue. Chao Xan, however, led a 
delegation to Hue, where he accused Chao Noi and his cousins 
of bringing dishonor to the emperor by surrendering a vassal 
prince to another king, of obstructing passage of a tribute mis- 
sion from Louangphrabang across the territory of Muang 
Phuan to Hue, and of negotiating to acknowledge Siamese 
suzerainty. 

Chao Noi was accordingly summoned to Hue to explain 
himself but sent his eldest son, Po. Angered by this flagrant dis- 
regard of a direct order, Minh Mang took no action, awaiting 
news of the fate of Chao Anou, who was the nominal suzerain 
and ordinarily would have dealt with the Phuan on behalf of 
Hue. Once word was received that Chao Anou had died, Minh 
Mang sent a Vietnamese detachment to Muang Phuan and 
arrested Chao Noi and most of his family. In May 1829, the pris- 
oners were taken to Annam, where Chao Noi and his cousin 
were executed in January 1830. Chao Noi's young sons and 
their mothers were kept in exile in Nghe An. The Muang 
Phuan succession thus fell to Chao Xan. Minh Mang, however, 
posted a quanphu (commissioner), supported by a garrison of 
500 soldiers who were rotated seasonally, to reside permanently 
at Chiang Kham (Khang Khay), at the headwaters of the Nam 
Ngum, as a precaution against a recurrence of conflict with the 
Siamese king. 

Rama III sent a further letter to Minh Mang in early 1829 
outlining his view of Chao Anou's treachery and thanking the 
emperor for his presents. But the king failed to provide an 
explanation for a serious incident at Nakhon Phanom in which 
three Vietnamese mandarins had been killed. In November 
1829, Siamese envoys returned home with a letter from Hue 
reiterating earlier demands for punishment of those people 
responsible. When it became obvious that Rama III would not 
revert to the old arrangement of joint administration, Hue 
gave administrative control over the entire eastern half of the 
former kingdom of Vientiane to Vietnamese officials in Annam 
and Tonkin. The territory was virtually annexed by Hue in 
1831 under the name Tran Ninh Phu Tarn Vien. The Vietnam- 
ese presence at Khang Khay continued until the mid-1 850s. 



12 



Historical Setting 



Ghao Anou's wars with the Siamese had stirred massive dis- 
ruptions of villages on the right bank. Terrified Lao fled every 
which way. When the Siamese arrived at Nakhon Phanom in 
182V, they found the town deserted, the officials having fled 
across the river to Mahaxai. In the aftermath of the war, how- 
ever, the Siamese established new towns — Chiang Khan, Nong 
Khai, Mukdahan, and Kemmarat — at key points on the 
Mekong to serve as administrative centers and as logistical 
bases for expeditionary forces operating across the river toward 
the mountains. 

On the left bank, where the writ of Siam ran as far south as 
Stung Treng, the Siamese followed a policy of depopulating 
the country. This policy had actually been initiated as early as 
1779; the first Phuan carried off by the Siamese arrived in 
Bangkok around 1792, where they were used as workers in the 
fields of the official classes. By removing people from the left 
bank, the Siamese deprived any invader from Annam of food 
supplies, transport, and recruits. Sporadic resistance, however, 
led for some time by the latsavong (first prince) of the old Vien- 
tiane kingdom, continued at Mahaxai until 1835, when the 
leading Lao official there agreed to become governor of Sakon 
Nakhon on the right bank, and the Siamese resettled there. 
From 1837 to 1847, the Siamese carried out depopulation raids 
annually during the dry season in Khamkeut and Khammouan 
and in the valley of the Xe Banghiang. Entire Lao villages were 
uprooted. 

Meanwhile, the leaders of Houaphan principality, fearing 
that the example of Muang Phuan might be applied to them, 
submitted to the suzerainty of Bangkok through the intermedi- 
ary of Louangphrabang. Events were not going well for the 
Siamese in Muang Phuan. After the Siamese removed Chao 
Xan and some of the elders to Bangkok in 1836, the Vietnam- 
ese in effect ruled the state directly, appointing local officials as 
administrators. The depopulation activities the Siamese carried 
out on the Plain of Jars and elsewhere in Xiangkhoang caused 
the remaining population to migrate eastward and southward, 
forming new villages in the upper reaches of the Nam Mat and 
around the northern extremities of the Nam Kading basin, 
around Muang Mo, Muang Mok, and Muang Ngan. This 
expansion of the Phuan state was encouraged by the Vietnam- 
ese in their administrative reorganization. Some of the Phuan, 
however, perhaps enticed by Lao governors acting for the 
Siamese, moved down the river valleys toward the Mekong. 



13 



Laos: A Country Study 

There, new towns such as Bolikhamxai and Pakxan were 
founded and given satellite status by the Siamese in the 1870s. 

Tu Due, on his accession as Vietnamese emperor at Hue in 
1847, allowed the sons of Chao Noi to return home with their 
families and to reestablish Xiangkhoang as the Phuan capital. 
They were given administrative responsibilities, and the eldest, 
Prince Po, at last was permitted to replace the commissioner. 
Meanwhile, King Tiantha Koumane of Louangphrabang (r. 
1851-69), one of three sons of Manta Thourath who succeeded 
to the throne, while in Bangkok to receive the investiture, 
quickly arranged with the new Siamese king, Rama IV, to 
become once again the suzerain over the Phuan state. The 
Vietnamese had no objection to vassal relations of the Phuan 
with Louangphrabang. But Rama IV was deeply suspicious of 
the Phuan elders and set as a condition for accepting this 
arrangement that the Phuan send an annual tribute mission to 
Louangphrabang. Tiantha Koumane hence was able to reestab- 
lish his authority over Muang Phuan. 

A new element — the Ho — entered the picture, further com- 
plicating the situation in northern Laos. The Ho first appeared 
in mid-1869 in the upper valley of the Nam Ou, where they 
made common cause with some Lu dissidents displaced from 
the Sipsong Panna during a civil war lasting twenty-five years. 
An army from Louangphrabang attacked these bands and with- 
drew, taking prisoners. 

The Lao and Siamese were ill prepared to face up to the new 
danger of anarchy in their domains. Tiantha Koumane was 
dving of malaria, and the Siamese, preoccupied with prepara- 
tions for the cremation of their own monarch, Rama IV, 
demanded that a tribute mission from Louangphrabang arrive 
in Bangkok in time for the ceremony. Many princes and senior 
officials had to absent themselves from Louangphrabang at this 
critical time and had to remain in Bangkok afterward for audi- 
ences with the new monarch. Oun Kham, who was already fifty- 
eight vears old, did not receive his crown from the Siamese 
until 1872. 

It was not until 1873 that the Siamese sent an army up the 
Nam Ou to attack the Ho and drive them out. Some Ho 
retreated into Houaphan, while others overran the Plain of 
Jars, where Chao Hung had succeeded his brother Chao Pho as 
ruler of the Phuan state, which became the main theater of 
conflict. The Ho camped at Chiang Kham and demanded "tax" 



14 



Historical Setting 



payments from the local population, threatening to kill anyone 
who resisted. Chao Hung raised a small army and led it to assist 
the beleaguered governor of Chiang Kham in 1874, but a fatal 
bullet wound to Chao Hung prompted the withdrawal of his 
army. Chao Hung's son, Prince Khanti, appealed to Annam for 
aid. A joint attack was made on Chiang Kham but was also 
repulsed. 

Early the following year, the Ho began plundering the low- 
lands along the Mekong as far upriver as Chiang Khan and as 
far south as Nakhon Phanom, directly threatening Siam's secu- 
rity. The teenage King Rama V was unable to mount an effec- 
tive response. The governor of Khorat took a force of men 
across the flooded Mekong at the height of the monsoon and 
attacked the Ho encamped in the ruins of Vientiane, killing 
their warlord and forcing the others to retreat to Muang 
Phuan. A concerted campaign against the Ho in their strong- 
hold was finally put in motion in 1876, but it resulted more in 
pillaging and looting the inhabitants than in stopping the Ho, 
who, with their horses, were more than a match for the Siamese 
and Lao foot soldiers. Rama V blamed the Phuan for having 
brought trouble on themselves by giving rice, silver, and horses 
to the Ho, which, in fact, they had done in a desperate effort to 
appease them. He rejected further appeals for aid on the 
grounds that the local leaders would prove incapable of deal- 
ing with the situation after the army withdrew. 

Meanwhile, the troubles in the upper valley of the Nam Ou 
continued. Siamese commissioners had to assist Oun Kham in 
restoring order in 1876 and to prod him into reorganizing the 
towns under his rule. Affairs remained in a state of flux for the 
next six years, and when in late 1882 Oun Kham appealed 
again to Bangkok for help against the Ho, the Siamese sent a 
major military mission. Subsequently, the Siamese maintained 
a permanent garrison at Louangphrabang. 

The Eviction of Siam 

The French, meanwhile, had imposed a treaty of protector- 
ate on Annam in 1884. This treaty implied a French interest 
going beyond exploratory involvement in the affairs of Laos. In 
June 1885, the French consul general in Bangkok notified the 
Siamese government that a vice consulate would be established 
in Louangphrabang under terms of a most-favored-nation 
clause contained in a Franco-Siamese treaty of 1856. A new 



15 



Laos: A Country Study 

Franco-Siamese convention of May 1886 acknowledged the 
role of Siamese officials in Laos for the conduct of administra- 
tive matters but avoided implying French recognition of 
Siamese claims to sovereignty there. 

Auguste Pavie arrived at Louangphrabang in 1887 to assume 
his post as vice consul. Pavie played a key role in saving Oun 
Kham's life from raiders from Lai Chau, earning the king's 
gratitude and a promise that he would place his kingdom 
under France's protection. Incidents between Siamese and 
French officials on the left bank, where the French had made 
themselves advocates of Vietnamese claims to suzerainty, con- 
tinued in 1887-93. Finally, in March 1893, the French govern- 
ment, acceding to a campaign by the colonialist lobby in Paris, 
decided to send three French commissioners, each with a small 
armed force, to evict the Siamese from outposts they had estab- 
lished in central and southern Laos. The commissioners had 
secret orders to avoid exchanges of fire if at all possible; ironi- 
cally, the Siamese were under identical orders from their gov- 
ernment. 

The French government dispatched two warships to the Gulf 
of Siam, and, in what became known as the Paknam incident, 
forced passage of a fort at the mouth of the Menam River on 
July 12 and anchored in the river with their guns trained on the 
royal palace. On July 20, the French gave an ultimatum to the 
Siamese government to recognize the rights of Annam to the 
left-bank territories and to meet a list of other demands within 
forty-eight hours. The Siamese replied on July 22, accepting 
the first demand on central and southern Laos but rejecting 
the rest. The French declared a blockade of Bangkok, where- 
upon the Siamese accepted the rest of the French demands. By 
terms of the treaty concluded on October 3, 1893, between the 
Government of the French Republic and the Government of 
His Majesty the King of Siam, Siam renounced all claims to ter- 
ritories on the left bank and to islands in the river. 

Laos under the French 

The Kingdom of Louangphrabang became a protectorate 
and was initially placed under the governor general of 
Indochina in Hanoi. Pavie saw to the officialization in Hanoi of 
the titles of King Oun Kham, his eldest son who assumed the 
duties of king under the name Zakarine — also known as Kham 
Souk (r. 1894—1904) — and the viceroy, Boun Khong. 



16 



Historical Setting 



The French originally divided central Laos into two adminis- 
trative districts. By April and May 1894, however, the initial 
organization was already being modified, and a new plan was 
put into effect a year later. In 1899 Upper Laos was integrated 
with Lower Laos under one administrator. 

In 1904 and 1905, Laos was deprived of southern plateaus 
that were previously part of its territory (see fig. 2). Under the 
February 13, 1904, Convention Modifying the Treaty Con- 
cluded on October 3, 1893, Siam ceded to France control of 
the right-bank portion of Louangphrabang (present-day 
Xaignabouri Province) and part of the right-bank territory of 
Champasak. The French governor general, by a decree of 
March 28, 1905, fixed the border between Laos and Cambodia 
at the Tonle Repou River. Under the March 23, 1907, Treaty 
Between France and Siam, the French retroceded the territory 
of Dan Sai, southwest of the "elbow" of the Mekong, to Siam. 

The French thus reestablished a political entity in the mid- 
dle Mekong Valley extending from China to the Khong falls on 
the Cambodian border that owed allegiance to neither Viet- 
nam nor Siam, thereby eluding Vietnamese claims to Laos, 
whose historical basis they had verified in the archives in Hue. 
Detachment of the administration of the left-bank territories 
from Annam was justified on grounds of budgetary necessity in 
the new French Indochina. 

World War II and After 

The French presence in Laos was sufficient to preserve inter- 
nal peace and cope with sporadic localized revolts among some 
of the mountain tribes in the years 1900-40. These revolts 
owed their origin to resistance to paying taxes and supplying 
corvee labor or to outbreaks of messianic hysteria. However, 
the French military in Indochina was too ill-equipped to con- 
template resisting Japan's movement to the south, which by 
1940 had become the main focus of Japanese military strate- 
gists. On August 30, 1940, the French Vichy government signed 
the Matsuoka-Henry Pact granting Japan the right to station 
troops in Indochina and use bases there for movement of 
forces elsewhere in the region. The agreement, although rec- 
ognizing Japan's preeminent role in Southeast Asia, preserved 
France's sovereignty over Indochina. 

To the west, French forces in Indochina were confronted by 
a threat from Thailand (Siam adopted this name in June 



19 



Laos: A Country Study 



1939), where Pibul Songkram's government was arousing pub- 
lic unrest with inflammatory speeches in Bangkok and radio 
broadcasts to those he called his brethren across the Mekong. 
The broadcasts called for an uprising against the French, an 
endeavor in which Pibul promised help — and for which he had 
secretly sought Japanese backing. After a series of increasingly 
serious incidents in the last months of 1940, Thai ground 
troops attacked French forces in Cambodia in January 1941. 
The May 9, 1941, Peace Convention Between France and Thai- 
land, under mediation from Japan, was highly favorable to 
Thailand, which regained the right-bank territories that it had 
given up in 1904. 

Laotian outrage was predictable. King Sisavang Vong of 
Louangphrabang (r. 1904-59) had only the promises made to 
his grandfather by Pavie as the basis for France's intentions to 
treat his kingdom as a protectorate. Worried in this regard, he 
had obtained in 1932 from Paul Raynaud, the French minister 
for colonies, written guarantees that France would continue to 
honor Pavie's promises. Therefore, the French were obliged to 
explain their giving away part of his kingdom or else offer the 
king suitable compensation. As a result, the French governor 
general, Admiral Jean Decoux, offered the king a treaty regu- 
larizing the protectorate and enlarging his domain. The 
Franco-Laotian Treaty of Protectorate between France and the 
Kingdom of Louangphrabang of August 29, 1941, attached the 
provinces of Vientiane, Xiangkhoang, and Louang Namtha to 
Louangphrabang, which already included Phongsali and 
Houaphan. 

The French Protectorate and Direct Administration 

The territory of Laos thus consisted of the Kingdom of 
Louangphrabang, under French protection, and the provinces 
south of the Nam Kading, which were administered directly by 
a resident superieur in Vientiane. The latter had direct authority 
over the provincial residents, who were on an equal footing with 
the Lao chao khoueng (provincial governors). The resident 
superieur also acted as the representative of the French state to 
the king of Louangphrabang and supervised the administra- 
tion of the kingdom through provincial commissioners. The 
affairs of the kingdom were conducted by a four-member coun- 
cil headed by the viceroy. The resident superieur also coordinated 
the activities of the public services of the Indochinese Federa- 



20 



Historical Setting 



tion, which operated in both the north and the south, and 
employed French, Vietnamese, and Lao civil servants. 

The treaty also reinstituted the position of viceroy, which 
had been abolished by the French at the death of Boun Khong 
in 1920. Boun Khong's son, Prince Phetsarath, became one of 
the major figures of modern Laos. Among his accomplish- 
ments were the establishment of the system of ranks and titles 
of the civil service, promotion and pension plans, the organiza- 
tion of a Laotian consultative assembly consisting of district 
and province chiefs, the reorganization of the king's Advisory 
Council along functional lines, and the establishment of a 
school of law and administration. Phetsarath also reorganized 
the administrative system of the Buddhist community of monks 
and novices, the clergy (sangha), and established a system of 
schools for educating monks in which the language of instruc- 
tion was Pali, the sacred language of Theravada Buddhism. 

Nationalist Stirrings 

Although French rule in Laos was punctuated by rebellions 
among tribal peoples that had to be suppressed by force, the 
Laotians by and large accepted the French presence. The need 
to counter the pan-Thai irredentism propagated by the Pibul 
regime in Bangkok nevertheless led the Decoux administration 
to foster Laotian nationalism through the Lao Renovation 
Movement (Lao Nhay). The goals of this movement were to 
"provide Laos with its own personality with respect to its neigh- 
bors and to inculcate the sense of patrie." The first Lao-lan- 
guage publications in the style of the modern press, for 
example, Lao Nhay (New Laos), and Tin Lao (News of Laos), 
both launched in 1941, resulted from this movement. 

An activist group of teachers and students among the Lao 
nationalists, however, attempted to stage a coup d'etat at the 
College Pavie in Vientiane in July 1940. When the coup failed, 
they fled across the river and founded a semisecret organiza- 
tion, Laos for the Lao (Lao Pen Lao). Founding members 
included the Pali teacher and historian Maha Sila Viravong, 
Tham Sayasithena, Thongdy Sounthonvichit, and Oudone San- 
anikone and his half-brother Oun. 

Beginning in December 1944, with the upswing of Allied for- 
tunes in Europe and the Pacific, General Charles de Gaulle's 
provisional government in Paris began airdropping French 
agents into Indochina with the aim of recruiting and training 



21 



Laos: A Country Study 



guerrilla forces to harass the Japanese and maintain a French 
presence. These agents readily found supporters in Laos, and 
soon Franco-Laotian guerrilla groups were operating from jun- 
gle camps scattered from Louang Namtha Province in the 
north to Ghampasak Province in the south. On March 9, 1945, 
however, the Japanese carried out a coup de force that over- 
turned the 1940 political agreement and ended French admin- 
istrative control throughout Indochina. Having the 
Indochinese rulers renounce their treaties of protectorate with 
France formed an integral part of Japanese plans, but no steps 
were taken to prepare the Laotians or others for "indepen- 
dence." 

Events in 1945 

Japanese troops moved into the towns and quickly impris- 
oned French officials and their families and confiscated their 
property. Prince Phetsarath, after ordering Laotian civil ser- 
vants to continue their duties as usual, left Vientiane for 
Louangphrabang to be with the king. 

After being delayed on the roads from Xiangkhoang and 
Vientiane by the Franco-Laotian guerrillas (of whom the 
Hmong were particularly effective), two battalions of Japanese 
troops finally arrived in Louangphrabang on April 7. They 
found the French gone. AJapanese representative suggested 
that the king proclaim Laos's independence and send someone 
to discuss the terms of Laotianjapanese cooperation. Sisavang 
Vong replied that he would stay with his people and that his 
attitude toward the French would not change. Laos was too 
small to be independent, but if he was obliged to accept inde- 
pendence he would do so. At the same time, he reluctantly 
issued a proclamation on April 8 ending the French protector- 
ate. The king secretly entrusted Prince Kindavong, a younger 
half-brother of Phetsarath, with the mission of representing 
him in the Allied councils abroad while he maintained clandes- 
tine contact with the Franco-Laotian guerrillas in Laos. He also 
sent Crown Prince Savang Vatthana to Japanese headquarters 
in Saigon, where he vigorously protested the Japanese actions. 

Phetsarath no doubt saw some good coming from the turn 
of events. The Japanese had told him that they intended that 
the king's proclamation of independence apply to all of Laos. 
Interested in the unity of Laos, he gave the Japanese a proposal 
for unifying the Laotian civil service. Phetsarath also opened 



22 



Historical Setting 



an account for the royal treasury with the Indochinese treasury 
in Hanoi, which gave the kingdom greater fiscal autonomy. 
Problems began to appear almost immediately, however. At the 
end of June, the coffers were empty in spite of an infusion of 
money brought back from Saigon by the crown prince. Japan, 
no longer able to provide for the salaries of the Laotian admin- 
istration, allowed the civil service to languish. 

Beyond this was the Vietnamese problem. In 1943 the six 
chief towns of Laos counted 30,300 Vietnamese inhabitants out 
of their total population of 51,150. Vietnamese occupied key 
positions in the federal civil service, public works, posts and 
telegraph, treasury, customs, and police. The political dangers 
to Laos of the Vietnamese presence were demonstrated on 
April 8 when Vietnamese residents of Khang Khay tried to 
detach Tran Ninh (Xiangkhoang), an integral part of the terri- 
tory of the Kingdom of Louangphrabang, from Laos and 
attach it to Vietnam. 

After their coup de force, the Japanese put prices on the heads 
of the Franco-Laotian guerrillas and anyone caught helping 
them. In spite of the danger, the guerrillas sought recruits in 
the countryside and stepped up their armed attacks against 
Japanese communications, virtually cutting off several towns. 
The guerrillas' message to Laotian civil servants: Disregard the 
Japanese-inspired proclamation of independence and carry on 
your regular duties without helping the Japanese. Chao khoueng 
(provincial governors) who joined the guerrillas and chao 
muang (district chiefs) faced the hard decision of leaving 
behind their colleagues and sometimes their families. Whereas 
many of the leading Lao and tribal figures supported the 
Franco-Laotian guerrillas, some families had divided loyalties. 

After Japan's surrender, Phetsarath acted on the premise 
that the king's proclamation of independence was still in force. 
On August 28, 1945, he sent a telegram to all provincial gover- 
nors notifying them that the Japanese surrender did not affect 
independence and warning them to resist any foreign interven- 
tion in their administration. Phetsarath also refused to recog- 
nize the authority of the French resident superieur when he was 
released from prison. Three days earlier, however, Colonel 
Hans Imfeld, commissioner of the French Republic, had 
entered Louangphrabang with a party of Franco-Laotian guer- 
rillas and had received assurances from the king that the pro- 
tectorate was still in force. Japanese troops having withdrawn to 



23 



Laos: A Country Study 



the south, a party of Franco-Laotian guerrillas under the com- 
mand of Major Fabre entered Vientiane peacefully on Septem- 
ber 3 to await developments. French civilians released from 
internment were evacuated. 

Vietnamese residents in Vientiane and other towns had 
already begun spreading anti-French propaganda and making 
preparations to resist the French. In these actions, they were 
guided by agents of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), a 
Marxist-Leninist party founded in 1930 by Ho Chi Minh. The 
ICP adhered to a Leninist strategy of seizing power by revolu- 
tionary action — national liberation followed by the transition 
to socialism. The ICP had established cells in Laos in the early 
1930s made up entirely of Vietnamese. 

The Vietnamese agitation came to a head with a large dem- 
onstration in Vientiane on August 23. Phetsarath favored tak- 
ing advantage of the French difficulties. As head of 
government, however, he was restricted not only by the wishes 
of the king, but also by the 1941 arrangement with the French 
that had made the crown prince the chairman of the King's 
Council. The French design had, perhaps intentionally, created 
an ambiguity that made for conflict. On September 2, Phetsar- 
ath sent a message to the king requesting a royal proclamation 
of the unity of Laos. 

While he was dealing with these matters, Phetsarath received 
an unsolicited message on September 3 from Prince Soupha- 
nouvong, another of his half-brothers. Souphanouvong had 
spent the previous sixteen years working as an engineer in Viet- 
nam. Souphanouvong flew from Vinh to Hanoi in an aircraft 
provided by the United States Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) to meet with Ho Chi Minh, who had just proclaimed the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi in the name of the 
Viet Minh (see Glossary), an ICP front organization. (Although 
OSS personnel were not authorized to operate in Indochina, 
the OSS station in Kunming, China, took advantage of a man- 
date for OSS teams to perform prisoner of war (POW) recov- 
ery work to enter Indochina.) Prince Souphanouvong said he 
was in a position to represent the interests of Laos and asked 
for instructions. On September 5, he sent another message to 
Phetsarath saying that he had begun to negotiate with the Viet- 
namese for aid in the independence struggle and to form "an 
Indochinese bloc opposing the return of colonialism." Phetsar- 
ath rejected Souphanouvong's offer. 



24 



Wat Pa Huak, one of 
Louangphrabang's oldest 
Buddhist temples, has 
gilded and carved wood 
front doors, a mosaic facade 
depicting Buddha riding a 
three-headed elephant, and 
beautiful interior murals 
showing historical scenes 
along the Mekong River. 
Courtesy Gina Merris 




The official United States position, communicated to 
France, was that there was no question concerning France's 
sovereignty over Indochina. At the end of August, President 
Harry S. Truman was personally assured by de Gaulle that 
Indochina would be granted independence once the status 
quo before the Japanese aggression had been restored. Mean- 
while, United States recognition of French sovereignty was 
qualified by the proviso that the French claim of support by the 
Indochinese populations be borne out by future events. Appar- 
ently without the knowledge of Washington, however, an OSS 
team that reached Vientiane in September — escorted by mem- 
bers of the Lao Pen Lao newly returned from Thailand — 
assured Phetsarath that the French would not be allowed to 
return. The team advised Phetsarath to await the arrival of the 
Inter-Allied Commission that was to decide his country's 
future. This information misled Phetsarath into believing that 
the international community supported an independent Laos. 

On September 7, however, Phetsarath was informed by the 
minister of interior that a royal proclamation had continued 
the French protectorate over the Kingdom of Louangphra- 
bang. On September 15, with the Inter-Allied Commission 
nowhere in sight, Phetsarath issued a proclamation that uni- 
fied the Kingdom of Louangphrabang with the four southern 
provinces of Khammouan, Savannakhet, Champasak, and Sara- 



25 



Laos: A Country Study 

van (Salavan). Vientiane would be the capital, and the Con- 
gress of People's Representatives would soon meet to decide all 
political, economic, and social questions. 

On September 21, Fabre demanded the dismissal of Xieng 
Mao (also known as Phaya Khammao, or Khammao Vilay), the 
provincial governor since 1941, for anti-French activities, and 
his replacement by Kou Voravong. The next day, an advance 
guard of the Chinese Nationalist troops responsible for receiv- 
ing the surrender of the Japanese arrived by boat down the 
Mekong. They appeared more interested in buying up the 
opium crop (harvested from late December to early February) 
than in disarming the already departed Japanese. 

The Lao Issara Government 

On October 7, Souphanouvong and a Vietnamese escort 
arrived in Savannakhet to find that Oun and his partisans, who 
included Phoumi Nosavan, had crossed the river from Thai- 
land, taken control of the town, and, in a loose alliance with 
the large Vietnamese population, armed themselves from 
looted armories of the local militia and with arms discarded by 
the withdrawing Japanese. As a result of negotiations, their 
forces merged. Souphanouvong became commander in chief 
and Oun second in command. Souphanouvong and his escort 
proceeded upriver, first to Thakhek and then to Vientiane, 
where a provisional revolutionary government had been pro- 
claimed two weeks earlier, taking the name Lao Issara (Free 
Laos — see Glossary). Moreover, the Committee of Indepen- 
dence, strongly influenced by the Lao Pen Lao, controlled 
Vientiane. Upon his arrival, Souphanouvong was made minis- 
ter of foreign affairs and commander in chief. At his urging, a 
military cooperation convention was signed with Ho Chi 
Minh's government. 

Meanwhile, bolstered by renewed assurances of support 
from the French, Sisavang Vong had sent messages on October 
10 to Vientiane accusing Phetsarath of exceeding his authority 
and stripping him of his position as prime minister and his title 
of viceroy. Phetsarath protested but accepted these decisions 
and, after thanking the Laotian civil servants for their support, 
immediately announced his withdrawal from public life. His 
decision was no doubt influenced by the fact that he was mar- 
ried to a sister of Sisavang. 



26 



Historical Setting 



The royal dismissal of Phetsarath turned Lao Issara leaders 
against the monarchy, which they saw as hopelessly compro- 
mised by the French. In an effort to give their government 
some semblance of legitimacy, Lao Issara leaders hastily named 
the People's Committee, consisting of thirty-four members, 
many of them Lao Pen Lao activists, but also including the gov- 
ernors of several provinces who were not even in Vientiane. 
Members of the Chamber of People's Representatives were 
elected — and simply notified after the fact — by the members of 
the People's Committee in accordance with a provisional con- 
stitution adopted on the morning of October 12. 

At the news of the king's deposition and the report that the 
Lao Issara government had dispatched an armed contingent to 
Louangphrabang under Sing Ratanassamay's command, the 
agitation in the royal capital grew rapidly. With Imfeld and his 
men disarmed and held under house arrest by Chinese troops, 
the governor, Boungnavath, was free to act, and he had Royal 
Lao Government (RLG — see Glossary) supporters arrested. 
On November 10, hours before the arrival of Sing's force, a 
mob surrounded the royal palace, fired shots in the air, 
climbed over the walls, and forced entry. Sing and his men had 
an audience with the king that afternoon. The king declared 
himself to be a simple citizen, prepared to hand over the phra- 
bang and to vacate the royal palace when the government 
thought it appropriate. Later that month, the government 
issued a formal decree that no government member would 
henceforth have any contact with the French. 

A Confusing Situation 

At the outset of its rule, the authority of the Lao Issara provi- 
sional government was extremely limited outside Vientiane. In 
the north, the towns of Louangphrabang, Phongsali, and 
Louang Namtha were occupied by the Chinese. The Franco- 
Laotian guerrillas, with support from Touby Lyfoung's Hmong, 
had taken control of the main towns of Xiangkhoang Province 
at the beginning of September. Their hold on Houaphan was 
much less solid, in spite of efforts on the part of the provincial 
« governor, Phoumi Vongvichit, to prevent the Chinese from 
entering the province. Here, because of its proximity to Viet- 
nam, the revolutionary propaganda spread by the Viet Minh 
was strong but also pro-Viet Minh rather than pro-Lao Issara. 
Moreover, the main roads leading east were denied to the 
Franco-Laotian guerrillas by Viet Minh detachments coming 



27 



Laos: A Country Study 



from Vietnam. In the center and south, the Lao Issara govern- 
ment controlled the towns of Thakhek and Savannakhet. Most 
of the remainder of the provinces of Khammouan and Savan- 
nakhet was controlled by the Franco-Laotian guerrillas. The 
same was true for the southernmost provinces of Pakxe and 
Saravan, which fell largely in the British zone of operation 
decided upon at the Potsdam Conference. Here also, Prince 
Boun Oum of Champasak, sympathetic to the French, had 
15,000 troops under his command. 

The outlook became more favorable for the Lao Issara as the 
year ended. France, preoccupied with the situation in Vietnam, 
was unable to send reinforcements to the Franco-Laotian guer- 
rillas. Fabre and his men were evacuated from Vientiane — 
eventually to Thailand — under an escort provided by the Chi- 
nese. Various events led the Franco-Laotian guerrillas to evacu- 
ate Xiangkhoang town and Louang Namtha. While Viet Minh 
propaganda exploited differences between the Lao and Phuan 
on the one hand and Touby's Hmong on the other, the Viet 
Minh were themselves putting together a Hmong guerrilla 
force under Faydang Lobliayao of the Lo clan. In Louangphra- 
bang, Imfeld and his men had been subjected to all kinds of 
pressure, culminating in their evacuation across the river 
under Chinese escort on January 4. 

In Vientiane, the Lao Issara government was confronted 
with a growing list of problems. The most serious was how to 
finance the government because the treasury was empty, and 
there were no funds to pay civil servants. An attempt to tax 
opium exports was unenforceable because the government did 
not control opium trade routes. The government even took 
steps to abolish the Indochinese regie (state monopoly) that 
regulated the opium trade and make it a Laos monopoly. In 
desperation, the government appealed to the Thai govern- 
ment for a press on which to print money. Foreign relations 
and the procurement of military equipment were also prob- 
lems. 

Beginning in January 1946, with the loss anew of Xiang- 
khoang, the fortunes of the Lao Issara government began to 
decline. The Franco-Laotian guerrillas were receiving rein- 
forcements and supplies by air and road from French head- 
quarters in Saigon, which made entry into the towns possible 
for the first time. Lao Issara appeals to the Viet Minh for assis- 
tance went largely unheeded, and the Franco-Laotian guerril- 



28 



Historical Setting 



las once again were positioned along the main roads leading 
from Vietnam. 

After long negotiations in Chongqing, China's wartime capi- 
tal, the French government obtained China's commitment to 
withdraw its troops from Indochina. The withddrawal allowed 
the Franco-Laotian guerrillas to make their entry into Savanna- 
khet against token resistance camouflaged by the Chinese with- 
drawal. At Thakhek, however, Souphanouvong and his largely 
Vietnamese force were determined to make the French pay. In 
a day-long battle on March 21, approximately 700 of the 
defenders and 300 civilians were killed. 

With the French menacing Vientiane, the first move of the 
Lao Issara government was to attempt to regularize its relations 
with the monarchy. On March 23, Xieng Mao, having aban- 
doned Vientiane for Louangphrabang, sent the king a letter 
asking him to resume his throne. But the king was in no hurry, 
and it was not until April 23 that the king signaled his accep- 
tance of the constitution and reaffirmed the unity of Laos by a 
royal ordinance. 

Meanwhile, a strong French column was making its way up 
the road from Vientiane to Louangphrabang. Simultaneously, 
Hmong guerrillas moved west to harass Chinese troops in the 
vicinity of the royal capital. The French column entered 
Louangphrabang, forcing Phetsarath and the Lao Issara minis- 
ters to flee Laos. The king welcomed the French by declaring 
null and void all acts that he had sanctioned under pressure 
from the Japanese, the Chinese, and the Lao Issara since April 
4, 1945. He also promised a democratic constitution. 

The Lao Issara government-in-exile set up its headquarters 
in Bangkok. Scattered groups of armed partisans mounted 
raids into Laos from bases along the Mekong and in southern 
Laos. One group was under the command of Thao O Anou- 
rack. After the Japanese takeover, Thao O had refused the 
Franco-Laotian guerrillas' appeal to join them. When the Lao 
Issara took over Savannakhet, the provincial governor 
appointed him commander of liberation forces in Xepon. 
Thus, when the Franco-Laotians reoccupied Xepon in March 
1946, Thao O made his way east with some 200 to 300 men to 
the safety of Lao Bao just across the border of Vietnam. Eventu- 
ally, he was forced to abandon Laos altogether and to make his 
way to Hanoi, where the Viet Minh put him in touch with Kay- 
sone Phomvihan, a Vietnamese-Lao metis (person of mixed 



29 



Laos: A Country Study 

race) from Savannakhet who had been sent to direct Lao Issara 
radio broadcasts over Radio Hanoi, and Nouhak Phoumsavan, 
a Vietnamese from Mukdahan. Neither Kaysone Phomvihan 
nor Nouhak Phoumsavan had a significant role in the Lao 
Issara, but both had the confidence of Ho Chi Minh and saw in 
Ho's government the salvation of an independent Laos. 

The Vietnamese proposed to Thao O — and he accepted — 
that he form a committee for the liberation of Laos. Nouhak 
became president of the committee. The enlistment of other 
small groups from Xiangkhoang and Houaphan brought the 
effective strength under Thao O's command to 500; he dis- 
patched one company each to Xam Nua, Xiangkhoang, Muang 
Mo, Nape, and Muang Sen. Thao O soon received secret codes 
from Phetsarath and Souvanna Phouma in Bangkok that 
allowed him to communicate with his companies. 

The Coming of Independence 

At the urging of the United States, France took steps to nor- 
malize its relations with Laos. In June 1946, a joint Franco-Lao- 
tian commission was established in Vientiane to discuss future 
relationships. This commission produced a document confirm- 
ing the existence of a unified Laos under the sovereignty of the 
king of Louangphrabang. Major political, military, and eco- 
nomic powers remained in French hands. Elections for a Con- 
stituent Assembly were to be held within a year. A modus 
vivendi was signed on August 27. A Franco-Siamese agreement 
signed in Washington on November 17, 1946, restored the 
right-bank provinces of Xaignabouri and Champasak to Laos. 
The multinational conciliation commission that examined 
Thailand's claims to these territories found in favor of Laos in 
its report of June 27, 1947. 

The Kingdom of Laos 

On December 15, 1946, in the face of guerrilla raids from 
across the Mekong, forty-four delegates to the Kingdom of 
Laos's first popularly elected Constituent Assembly were cho- 
sen. Under French supervision, the delegates worked on a con- 
stitution promulgated by Sisavang Vong on May 11, 1947. This 
constitution declared Laos an independent state within the 
French Union. On November 26, 1947, the thirty-three depu- 
ties to Laos's first National Assembly invested a government 
headed by Prince Souvannarath, another half-brother of Phet- 



30 



Historical Setting 



sarath. By the terms of a confidential protocol of February 25, 

1948, Boun Oum was allowed to keep his title of Prince of 
Champasak but renounced his suzerain rights to this former 
kingdom. In return he was made inspector general of the king- 
dom, the third-ranking personage of Laos after the king and 
crown prince. 

Under a successor government headed by Boun Oum, the 
Franco-Lao General Convention of July 19, 1949, gave Laos 
greater latitude in foreign affairs. Over the following months, 
France transferred its remaining powers. A Royal Lao Army was 
created, which by the end of 1952 comprised seventeen compa- 
nies, in addition to a battalion entirely commanded by Laotian 
officers. On February 7, 1950, the United States and Britain 
recognized Laos. Later that year, the United States opened a 
legation in Vientiane. 

Meanwhile, contacts had been made in Bangkok between 
the French and moderates in the Lao Issara government-in- 
exile. A coup d'etat in Thailand ushered in a government 
much less sympathetic to the anti-French resistance in Laos 
than its predecessor and deprived the hardliners among the 
Lao Issara of precious support. A conflict developed between 
Phetsarath and Souphanouvong over the issue of the Lao 
Issara's ties to the Viet Minh. This conflict led to Souphanou- 
vong's dismissal from the government-in-exile. When France 
offered an amnesty, the government decreed its own dissolu- 
tion in October 1949 and returned to Vientiane in a French 
plane. Phetsarath was left in Thailand. Souphanouvong, vow- 
ing to continue to fight, headed for Vietnam. The Lao Issara 
was a spent force, although it lived on in legend. 

The Pathet Lao 

War had broken out in the meantime between the French 
and Ho Chi Minh's government at the end of 1946. Leaving 
Nouhak in charge of the resistance committee, Thao O set up 
his base at Con Cuong (Vietnam), from which his men could 
cross the border into Laos with relative impunity. In January 

1949, Kaysone formed the first unit of a new resistance army, 
the Latsavong detachment, named after the la tsa vong of Vien- 
tiane, who had led resistance against the Siamese in the nine- 
teenth century. To lend the resistance the appearance of 
authority it lacked in reality, a government headed by Soupha- 
nouvong was formed at a congress held in Vietnam in August 



31 



Laos: A Country Study 

1950. This government included Kaysone, Nouhak, Tiao Souk 
Vongsak, and Phoumi Vongvichit 

The congress created the Neo Lao Issara (Free Laos Front — 
see Glossary). The basic stance of this front's propaganda was 
the united struggle against the French without reference to 
political parties or ideology. Illustrative of this stance was the 
use henceforth of the name Pathet Lao (Lao Nation — see Glos- 
sary). Indicative of the "single battlefield" theme repeated in 
Viet Minh propaganda were the increasing numbers of Viet 
Minh agents sent to Laos: 500 to 700 political and military 
agents at the end of 1946 and the beginning of 1947, approxi- 
mately 5,000 to 7,000 agents at the end of 1950 and the begin- 
ning of 1951, and 17,000 agents in 1953. 

In keeping with the united front against the French, Soupha- 
nouvong's Pathet Lao government included not only leaders 
who had developed close ties to the Viet Minh over the previ- 
ous five years, but also members of the Lao aristocracy (such as 
Souphanouvong himself) and former officials of the RLG. Sig- 
nificantly, the Pathet Lao government also included two repre- 
sentatives of Laos's tribal groups who were made ministers 
without portfolio. 

By 1950 both Kaysone and Nouhak had become members of 
the ICR The party's strategy was to operate clandestinely 
behind broad national front organizations such as the Viet 
Minh and the Neo Lao Issara that were capable of mobilizing 
support from people for whom Marxism-Leninism held no 
appeal. This strategy applied particularly to Laos, where issues 
such as land reform and other aspects of class struggle, anti- 
thetical to the notion of Buddhist harmony, had almost no 
appeal. The overthrow of the monarchy, which had figured as a 
goal in the ICP program since 1932, was also not publicized. 

Although the ICP had announced its dissolution in 1945, it 
continued to operate secretly. In February 1951, at its second 
congress, the ICP decided to split into separate parties for each 
of the three countries — Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia — in 
accordance with the need to mobilize mass support for the 
anti-French war throughout Indochina. At this time, of 2,091 
ICP members in Laos, only thirty-one were Laotians. The Lao- 
tian members of the ICP were "transferred" to a new party 
whose name reflected its Laotian constituency but that was still 
tied to the two other parties of the ICP in the new triad. 



32 



That Luang in Vientiane, the most important Laotian national monument, has a 
golden stupa believed to contain a relic of tJw Buddha. 

Courtesy Gina Merris 

The decision to form a new party led to considerable discus- 
sion among noncommunist Pathet Lao supporters unfamiliar 
with Leninist strategy. In the second half of 1954, an important 
meeting of Pathet Lao leaders was held near the Houaphan 
Province border, where the need to establish this new party to 
ensure success of the struggle in the postwar period was 
explained. Some participants supported this proposal; others 
did not. Proponents of the new party met in secret. The Phak 
Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party — LPP) was formally estab- 
lished on March 22, 1955. The very existence of the party was 
kept a secret from nonparty people. 

By 1951 enough Pathet Lao troops had been recruited and 
trained to take part in Viet Minh military operations against 
French Union forces in Laos. In the spring of 1953, the Viet 
Minh overran almost all of Houaphan Province and portions of 



33 



Laos: A Country Study 



Phongsali, Xiangkhoang, and Louangphrabang provinces. 
Approximately 300 Pathet Lao accompanied the Viet Minh. On 
April 19, Souphanouvong formally established the Pathet Lao 
government in Houaphan Province. A "people's tribunal" pre- 
sided over by Kaysone condemned the acting province chief to 
death for having helped organize guerrilla resistance to the 
invaders. 

With Louangphrabang in danger of Viet Minh occupation, 
Crown Prince Savang Vatthana received a letter from the 
United States charge d'affaires in Saigon, Robert McClintock, 
expressing concern for the king's safety and saying that with- 
drawal from the capital "would seem the course of wisdom." 
Savang said that the king intended to stay to bolster morale for 
the defense of his capital. At the end of 1953 and beginning of 
1954, the Viet Minh again invaded Laos, pushing as far as Tha- 
khek and creating considerable difficulties for the French 
Union defenders. Their appearance seemed timed to coincide 
with the sale of the opium crop in Houaphan and Xiang- 
khoang provinces. 

In elections to the National Assembly held on August 26, 
1951, the National Progressive Party (Phak Xat Kao Na) 
formed by the returned Lao Issara ministers, Xieng Mao, Sou- 
vanna Phouma, and Katay Don Sasorith, won fifteen of thirty- 
nine seats. The Democratic Party (Praxathipatay) of Kou Vora- 
vong and his brother-in-law, Major Phoumi Nosavan, won four 
seats; the National Lao Union (Lao Rouam Samphan) of Bong 
Souvannavong won three; and seventeen seats went to inde- 
pendents that included Phoui Sananikone and Leuam Insi- 
xiengmay. With Xieng Mao having failed to form a 
government, Prince Souvanna Phouma headed a government 
that was invested on November 21. The Franco-Lao Treaty of 
Amity and Association on October 22, 1953, removed the last 
strictures on independence. 

Toward Neutrality: The First Coalition 

It was thus as a fully sovereign country that Laos sent a dele- 
gation headed by its foreign minister, Phoui Sananikone, to the 
Geneva Conference on Indochina that put an end to the First 
Indochina War in July 1954. The armistice agreement for Laos, 
signed by a French general on behalf of French Union forces 
and a Viet Minh military official, provided for a cease-fire to 
take effect at 8:00 a.m. on August 6. Viet Minh forces were to 



34 



Historical Setting 



be withdrawn from Laos to North Vietnam within 120 days. 
The Viet Minh delegation had brought Nouhak and another 
Pathet Lao member, Ma Khamphitay, with them to Geneva on 
Viet Minh passports, intending to have a Pathet Lao delegation 
seated, but they were not recognized by the conference. A pro- 
vision in the armistice agreement for Laos was nevertheless 
inserted providing for the "fighting units of Pathet Lao" to be 
regrouped in Houaphan and Phongsali provinces pending a 
political settlement. The RLG pledged to take steps to inte- 
grate all Laotian citizens into the political life of the kingdom. 

The representatives of the other powers at Geneva signed no 
conference documents but instead subscribed to the Final Dec- 
laration taking note of the armistice agreements. United States 
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles lobbied hard to ensure 
that the Laotians made no unnecessary concessions to the com- 
munists. At the final session, the United States delegation 
declared that it would refrain from the threat or use of force to 
disturb the armistice agreements and that it would view any vio- 
lations of them as a threat to peace and security. Chinese pre- 
mier Zhou Enlai stressed the advisability of a coalition 
government to the Laotians, urging an early meeting between 
princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong. He seemed 
prepared to offer an exchange of diplomats, his main concern 
being that Laos be free of United States military bases. 

Initial Difficulties 

Implementation of the armistice agreement in Laos began 
on schedule. The Joint Commission, on which the RLG was 
represented by General Bounphone Maekthepharak, Colonel 
Sengsouvanh Souvannarath, and Colonel Boun Ma, and the 
Pathet Lao by Singkapo, Sisavath, and Ma Khamphitay, held a 
number of meetings at Khang Khay to deal with the details. 
The presence of the International Control Commission (ICC), 
made up of Canada, India, and Poland, also helped force the 
two sides to live up to their commitments. However, the insis- 
tence of the Pathet Lao that their regroupment areas cover the 
entire territory of the two provinces, along with a right to 
exclusive administration of those provinces, raised serious 
problems almost immediately. Another part of the armistice 
agreement that caused difficulties was, as noted in an ICC 
report, the ". . . glaring differences regarding the number and 
categories of prisoners of war and civil internees exchanged." 



35 



Laos: A Country Study 

It became clear that higher-level negotiations were needed. 
Princes Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong met at Khang 
Khay on September 8. The assassination of the defense minis- 
ter, Kou Voravong, in Vientiane on September 18, however, 
demonstrated the fragility of the Laotian political structure. 
The act seemed to be a settling of old scores, dating probably 
to Kou's energetic measures as interior minister to suppress 
banditry perpetrated from across the river. Thailand also 
seemed to be implicated, but the announcement by Thai 
police that they had arrested the assassin, who claimed to have 
been in league with Phoui, only poisoned relations between 
the Voravong and Sananikone families. Crown Prince Savang 
wondered aloud whether Phetsarath, with the help of foreign- 
ers, was trying to oust the monarchy. 

The Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese backers, mean- 
while, took advantage of the cease-fire to launch a vast recruit- 
ment campaign. In the cases of numerous recruits who were 
later interviewed, the offer of schooling or more specialized 
training in North Vietnam proved decisive to their enlistment, 
and even those who were initially skeptical were ultimately won 
over by the attentions of their Vietnamese instructors and the 
persuasiveness of the political lessons they received. One major 
consequence of this campaign was that the Pathet Lao ranks 
were swelled by recruits from the many different hill tribes of 
Laos. These men were to constitute the initial Pathet Lao units. 
The immediate goal after regrouping in the two provinces was 
to form nine battalions, plus independent companies for pro- 
paganda missions. 

Laos, a member of the United Nations (UN) since Decem- 
ber 14, 1955, seemed an unlikely place for a resumption of hos- 
tilities. Peaceful coexistence was the dominant mood of the 
time. A new government under Katay was represented at the 
Asian-African Conference held in April 1955 in Bandung, 
Indonesia, where he and North Vietnamese prime minister 
Pham Van Dong spoke of peace and noninterference in each 
other's affairs. But an initial round of negotiations between the 
government and the Pathet Lao in Rangoon in October col- 
lapsed, dashing hopes of a rapid settlement of the Pathet Lao 
question. Armed clashes between the Royal Lao Army and the 
Pathet Lao continued sporadically in the two provinces. 

The threat to the RLG posed by a combination of internal 
subversion and outside aggression preoccupied its leaders, 



36 



Historical Setting 



none more so than Crown Prince Savang Vatthana. As early as 
summer 1954, fearing a French deal with the Viet Minh that 
might be injurious to Laotian sovereignty and territorial integ- 
rity, Savang had flown to Paris to make his own soundings of 
French intentions. He was also anxious to probe United States 
diplomats for reassurances as to the nature of the support Laos 
could expect in the event of an attack from its communist 
neighbors. He told Dulles that Laos was in a "life or death 
struggle" for survival and that the Laotian people were 
opposed to communist dictatorship. Dulles replied, "You can 
count upon our support — moral, political, and material — so 
long as that support goes to a government vigorously seeking 
to maintain its own independence." 

Washington's immediate concern was that the Royal Lao 
Army was inadequately trained and equipped because all 
French troops, except for a small detachment at Xeno in the 
south, had departed. The Geneva armistice terms prohibited 
Laos from having foreign military bases and participating in 
any foreign military alliance, but allowed a small French train- 
ing mission. Dissatisfied with the French mission and seeing a 
larger role for itself, the United States established a disguised 
military mission in Vientiane, the Programs Evaluation Office 
(PEO). This mission became operational on December 13, 
1955, under the command of a general officer, who, like others 
on his staff, had been removed from Department of Defense 
rosters of active service personnel. The secrecy stemmed from 
the Department of State's concern that the PEO's existence 
might be construed as a violation of the Geneva Agreement of 
1954, which United States policy continued to uphold. 

The RLG held elections in December 1955 without the 
Pathet Lao. As a result, the Progressive Party again emerged as 
the leading party with eighteen seats; the newly formed Inde- 
pendent Party (Phak Seli) of Phoui Sananikone and Leuam 
secured nine seats, the Democratic Party secured four seats, 
and the National Union Party won two seats. 

Renewed Negotiations 

After the elections, Souvanna Phouma signaled a renewed 
effort at negotiations, when, presenting his new government to 
the National Assembly on March 20, 1956, he called the settle- 
ment of the Pathet Lao problem "the gravest and most urgent" 
question before the country. He opened negotiations in Vien- 



37 



Laos: A Country Study 



tiane in August; the Pathet Lao were represented by Soupha- 
nouvong. Two joint declarations issued shortly thereafter by 
the delegations pledged agreement on a foreign policy of 
peaceful coexistence, a new cease-fire in the two northern 
provinces, exercise of democratic freedoms, authorization for 
the Pathet Lao's political party to operate, procedures for the 
RLG's administration in the two provinces, integration of 
Pathet Lao units into the Royal Lao Army, the formation of two 
mixed commissions to work out the above-mentioned details, 
the holding of supplementary elections to an enlarged 
National Assembly, and the establishment of a coalition govern- 
ment. In preparation for engaging in the politics of the king- 
dom, the Pathet Lao had formed an organization to act as a 
front — the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front — LPF; see 
Glossary) in January 1956, with an innocuous-sounding plat- 
form. Souphanouvong and the other Pathet Lao delegates took 
the oath of allegiance to the king in the presence of Souvanna 
Phouma and Kou Abhay, president of the King's Council. This 
round of negotiations concluded in a further series of agree- 
ments covering a cease-fire, implementation of a policy of 
peace and neutrality, and measures guaranteeing civic rights 
and nondiscrimination against Pathet Lao followers. 

In late August, Souvanna Phouma visited Beijing and Hanoi, 
where he was warmly received. Far from committing Laos to 
the communist bloc as the United States Department of State 
feared, these visits formed part of Souvanna Phouma's strategy 
to neutralize the danger to Laotian independence posed by the 
Pathet Lao. It was obvious to him that communism held little 
appeal for the inhabitants of Laos. Although there were com- 
munists among the leaders of the Pathet Lao — and Souvanna 
Phouma refused to believe his half-brother was one of them — 
the communists depended on the exercise, or at least the 
threat, of armed force to carry out their "revolution." Sou- 
vanna Phouma's strategy was intended to separate the national- 
ists from the communists in the Pathet Lao. He warned the 
Pathet Lao's foreign backers that if they provided sanctuary to 
armed resistance groups — once the Pathet Lao had been rein- 
tegrated into the kingdom's political life — they would be going 
back on their pledges of noninterference. 

At the same time, however, Souvanna Phouma's ideas for 
safeguarding Laotian independence differed radically from 
Dulles's. Dulles viewed the Pathet Lao as unacceptable coali- 
tion partners; in his view, they were all simply communists 



38 



Historical Setting 



rather than a front comprising a number of nationalists. The 
United States ambassador in Vientiane, J. Graham Parsons, 
informed Souvanna Phouma that Washington was implacably 
opposed to a coalition government. The United States 
remained unmollified by a secret protocol attached to a 
November 2, 1956, agreement on a neutral foreign policy that 
proscribed the establishment of diplomatic relations with 
North Vietnam and China in the immediate future. On 
November 22, Parsons was instructed to inform the prime min- 
ister that the United States was unable to respond favorably to 
his appeal for support. 

Negotiations with the Pathet Lao resumed in February 1957 
but were interrupted when Souvanna Phouma resigned in May 
over an unfavorable vote in the National Assembly. In the 
interim, Phetsarath had been persuaded to return from Thai- 
land. Unbowed by age, but no longer keen on a role for him- 
self in politics, he returned in March and took up residence in 
Louangphrabang, where, in a gesture of royal reconciliation, 
he made his obeisance to the king and received back his old 
title of viceroy. 

A Fragile Unity 

Souvanna Phouma returned as prime minister in August 
1957 following a cabinet crisis and was charged by the king with 
forming a new government. He reopened negotiations, and on 
October 22, a final agreement was reached. This agreement 
called for reestablishing RLG administration over the two prov- 
inces, forming a coalition government, and holding supple- 
mentary elections to the National Assembly The government 
set elections for May 1958. On November 18, Souphanouvong 
symbolically returned to RLG authority, represented by Crown 
Prince Savang, the two provinces, together with all the troops, 
civil servants, and war materiel belonging to the Pathet Lao. A 
RLG governor was appointed in Houaphan and a Pathet Lao 
governor in Phongsali, each with a deputy of the opposite 
camp. Mayoral and other provincial official positions were 
equally divided between the two parties. It was agreed that two 
Pathet Lao battalions, totaling 1,500 troops, would be inte- 
grated into the Royal Lao Army and the remainder would be 
demobilized and sent home. The National Assembly unani- 
mously approved the coalition government. Souphanouvong 
became minister of planning, reconstruction, and urbanism, 



39 



Laos: A Country Study 



and Phoumi Vongvichit became minister of culture and fine 
arts. 

Souvanna Phouma visited Washington in January 1958 hop- 
ing to persuade United States policy makers, who worried 
about his having accepted Pathet Lao participation in the gov- 
ernment in advance of elections, that his strategy for dealing 
with the Pathet Lao was the best course. He left Washington, 
however, without gaining unqualified support for his strategy. 

United States aid failed to blunt the effects of Pathet Lao 
propaganda and indoctrination in the villages. The Pathet Lao 
were masters of political persuasion, exploiting popular themes 
of nationalism, anticorruption, and "anti-big family." There 
were exceptions, however, to the general negative perception 
of United States aid. Tom Dooley, a physician from the United 
States, brought health care to the people who needed it most, 
those in remote villages. Another American — an Indiana 
farmer named Edgar "Pop" Buell — devoted the last years of his 
life to helping the Hmong, including training the first Hmong 
nurses and opening Hmong schools. 

The 1958 Elections 

The stunning success of the LPF and its allies in winning 
thirteen of the twenty-one seats contested in the May 4, 1958, 
elections to the National Assembly changed the political atmo- 
sphere in Vientiane. This success had less to do with the LPF's 
adroitness than with the ineptness of the old-line nationalists, 
who were more intent on advancing their personal interests 
than on meeting the challenge from the LPF. The two largest 
parties, the Progressive Party and the Independent Party, could 
not agree on a list of common candidates in spite of repeated 
prodding by the United States embassy and so split their votes 
among dozens of candidates. The LPF and the Peace (San- 
tiphab) Party carefully worked out a strategy of mutual sup- 
port, which succeeded in winning nearly two-thirds of the seats 
with barely one-third of the votes cast. Souphanouvong gar- 
nered the most votes and became chairman of the National 
Assembly. The Progressive Party and the Independent Party tar- 
dily merged to become the Rally of the Lao People (Lao 
Rouam Lao). 

In the wake of the election fiasco, Washington concentrated 

on finding alternatives to Souvanna Phouma's strategrv of win- 
es o/ 

ning over the Pathet Lao and on building up the Royal Lao 



40 



Viet Mink and Laotian officials on November 1, 1945, reviewing a 
parade of troops of the Chinese Nationalist 93d Division in Vientiane. 
Prince Souphanouvong, commander in chief Lao Issara forces, is in 
uniform in the front row, next to his young son, Ariya. 
Courtesy Tran Van Dinh (former military adviser, intelligence and 

operations, to Prince Souphanouvong) 

Army as the only cohesive nationalist force capable of dealing 
with the communists' united front tactics. On June 10, 1958, a 
new political grouping called the Committee for the Defense 
of the National Interests (CDNI) made its appearance. Formed 
mainly of a younger generation not tied to the big families and 
as yet untainted by corruption, it announced a program for 
revitalizing the economy, forming an anticommunist front that 
excluded the Pathet Lao, suppressing corruption, and creating 
a national mystique. 

Washington, which was paying the entire salary cost of the 
Royal Lao Army, was enthusiastic about the "young turks" of 
the CDNI. This enthusiasm was not altogether shared by 



41 



Laos: A Country Study 

United States ambassador Horace H. Smith, who asked what 
right a group untested by any election had to set its sights on 
cabinet appointments. Whereas Souvanna Phouma tried and 
failed to form a government, creating a drawn-out cabinet cri- 
sis, Phoui Sananikone eventually succeeded and included four 
CDNI members and Phoumi Nosavan in a subcabinet post. 

North Vietnamese Invasion 

In foreign and domestic affairs, the atmosphere changed in 
the summer of 1958. Souvanna Phouma announced that with 
the holding of elections the RLG had fulfilled the political obli- 
gations it had assumed at Geneva, and the ICC adjourned sine 
die. Phoui, less scrupulous about preserving Laos's neutrality 
than his predecessor, angered Beijing and Hanoi by admitting 
diplomats from Taipei and Saigon. China and North Vietnam, 
already upset by the departure of the ICC, which they had seen 
as a restraining influence, protested. The United States worked 
out an agreement with France that reduced the role of the 
French military mission and enlarged that of the PEO, which 
embarked on a major strengthening of its staff and functions. 

The occupation by North Vietnamese security forces in 
December 1958 of several villages in Xepon District near the 
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North Vietnam and South 
Vietnam was an ominous development. The RLG immediately 
protested the flying of the North Vietnamese flag on Laotian 
territory. Hanoi claimed the villages had historically been part 
of Vietnam. With regard to precedent, this was a decidedly 
modest claim; nonetheless, it represented a unilateral reinter- 
pretation of the French map used by the Truong Gia Armistice 
Commission in the summer of 1954 to draw the DMZ, and, 
backed by force of arms, it constituted nothing less than 
aggression. Phoui received extraordinary powers from the 
National Assembly to deal with the crisis. But the failure to 
regain their lost territory rankled the Laotian nationalists, who 
were hoping for a greater degree of United States support. 

One of Washington's major preoccupations was the danger 
that the Royal Lao Army would integrate the Pathet Lao troops 
without the safeguard of "screening and reindoctrinating" 
them. The embassy was instructed to tell the government that 
it would be difficult to obtain congressional approval of aid to 
Laos with communists in the Royal Lao Army. Before the final 
integration of 1,500 Pathet Lao troops (two battalions) into the 



42 



Historical Setting 



Royal Lao Army could take place as planned in May 1959, the 
Pathet Lao used a quibble about officer ranks to delay the final 
ceremony. As monsoon rains swept over the Plain of Jars one 
night, one of the two battalions slipped away, followed soon 
after by the other, near Louangphrabang. The event signaled a 
resumption of hostilities. In July Phoui's government, after pro- 
tracted cabinet deliberations, ordered the arrest of the LPF 
deputies in Vientiane — Souphanouvong, Nouhak, Phoumi 
Vongvichit, Phoun Sipaseut, Sithon Kommadan, Singkapo, and 
others. Tiao Souk Vongsak evaded arrest. 

Fighting broke out all along the border with North Vietnam. 
North Vietnamese regular army units participated in attacks on 
July 28-31, 1959. These operations established a pattern of 
North Vietnamese forces leading the attack on a strong point, 
then falling back and letting the Pathet Lao remain in place 
once resistance to the advance had been broken. The tactic 
had the advantage of concealing from view the North Vietnam- 
ese presence. Rumors of North Vietnamese in the vicinity often 
had a terrifying effect, however. Among the men who heard 
such rumors in the mountains of Houaphan Province that sum- 
mer was a young Royal Lao Army captain named Kong Le. 
Kong Le had two companies of the Second Paratroop Battalion 
out on patrol almost on the North Vietnamese border. When 
they returned to Xam Nua without encountering the enemy, 
they found that the garrison had decamped, leaving the town 
undefended. 

Direct North Vietnamese involvement in Laos began taking 
another form wherein aggression was difficult to prove. Two 
months after the 1954 Geneva Conference on Indochina, the 
North Vietnamese established a small support group known as 
Group 100, on the Thanh Hoa-Houaphan border at Ban 
Nameo. This unit provided logistical and other support to 
Pathet Lao forces. In view of the reversion to a fighting strategy, 
the North Vietnamese and Lao parties decided to establish an 
upgraded unit. The new unit, known as Group 959, headquar- 
tered at Na Kai, just inside the Houaphan border, began oper- 
ating in September 1959. Its establishment coincided with a 
major effort to expand the hitherto small Pathet Lao forces. 
According to an official history published after the war, its mis- 
sion was "serving as specialists for the Military Commission and 
Supreme Command of the Lao People's Liberation Army, and 
organizing the supplying of Vietnamese materiel to the Laotian 
revolution and directly commanding the Vietnamese volunteer 



43 



Laos: A Country Study 



units operating in Xam Nua, Xiangkhoang, and Viangchan." 
These actions were in violation of the obligation Ho Chi Minh's 
government had assumed as a participant in the 1954 Geneva 
Conference to refrain from any interference in the internal 
affairs of Laos. 

The Vietnamese party's strategy was by now decided with 
regard to South Vietnam. At the same time, the party outlined 
a role for the LPP that was supportive of North Vietnam, in 
addition to the LPP's role as leader of the revolution in Laos. 
Hanoi's southern strategy opened the first tracks through the 
extremely rugged terrain of Xepon district in mid-1959 of what 
was to become the Ho Chi Minn Trail. 

Phetsarath and Sisavang Vong, viceroy and king, died within 
two weeks of each other in October 1959. Sisavang Vong 
reigned over Laos for fifty-four turbulent years as a man of 
honor, and, after his death, his memory was so venerated that 
when the communists came to power in Vientiane they left his 
statue standing. His successor, Savang Vatthana, lacked both his 
father's hold on his people and Phetsarath's charisma. A deeply 
fatalistic man who foresaw he would be the last king of Laos, 
Savang Vatthana remained uncrowned for the rest of his reign 
because a propitious date for the coronation ceremony could 
not be found. 

The Army Enters Politics 

With the LPF's deputies in prison, the political scene 
became increasingly chaotic, even lawless. When Phoui's man- 
date ended in December 1959, Phoumi Nosavan and his CDNI 
supporters began their move to force the king to grant them 
power by announcing that the supreme command of the 
armed forces was "handling current affairs." Their move, how- 
ever, was too bold and caused the Western ambassadors in 
Vientiane to present a united front to the king in support of 
constitutionality. An interim government headed by Kou 
Abhay was charged with preparing for new elections. Phoumi, 
temporarily rebuffed, bided his time as minister of defense. 
The army had entered politics but not quite in the manner 
Washington had hoped. 

In the April 24, 1960, elections, Phoumi found his revenge. 
By exerting considerable pressure, he had changes made in the 
electoral law. With financial support from Marshal Sarit Tha- 
narat of Thailand, Phoumi bought off strong or inconvenient 



44 



Historical Setting 



candidates and enlisted civil servants as his campaign workers. 
Election balloting was fraudulent, and the results, giving right- 
ist candidates large majorities, were totally unbelievable. A new 
government was formed on June 3, ostensibly headed by Som- 
sanith but in fact controlled by Phoumi acting as minister of 
defense under the aegis of his new political party, the Social 
Party (Paxa Sangkhom). Souvanna Phouma, elected without 
fraud, became the president of the National Assembly. The 
imprisoned LPF deputies had not been allowed to run for the 
Assembly, but sent word to LPF supporters to vote for any LPF 
candidates who had dared run or else to vote for Peace Party 
candidates. However, on May 23, under darkness and with the 
cooperation of personnel at their prison, the LPF deputies 
escaped and disappeared into the countryside. 

The Attempt to Restore Neutrality 

On August 9, Captain Kong Le led the Second Paratroop 
Battalion in a virtually bloodless coup d'etat that changed the 
history of modern Laos. In taking over Vientiane, the para- 
troopers had unwittingly chosen a moment when the entire 
cabinet was in Louangphrabang conferring with the king. They 
informed their compatriots and the outside world by broad- 
casting their communiques on the radio. In a rally at the city 
football stadium on August 11, Kong Le expanded on his goals: 
end the fighting in Laos, stem corruption, and establish a pol- 
icy of peace and neutrality. Recalling the experience of the first 
coalition when the country was temporarily at peace, Kong Le 
asked for the nomination of Souvanna Phouma as prime minis- 
ter. 

On August 11, General Ouan Ratikoun, as the cabinet's 
envoy, arrived in Vientiane from Louangphrabang. After nego- 
tiations with Kong Le and Souvanna Phouma as president of 
the National Assembly, Ouan returned to Louangphrabang 
with a document in which the coup leaders requested the cabi- 
net to return. They agreed to withdraw their forces to specified 
points in the city and stipulated that these steps would lead to 
negotiations on the government's future. Two days later, how- 
ever, when Ouan returned alone, it became evident that the 
cabinet was reluctant to return to Vientiane. Once this news 
spread, demonstrators gathered outside the Presidency of the 
Council of Ministers demanding Somsanith's immediate resig- 
nation; they next marched on the National Assembly, where 



45 



Laos: A Country Study 

Souvanna Phouma met them and, startled by their vehemence, 
attempted to moderate their demands. Inside, the forty-one 
deputies present voted unanimously to censure the Somsanith 
government. On August 14, a delegation of the assembly car- 
ried the news of this vote to Louangphrabang and asked the 
king to name Souvanna Phouma to form a new government. 
Fearing violence in Vientiane, Somsanith resigned, and the 
king named Souvanna Phouma prime minister. The new gov- 
ernment was invested by thirty-four deputies on August 16. The 
next day, Kong Le declared his coup d'etat over and vacated 
the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 

On receiving word of the coup, Phoumi flew from Louang- 
phrabang to Ubol, where he informed Thai and United States 
officials of his intention to "straighten things out" in Laos and 
from where he sent emissaries to Savannakhet and Pakxe. In 
Bangkok the following day, Phoumi met with Sarit, United 
States embassy counselor Leonard Unger, and the chief of the 
United States military mission in Thailand. He outlined plans 
for a parachute drop to recapture the Vientiane airport and 
ferry in additional forces by air to oust the rebels. He requested 
that Thailand and the United States provide air transport, fuel, 
salaries for his troops, and two radio broadcasting units. He 
also asked for a secure channel of communication between his 
new headquarters at Savannakhet and Bangkok. 

These steps, taken in secrecy, received immediate approval 
in Washington. Orders went out to designate a senior PEO offi- 
cer as liaison to Phoumi, and a PEO channel was established 
between Savannakhet and the United States military mission in 
Bangkok, bypassing the embassy in Vientiane. Aircraft of Civil 
Air Transport, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) front, were 
made available to Phoumi, and Laotian droops training at bases 
in Thailand were to be returned as soon as possible to Savanna- 
khet. 

Sarit, Pibul's minister of defense who had come to power in 
a coup in October 1958, had invested heavily in Phoumi and 
was not about to let him go. The United States Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, for their part, saw aid to Phoumi as preserving at least 
part of the anticommunist forces in Laos from the effects of the 
split in the royal army. But from this point on, much as United 
States officials tried to separate the two issues, aid to the anti- 
communists in Laos was inseparable from Sarit's personal com- 
mitment to Phoumi. The United States embassy in Bangkok 



46 



Historical Setting 



was also alarmed by the possibility that inadequate support for 
Phoumi might lead Sarit to intervene unilaterally in Laos 
because he had already imposed a blockade on Vientiane. 

A Deepening Split 

Phoumi enlisted the support of the commanders of four of 
Laos's five military regions. He also began immediately broad- 
casting propaganda denouncing Kong Le as a communist and 
on August 15 proclaimed the establishment of a Counter Coup 
d'Etat Committee. He appealed to all military personnel to 
rally behind him, guaranteed their salaries, and proclaimed his 
intention to liberate Vientiane from communist hands. Forces 
loyal to Phoumi seized Pakxan. 

The United States considered Souvanna Phouma's return to 
office bad news. A Department of State cable stated that the 
United States sought "to bring about an acceptable power bal- 
ance of non-communist elements which would eliminate Kong 
Le and restore authority and stability." 

Souvanna Phouma, wanting to avoid civil war, with Phoumi's 
concurrence convoked the National Assembly in Louangphra- 
bang on August 29. A new government, with Souvanna 
Phouma as prime minister and Phoumi as deputy prime minis- 
ter and minister of interior, was sworn in on August 31. Phoumi 
announced the dissolution of his Counter Coup d'Etat Com- 
mittee. This might have defused the crisis, but the same day, 
Kong Le made a radio broadcast protesting the presence of 
Phoumi in the cabinet. Souvanna Phouma convinced him to 
change his mind, which he did "for the sake of peace and rec- 
onciliation" on September 1. Phoumi returned to Savannakhet 
and waited. 

On September 10, Prince Boun Oum, speaking from Savan- 
nakhet in the name of the new Revolutionary Committee, 
announced that the constitution had been abolished, and he 
and Phoumi were assuming power. In mid-September, two 
companies of Kong Le's paratroopers routed the two battalions 
of Phoumi's advance guard from their position at Pakxan and 
installed a defensive line on the north bank of the Nam 
Kading. Phoumi made no move to organize his paratroop drop 
on Vientiane, in spite of the considerable means at his disposal. 
On the evening of September 21, Sarit made a speech in which 
he hinted at Thai armed intervention in Laos. 



47 



Laos: A Country Study 



Kong Le's reputation as a giant slayer had by now spread 
from the capital to the far corners of the kingdom. On Septem- 
ber 28, when he dropped a handful of paratroopers near Xam 
Nua in order to explain the situation to the 1,500-person garri- 
son that in principle was loyal to Souvanna Phouma, rumors 
that the garrison's officers, some of whom had been in contact 
with Phoumi, might be cashiered created a panic. The garrison 
abandoned the town to the Pathet Lao, who were accompanied 
by their North Vietnamese advisers from Group 959. The with- 
drawing column surrendered its arms to the Pathet Lao near 
Muang Peun on October 2. 

The Pathet Lao now claimed to be supporting Souvanna 
Phouma. The coup and Phoumi's resistance with foreign assis- 
tance, which the United States and Thailand had difficulty 
camouflaging, gave the still-secret LPP an unprecedented 
opportunity to burrow more deeply behind the nationalist 
mantle, and it lost no time in seizing the occasion. Many Lao- 
tians came to see the Pathet Lao as acting to defend the coun- 
try against United States- and Thai-backed aggression. Even in 
Vientiane, there was growing resentment of the Thai blockade, 
which caused a shortage of consumer goods and rising prices. 
Foreseeing an opening for the Pathet Lao to negotiate with the 
new government, Radio Hanoi and Radio Beijing broadcast 
support for Souvanna Phouma. 

Although Souvanna Phouma's government was accepted as 
the legal government of Laos by Britain, France, and the 
United States, this did not prevent the United States from 
broadening its support to Phoumi's forces on the grounds that 
they were fighting the Pathet Lao. In fact, there is no record of 
their taking any offensive action against the Pathet Lao. 
Phoumi had ordered the pullback from Xam Nua. Winthrop 
G. Brown, the new United States ambassador, reported 
instances where Phoumi refused help to engage the Pathet Lao 
because it was offered by Vientiane. The only offensive actions 
taken by Royal Lao Army troops against the Pathet Lao 
between August and December 1960 were those taken by 
troops loyal to Souvanna Phouma in Phongsali and elsewhere. 

The "compromise" worked out by the embassy with Sou- 
vanna Phouma, in which the prime minister would not object 
to direct United States military aid to Phoumi as long as this 
aid was not used against his government, was a sham. When- 
ever the embassy tried to persuade Phoumi to give up his plan 



48 



Historical Setting 



and return to Vientiane, Phoumi pleaded fear for his safety 
and escalated his demands. In Louangphrabang, King Savang 
Vatthana temporized, hoping to bring the military leaders 
together at least in a united stand against the communists and 
putting off a political solution until later. Failing to achieve his 
aim, he retreated, saying he was disgusted with all concerned. 
Brown felt he was waiting for Phoumi's capture of Viendane to 
get him off the hook and avoid the necessity of his taking any 
categoric actron. 

Brown cabled Washington on October 5 that, in the contin- 
ued absence of an agreement between Phoumi and Souvanna 
Phouma, United States support of Phoumi would lead to "fur- 
ther disintegration" of the anticommunist forces and would 
involve the United States in actions that risked internationaliz- 
ing the conflict in Laos. 

At a meeting on October 11 with a visiting United States del- 
egation made up of Parsons, Assistant Secretary of Defense 
John N. Irwin II, and Vice Admiral Herbert D. Riley, chief of 
staff to the commander in chief, Pacific, Souvanna Phouma 
gave an indictment of the provocative errors committed by his 
successors after formation of the first coalition. He warned that 
the only course for Laos was to implement the 1957 agree- 
ments before the Pathet Lao — with whom he was in touch and 
intended to resume negotiations — presented even more far- 
reaching demands. The first Soviet ambassador to Laos, Alek- 
sandr N. Abramov, arrived as Parsons was leaving. 

After conferring with the king, the Parsons-Irwin-Riley team 
proceeded to Bangkok. On October 17, Irwin and Riley met 
with Phoumi in Ubol. Although the Department of State at that 
point was under the impression that United States policy 
required that Phoumi dissolve the Revolutionary Committee, 
both as a gesture of good faith toward Souvanna Phouma in 
preserving the unity of anticommunist forces in Laos and, 
more practically, in order to avoid the growing impression 
abroad that the United States was illegally aiding a rebel move- 
ment, no mention of this point was made either in Parsons's 
instructions to his two colleagues or at the October 17 meeting. 

Following the formal conversation, Riley took Phoumi aside 
and told him that the United States had completely lost confi- 
dence in Souvanna Phouma and was backing Phoumi to go 
back and clean up the situation. Irwin similarly told Phoumi 
that although the United States was only supporting him in 



49 



Laos: A Country Study 



building up his defenses for the moment, in the long run the 
United States was supporting him all the way. The message was 
not lost on Phoumi. The effect of these unauthorized remarks 
was to undercut both Souvanna Phouma's efforts to negotiate a 
compromise solution with Phoumi and Brown's bona fides with 
Souvanna Phouma, already strained by the continuing United 
States aid flowing into Savannakhet in the absence of any 
matching military action against the Pathet Lao. Phoumi's 
intransigence in turn led the Department of State to make 
ever-increasing demands on Souvanna Phouma in the interest 
of "compromise," beginning with the charge that the prime 
minister was not exercising sufficient control over Kong Le, the 
demand that he take appropriate precautions to prevent Kong 
Le from launching an attack on Savannakhet, and so forth. 

Souvanna Phouma began negotiations with the Pathet Lao 
on October 18. However, his position was much weaker than in 
1957 when he faced the same set of Pathet Lao demands. 
Although nothing substantive would come from these negotia- 
tions, they provided fuel for Phoumi's anticommunist propa- 
ganda and heightened nervousness in Washington and 
Bangkok. 

Next, Phoumi forced the commander of the Louangphra- 
bang garrison to declare for the Revolutionary Committee. 
This was an important move, for it placed the king within 
Phoumi's territory. In Bangkok, Sarit's first reaction on hearing 
the news was to ask the United States ambassador, U. Alexis 
Johnson, whether now would be a good time for the Revolu- 
tionary Committee to "establish itself as a government." Gene- 
ral Ouan Ratikoun quickly defected to Savannakhet. Phoumi 
captured another general, Amkha Soukhavong, at Xiang- 
khoang and gained the support of General Sing Ratanassamay. 
Phoumi's troops had been paid without Brown's having been 
consulted. Ambassador Johnson, without consulting Brown, 
assured Sarit that the United States would pay Phoumi's troops, 
an action that Brown protested. 

When Phoumi finally launched his offensive on the Nam 
Kading on November 21, Souvanna Phouma vainly attempted 
to contact him. With badly needed supplies to Vientiane, espe- 
cially fuel, still cut off by the Thai blockade, Souvanna 
Phouma's forced acceptance of a Soviet offer of aid lent 
Phoumi's imminent attack "to drive out the communists" a 
semblance of legitimacy. On December 11, Phoumi led the 



50 



Historical Setting 



forty National Assembly deputies who had gathered in Savan- 
nahket over the preceding weeks to vote no confidence in Sou- 
vanna Phouma's government. The king accepted the vote as 
legal the next day when he signed Royal Ordinance No. 282, 
dismissing Souvanna Phouma's government and giving powers 
provisionally to the Revolutionary Committee. Royal Ordi- 
nance No. 283, approving a provisional government formed by 
Prince Boun Oum, who acted as front man for Phoumi — the 
king had scruples about naming a general to be prime minis- 
ter — was signed on December 14. The Department of State 
notified its acceptance of the new regime and said it was acting 
to meet its requests for assistance "to restore peace to the coun- 
try." At this time, neither the deputies nor the court were free 
agents — and Souvanna Phouma had not resigned. 

The Battle of Vientiane 

The capital braced for Phoumi's attack. A last-minute and 
temporary switch of sides by Colonel Kouprasith Abhay, com- 
mander of the Vientiane military region headquartered at 
Camp Chinaimo on the eastern outskirts, was quickly neutral- 
ized by Kong Le, but tension heightened. The Pathet Lao dele- 
gation hurriedly left town. More of Souvanna Phouma's 
ministers disappeared and reappeared. The situation was 
becoming ungovernable. Souvanna Phouma viewed battle as 
inevitable, and, accompanied by his ministers Boun Om (Boun 
Oum's nephew), Tiao Sisoumang Sisaleumsak, and Inpeng 
Suriyadhay, flew to Phnom Penh on December 9, having dele- 
gated his powers to the military. The following morning, Qui- 
nim Pholsena, the minister of information whom Souvanna 
Phouma had left behind, flew to Hanoi accompanied by 
Phoumi Vongvichit, the chief Pathet Lao negotiator, and Lieu- 
tenant Deuane Sunnalath, Kong Le's deputy, on a mission to 
seek Soviet and North Vietnamese military aid, which began 
arriving the following day on Soviet aircraft. 

Phoumi began his attack on December 13. From his com- 
mand post near the airport, Kong Le had positioned his men at 
key points on the outskirts, intending merely to fight a delaying 
action to allow the safe evacuation to the north of his men and 
their equipment. The regional command post of the Pathet 
Lao, situated at Na Khang, sixty kilometers north of the capital, 
disposed of three guerrilla groups but did not take part in the 
battle of Vientiane. A massive display of firepower by Phoumi's 
troops resulted in the deaths of 400 to 500 civilians in the town, 



51 



Laos: A Country Study 

mostly Vietnamese residents, and the wounding of another 
1,000 to 1,500 civilians. Kong Le's troops only lost seventeen. 
Phoumi's armor rolled into town on December 16. 

Kong Le retreated slowly northward toward Louangphra- 
bang, while Soviet aircraft parachuted in badly needed sup- 
plies — rice, salt, sugar, blankets, light arms, ammunition, and 
radios. With new recruits, his ranks had swelled from 800 to 
1,200 men. On December 23, at Phon Hong, about sixty kilo- 
meters north of the capital, Kong Le was visited by Kaysone, 
who had come to settle the details of distribution of Soviet aid 
and coordination of Neutralist and Pathet Lao troops in future 
operations. On January 1, Kong Le's troops took control of the 
Plain of Jars and Khang Khay after skirmishing with some of 
the 9,000 Phoumist troops and an equal number of Hmong 
guerrillas in the vicinity and recovered large quantities of sup- 
plies. The following day, the Neutralists occupied Xiang- 
khoang, and United States advisers and Phoumist troops were 
evacuated from the Muang Phonsavan airfield. 

Quinim and Tiao Sisaleumsak established themselves at 
Khang Khay and urged Souvanna Phouma, who was in Cambo- 
dia, to join them. Souvanna Phouma said that he was still 
legally prime minister but would resign at once if Phoumi's gov- 
ernment were validated in accordance with the constitution. 
Souvanna Phouma argued that the National Assembly's vote of 
no confidence on December 11 was not valid because it had 
taken place in neither the royal capital nor the administrative 
capital. He regarded the king's dealings with the Revolutionary 
Committee as beyond the king's authority. When the National 
Assembly met in Vientiane and voted confidence in the Boun 
Oum government on January 4, Souvanna Phouma ignored 
the action. 

The Widening War 

The Soviet airlift, which continued despite United States 
protests to Moscow, transformed the Plain of Jars into a vast 
armed camp, fully resupplying Kong Le. For the first time, the 
Pathet Lao were equipped with heavy weapons allowing them 
to play a major role in their military alliance with Kong Le's 
troops in support of Souvanna Phouma's government. There 
was, moreover, another and more important factor: the com- 
mitment of significant numbers of North Vietnamese troops to 
the fighting, exactly what Souvanna Phouma and Brown had 



52 



The Anousavari, in 
Vientiane, is built of cement 
and has bas-relief on the 
sides and temple-like 
ornamentation along the 
top and cornices; a stairway 
leads to the top of the 
monument, which provides 
panoramic views of the city. 
Courtesy Gina Merris 




feared. Kong Le requested four battalions of North Vietnamese 
troops on January 7. Two of these linked up with his forces on 
Route 7 and down Route 13. The third was engaged in military 
action at Tha Thorn, a key defense point south of the Plain of 
Jars. The fourth took up a position north of the plain. 

In Xiangkhoang, the Hmong once again blew up the bridges 
on Route 7 in a desperate effort to interfere with North Viet- 
namese truck convoys rolling westward. The Royal Lao Army 
had been quietly supplying arms to the Hmong since at least 
March 1957 to enable them to resist the Pathet Lao, but the 
North Vietnamese influx created a sudden need for arms far in 
excess of what the Laotians could supply, even with the help of 
Thailand. The Hmong, under their military leader Vang Pao, 
had taken up positions in the mountains surrounding the Plain 
of Jars and asked to talk to United States officials. Vang Pao 
requested quick delivery of arms, but United States officials 
were concerned that the Hmong would not fight, and the arms 
might fall into communist hands. Vang Pao said all 7,000 volun- 
teers would fight, but they needed the arms in three days or 
they would have to fall back to less exposed positions. United 
States airdrops of arms from stocks in Okinawa began three 



53 



Laos: A Country Study 

days later, signaling the beginning of a heroic Hmong resis- 
tance. 

International Pressure and the Advent of the Second 
Coalition 

Souvanna Phouma reaffirmed his position that his was the 
legal government of Laos. In an interview, he spoke bitterly 
about his nemesis, Parsons, and said that "the Savannakhet 
group" was committed to the policy of military confrontation 
that had failed in the past. He believed Laos should conserve 
its ancient traditions and monarchy and urged a political settle- 
ment along the lines negotiated in 1957. 

Phoumi's failure to advance on the Plain of Jars made a deep 
impression on the new administration of United States presi- 
dent John F. Kennedy. If Phoumi had his difficulties with Kong 
Le's outnumbered battalion, he was no match for the North 
Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao counteroffen- 
sive that opened in January drove Phoumi's poorly motivated 
troops and their United States military advisers back — a retreat 
that irrevocably changed the balance of forces in Laos. 

The United States embassy in Vientiane had accurate intelli- 
gence on the numbers and movements of North Vietnamese 
military units in Laos, as opposed to the alarming reports ema- 
nating from Phoumi's headquarters. Central Laos and the 
entire length of the road from the Sala Phou Khoun junction 
south to Vangviang was in North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao hands 
by mid-March. 

Contact between emissaries of the two sides was finally made 
by officers under a truce flag at the village of Ban Hin Heup on 
the Vientiane-Louangphrabang road. Tripartite truce talks 
opened in the nearby village of Ban Namone, with the ICC, 
reconvened by the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, 
Britain, and the Soviet Union, present. The three negotiators 
were Nouhak, Pheng Phongsavan, and General Sing Ratanassa- 
may. A cease-fire declared on May 3 did not prevent the Pathet 
Lao from capturing Xepon, an important crossroads on the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail, or put an end to the fighting in the Hmong 
country. As part of the plan to find a settlement, an enlarged 
Geneva Conference convened on May 16. 



54 



Historical Setting 



Expansion of Pathet Lao Influence 

There were thus two rival royal governments in Laos from 
the beginning of 1961, the Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan gov- 
ernment at Vientiane and the Souvanna Phouma government 
at Khang Khay. The Pathet Lao, protected by the presence of 
thousands of North Vietnamese troops, constituted a third fac- 
tion in what became a rightist-Neutralist-leftist division. 

The idea of neutralism had been expressed by Kong Le in 
his earliest speeches in Vientiane, which described the goals of 
his coup d'etat as stopping the fighting among the Laotians 
and enacting a policy of friendship with all foreign countries, 
especially Laos's neighbors. At Khang Khay, Soviet diplomats 
mingled with officials of missions from Beijing and Hanoi, with 
which relations had been established on May 5. Kong Le's 
troops readily adopted the unofficial name Neutralist Armed 
Forces. Souvanna Phouma seized the opportunity of having a 
sizeable number of adherents on hand at Khang Khay, includ- 
ing many Lao students returned from abroad, to form the Neu- 
tralist Party (Lao Pen Kang — known as the Neutralists). He was 
confident the party would outpoll the Pathet Lao's LPF in a 
free election. 

Although publicly deferring to Souvanna Phouma on mat- 
ters of government policy, the Pathet Lao secretly extended 
their influence at the grassroots level, using their proven meth- 
ods of propaganda and organization. In villages under their 
control, the Pathet Lao installed their own personnel alongside 
the existing administration — for example, a khana muang (lib- 
erated district) alongside a chao muang (district chief), a khana 
seng (liberated subdistrict) alongside a pho tasseng (subdistrict 
chief), and a khana ban (liberated village) alongside a pho ban 
or nai ban (village chief). Access to the Pathet Lao-adminis- 
tered areas was forbidden to outsiders, even after the forma- 
tion of the coalition government. 

A hierarchy of politico-military participation and responsi- 
bility tied the villagers to a chain of command. All resources in 
villages under Pathet Lao control were mobilized into both a 
horizontal and a vertical structure that included organizations 
of women, youth, and monks. Villagers were easily susceptible 
to Pathet Lao control, making a Pathet Lao village a world unto 
itself. Children acted as couriers and lookouts; young people 
joined the village self-defense units, the lowest level of guerrilla 
organization; adults acted as porters for the regular guerrilla 



55 



Laos: A Country Study 



units; and women made clothing, prepared food, and looked 
after the sick and wounded. 

Protracted Diplomacy 

At the reconvened Geneva Conference, the Neutralists were 
represented by Quinim, the rightists by Phoui Sananikone, and 
the Pathet Lao by Phoumi Vongvichit. The separate delega- 
tions served until they agreed on forming a unified govern- 
ment to sign the final agreement. All Laos's neighbors were 
represented, as were the three ICC member countries and 
their cochairmen, and the United States and France. 

The summit meeting between John F. Kennedy and Nikita 
Khrushchev in Vienna on June 3-4, 1961, coincided with the 
crisis over the North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao cease-fire viola- 
tions at the besieged Hmong outpost of Padong. The Hmong 
abandoned Padong in early June and established a new base at 
Long Chieng. Kennedy protested North Vietnam's involvement 
to Khrushchev and pointed out that the United States was sup- 
porting Laos's neutrality. Both leaders agreed that the conflict 
in Laos should not bring their two countries into confronta- 
tion. The idea of neutralizing Laos had been suggested to 
Kennedy as early as January. 

For the next year, an enormous effort of persuasion involv- 
ing all the great powers went into getting the Laotian parties to 
agree to form a coalition government. The effort included 
meetings among princes Souvanna Phouma, Boun Oum, and 
Souphanouvong in Zurich and Vientiane and protracted diplo- 
matic consultations in Vientiane, Xiangkhoang, Rangoon, Mos- 
cow, Paris, and Geneva. 

Phoumi finally had to be disabused of the notion that he 
could count on unqualified United States and Thai support. 
Sarit favored supporting the negotiation policy. Phoumi 
favored peace but felt that Souvanna Phouma was the wrong 
choice to lead a new government. W. Averell Harriman, the 
intermediary, and a United States delegation held a tense and 
acrimonious meeting with Phoumi and his cabinet at the gen- 
eral's office in Vientiane. Phoumi repeated his opposition to 
Souvanna Phouma, and Harriman warned him he was leading 
his country to disaster. The meeting ended inconclusively. 
Phoumi further demonstrated his intransigence by building up 
his forces at Nam Tha, a town in northwestern Laos without 
strategic importance, thereby inviting attack. When the North 



56 



Historical Setting 



Vietnamese and Pathet Lao attacked, camouflaging their viola- 
tion of the cease-fire with the usual propaganda about mutinies 
in the opposing ranks, the defenders fled toward the Mekong, 
leaving most of their weapons behind. Phoumi may have 
hoped the debacle would precipitate Thai or United States 
armed intervention, but it did not. In the end, he agreed to the 
coalition. 

Souvanna Phouma's new government took office on June 
23, 1962, the second coalition in Laos's modern history. In 
accordance with the principle of tripartism, seven cabinet seats 
were allocated to the Neutralists, four seats each to the rightists 
and Pathet Lao, and four to nonparty people. The rapproche- 
ment between Souvanna Phouma and Kennedy was manifested 
by the former's visit to Washington in July at the conclusion of 
the Geneva Conference. Unlike in 1954, representatives of 
each of the fourteen participating nations signed the final doc- 
ument, the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and its Proto- 
col. 

Renewed Strains 

The strains imposed on the Neutralists by their alliance of 
convenience with the Pathet Lao were now manifested. In addi- 
tion, the presence of the North Vietnamese army that this alli- 
ance implied did nothing to support neutralism. As if to 
confirm their doubts, the Neutralists were subjected to commu- 
nist propaganda. Deuane Sunnalath, Kong Le's subordinate, 
allowed himself to be subverted by this political influence and 
started publishing his own newspaper, Khao Pathan Van (Daily 
News), full of anti-United States propaganda. Most of Kong 
Le's followers remained fiercely loyal, however, and the dissi- 
dents, who called themselves Patriotic Neutralists, remained a 
minority. 

On April 1, 1963, less than a year after the Geneva agree- 
ment, Foreign Minister Quinim was assassinated in Vientiane. 
Protesting the lack of security, Pathet Lao members of the coa- 
lition immediately left town. Following a series of incidents in 
which one of Kong Le's closest aides was assassinated and a 
United States plane on a supply flight to Kong Le authorized 
by Souvanna Phouma was shot down by Deuane's troops, fight- 
ing broke out in the Neutralist camp. Kong Le pulled his men 
back from Khang Khay and set up a new command post at 
Muang Souy on the western edge of the Plain of Jars. Kong Le 



57 



Laos: A Country Study 



was running short of supplies, however, because the Soviet air- 
lift had ended, and the North Vietnamese were in a position to 
block supplies by road. 

An estimated 10,000 North Vietnamese were still present in 
Laos, despite the stipulation their government had signed at 
Geneva that withdrawal of all foreign troops be completed by 
October 7. In preparation for a massive escalation of the con- 
flict in South Vietnam, North Vietnam had expanded the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail through eastern Laos and garrisoned it with 
support troops. North Vietnamese troops also were present in 
northern Laos, where they were engaged almost continuously 
in pressuring the Hmong guerrillas. All United States military 
advisers had been withdrawn by the deadline, but clandestine 
operations continued, and supply and reconnaissance flights 
still were conducted over such heavily contested areas as the 
Plain of Jars. Antiaircraft fire took its toll on such flights, and as 
a result, the planes began attacking targets on the ground in 
Laos beginning in 1964. 

The "Secret War" 

United States support of Souvanna Phouma's government in 
the face of continuing North Vietnamese aggression did not 
constitute, technically speaking, a violation of the terms of the 
1962 Geneva Protocol, as Radio Hanoi and Radio Pathet Lao 
charged. It did not involve Laos in a military alliance, and 
there were no United States military bases or ground troops in 
Laos. Supply flights to RLG outposts were flown by civilian 
companies under charter to Souvanna Phouma's government. 
United States military pilots in civilian clothes, their names 
deleted from Department of Defense rosters, flew forward air 
control missions over Laos. United States pilots killed or cap- 
tured in Laos often were officially described as lost "in South- 
east Asia." CIA advisers assisted the guerrilla units of General 
Vang Pao's Hmong army, which, along with irregular forces in 
the south, was supplied with rice, arms, and pay by CIA opera- 
tives based at Udon Thani in Thailand. The total number of 
CIA personnel involved in this effort never exceeded 225 and 
included some fifty case officers. 

On the periphery of the plenary sessions at Geneva, Harri- 
man and his deputy, William H. Sullivan, had arrived at an 
informal understanding with Soviet deputy foreign minister 
Georgi M. Pushkin to the effect that as long as the United 



58 



Historical Setting 



States did not technically violate the Geneva Protocol the 
Soviet Union would not feel compelled, out of consideration of 
its ally in Hanoi, to respond to United States activities in Laos. 
The official curtain of secrecy associated with this arrangement 
gave rise later to statements in Congress that the United States 
was engaged in a "secret war" in Laos, a perspective that 
absolved the Ho Chi Minh government of responsibility for its 
support of the communist-dominated resistance movement in 
Laos since 1945. 

Souvanna Phouma was having problems of his own because 
of the peculiar nature of the Cold War in Laos. In April 1964, 
he visited Hanoi and Beijing. Premier Zhou Enlai reiterated 
China's support for the 1954 and 1962 Geneva agreements and 
advised Souvanna Phouma to dissociate the Laos question from 
the Vietnam question, a difficult task. Hanoi seemed to have 
succeeded in its strategy of making "one battlefield" out of 
Indochina — Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam — and the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail now extended through Laos and Cambodia. 

After a new tripartite meeting on the embattled Plain of Jars, 
Souvanna Phouma returned to Vientiane without any result 
and announced his intention to resign. Two rightist generals 
took advantage of the situation, staged a coup attempt, and 
arrested Souvanna Phouma. Only concerted action by Western 
ambassadors in the capital secured his release. Souvanna 
Phouma pledged to merge the rightist and Neutralist factions. 

There was further infighting among the generals. In Febru- 
ary 1965, General Phoumi, whose business dealings had 
earned him many enemies on the noncommunist side, left for 
Thailand. 

With the formal merger of their faction with the rightists, 
Neutralist leaders increasingly felt their lives to be in danger. 
Kong Le eventually took refuge in the Indonesian embassy in 
Vientiane, leaving Laos soon after for the safety of Paris. He was 
replaced as commander of Neutralist troops by General Seng- 
souvanh Souvannarath. 

From 1965 to 1973, the civil war seesawed back and forth in 
northern Laos, characterized by short but often very intense 
engagements. Because of the large areas contested, even North 
Vietnamese regular divisions in Laos, such as the 316th, were 
used in small-unit engagements during the dry season to deny 
control of territory and population to the other side. Popula- 
tion control was particularly important, because that was where 



59 



Laos: A Country Study 



recruitment for military training and transport occurred. The 
Hmong, in particular, suffered. Aside from the casualties, 
entire villages periodically had to escape the fighting, disrupt- 
ing crop growing and livestock tending. 

An exception to the rule of small-scale engagements was the 
major North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao offensive against Vang Pao 
that began in mid-December 1971 and lasted until the end of 
April 1972. This battle involved more than twenty North Viet- 
namese battalions and some 10,000 Hmong irregulars and 
Royal Lao Army defenders. After blasting the last defensive 
positions on the Plain of Jars with newly introduced 130mm 
guns with a thirty-kilometer range, the North Vietnamese 
advanced on Longtiang. They captured a number of positions 
on a ridge dominating the airfield before being driven off with 
heavy loss of life on both sides. The Hmong halted an attack of 
T-34 tanks against the airfield by skillfully placing land mines. 

Since 1963 Souvanna Phouma had kept vacant the cabinet 
seats allotted to the LPF, as he had done in the case of 
Phoumi's seat as interior minister in his August 30, 1960, gov- 
ernment. When the National Assembly rejected his budget in 
debate in September 1966, he obtained a vote in the King's 
Council to dissolve the assembly and hold elections for a new 
assembly the following year. Elections were held again on Janu- 
ary 2, 1972; forty-one of the fifty-nine deputies elected were 
new. The LPF boycotted the elections. The prime minister kept 
up contact with Souphanouvong in his cave headquarters in 
Houaphan, occasionally using the ICC and Soviet and North 
Vietnamese ambassadors as messengers. 

Powerless to stop the war and acquiescing in the diplomatic 
fiction that the 1962 Geneva Agreement was still in effect, Sou- 
vanna Phouma endured the revilement of Radio Pathet Lao, 
which called him a traitor, a capitulationist, and a tool of 
United States aggressors. The war drained Laos's manpower 
resources and pushed Souvanna Phouma into agreeing to 
introduce Thai artillery units on the royalist side and also 
helped to identify him with the rightist faction. As a result of 
the war, a peak number of 378,800 internally displaced persons 
were being cared for by the RLG in October 1973. Souvanna 
Phouma never gave up hope of resuming negotiations when 
conditions became more favorable. 



60 



The Unknown Soldiers Memorial, in Vientiane, was built after the 
revolution to commemorate the Pathet Lao who died during 

the Second Indochina War. 
Courtesy Gina Merris 

The Third Coalition and the Lao People s Democratic 
Republic 

Negotiations in Paris in the autumn of 1972 between the 
United States and North Vietnam created a favorable environ- 
ment for reaching a cease-fire agreement in Laos. Negotiations 
opened in Vientiane on October 17, 1972, and went on incon- 
clusively between Pheng Phongsavan, representing Souvanna 
Phouma, and Phoumi Vongvichit, representing the Pathet Lao. 
Souvanna Phouma was hopeful that the United States would 
keep up the pressure. But the situation had changed drastically 
during the previous decade. There were now only two sides in 
the negotiations, and the Pathet Lao insisted that their oppo- 
nents be referred to as "the Viangchan government side." 



61 



Laos: A Country Study 

Moreover, the United States was on its way out of Indochina — 
whether by its Vietnamization policy or by negotiations with 
Hanoi. Nonetheless, there was no guarantee that Hanoi would 
respect the provisions of negotiated agreements on Laos, and 
the ability of the United States to enforce compliance was not 
as great as Souvanna Phouma imagined. The pressure grew to 
conclude the negotiations rapidly. 

The Vientiane Agreement 

The two sides signed the peace agreement in Vientiane on 
February 21, 1973. A new coalition government was to be 
formed. Vientiane and Louangphrabang were to be neutral- 
ized by the arrival of Pathet Lao security contingents. A cease- 
fire was to take effect from noon on the following day. Unlike 
in 1962, however, there were no solemn guarantees by fourteen 
signatories of Laos's neutrality. The agreement was strictly 
between Laotians, with the ICC more powerless than ever to 
verify its execution. 

By the time of the cease-fire, United States aircraft had 
dropped almost 2.1 million tons of bombs on Laos, approxi- 
mately the total tonnage dropped by United States air forces 
during all of World War II in both the European and Pacific 
theaters. Most bombs were dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, 
which had grown into a major transportation route for the 
North Vietnamese. The cessation of United States bombing 
allowed the North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao supply convoys to 
move with impunity, enabling them to initiate armed actions 
that they camouflaged with accusations of cease-fire violations 
by RLG forces. The United States, in protest against some of 
the most flagrant cease-fire violations, sent its planes back into 
action on limited missions. This enabled the Pathet Lao to 
claim that the United States had violated the Vientiane Agree- 
ment. 

An uneasy lull settled on the Hmong country north of Vien- 
tiane. Air power had allowed the Hmong to maintain a tenuous 
balance of force with their adversaries. However, the air strip at 
Longtiang was empty, and the Royal Lao Air Force T-28s, on 
which General Vang Pao had often relied, had been pulled 
back to Vientiane on orders from Souvanna Phouma. The 
United States air armada that had operated from bases in Thai- 
land was withdrawn. With the loss of air cover, no area in 
Hmong territory was safe from artillery bombardment. 



62 



Historical Setting 



Although their CIA advisers remained temporarily at Long- 
tiang, the Hmong were beginning to feel deserted. With the 
war winding down in Vietnam and the military government in 
Thailand overthrown in a student revolt in October 1973, 
United States interest in Laos waned. 

The Origins of the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Question 

The unconditional return of prisoners of war (POWs) from 
all the countries of Indochina was, in the words of Henry A. 
Kissinger, the chief United States negotiator at Paris, "one of 
the premises on which the United States based its signature of 
the Vietnam agreement." Kissinger said he had received "cate- 
gorical assurances" from the North Vietnamese delegation in 
Paris that United States POWs captured in Laos would be 
released in the same time frame as those from North Vietnam 
and South Vietnam, that is, by March 28, 1973. 

Under the provisions of Chapter II, Article 5, of the Vien- 
tiane Agreement, the two sides were obligated to repatriate all 
persons held captive regardless of nationality within sixty days 
of the formation of the coalition government. When the cease- 
fire came, it was generally assumed that the Pathet Lao held a 
large number of United States citizens they or the North Viet- 
namese had captured in Laos, and the Department of Defense 
listed some 555 United States personnel as unaccounted for — 
either as POWs, missing in action (MIA), or killed in action/ 
body not recovered. The Pathet Lao had released a number of 
United States prisoners after the formation of the 1962 coali- 
tion. There was considerable uncertainty surrounding the 
POW/MIA question, however, because the Pathet Lao had nei- 
ther provided lists of those who had fallen into their hands nor 
adhered to international conventions on treatment of POWs, 
in keeping with their contention that the United States was 
guilty of an aggressive, undeclared war against Laos. Condi- 
tions of detention in jungle prison camps were harsh in the 
extreme, as attested to by the few who managed to escape. Pris- 
oners had no medicine, and they had to supplement their 
ration of rice, both meager and dirty, with beetles and rats. 

Soth Petrasy, permanent representative of the Pathet Lao 
delegation in Vientiane, told Phone Chantaraj, editor of the 
Vientiane newspaper Xat Lao (The Lao Nation), five days prior 
to the signing of the Vientiane Agreement that the Pathet Lao 
leadership had a detailed accounting of United States prison- 



63 



Laos: A Country Study 



ers and the locations where they were being held and that they 
would be released after the cease-fire. He added: "If they were 
captured in Laos, they will be returned in Laos." On the day 
the Vientiane Agreement was signed, the United States charge 
d'affaires obtained confirmation from Soth of his previous 
statements and requested further details. Although Soth pro- 
posed to send a message to Xam Nua asking for the number 
and names of United States citizens held captive, this informa- 
tion was not forthcoming. 

The United States embassy began pressing for the release by 
March 28 of prisoners captured in Laos. The question was 
whether the Pathet Lao would consider themselves bound by 
the agreement with its implication that they followed the 
orders of the North Vietnamese. Resolution of the matter was 
further complicated by the fact that procedures for prisoner 
exchanges stipulated in the Vientiane Agreement had still to 
be negotiated by the two sides in Laos. 

On March 26, Soth informed the United States that the 
Pathet Lao would release eight ^prisoners in Hanoi on March 
28. These prisoners, whose names had previously been given to 
United States officials by the North Vietnamese in Paris, had 
been held in North Vietnam for some time. On March 27, the 
Pathet Lao delivered a note verbale to the United States embassy 
that stated this fulfilled their POW release obligations and 
demanded that the United States pressure the Vientiane gov- 
ernment to negotiate "seriously" for implementing the political 
provisions of the agreement. The Pathet Lao rejected subse- 
quent United States requests to dissociate the question of 
United States POWs from other matters covered by the Vien- 
tiane Agreement. The North Vietnamese, for their part, did 
not respond to Kissinger's requests for clarification of the dis- 
crepancy between the number of POWs and MIAs carried by 
the Department of Defense and the small number of POWs 
released. 

The protocol giving effect to the Vientiane Agreement was 
signed on September 14, 1973. Paragraph 18 made the two- 
party Joint Central Commission to Implement the Agreement 
responsible for implementing provisions for exchanges of pris- 
oners and information. The names of personnel who had died 
in captivity were to be exchanged within fifteen to thirty days, 
and all prisoners were to be released within sixty days after for- 
mation of the coalition government. However, the only United 



64 



Historical Setting 



States citizen released by the Pathet Lao in Laos in accordance 
with these provisions was a civilian pilot captured after the 
cease-fire. For the next twenty years, representatives of the new 
regime would sit at a table and calmly inform visiting United 
States officials and families of POW/MIAs that they knew noth- 
ing about the fate of United States POWs and MIAs in Laos 
(see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). 

Formation of the Third Coalition 

The Provisional Government of National Union (PGNU), 
Laos's third experiment with coalition government, was finally 
constituted on April 5, 1974, following one last desperate coup 
attempt by rightist officers in exile against Souvanna Phouma. 
Cabinet posts were assigned, with a vice premier and five minis- 
ters from each side plus two chosen by mutual consent. Under 
each minister was a vice minister from the other side. The 
makeup of the National Political Consultative Council, an 
unelected pseudo-National Assembly, was similarly balanced. 

Paragraph 14 of the September 14, 1973, protocol provided 
for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Laos within sixty 
days of the PGNU's formation, the same deadline as for pris- 
oner exchanges. Once again the United States met the dead- 
line. Although it terminated the mission of Group 959 after the 
cease-fire, North Vietnam did not withdraw its estimated 
38,500 regular troops from Laos. Among other provisions that 
occupied the Joint Central Commission to Implement the 
Agreement was the demarcation of the cease-fire line and the 
neutralization of the two capitals. 

Because of the Pathet Lao ministers' opposition, the PGNU 
barred the traditional opening of the National Assembly on 
May 11, Constitution Day. The king voiced his displeasure over 
the PGNU's decision to circumvent the constitution and not 
convene the National Assembly, elected in 1972. The dissolu- 
tion of the National Assembly and the holding of new elec- 
tions, matters that had not been specifically included in the 
Vientiane Agreement or its protocol, embroiled the PGNU in 
endless argument. The king did not attend the session of the 
National Political Consultative Council in Louangphrabang, 
which, under the chairmanship of Souphanouvong, adopted a 
far-ranging eighteen-point political program. One of the points 
in the National Political Consultative Council's program was a 



65 



Laos: A Country Study 



demand that the United States pay reparations for war dam- 
ages. 

The Communist Seizure of Power 

On March 27, 1975, North Vietnamese-Pathet Lao forces 
launched a strong attack against Vang Pao's Hmong defenders. 
The attackers rapidly captured the Sala Phou Khoun road junc- 
tion and then drove south along Route 13 as far as Muang Kasi. 
Souvanna Phouma, wishing to avoid bloodshed, ordered Vang 
Pao only to defend himself and refused to allow air strikes in 
his support. The Pathet Lao singled out the Hmong as enemies 
to be shown no quarter. Pathet Lao radio broadcasts spoke of 
"wiping out" these special forces who had stood in their way for 
fifteen years. 

Realizing that the Hmong were being abandoned and the 
penalty they faced if left to the mercy of the Pathet Lao, Vang 
Pao requested evacuation for his soldiers and their families to 
safe haven in Thailand. The CIA station at Udon Thani offered 
to evacuate families of key officers. Vang Pao requested an air- 
lift for 5,000. Facing an ultimatum, Vang Pao and twelve 
Hmong leaders signed a treaty on May 10 reminding the 
United States of the pledges made to them and agreeing to 
leave Laos and never return. In the next days, a motley collec- 
tion of planes piloted by United States volunteers, Hmong, and 
Lao flew out a few hundred Hmong. Vang Pao himself left on 
May 14, eluding the T-28s at Vientiane. 

Meanwhile, a campaign of intimidation against rightist 
members of the PGNU and military officers gathered momen- 
tum in Vientiane. Operating under the umbrella of a coalition 
of twenty-one "organizations standing for peace and national 
concord," a standard communist tactic, the demonstrators used 
inflation and other popular grievances to mobilize support for 
the eighteen-point program of the National Political Consulta- 
tive Council. Souvanna Phouma tried at first to ban the demon- 
strations but later gave in and sided with their aims. The May 
Day holiday provided the pretext for the largest demonstration 
to date, followed a week later by a demonstration against the 
rightist army and police. Demonstrators occupied the com- 
pound of the United States aid mission, forcing termination of 
the aid program. Four rightist ministers, including the defense 
minister, Sisouk na Champasak, fled. Another minister, Boun 
Om, was assassinated in the capital. 



66 



Historical Setting 



Elsewhere, takeovers of government offices and orchestrated 
demonstrations led to the entry of Pathet Lao troops into 
Pakxe, Savannakhet, Thakhek, and other towns during May "to 
secure their defense." People's revolutionary committees sur- 
faced to seize administrative power from the remnants of the 
RLG. Officials and military officers who chose not to flee were 
summoned to "seminars." On August 23, the Pathet Lao com- 
pleted its seizure of local power with the takeover of the Vien- 
tiane city administration by a revolutionary committee. The 
Pathet Lao announced that military units had requested Pathet 
Lao "advisers," thereby facilitating the integration of the army. 

Throughout this time, the elite communist leaders who were 
making the decisions remained out of sight. Kaysone Phomvi- 
han, in a speech in Vieng Xay on October 12, declared that 
"the revolution will speed up." Simultaneously, the National 
Political Consultative Council established new screening proce- 
dures for candidates for election that effectively eliminated all 
those who had not supported the LPF. Suddenly, in the last 
week of November, the NPCC convened in Xam Nua. Also in 
November, elections were held in the "new zone," the former 
RLG zone. Eligible voters were required to vote for a list of can- 
didates whose names were distributed the evening before. Can- 
didates were local party administrators, whose identities had 
been kept secret up to then. On November 28, demonstrators 
demanded the dissolution of the PGNU and the National Polit- 
ical Consultative Council as inappropriate to the situation. The 
next day, Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong flew to 
Louangphrabang and persuaded the king to abdicate. 

Establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic 

The National Congress of People's Representatives, recreat- 
ing the mise-en-scene of 1945, met in the auditorium of the 
former United States community school on December 1. 
Sisana Sisan delivered the opening speech on behalf of the pre- 
liminary committee for convening the National Congress of 
People's Representatives. So far only the LPF and other front 
organizations and delegations from the various provinces were 
listed as attending among the 264 delegates. The preliminary 
committee thereupon dissolved itself. 

Prince Souphanouvong, named to the presidium of the 
National Congress, said in his speech that the congress would 
"study" the king's abdication, the dissolution of the PGNU and 



67 



Laos: A Country Study 



the National Political Consultative Council, and the political 
report on abolishing the monarchy and establishing a people's 
democratic republic. This last item was read by Kaysone, who 
was also on the congress presidium. For most of the world, it 
was the first look at the man who, for thirty years, had led the 
revolution in Laos from behind the scenes in Vietnam and in 
the caves of Houaphan. Kaysone presided at the December 2 
session. He began by reading a motion to establish the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, which was passed by acclama- 
tion. Kaysone then nominated Souphanouvong to be president 
of the country. Again, the vote was unanimous. Next, Nouhak 
took the podium to say it was necessary to elect a Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly. He proposed Souphanouvong as president of 
the Supreme People's Assembly and then read a list of forty- 
four names. This vote was also unanimous. 

Officially, the party — which had been renamed the Phak 
Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party — LPRP; 
see Glossary) at its Second Party Congress in 1972 — played no 
role in the National Congress. But it began making its public 
appearance immediately thereafter in indirect ways; for exam- 
ple, banners carrying revolutionary slogans and messages of 
congratulations from North Vietnamese, Soviet, and Chinese 
leaders began to appear. With power firmly in its grasp, the 
LPRP no longer had any reason to hide its identity. For the first 
time, the party publicly identified the seven members of its 
Political Bureau (Politburo). From this point, the party alone 
made decisions in the Lao People's Democratic Republic. 
Gone were the "democratic freedoms" that had been extolled 
in the National Political Consultative Council's eighteen 
points. The Neutralist Party and other noncommunist parties 
disappeared, leaving a one-party regime. Those who objected 
could leave. Some 350,000 availed themselves of this opportu- 
nity over the next few years, leaving behind their homes and 
belongings, and, in many cases, even their loved ones. 

"Seminar Camps" and the Death of King Savang Vatthana 

"Seminar camps," also called reeducation centers, were the 
centerpiece of the new regime's policy toward the enemies it 
had defeated. The LPRP's Marxist-Leninist dogma allowed no 
respite in the class struggle, and those identified as its former 
enemies were the presumed saboteurs and subversives of the 
socialist phase of the revolution that was just getting under way. 
After its victory, the regime made people judged unfit to par tic- 



68 



Historical Setting 



ipate in the new society in their present frame of mind con- 
struct a series of camps, known only by their numbers. They 
included Camp 01 at Sop Hao; Camp 03 near Na Kai, newly 
given the Pali name Viangxai, meaning "Victorious Town"; 
Camp 05 near Muang Xamteu; and Camps 04 and 06 near 
Muang Et, all in Houaphan. A camp was also built at Muang 
Khoua on the Nam Ou, and others were built in the center and 
south. There are no official figures on the numbers of people 
sent for reeducation, because the camp network was kept a 
secret from the outside world. The only information was 
brought out by former inmates and their families. Various pub- 
lished estimates have put the number of inmates at 30,000, at 
37,600, and at 50,000. 

Even before the communist takeover, the first groups of 
high-level officials, including provincial governors and district 
chiefs, had been transported to the camps, arriving in full dress 
uniform. They had received letters signed by Souvanna 
Phouma ordering them to attend an important meeting in 
Vientiane. After an overnight stay in Vientiane, the group was 
flown to the Plain of Jars, where a festive atmosphere prevailed. 
The officials, about seventy in all, were feted with food and a 
movie, and North Vietnamese advisers were present. They were 
then flown to Houaphan, separated into small groups, and 
organized into work parties. 

In August and September 1977, a group of twenty-six "reac- 
tionary" high-ranking officials and military officers in Camp 05 
were accused of plotting a coup and arrested. These persons 
were taken away to Camp 01. They included Pheng Phongsa- 
van, the minister who had signed the Vientiane Agreement; 
Touby Lyfoung, the Hmong leader; Soukhan Vilaysan, another 
of Souvanna Phouma's ministers who had been with him in the 
Lao Issara and had risen to become secretary general of the 
Neutralists; and Generals Bounphone Maekthepharak and 
Ouan Ratikoun. All died in Camp 01. Thus, those who played 
roles in the modern history of Laos were relegated by the 
regime to the status of nonpersons and their fate placed in the 
hands of their prison guards. Others, like Tiao Sisoumang 
Sisaleumsak, a minister in Souvanna Phouma's 1960 govern- 
ment, General Sengsouvanh Souvannarath, commander of the 
Neutralist forces, Khamchan Pradith, an intellectual and diplo- 
mat, and even Sing Chanthakoummane, a lieutenant in the 
Second Paratroop Battalion in 1960, were held in seminar 
camps for fifteen years or more before being released. Sou- 



69 



Laos: A Country Study 



vanna Phouma was allowed to live quietly in Vientiane until his 
death in January 1984. 

The new regime feared that ex-King Savang Vatthana, who 
until March 1977 had lived quietly in the royal palace as a pri- 
vate citizen with the meaningless title of adviser to President 
Souphanouvong, would become a symbol of popular resis- 
tance. As a result, he was suddenly spirited away by helicopter 
to Houaphan along with Queen Khamboui and Crown Prince 
Say Vongsavang. Imprisoned in Camp 01, the crown prince 
died on May 2, 1978, and the king eleven days later of starva- 
tion. The queen died on December 12, 1981. According to an 
eyewitness, all were buried in unmarked graves outside the 
camp's perimeter. No official announcement was made. More 
than a decade later, during a visit to France in December 1989, 
Kaysone confirmed reports of the king's death in an innocuous 
aside that attributed it to old age. 

The party did not dare abolish the Buddhist community of 
monks and novices, the clergy (sangha), of which the king had 
been the supreme patron. It did, however, attempt to reshape 
the sangha into an instrument of control. In March 1979, the 
Venerable Thammayano, the eighty-seven-year-old Sangha-raja 
of Laos, the country's highest-ranking abbott, fled by floating 
across the Mekong on a raft of inflated car tubes. His secretary, 
who engineered the escape, reported that the Sangha-raja had 
been confined to his monastery in Louangphrabang and was 
forbidden to preach. Ordinary monks were not forbidden to 
preach, but their sermons were commonly tape recorded and 
monitored for signs of dissidence. As a result of these pres- 
sures, the number of monks in Laos decreased sharply after 
1975 (see Buddhism, ch. 2). 

Postwar Relations with the United States 

Perhaps more understandable than its brutality toward its 
own people was the party's hostility toward the formerly large 
United States aid program, which had been directed at sup- 
porting the RLG. Even so, the public humiliations inflicted on 
the departing aid mission personnel — forced to leave behind 
everything they could not carry aboard a plane — were exces- 
sive by any standard. Aid projects such as the Operation Broth- 
erhood hospital at Longtiang were abandoned overnight. In 
spite of Souvanna Phouma's assurances to the United States 
ambassador that the government would provide continuity in 



70 



Monk crossing Wat Xieng Thong yard, Louangphrabang 

Courtesy Gina Merris 

medical services, foreign nurses and other technicians were 
not replaced. 

No record exists of any discussion by the United States 
embassy — staffed at the charge d'affaires level after the depar- 
ture in April 1975 of Ambassador Charles S. Whitehouse — of 
United States "participation" in healing war wounds or of the 
reconstruction aid mentioned in Article 10c of the Vientiane 
Agreement. Even had the United States been predisposed to 
discuss these matters, the conditions of the takeover by the 
LPRP would have precluded it. Ambassadorial relations 
resumed in 1992. 

Another issue was opium production, which, in Laos as in 
the rest of the Golden Triangle of Laos-Burma-Thailand, had 
grown as the demand for the opium derivative heroin grew. 
Opium production and trade became a source of tension in 
relations between the two governments. Laos resented official 



71 



Laos: A Country Study 



United States pressure as an attempt to shift the blame for the 
problem (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4; Narcotics and Counter- 
narcotics Issues, ch. 5). 

Developments in the Lao People's Democratic Republic 

In spite of the regime's revolutionary rhetoric about self-reli- 
ance on the march to socialism, Western aid was simply 
replaced over the 1970s and 1980s by aid from "fraternal coun- 
tries" of the Soviet bloc. Living standards declined further. 
Nongovernmental organizations, including some from the 
United States, in cooperation with local officials, established a 
few small-scale aid projects that reached out to real needs in 
the areas of health, education, and economic development. 

Kaysone and his colleagues, following the well-known exam- 
ples of Soviet and East European party leaders, led carefully 
protected lives behind the walls of their guarded compounds 
in the capital, secluded from public scrutiny and shielded from 
any manifestation of hostility, their movements kept secret. The 
minister of interior, Somseun Khamphithoun, whose ministry 
was responsible for the operation of the seminar camps, was 
never seen publicly in Vientiane. Corruption, widespread in 
the years of the United States civilian and military aid pro- 
grams, resumed with the new opportunities presented by the 
"economic opening" beginning in 1986. 

The first Supreme People's Assembly, appointed by the 
National Congress on December 2, 1975, rapidly faded into 
obscurity, although its twice-yearly meetings were reported in 
the controlled press. In 1988, perhaps because the regime 
wished to give itself some semblance of popular underpinning, 
it suddenly announced that elections would be held for a new 
Supreme People's Assembly. Elections were held on June 26, 
1988, for 2,410 seats on district-level people's councils and on 
November 20, 1988, for 651 seats on province-level people's 
councils. On March 26, 1989, elections were held for seventy- 
nine seats on the Supreme People's Assembly. Candidates in all 
elections were screened by the party. Sixty-five of the seventy- 
nine members of the assembly were party members (see Legis- 
lature, ch. 4). 

In the area of foreign relations, Laos joined the ranks of the 
"socialist camp" on December 2, 1975. Gone was any pretense 
of neutrality. In the new state of affairs where "peace" had at 
long last been achieved and no one paid attention to the pres- 



72 



Historical Setting 



ence of "fraternal" foreign troops on Laotian soil, the delega- 
tions of the ICC in Laos returned to their respective countries, 
leaving behind piles of unpaid bills. 

In accordance with the organic links between the Vietnam- 
ese and Laotian parties that have been acclaimed by the high- 
est party leaders, Laos has been tied more closely to Vietnam 
than to any other country. The term special relations (in Lao, 
khan phoua phan yang phiset) to describe the linkage between 
the two parties and governments had come into use as early as 
November 1973 when Le Duan, first secretary of the Vietnam- 
ese party, visited Viangxai (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). 
Thereafter, special relations was the term increasingly empha- 
sized in joint statements. In July 1977, Laos and Vietnam 
signed the twenty-five-year Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- 
tion. They also agreed to redefine their common border, which 
was demarcated in 1986. In early 1989, the Vietnamese troops 
that had been stationed in Laos continuously since 1961 were 
reported to have been withdrawn. 

Despite some incidents along their common border, Thai- 
land took an accommodating stand toward the country. Open- 
ing the border to trade and eliminating the "sanctuary" 
problem were affirmed as goals in a 1979 joint communique 
between Kaysone and the Thai prime minister, Kriangsak 
Chomanand, which was subsequently cited by Laotians as the 
touchstone of their relations with Thailand (see Bilateral Rela- 
tions, ch. 4). Following a series of shooting incidents in 1984 
involving rival claims to three border villages, a major dispute 
arose in December 1987 over territory claimed by Laos as part 
of Boten District in Xaignabouri and by Thailand as part of 
Chat Trakan District in Phitsanulok Province. The fighting that 
ensued claimed more than 1,000 lives before a cease-fire was 
declared on February 19, 1988. The origin of the dispute was 
the ambiguity of the topographic nomenclature used in the 
1907 Franco-Siamese border treaty over the area of the Nam 
Heung, up which Fa Ngum's army had traveled in the four- 
teenth century. After 1975 the sanctuary problem also defied 
solution for a decade, with the Hmong and communist rebels 
occupying some of the old Lao Issara resistance bases in Thai- 
land. However, a series of working-level meetings between the 
two sides were arranged that served to defuse the conflict, and 
relations improved markedly in the late 1980s. 



73 



Laos: A Country Study 

Although official relations between Laos and China were 
strained by the Si no-Vietnamese War of 1979, the two countries 
maintained diplomatic relations, and local trade continued 
across their common border. The ending of the brief war saw a 
rapid and steady improvement in mutual ties and exchanges of 
visits at all levels. Kaysone visited Beijing, and a border demar- 
cation commission completed its work to mutual satisfaction. 

Laos seemed at last to have achieved stable relations with its 
neighbors. Centuries-old conflicts that had repeatedly seen for- 
eign invaders trampling Laotian soil with their elephants or 
tanks, Laotians conscripted by this or that pretender to the 
throne, pagodas built and then destroyed, and the countryside 
laid waste, had receded. Peace brought the prospect of a better 
life, if not yet participation in a multiparty democracy. It was as 
if after so much suffering Laotians had turned inward, seeking 
the fulfillment that had always come from their families, their 
villages, their sangha, and their pride in the moments of glory 
in their country's long history. 

* * * 

No complete history of Laos exists in English, but there are 
three very useful bibliographies. The most useful for the begin- 
ner, because of the annotations, is Helen Cordell's Laos. The 
compiler's introductory essay also provides an informative 
overview of the country and its people. A far more extensive 
bibliography, but lacking annotation except for subject matter 
headings, is William W. Sage and Judith A. N. Henchy's Laos: A 
Bibliography. Finally, Martin Stuart-Fox and Mary Kooyman's 
Historical Dictionary of Laos contains a much more narrow selec- 
tion of writings on Laos. 

For the modern period before 1975, Arthur J. Dommen's 
Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization and Hugh Toye's 
Laos: Buffer State or Battleground are still standard. Maha Sila 
Viravong's Phongsavadan Lao (History of Laos), although 
flawed and somewhat dated, is still useful. MacAlister Brown 
and Joseph J. Zasloffs Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist 
Movement in Laos, 1930-85 provides detailed information on 
the civil war years. No history of the Lao People's Democratic 
Republic in English has yet appeared, and in view of the secre- 
tiveness of the regime, writing about it is difficult. Readers 
interested in following current events are advised to rely on the 
translations provided by the Foreign Broadcast Information 
Service's Daily Report: East Asia. 



74 



Historical Setting 



Primary source materials are available in both the French 
and United States archives. The former deal mainly with the 
colonial period. The latter contain so far declassified diplo- 
matic correspondence of the Department of State through 
1960, with the exception of that dealing with the POW/MIA 
issue for 1973-92 declassified at a Senate committee's request. 
All Department of Defense documents relating to the POW/ 
MIA issue are available at the Library of Congress. Documenta- 
tion of the CIA's role in Laos is still withheld by the CIA. 

Foreign scholars have not had access to the archives of the 
Indochinese Communist Party, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party, or the Lao People's Revolutionary Party (with the excep- 
tion of some work by Japanese scholars in Hanoi dealing with 
the period of the 1940s and early 1950s; e.g., Moto Furuta and 
Masaya Shiraishi's Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s). These 
archives seem unlikely to be opened short of an upheaval simi- 
lar to that which befell the parties of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. 

Much scholarly writing on Laos history appears in periodi- 
cals, such as Asian Survey, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 
Pacific Affairs, and Peninsule. (For further information and com- 
plete citations, see Bibliography.) 



75 



Chapter 2. The Society and Its Environment 




Detail of a glass mosaic depicting scenes of village life covering the walls of the 
"Library, " a small building on the grounds of Wat Xieng Thong, Louang- 
phrabang; an example of sixteenth-century Buddhist architecture. 



LAOS IS A RURAL COUNTRY whose relatively low population 
density has allowed the continuation of a village society reliant 
on subsistence agriculture. The lack of a national government 
infrastructure and effective transportation networks has also 
contributed to the relative independence and autonomy of 
most villages. Residence in a village thus has been an important 
aspect of social identity, particularly for lowland Lao ethnic 
groups. For many upland ethnic groups, clan membership is a 
more important point of social identification. For all groups, 
the village community has a kinship nexus, although structures 
differ. Rice is the staple food for all Laotians, and most families 
and villages are able to produce enough or nearly enough each 
year for their own consumption. 

Laos is ethnically diverse; the population includes more than 
forty ethnic groups, which are classified within three general 
families of Lao Sung (upland Lao), Lao Theung (midland 
Lao), and Lao Loum (lowland Lao). The country is officially a 
multiethnic nation, with Lao as the official language, but rela- 
tionships among the different groups have sometimes been 
characterized by misunderstandings and competition over nat- 
ural resources. The different ethnic groups have substantially 
different residential patterns, agricultural practices, forms of 
village governance, and religious beliefs. 

Only the national capital of Vientiane and a few other pro- 
vincial capitals can be considered urban. These small cities are 
market and administrative centers that attract trading and com- 
munications activity, but they have developed very little manu- 
facturing or industrial capacity. Daily and seasonal life in all 
sectors of the society is affected by the monsoon. Rice produc- 
tion determines periods of heavy and slack work, which are 
mirrored in school vacations, religious festivals, and govern- 
ment activity. 

Most lowland Lao and some midland groups practice Thera- 
vada Buddhism, but also believe in spirits of places or of 
deceased persons. Upland and most midland ethnic groups are 
animist, with religious practices oriented toward protective or 
guardian spirits commonly associated with places or with a fam- 
ily or clan. Shamans or other spirit practitioners are recognized 



79 




Figure 3. Laos in Its Southeast Asian Setting, 1994 

and respected for their divinatory and healing powers among 
most ethnic groups, whether Buddhist or not. 

Education and social services remain rudimentary at best 
but are improving. In lowland villages, traditional education 
was provided to boys and young men through the Buddhist 
temples. Although this practice continues in some areas, in 
general it has been supplanted by a national education system, 
which, unfortunately, is hampered by limited financial 



80 



The Society and Its Environment 



resources and a lack of trained teachers. Western medical care 
is seldom available outside provincial or a few district centers 
and even then is very limited. Child and infant mortality is 
high, and life expectancy is the lowest in Southeast Asia; the 
population, however, is increasing at a rapid rate. Since the end 
of World War II, significant differences in education, health, 
and demographic conditions have prevailed among the ethnic 
groups and between rural and urban populations. 

The Physical Environment 

Laos, a landlocked nation that covers 236,800 square kilome- 
ters in the center of the Southeast Asian peninsula, is sur- 
rounded by Burma, Cambodia, China, Thailand, and Vietnam 
(see fig. 3). Its location has often made it a buffer between 
more powerful neighboring states, as well as a crossroads for 
trade and communication (see Developments in the Nine- 
teenth Century, ch. 1; Foreign Trade, ch. 3). Migration and 
international conflict have contributed to the present ethnic 
composition of the country and to the geographic distribution 
of its ethnic groups. 

Topography 

Most of the western border of Laos is demarcated by the 
Mekong River, which is an important artery for transportation 
(see fig. 4). Khong Falls at the southern end of the country pre- 
vents access to the sea, but cargo boats travel along the entire 
length of the Mekong in Laos during most of the year. Smaller 
power boats and pirogues provide an important means of 
transportation on many of the tributaries of the Mekong. The 
Mekong has thus not been an obstacle but a facilitator for com- 
munication, and the similarities between Laos and northeast 
Thai society — same people, same language — reflect the close 
contact that has existed across the river for centuries. Also, 
many Laotians living in the Mekong Valley have relatives and 
friends in Thailand. Prior to the twentieth century, Laotian 
kingdoms and principalities encompassed areas on both sides 
of the Mekong, and Thai control in the late nineteenth cen- 
tury extended to the left bank. Although the Mekong was 
established as a border by French colonial forces, travel from 
one side to the other has been significantly limited only since 
the establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic 
(LPDR, or Laos) in 1975. 



81 



Laos: A Country Study 

The eastern border with Vietnam extends for 2,130 kilome- 
ters, mostly along the crest of the Annamite Chain, and serves 
as a physical barrier between the Chinese-influenced culture of 
Vietnam and the Indianized states of Laos and Thailand. These 
mountains are sparsely populated by tribal minorities, who tra- 
ditionally have not acknowledged the border with Vietnam any 
more than lowland Lao have been constrained by the 1,754- 
kilometer Mekong River border with Thailand. Thus, ethnic 
minority populations are found on both the Laotian and Viet- 
namese sides of the frontier. Because of their relative isolation, 
contact between these groups and lowland Lao has been mostly 
confined to trading. 

Laos shares its short — only 541 kilometers — southern border 
with Cambodia, and ancient Khmer ruins at Wat Pho and other 
southern locations attest to the long history of contact between 
the Lao and the Khmer. In the north, the country is bounded 
by a mountainous 423-kilometer border with China and shares 
the 235-kilometer-long Mekong River border with Burma. 

The topography of Laos is largely mountainous, with eleva- 
tions above 500 meters typically characterized by steep terrain, 
narrow river valleys, and low agricultural potential. This moun- 
tainous landscape extends across most of the north of the 
country, except for the plain of Vientiane and the Plain of Jars 
in Xiangkhoang Province. The southern "panhandle" of the 
country contains large level areas in Savannakhet and Cham- 
pasak provinces that are well suited for extensive paddy rice 
cultivation and livestock raising (see Crops and Farming Sys- 
tems, ch. 3). Much of Khammouan Province and the eastern 
part of all the southern provinces are mountainous. Together, 
the alluvial plains and terraces of the Mekong and its tributar- 
ies cover only about 20 percent of the land area. 

Only about 4 percent of the total land area is classified as 
arable. The forested land area has declined significantly since 
the 1970s as a result of commercial logging and expanded swid- 
den, or slash-and-burn, farming (see Forestry, ch. 3). 

Climate 

Laos has a tropical monsoon climate, with a pronounced 
rainy season from May through October, a cool dry season 
from November through February, and a hot dry season in 
March and April. Generally, monsoons occur at the same time 
across the country, although that time may vary significantly 



82 



t 





8 



The Society and Its Environment 



from one year to the next. Rainfall also varies regionally, with 
the highest amounts — 3,700 millimeters annually — recorded 
on the Bolovens Plateau in Champasak Province. City rainfall 
stations have recorded that Savannakhet averages 1,440 milli- 
meters of rain annually; Vientiane receives about 1,700 milli- 
meters, and Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang) receives about 
1,360 millimeters. Rainfall is not always adequate for rice culti- 
vation, however, and the relatively high average precipitation 
conceals years where rainfall may be only half or less of the 
norm, causing significant declines in rice yields. Such droughts 
often are regional, leaving production in other parts of the 
country unaffected. Temperatures range from highs around 
40°C along the Mekong in March and April to lows of 5°C or 
less in the uplands of Xiangkhoang and Phongsali in January. 

Transportation Routes 

Because of its mountainous topography and lack of develop- 
ment, Laos has few reliable transportation routes. This inacces- 
sibility has historically limited the ability of any government to 
maintain a presence in areas distant from the national or pro- 
vincial capitals and has limited interchange and communica- 
tion among villages and ethnic groups (see Transportation and 
Telecommunications, ch. 3). The Mekong and Nam Ou are the 
only natural channels suitable for large-draft boat transporta- 
tion, and from December through May low water limits the size 
of the craft that may be used over many routes. Laotians in low- 
land villages located on the banks of smaller rivers have tradi- 
tionally traveled in pirogues for fishing, trading, and visiting up 
and down the river for limited distances. Otherwise, travel is by 
ox-cart over level terrain or by foot. The steep mountains and 
lack of roads have caused upland ethnic groups to rely entirely 
on pack baskets and horse packing for transportation. 

The road system is not extensive. However, a rudimentary 
network begun under French colonial rule and continued 
from the 1950s has provided an important means of increased 
intervillage communication, movement of market goods, and a 
focus for new settlements. In mid-1994, travel in most areas was 
difficult and expensive, and most Laotians traveled only lim- 
ited distances, if at all. As a result of ongoing improvements in 
the road system during the early 1990s, however, it is expected 
that in the future villagers will more easily be able to seek med- 
ical care, send children to schools at district centers, and work 
outside the village. 



85 



Laos: A Country Study 

Natural Resources 

Expanding commercial exploitation of forests, plans for 
additional hydroelectric facilities, foreign demands for wild 
animals and nonwood forest products for food and traditional 
medicines, and a growing population have brought new and 
increasing attention to the forests. Traditionally, forests have 
been important sources of wild foods, herbal medicines, and 
timber for house construction. Even into the 1990s, the gov- 
ernment viewed the forest as a valued reserve of natural prod- 
ucts for noncommercial household consumption. Government 
efforts to preserve valuable hardwoods for commercial extrac- 
tion have led to measures to prohibit swidden cultivation 
throughout the country (see Agriculture and Forestry, ch. 3). 
Further, government restrictions on clearing forestland for 
swidden cropping in the late 1980s, along with attempts to 
gradually resettle upland swidden farming villages {ban — see 
Glossary) to lowland locations suitable for paddy rice cultiva- 
tion, had significant effects on upland villages. Traditionally, 
villages have relied on forest products as a food reserve during 
years of poor rice harvest and as a regular source of fruits and 
vegetables. By the 1990s, however, these gathering systems were 
breaking down in many areas. At the same time, international 
concern about environmental degradation and the loss of 
many wildlife species unique to Laos has prompted the govern- 
ment to consider the implications of these developments. 

Population 

The first comprehensive national population census of Laos 
was taken in 1985; it recorded a population of 3.57 million (see 
fig. 5). Annual population growth was estimated at between 2.6 
and 3.0 percent, and the 1991 population was estimated at 4.25 
million. The national crude birth rate was estimated at about 
forty-five per 1,000, while the crude death rate was about six- 
teen per 1,000. Fertility rates were consistently high from ages 
twenty through forty, reflecting a lack of contraceptive use. 
Each woman bore an average of 6.8 children. 

Birth control techniques were not generally available to the 
population before the late 1980s, although there was limited 
use of oral contraceptives from the late 1960s through 1975. 
The government took a pronatalist stance, believing that the 
country was underpopulated. The overall population density 
was only eighteen persons per square kilometer, and in many 



86 



The Society and Its Environment 



districts the density was fewer than ten persons per square kilo- 
meter. Population density per cultivated hectare was consider- 
ably higher, however, ranging from 3.3 to 7.8 persons per 
hectare. Because high fertility and poor nutrition contribute to 
the poor health of women and high infant and child mortality, 
since the late 1980s the Federation of Women's Unions has 
advocated a policy of birth spacing to improve the health of 
women and their children. Official prohibitions on contracep- 
tive technology were relaxed, but use of contraception was still 
low as of mid-1994 and virtually nonexistent in villages distant 
from provincial capitals or the Thai border. Regional differ- 
ences in birth rates as of late 1988 — forty per 1,000 in Vien- 
tiane and Bolikhamxai provinces versus forty-eight per 1,000 in 
other provinces — reflected uneven access to contraception 
(see table 2, Appendix). 

Ethnic Diversity 

The population is ethnically diverse, but a complete classifi- 
cation of all ethnic groups has never been undertaken. Before 
the Indochina wars, sources commonly identified more than 
sixty different groups, whereas the 1985 census listed forty- 
seven groups, some with populations of only a few hundred 
persons. Discrepancies in the number of groups resulted from 
inconsistent definitions of what constitutes an ethnic group as 
opposed to a subgroup, as well as incomplete knowledge about 
the groups themselves. The 1985 census distinguished three 
general ethnic group classifications reflecting common origin 
and language grouping and noted significant differences 
among the groups comprising the three families. Because 
detailed ethnographic information about many groups is lack- 
ing — especially for the midland groups — and because the 
sheer number of ethnicities represented in Laos is so great, the 
discussion of ethnic groups concentrates on one or two repre- 
sentative examples of each of the three larger groupings; other 
groups may differ on a number of points (see fig, 6; table 3, 
Appendix). 

The Lao Loum (see Glossary), or lowland Lao, constitute 
the majority of the population — 66 percent — and comprise sev- 
eral ethnic groups that began to move from the north into the 
Southeast Asian peninsula about 1,000 years ago. All Lao Loum 
speak languages of the Tai-Kadai family — for example, Lao, 
Lue, Tai Dam (Black Tai), and Tai Deng (Red Tai). Lao Loum 



87 



Laos: A Country Study 



AGE-GROUP 



90 and over 
85-89 
80-84 
75-79 
70-74 
65-69 
60-64 
55-59 
50-54 
45-49 
40-44 
35-39 
30-34 
25-29 
20-24 
15-19 
10-14 
5-9 
0-4 











































1 
















l 














■ 


21 


























MA 


lLES 






-FEM 


Al FS 





































































































































































400 300 200 100 100 200 300 400 
POPULATION IN THOUSANDS 



Figure 5. Population by Age and Gender, 1985 

Source: Based on information from National Committee of Plan, Population Census of 
1985, Vientiane, 1986. 

prefer to live in lowland valley areas and base agricultural pro- 
duction on paddy rice. 

The Lao Theung (see Glossary), or midland Lao, are of Aus- 
troasiatic origin and are probably the autochthonous inhabit- 
ants of Laos, having migrated northward in prehistoric times. 
Originally paddy rice farmers, they were displaced into the 
uplands by the migrations of the Lao Loum and in 1993 
accounted for about 24 percent of the national population. 
The cultural and linguistic differences among the many Lao 
Theung groups are greater than those among the Lao Loum or 
Lao Sung (see Glossary), or upland Lao. Groups range from 
the Kammu (alternate spellings include Khamu and Khmu) 
and Lamet in the north, to the Katang and Makong in the cen- 
ter, to the Loven and Lawae in the far south. 

The Lao Sung make up about 10 percent of the population. 
These groups are Miao-Yao or Tibeto-Burmese speaking peo- 
ples, who have continued to migrate into Laos from the north 



88 



The Society and Its Environment 



within the last two centuries. In Laos most highland groups live 
on the tops or upper slopes of the northern mountains, where 
they grow rice and corn in swidden fields. Some of these vil- 
lages have been resettled in lowland sites since the 1970s. The 
Hmong (see Glossary) are the most numerous Lao Sung 
group, with villages spread across the uplands of all the north- 
ern provinces. Mien (Yao), Akha, Lahu, and other related 
groups are considerably smaller in numbers and tend to be 
located in rather limited areas of the north. 

Government policy emphasizes the multiethnic nature of 
the nation and in many ways works to reduce the discrimina- 
tion against midland and upland minorities by some lowland 
Lao (see Education, this ch.). Use of the three general ethnic 
group classifications emphasizes the commonality of Lao 
nationality but obscures significant differences among the 
smaller groups. Most Laotians categorize ethnic groups in 
terms of these three broad categories, and villagers themselves, 
when asked their ethnicity by outsiders, are likely to respond 
Lao Loum, Lao Theung, or Lao Sung, rather than their spe- 
cific ethnicity. 

Although ethnic differences are seldom a direct source of 
conflict, historical patterns of exploitation and competition for 
natural resources have led to tensions and occasional overt 
conflicts, some of which persisted in the early 1990s. For exam- 
ple, lowland Tai-Lao migrants displaced the Lao Theung 
groups into the uplands beginning a millennium ago, domi- 
nated them politically, and exploited them as well. The Lao 
Theung were frequently referred to as "Kha," a derogatory 
term meaning slave, which reflected their social, if not neces- 
sarily legal, status. (Slave trade did exist in the south of Laos 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, usually involv- 
ing the Lao Theung.) Rites surrounding the coronation of the 
Lao king in Louangphrabang, as well as annual ceremonies of 
renewal, include rituals in which the king makes symbolic pay- 
ment to Lao Theung representatives for the land, and they in 
turn acknowledge the legitimacy of the king. 

French colonial rule tended to strengthen the position of 
lowland Lao, both by granting them access to education and by 
commonly appointing them as district and provincial gover- 
nors regardless of the ethnic makeup of a region. In the early 
1900s, Lao Theung and Lao Sung groups carried out several 
rebellions against Lao-Thai as well as French authority but all 



89 



Laos: A Country Study 




Figure 6. Ethnic Groups, 1992 

Source: Based on information from United Nations Children's Fund, Children and 

Women in the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Vientiane, 1992; and Laos, National 
Committee of Plan, Population Census of 1985, Vientiane, 1986. 

were eventually suppressed, leaving unresolved tensions. The 
court, administration, and national symbols continued to be 
defined in terms of Tai-Lao cultural traditions. During the 
1950s, significant numbers of Lao Theung and Lao Sung were 
recruited by the leftist Pathet Lao (Lao Nation — see Glossary), 
and these groups played an important role in the military 



90 



The Society and Its Environment 



struggle (see The Coming of Independence, ch. 1). Since 1975 
the number of Lao Theung and Lao Sung in the national and 
provincial administrations has increased, although in 1993 they 
were still underrepresented (see Government Structure, ch. 4). 

National borders have not created significant barriers to the 
movement and settlement patterns of the different Lao ethnic 
groups because Laotian villagers have traditionally moved in 
search of better land for rice farming. About 5 million Hmong 
lived in southern China in the early 1990s, as opposed to about 
200,000 in Vietnam, a similar number in Laos, and about 
90,000 in northern Thailand. Kammu settlements existed both 
in northern Laos and northern Thailand, and many of the 
midland groups in the center of the country had villages in 
both Laos and Vietnam. The lowland Lao historically lived on 
both sides of the Mekong, with early Lao kingdoms encompass- 
ing much of the Khorat Plateau in present-day Thailand. Cul- 
tural and linguistic differences between the Lao Loum and the 
Thai Isan — what the Thai call the inhabitants of the Khorat Pla- 
teau in northeast Thailand — were primarily a result of the 
expansion of the Thai state and its influence in that region 
since 1945. Significant political changes in Laos since 1975 also 
contributed to a growing cultural distance. 

The Refugee Population 

During the Second Indochina War (1954-75), particularly 
between 1960 and 1973, large numbers of Laotians were dis- 
placed from their villages, either to escape frequent bombings 
or as a result of forced relocations by one side or the other 
seeking to consolidate control over an area. In the eastern 
zone controlled by the Pathet Lao, many villages were aban- 
doned, and the inhabitants either lived in caves, fled across the 
border to Vietnam (where, despite the massive United States 
aerial war, the bombing was less intense than in the areas from 
which they had moved), or moved to refugee villages or camps 
in Royal Lao Government (RLG — see Glossary) areas (see 
Toward Neutrality: The First Coalition; The Attempt to Restore 
Neutrality; International Pressure and the Advent of the Sec- 
ond Coalition; The Third Coalition and the Lao Democratic 
People's Republic, ch. 1). These villages were established along 
Route 13 from Savannakhet to Pakxan and continued north of 
Vientiane. In addition, many Hmong and Mien villages that 
had allied with the RLG were frequently forced to move as a 



91 



Laos: A Country Study 



result of the changing battle lines and were regularly supplied 
by the RLG and United States. 

At the end of the war, an estimated 700,000 persons, or 
about 25 percent of the population, were in some way dis- 
placed from their original homes. Many of these refugees 
began to return to their villages, or at least to the same general 
area, after the cease-fire of 1973, emptying many of the refugee 
villages along Route 13. The United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees (UNHCR — see Glossary) provided some 
assistance in transportation and initial rice supplies, and after 
1975 the government also assisted to the extent possible with 
its meager resources. Hmong who sided with the RLG were 
forced to flee after 1975. 

Not all internal refugees returned to their home districts, 
however. Some chose to remain in more populated areas near 
the Mekong and the larger towns, continuing to farm land that 
they had cleared during the war. The fall of the RLG and 
increased control by government cadres over daily activities in 
the villages also caused many villagers to flee the country. Many 
ended up in refugee camps in Thailand. The outmigration 
occurred in three phases. An initial flight of RLG officials and 
Westernized elite began in 1975. A second period of depar- 
tures by many more ordinary villagers occurred between 1977 
and 1981. These villagers were responding as much to eco- 
nomic hardship caused by poor weather and government mis- 
management of the agricultural sector as to political control 
measures. A later period of less rapid departure lasted through 
the late 1980s. In all, more than 360,000 Laotians — about 10 
percent or more of the population — fled the country between 
1975 and 1992. This group included nearly all Western-edu- 
cated Laotians, and, as political scientist Martin Stuart-Fox has 
noted, the loss of the intelligentsia may have set the country 
back an entire generation. Some upland minorities who had 
supported the RLG and the United States military effort also 
fled immediately, while other groups continued a guerrilla 
insurgency, which was not brought under control until after 
about 1979 (see Threats to National Security, ch. 5). 

By the end of 1992, approximately 305,000 Laotian refugees 
had been permanently resettled in third countries, most com- 
monly in the United States and France. Forty thousand Lao- 
tians — mostly Hmong — remained in refugee camps in 
Thailand, and 12,000 refugees had been voluntarily repatriated 



92 



The Society and Its Environment 



to Laos under the supervision and with the assistance of the 
UNHCR. International agreements mandated the resettlement 
or repatriation of all remaining refugees in Thailand by the 
end of 1994. 

Even without the circumstances of war, Laotian villagers tra- 
ditionally have moved in search of better prospects. Because of 
the overall low population density, if farmland near a village 
became scarce or its quality declined, part or all of a village 
might decide to relocate where there was more potential. This 
pattern occurs more frequently among upland semimigratory 
peoples, where there is a regular pattern of movement linked 
to the use of swidden fields. Even the lowland Lao, however, 
have a history of village fragmentation in search of new lands, 
although their investment in household or village infrastruc- 
ture has tended to stabilize the population. Since the mid- 
1980s, the government has encouraged or compelled a num- 
ber of upland villages farming swidden rice to resettle in low- 
land environments — a pattern also used by the RLG to more 
easily control villagers. In some instances, assistance in reloca- 
tion and initial land clearing has been provided, while in oth- 
ers people have been left to fend for themselves in their new 
locations. 

Rural-Urban Distribution 

In the early 1990s, over 85 percent of the Laotian population 
was rural, typically living in villages ranging from ten to 200 
households, or up to about 1,200 persons. Towns grew during 
the Second Indochina War as villagers fled to escape United 
States bombing. After 1975 many rural migrants returned to 
farming. Most of the sixteen province capitals or centers can be 
considered towns, although a few, such as Phongsali, Attapu, 
and Xiangkhoang, are not much more than market centers, 
with populations well under 5,000 surrounded by a somewhat 
denser network of neighboring villages. In 1985 Vientiane had 
a population estimated at about 250,000, with municipal water 
and electricity systems, a variety of housing, and more devel- 
oped educational and health facilities than were available else- 
where in the country. 

The major provincial centers are Louangphrabang — the 
former royal capital — Savannakhet, and Pakxe, with popula- 
tions ranging from 20,000 to 109,000 and a range of services 
and urban amenities. The other provincial capitals are distin- 



93 



Laos: A Country Study 

guished by several government buildings, a regular market — 
although not always daily — at least one hotel and restaurant, 
and occasional air service. Towns are primarily administrative 
and market centers, with little or no industrial manufacturing 
outside of Vientiane (see Industry and Services, ch. 3). Aside 
from Vientiane and a few other provincial towns, growth has 
been limited, and the general pattern of existence held over 
many generations. In 1994, most of the 121 district centers 
were little more than large villages with the addition of a mid- 
dle school and a few score officials. 

Rural Life 

Laotian society is above all else characterized by semi-inde- 
pendent rural villages engaged in subsistence agricultural pro- 
duction. Ethnic, geographic, and ecological differences create 
variations in the pattern of village life from one part of the 
country to another, but the common threads of village self-reli- 
ance, limited regional trade and communication, and identifi- 
cation with one's village and ethnic group persist regardless of 
the setting. Rural trade networks, however, have been a part of 
life since the 1950s. Except near the larger towns and in the 
rich agricultural plains of Vientiane and Savannakhet, villages 
are spaced at least several kilometers apart and the intervening 
land is variously developed as rice paddy and swidden fields or 
maintained as buffer forest for gathering wild plants and ani- 
mals, fuelwood, and occasional timber harvest. 

Ethnicity differentiates the villages but is usually not a source 
of conflict or antagonism. Nearly all villages are ethnically 
homogeneous, although a few include two or more distinct 
groups. Ethnic mixing often has resulted from different groups 
migrating to a new settlement site at about the same time, or a 
larger village at a crossroads or river transit point developing 
into a minor trading center. Ethnic identity is never absolutely 
immutable. Some minority Laotian individuals have adopted 
lowland Lao behavior and dress patterns, or intermarried with 
lowland Lao, and have effectively acculturated to lowland soci- 
ety. In some units, military service has also brought together 
Laotians of different ethnic groups, both before and after 
1975. 

Only since 1975 has there been any sense of national unity 
among most rural villagers. Precolonial governments 
depended more on a system of control at the district level, with 



94 



The Society and Its Environment 



the chao muang (district chief) maintaining his own allegiance 
and tribute to the state (see Government Structure, ch. 4). 
Administrative practices under the French and during the post- 
World War II period were confined primarily to provincial and 
a few district centers. The government was able to extract taxes 
with some facility but had little impact on the daily lives or 
thoughts of most villagers. However, since 1975, the govern- 
ment has expended considerable energy and resources on 
national unification, so that even isolated villages recognize the 
role of local government and consider themselves at some level 
to be part of a Laotian state. 

Lowland Lao Society 

Lao Loum (Laotian of the valley) have been the dominant 
group — numerically, politically, and economically — since the 
founding of the Kingdom of Lan Xang in the fourteenth cen- 
tury. The Lao of the Lao Loum ethnic group comprise just over 
50 percent of the total population. Other related lowland 
groups include the Lue and Phu Thai, who together make up 
an additional 15 percent of the population. Groups such as the 
Tai Dam and Tai Deng are included by government statistics in 
the general category Phu Thai despite linguistic and cultural 
differences from other lowland groups. Variations occur 
regionally and among different ethnic subgroups, but the gen- 
eral patterns are relatively uniform. Most officials in the RLG 
were Lao Loum, and despite increases in the number of minor- 
ity officials in the government, the lowland Lao held a clear 
majority in the early 1990s. Lowland cultural patterns are fre- 
quently considered the norm in designing policy or setting 
development priorities. 

Lao Loum traditionally live in stable independent villages sit- 
uated near lowland rivers or streams. At higher elevations, vil- 
lages are located in valley areas that give as much access as 
possible to land suitable for paddy rice cultivation. Villages are 
self-contained and range from around twenty to over 200 
households, although they typically contain forty or fifty houses 
and 200 to 300 people. Usually, villages are separated by rice 
fields or unused land. In rural areas, there might be five kilo- 
meters or more between villages, whereas in more densely pop- 
ulated areas only one kilometer or less separates the 
settlements. Most villages have grown in population over time, 
and if good land becomes scarce in the vicinity, it is not uncom- 
mon for some families to migrate to another area, either indi- 



95 



Laos: A Country Study 

vidually or as a group. Individual households usually move to 
another village where the family has kin or friends, out larger 
groups have often migrated to unsettled areas. Such village fis- 
sion or relocation continued into the early 1990s, although 
migrants had to obtain permission from the district administra- 
tion before settling in a new site. 

The traditional independence and relative isolation of low- 
land villages has been reduced since the late 1980s. Although 
commerce in forest products — for example, sticklac — dates to 
colonial times, as roads have improved and marketing net- 
works expanded, the government has encouraged commercial 
production for trade and export. As long as the open eco- 
nomic policies of the New Economic Mechanism are operat- 
ing, the process of integrating lowland villages into a national 
socioeconomic system will likely continue (see Agriculture and 
Forestry; Foreign Trade, ch. 3). 

Lao Loum houses are built on wooden piles, with the floor 
from one to two and one-half meters above the ground. This 
style keeps the living area above the mud of the rainy season, 
provides a shady area under the house to work or rest during 
the day, and allows the house to catch breezes for natural cool- 
ing. Depending on the wealth and resources of the family, the 
walls and floor may be made of woven split bamboo or sawn 
wood; the roof is constructed from grass thatch, bamboo, wood 
shingles, or corrugated steel roofing sheet. Some older houses 
in well-off villages are roofed with clay tiles, but this style was no 
longer common in the early 1990s. A separate rice granary is 
built in the house compound, also on posts using similar con- 
struction. Livestock is sometimes kept under the house. 

Houses commonly range from five by seven meters to eight 
by twelve meters, with the smallest size typical of a newly estab- 
lished household or a family that has recently moved. Most 
houses are built with a porch on the long side that is used for 
visiting and as a public area. The interior is divided into one or 
two sleeping rooms, a common room for visiting and eating, 
and a separate kitchen area or side porch. Household furnish- 
ings are simple: mats or mattresses and blankets for sleeping on 
the floor, a low woven bamboo and rattan table for eating, and 
a few pots and dishes for cooking and 1 eating. Lao Loum sit on 
the floor and eat from common bowls of soup or other dishes. 
Steamed rice is distributed among two or three common bas- 
kets placed around the edge of the table. 



96 




97 



Laos: A Country Study 

Lao Loum households average between six and eight per- 
sons, but may reach twelve or so in exceptional cases. The fam- 
ily structure is typically nuclear or stem: a married couple and 
their unmarried children, or an older married couple together 
with one married child and his or her spouse plus unmarried 
children and grandchildren. Because kinship is reckoned bilat- 
erally and flexibly, Lao Loum may maintain close social rela- 
tionships with kin who are only distantly related by blood. 
Terms of address for persons in an older generation indicate 
whether the relationship is through the father's or mother's 
side and distinguish between elder and younger siblings. 

Marriage occurs through a blend of traditional and modern 
practices. In earlier generations, marriages may have been 
arranged by the families, but at least since the 1960s, most cou- 
ples usually have made their own choice, which is communi- 
cated to the parents. A bride-price is negotiated, which often 
defrays the expenses of the wedding. The wedding takes place 
at the home of the bride's family, with whom the couple ini- 
tially resides, either in the same house or nearby. The groom 
helps with farming in the bride's family for several years until 
the couple feels they are economically ready to establish a sepa- 
rate household. Even then, they may continue to farm jointly 
with the older generation and either divide the harvest or eat 
from a common granary. A bride may sometimes move into her 
husband's household, but uxorilocal residence is somewhat 
more common. Initial uxorilocal residence combined with the 
sequential establishment of separate households by each older 
sibling frequently leaves the youngest daughter and her hus- 
band to care for the aged parents and ultimately to inherit the 
house. All the children divide lands and other valuables. 

Polygyny is traditionally allowed but uncommon since the 
LPDR government outlawed it shortly after coming to power. 
Further, having multiple wives generally was restricted to the 
elite because it required the ability to maintain a larger house- 
hold. However, many men have mistresses. Divorce may be ini- 
tiated by either party. If a couple encounters domestic 
difficulties, the two families usually address the problem first. If 
necessary, the village elders join the attempt to resolve the cou- 
ple's differences and achieve a reconciliation. After a divorce, 
both husband and wife may return to their families of birth, 
unless either can make a living other than from farming. Chil- 
dren of divorce may remain with either parent. In the case of a 
spouse's death, the widow or widower may return to her or his 



98 



The Society and Its Environment 



natal household but more commonly maintains an indepen- 
dent household or remarries. The choice often hinges on the 
ages of children; if none are old enough to help in the fields, 
the family has a difficult time surviving without extra help. 

The lowland Lao village economy is centered on paddy rice 
cultivation, and most village activities and daily life revolve 
around rice production. Glutinous, or sticky, rice is the staple 
food; because it has a high starch content, sticky rice must be 
steamed rather than boiled. It is eaten with the fingers and 
dipped in soup or a vegetable or meat dish. Most Lao Loum vil- 
lages are self-sufficient in rice production, although the pro- 
duction of individual households within a village varies. 
Household work centers on paddy production from the begin- 
ning of the rains in May through December when all the rice 
has been brought to storage. Periods of intense work occur at 
the time of transplanting and harvesting, and cooperative work 
groups are often organized among several families to help get 
the tasks completed in a timely manner. 

Where level terrain is inadequate, lowland Lao also practice 
swidden rice farming. This method is less efficient than paddy 
rice cultivation, which provides higher and more stable yields 
for less work. In certain villages, swidden rice is grown only in 
some years as a supplement to paddy rice production, whereas 
in others it is planted regularly in small quantities. Some Lao 
Loum villages have no land suitable for rice paddies and are 
completely dependent on swidden rice production. Newly 
established villages may first clear fields and plant swidden rice 
for a year or two before plowing and bunding the fields to con- 
vert them to paddies. 

In addition to paddy rice, most households also have a small 
vegetable garden and some fruit trees, either in the house com- 
pound or near a stream or other water source. Other crops 
include cotton, tobacco, and sugarcane, but they are usually 
planted only in small quantities for personal use. Villagers also 
raise chickens, ducks, and pigs, as well as a buffalo or two for 
plowing the fields and perhaps a pair of cattle for pulling a 
cart. In general, rural households are largely self-sufficient, 
growing their own food, making their own tools and clothes, 
and trading any surplus for soap, kerosene, medicines, and 
kitchen or household goods. 

Hunting, fishing, and gathering traditionally play an impor- 
tant role in the household economy, although as the popula- 



99 



Laos: A Country Study 



tion has increased and wild areas have been degraded, access 
to these resources has gradually deteriorated. Homemade rifles 
are used to hunt small deer, wild pigs, and small game such as 
squirrels and birds; fish are caught with a variety of nets, traps, 
or hooks. Bamboo shoots, mushrooms, fruit, medicinal or culi- 
nary roots, and leaves are gathered in the forest according to 
the season. Men hunt and fish with throw nets and hooks, while 
women fish with dip nets and baskets and collect roots and wild 
vegetables. 

Household tasks are typically divided according to gender, 
but the divisions are not rigid, and men and women often per- 
form tasks interchangeably. For example, both sexes cut and 
carry firewood. Women and children traditionally carry water 
for household use and to cultivate kitchen gardens. Women do 
most of the cooking, household cleaning, and washing and 
serve as primary caretakers for small children. They are the 
main marketers of surplus household food and other petty pro- 
duction, and women are usually the commercial marketers for 
vegetables, fruit, fish, poultry, and basic household dry goods. 
Men typically market cattle, buffalo, or pigs and are responsi- 
ble for the purchase of any mechanical items. Intrafamily deci- 
sion making usually requires discussions between husband and 
wife, but the husband usually acts as the family representative 
in village meetings or other official functions. In farming work, 
men traditionally plow and harrow the rice fields, while women 
uproot the seedlings before transplanting them. Both sexes 
transplant, harvest, thresh, and carry rice. 

Occupational specialization in the village is low; virtually 
everyone is a rice farmer first. Some villagers may have special 
skills in weaving, blacksmithing, or religious knowledge, but 
these skills are supplementary to the fundamental task of grow- 
ing enough rice and vegetables for the family. Social and eco- 
nomic stratification tends to be low within any one village, 
although villages may differ substantially one from another. 
Status accrues to age, wealth, skill in specific tasks, and reli- 
gious knowledge. Factions based on kinship or political alli- 
ance may exist in a village but usually do not obstruct overall 
village cooperation and governance. 

Traditionally, lowland Lao villages are led by a village chief 
(pho ban or nai ban) and one or two assistants who are elected 
by the villagers, although district or province officials some- 
times use their positions to influence the results. Respected 



100 



The Society and Its Environment 



elders, including women, form an advisory group that medi- 
ates intravillage disputes. Since 1975 villages have been gov- 
erned by an administrative committee headed by a village 
president (pathan ban) and several other persons with responsi- 
bilities for such specific areas as economic and population 
records, self-defense militia, agriculture, women's affairs, and 
youth affairs. All members are in principle elected by popular 
vote, although for about a decade after 1975, party cadres at 
the village level were supposed to have taken an active role to 
ensure that acceptable candidates were selected. 

Even under the present political system, however, village 
leaders have little or no formal authority and govern through 
consensus and the use of social pressure to ensure conformity. 
Village meetings are held infrequently, but are usually well 
attended with different viewpoints on issues expressed openly. 
If a consensus on an issue is not reached, leaders will delay 
decisions to allow further discussion outside the meeting with 
all members of the community. Typical issues might include 
whether to build or expand a village school or dig a community 
well, or how to organize the annual ceremony for the village 
protective spirit. Historically, religious and ceremonial activi- 
ties and ties with the Buddhist temple or monastery (wat) have 
been very important in village life and a focus of considerable 
time and expenditure. 

Each family contributes equal amounts of labor, material, 
and money to village projects. Once a decision is made to 
undertake a project, a committee is appointed to manage the 
details and keep track of the contributions to ensure that every- 
one does his or her share. Systems of rotating labor groups for 
village projects are common; for example, groups of ten house- 
holds may supply one worker per household every three to 
seven days, depending on the number of groups, until the 
project is finished. Some large projects, such as building a 
school, may continue for several years, with work taking place 
during the dry season when farming tasks are not heavy or 
when funds are available to purchase materials. 

Households also cooperate informally, especially in agricul- 
tural work. Labor exchange occurs for almost every task associ- 
ated with rice farming, although it is most common for 
transplanting, harvesting, and threshing. There are two differ- 
ent patterns of farm exchange. In central and southern Laos, 
villagers call on many other households, sometimes the entire 



101 



Laos: A Country Study 



village, for one day's help to complete a specific task such as 
transplanting. No specific repayment is required, but the fam- 
ily is obligated to help others in the village if they are unable to 
finish work in time. In northern villages, mutual assistance is 
organized on the basis of exchanges between families that 
should even out over the year; a day's work transplanting may 
be repaid by a day's work threshing. The contributions of men, 
women, and children over sixteen are considered equal, 
regardless of the task. 

Houses are typically built by hand using local materials, and 
once the householder has collected enough wood, bamboo, 
and/ or thatching grass, he will ask his neighbors and relatives 
to assist in the house raising. It usually takes twenty people a 
day or two to assemble the frame and raise the heavy timbers. 
Once the heavy work is completed, the owners finish construc- 
tion over the ensuing weeks. In this work as well as farm labor 
exchange, the host family provides a meal to all those coming 
to help. For common farmwork, the meal is relatively simple 
and usually includes a chicken or duck and a bottle of local rice 
liquor. For a house raising, the meal is more elaborate — a pig 
or small ox and considerably more liquor after the task is done. 
Illness, death, or other household emergencies also elicit help 
from one's neighbors. 

Lowland Lao are almost all Buddhists, and most villages have 
a wat, which serves as both a social and religious center (see 
Buddhism, this ch.). Whereas small villages may have only one 
or two monks in residence plus a few novice monks, larger vil- 
lages may have up to six monks plus novices (see Religion, this 
ch.). Many villagers assemble at the wat for prayers on the days 
of each lunar quarter; on days of major religious festivals, they 
carry out more elaborate ceremonies and may organize a boun 
(religious fair) at the wat. Before the development of a national 
education system, boys and young men received basic religious 
and secular education at the wat. The wat is frequently used as 
a place for village meetings because the hall is often the only 
building large enough to accommodate everyone at once. Most 
villages have a small wat committee to oversee the maintenance 
of the building, organization of the fair, and the general wel- 
fare of the monks and novices. The committee members are 
selected by consensus on the basis of their morality and reli- 
gious sincerity and usually have been monks at some time in 
their lives. 



102 



Lowland Lao in formal 
dress celebrating the opening 
of Lane Xang Bank, 
Louangphrabang 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



i 



Lowland Lao in formal 
dress in front of Wat Xieng 
Thong dressed for the Lao 
New Year in typical 
Louangphrabang style 
Courtesy Ernest Kuhn 



y f 




103 



Laos: A Country Study 

Although they are Buddhists, Lao Loum also respect the 
power of phi (spirits), which may be associated with a place or a 
deceased person. More important for village organization is 
the cult of a village protective deity, or phi ban, which is typically 
celebrated yearly. Many villages have abandoned this practice 
in the face of increased modernization and official discourage- 
ment by the government. However, some villages continued 
through the early 1990s to offer an annual sacrifice to the phi 
ban in a ceremony that both reaffirmed the importance of the 
village as a unique social unit and aimed to secure the contin- 
ued good fortune of the village and its inhabitants. 

Midland Lao Society 

Lao Theung (Laotian of the mountain slopes) make up 
about 24 percent of the population and consist of at least 
thirty-seven different ethnic groups ranging in population 
from nearly 400,000 (the Kammu) to fewer than 100 (the Num- 
bri). Many of the groups have additional members in Thailand 
or Vietnam. Of the three main ethnic classifications, the differ- 
ences among the Lao Theung groups are greater than among 
the Lao Loum or Lao Sung. Little is known about many of 
these groups, and reasonably complete ethnographic accounts 
are available only for a few. Most Lao Theung groups reside in 
a relatively limited geographic area; for example, the Nyaheun, 
Sedang, and Lavae mostly live in the far southern provinces of 
Attapu and Saravan (Salavan), whereas the Lamet reside near 
the border between Bokeo, Oudomxai, and Louang Namtha 
provinces. The Kammu live scattered throughout the north, 
from Xiangkhoang to Bokeo. 

The Lao Theung speak languages of the Austroasiatic family, 
and although some languages are closely related, such as 
Kammu, Lamet, and Sam Tao, others are mutually incompre- 
hensible. None of the languages has developed a written script. 
The geographer Christian Taillard has suggested that the Lao 
Theung were originally paddy rice farmers displaced by Tai 
migrants into the hills and mountains and forced to turn to 
swidden rice production. However, Karl Gustav Izikowitz's eth- 
nography of the Lamet reports that historically they had been 
swidden farmers and did not cultivate paddy rice even in areas 
where suitable land was available. Certainly within the last two 
centuries, all the Lao Theung have been characterized as swid- 
den farmers and as semimigratory because they have occasion- 
ally relocated their villages as swidden areas were exhausted. 



104 



The Society and Its Environment 



The Kammu and Lamet, who are found in northern Laos, have 
different social organization and agricultural ecology than the 
ethnic groups in southern Laos. 

Most Lao Theung villages (based primarily on descriptions 
of the Kammu) are located on mountain slopes but not at the 
peaks or ridges — the name Lao Theung means roughly "the 
Lao up there." Since the 1950s, however, a growing number of 
villages have been established at lower elevations near rivers or 
roads; villages grew up as roads were beginning to be rebuilt 
and expanded. Sometimes these villages were founded by peo- 
ple fleeing the war, and sometimes they arose out of the peo- 
ple's desire to be closer to transportation, markets, and social 
services. After 1975 many Hmong and some Kammu were 
driven out by the Pathet Lao and the Lao People's Army (see 
Glossary). Since the 1980s, the government has encouraged 
upland swidden farming minorities to relocate to lowland areas 
in order to reduce upland swidden farming and forest clearing. 
Kammu and Lamet villages, as well as those of some other mid- 
land groups, are relatively permanent, some remaining over 
fifty years in a location. Traditionally, villages managed the 
rotation of swidden fields in such a way as to sustain agricul- 
tural production over long periods. Individual households 
might move from a village to another location, or villages 
might merge with a second village being established a short dis- 
tance away; however, the usual pattern was sedentary. Midland 
groups inhabiting central Laos generally have been more 
mobile, with villages relocated after a decade or so. It is not 
clear, however, whether this is a long-standing pattern or a 
response to the unsettled conditions during the Second 
Indochina War. 

Lao Theung villages are usually somewhat smaller than most 
Lao Loum villages, commonly ranging between twenty and 
thirty households, but sites with fifty households and 300 or 
more inhabitants have been reported. Houses in Lamet and 
Kammu villages are clustered without apparent organization or 
orientation, but individual sites are selected with the advice of a 
village spirit practitioner. Lamet villages are commonly divided 
into two segments by the men's common house located in the 
middle of the village, but a similar practice has not been 
recorded for the Kammu. Traditionally, in Kammu households, 
there is a separate common house for adolescent boys and 
strangers, but this practice has not been continued in many 
new settlements established after 1975. 



105 



Laos: A Country Study 



The houses are built on wooden or bamboo piles between 
one and two meters above the ground and are at least five by 
seven meters in size. Usually they are larger. Construction 
materials include woven bamboo or sawn lumber for floors and 
walls and grass thatch or bamboo shingle roofing. A kitchen 
hearth is located inside the house, and an open porch is built 
on at least one end of the house. A separate rice barn, also 
built on piles, may be located in the village near the house 
(Kammu) or on the edge of the village (Lamet). Villages are 
commonly built near a small stream to provide drinking and 
washing water, which is often diverted through a bamboo aque- 
duct to facilitate filling buckets and bathing. 

Almost all Lao Theung groups rely on swidden rice cultiva- 
tion as the basis of their household economy. Lamet and 
Kammu prefer glutinous rice, but some other groups prefer to 
eat ordinary rice. A small field house is almost always built in 
the fields, and all or part of the family may sleep there for days 
during the farming season rather than walk back to the village 
every day. 

Swidden rice seldom yields as much as paddy fields, and the 
labor needed to keep weeds under control is the major con- 
straint to expanding the area farmed. Corn, cassava, and wild 
tubers are thus important components of the diet to supple- 
ment a frequently inadequate rice supply. As a consequence of 
low rice yields, Lao Theung are generally considered to be the 
poorest of the three ethnic groupings in Laos. Men often come 
to towns to work as coolies. 

In addition to farming, Lao Theung engage in hunting and 
gathering in the forests surrounding the village. Men shoot or 
trap small game and occasionally a wild pig or deer. Both 
women and men regularly collect bamboo and rattan sprouts, 
wild vegetables, mushrooms, tubers, and medicinal plants, the 
latter marketed by women. Fishing is common for some groups 
but seldom practiced by others, perhaps as a consequence of 
living in an upland environment distant from large streams. 

Damrong Tayanin, an anthropologist of Kammu origin, has 
described a pattern of land tenure for the Kammu in which 
households own a large number of separate fields that are 
farmed over a twelve- to fifteen-year rotation; other households 
recognize these ownership rights. The claimed fields are 
divided among the offspring of each generation. However, no 
other studies mention any Lao Theung group respecting per- 



106 



The Society and Its Environment 



manent rights to swidden fields. In all cases, fields that are 
cleared and farmed are allowed to revert to fallow after a year 
or two. Depending on the population-to-land balance, these 
fields might be allowed to lie fallow for three to over fifteen 
years before being cleared again. After each harvest, individual 
households select the fields they will clear and farm the follow- 
ing year. Sometimes this choice is an individual decision, but 
sometimes a group of households cooperates to clear and 
fence a single large area, which is then divided. Or, a village 
decides which area to clear and divide among all the families in 
the village. Once a field is abandoned, anyone may clear it and 
farm. Fallow periods shorter than five to seven years lead to 
gradual degeneration of the swidden system, however, because 
they do not allow adequate regrowth of vegetation to restore 
the soil fertility. 

Almost all Lao Theung groups are patrilineal. Kammu and 
Lamet households average between six and seven persons but 
may be as large as twelve or fourteen persons. The ideal house- 
hold consists of parents and children, wives of married sons, 
and grandchildren. Married sons eventually establish separate 
households, but a family might be temporarily augmented by a 
son-in-law who must live and work with the bride's parents for 
several years in partial payment of the bride-price. The Kammu 
and Lamet have eight and seven totemic clans, respectively, 
which provide a basis for social organization and the regulation 
of marriage. For the Lamet, the clans are exogamous, and each 
village contains at least two clans, thus providing the possibility 
of marriage exchanges. Kammu group the clans according to 
three categories — quadruped, bird, or plant — depending on 
the clan's totem. The totem is a plant or animal that was instru- 
mental in either saving or killing the legendary clan ancestor. 
One must marry someone from another clan, and more partic- 
ularly, men should marry real or classificatory mother's broth- 
ers' daughters. Each group of clans (for example, quadruped) 
always gives brides to one of the others (for example, bird) and 
receives brides from the third (for example, plants) in a circu- 
lar relationship. Thus, a village must have all three clan catego- 
ries represented for marriage exchanges to proceed. 

Lamet clans help in establishing relationships between per- 
sons both inside and outside a village. In the village, members 
of the same clan are likely to develop cooperative relationships 
in farming, and a man traveling outside his village might seek 
out fellow clan members when arriving in another village. For 



107 



Laos: A Country Study 



the Kammu, however, clan membership appears relevant only 
for facilitating interhousehold cooperation and for regulating 
marriage relationships within a village. Should a family move to 
another village, it may change its clan membership in order to 
fit into the three-group marriage exchange circle. 

Marriage choices are made by the groom and bride. Once a 
couple agrees to marry, their parents negotiate a bride-price. 
Among the Lamet, the bride's family also sends a dowry. 
Because there are few opportunities to acquire significant 
wealth in villages, Kammu and Lamet young men have fre- 
quently migrated to towns or to Thailand since the 1920s to 
work for several years until they acquire the funds needed for a 
bride-price. Among the Lamet, unmarried adolescent males 
sleep in the communal men's house, although they work with 
their families during the day. 

Polygyny traditionally has been allowed, but it is rare, 
because few men can afford a second wife. Whereas a Lamet 
man may marry two sisters, this practice is prohibited among 
the Kammu; a widow may marry her husband's brother in 
either culture. If he chooses not to marry her, however, the 
brother is still responsible for her support. Initial residence 
after marriage is usually patrilocal, but if the groom is unable 
to pay the full agreed-upon bride-price, he may be obligated to 
live and work in his in-laws's household for several years in lieu 
of the bride-price. Upon the parents' death, the sons divide 
items of value and, according to Damrong, rights to swidden 
fields and fallows. Material possessions are generally limited 
and include not much more than livestock, farm and house- 
hold equipment, or perhaps a few silver coins — used in tradi- 
tional dress — or ingots. Wooden and bronze drums were 
important symbols of Lamet and Kammu household wealth in 
the past, but most appear to have been lost or sold during the 
Indochina wars. 

Gender role differentiation in both farming and household 
activities is considerably greater among the Lao Theung than 
among the Lao Loum. Men are primarily responsible for clear- 
ing and burning swidden fields, although women may assist in 
clearing the smaller brush. Men punch holes for seed and the 
women follow, dropping and covering the seed with topsoil. 
Both sexes weed the fields, but the women are primarily 
responsible for this time-consuming task. Harvest is a joint 
activity. In the house, women cook, care for children, husk rice, 



108 



The Society and Its Environment 



cut firewood, and haul water. Women also gather roots, shoots, 
and other wild vegetative products. Men weave baskets, repair 
farm tools, and hunt small game. Men are also more likely than 
women to manage household finances and engage in trade, 
typically selling livestock and collected forest products or scrap 
metal from the war in exchange for rice. Izikowitz reports a sig- 
nificant trade of surplus rice by the Lamet and Kammu to 
neighboring lowland Lao villages in exchange for salt and 
metal implements in the 1920s and 1930s but notes that rice 
sales were declining because of competition from other pro- 
ducers. Since at least the 1970s, few Lao Theung have pro- 
duced any surplus rice. Women may sell vegetables, chickens, 
or occasionally handicrafts locally but do not have the impor- 
tant market role of lowland Lao women. Where villages have 
access to primary schools, both boys and girls attend for a few 
years, but girls are much more likely to drop out before boys do 
(see Education, this ch.). 

As in all villages in Laos, village governance is managed by 
an elected administrative committee consisting of a president 
and several other members in charge of economic affairs, self- 
defense, agriculture, and so on (see Government Structure, ch. 
4). Traditionally, the village has a chief who is the intermediary 
between the village and the national government. Important 
decisions are made by elders, who in the absence of a written 
script memorize agreements among village members. 

Both Kammu and Lamet villages have a ritual leader (Ikuun 
in Kammu, xemia in Lamet), who officiates at important spirit 
rituals that affect the entire village. This position is hereditary 
in the male line. Kammu and Lamet, as most Lao Theung, are 
animists and are respected by their lowland neighbors as being 
especially proficient in protecting against or propitiating spirits 
that may cause illness or accidents. Ancestral spirits are an 
important aspect of household religious and safety rituals, but 
above the grandparents' generation they are generalized, and 
the spirits of specific persons are not worshiped. Kammu and 
Lamet revere rather than fear the spirits of their ancestors, who 
protect the household and village against harm as long as they 
are respected and are offered sacrifices. Rituals are also per- 
formed at the start of any important undertaking, for example, 
at the beginning of rice planting or building a house. Taboos 
restrict certain activities; for example, Lamet cannot make or 
repair tools inside the family house but do this work in the 
communal men's house. 



109 



Laos: A Country Study 

Lao Theung are socially, economically, and politically the 
most marginal group of the three ethnic classes. During the 
Second Indochina War, many Lao Theung supported the Neo 
Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front — LPF; see Glossary), the 
political party of the Pathet Lao — or actively fought with the 
Pathet Lao. Ethnic differences and resentments against low- 
land Lao dominance likely stimulated some of this support, as 
did effective Pathet Lao recruitment activities in the remote 
eastern areas populated principally by Lao Theung groups. 
During the years immediately after 1975, Lao Theung cadres 
gained numerous mid-level positions in the new government, 
but later many were replaced by lowland Lao with greater tech- 
nical training and experience. Provincial and district officials 
are more likely to be Lao Theung in provinces with pro- 
nounced minority populations, and geographical isolation and 
poor education are still barriers to the integration of all Lao 
minorities in national affairs. The traditional subsistence swid- 
den agricultural societies of the Lao Theung, which involved 
little trade with other groups, led to a marginal economic exist- 
ence for many villages in the early 1990s. Numerous individual 
Lao Theung have adopted lowland behavioral patterns and 
successfully pass as lowland Lao, but prejudicial attitudes attrib- 
uted to many lowland Lao continue to affect social and eco- 
nomic opportunities for many Lao Theung villages. 

Upland Lao Society 

Lao Sung (Laotian of the mountain top) include six ethnic 
groups, of which the Hmong, Akha, and Mien (Yao) are the 
most numerous. As of 1993, the Hmong numbered over 
200,000, with settlements throughout the uplands of northern 
Laos. About the same number of Hmong live in northern Viet- 
nam, and approximately 90,000 live in Thailand; this number 
does not include the 30,000 Hmong that were living in Thai 
refugee camps at the end of 1992. Some 60,000 Akha reside in 
Louang Namtha, Phongsali, and Bokeo provinces. The other 
upland groups are the Phu Noi, found in Phongsali and north- 
ern Louangphrabang provinces, the Mien (in Bokeo and 
Louang Namtha provinces), and small populations (fewer than 
10,000) of Lahu and Kui located in the far northwest. The 1985 
census also classified the 6,500 Ho (Haw) — Chinese originally 
from Yunnan Province — with the Lao Sung. All these groups 
have significant populations outside Laos, and the bulk of the 



110 



The Society and Its Environment 



ethnographic information available is from studies conducted 
in neighboring countries. 

The Lao Sung are the most recent migrants to Laos, having 
arrived from the north in a series of migrations beginning in 
the early nineteenth century. Hmong entered northwestern 
Vietnam from China prior to 1800, and early settlements in 
northeastern Laos were reported around the turn of the nine- 
teenth century. Pioneering settlements gradually extended 
westward, crossing the Mekong around 1890 and reaching Tak 
in northern Thailand around 1930. Mien migrations, in con- 
trast, seem to have come southeast through Burma and Thai- 
land before reaching Laos. All Lao Sung settlements are 
located in the north, with only Hmong villages found as far 
south as Vientiane. 

Lao Sung typically live on mountain tops, upland ridges, or 
hillsides over 1,000 meters in elevation. The name Lao Sung 
means "the Lao up high." Most groups are considered to be 
semimigratory; villages are moved to new locations when swid- 
den farming resources in the old locale have been exhausted. 
Yet some villages have continued for more than 100 years, with 
individual households moving in or out during this period. 
Although all Lao Sung traditionally live in the uplands and 
engage in swidden farming, their housing styles, diet, farming 
techniques, kinship systems, and social organization vary from 
one group to another. 

The Hmong make up more than two-thirds of the Lao Sung. 
Hmong villages in Laos, Vietnam, and Thailand have tradition- 
ally been found on mountain. or ridge tops, with sites selected 
according to principles of geomancy. Before the 1970s, villages 
seldom consisted of more than twenty or thirty households. 
Hmong rely on swidden farming to produce rice, corn, and 
other crops, but tend to plant a field until the soil is exhausted, 
rather than only for a year or two before allowing it to lie fal- 
low. Consequently, the fields farmed by a village would gradu- 
ally become too distant for easy walking, and the village would 
relocate to another site. The new site might be nearby or might 
be many kilometers distant. 

The Hmong fled China (where they were traditionally paddy 
rice farmers) to escape persecution and pacification cam- 
paigns, gradually migrating through Vietnam and Laos into 
Thailand. They adopted swidden farming in these regions by 
necessity because lowland basins were already settled. Small 



111 



Laos: A Country Study 

groups of households would leave an established village to start 
another village in relatively uninhabited upland areas. In turn, 
other families moving from older settlements would settle an 
area that had been vacated, always in search of better farm- 
lands than those that had been left behind. As the population 
of both Hmong and other neighboring groups increased, it 
ultimately became impossible to find new unclaimed lands, 
and the pioneering settlement pattern ended sometime 
between 1960 and 1975 in western Laos and northern Thai- 
land. Villages in the old settled areas of eastern Laos — 
Xiangkhoang and Louangphrabang — in many cases have been 
in one location for more than thirty or fifty years and have 
grown in size to as many as sixty or eighty households and more 
than 500 persons. 

Hmong houses are constructed directly on the ground, with 
walls of vertical wooden planks and a gabled roof of thatch or 
split bamboo. In size they range from about five by seven 
meters up to ten by fifteen meters for a large extended house- 
hold. The interior is divided into a kitchen/cooking alcove at 
one end and several sleeping alcoves at the other, with beds or 
sleeping benches raised thirty to forty centimeters above the 
dirt floor. Rice and unhusked corn are usually stored in large 
woven bamboo baskets inside the house, although a particu- 
larly prosperous household may build a separate granary. Fur- 
nishings are minimal: several low stools of wood or bamboo, a 
low table for eating, and kitchen equipment, which includes a 
large clay stove over which a large wok is placed for cooking 
ground corn, food scraps, and forest greens for the pigs. 
Almost every house has a simple altar mounted on one wall for 
offerings and ceremonies associated with ancestral spirits. 

The Hmong swidden farming system is based on white (non- 
glutinous) rice, supplemented with corn, several kinds of 
tubers, and a wide variety of vegetables and squash. Rice is the 
preferred food, but historical evidence indicates that corn was 
also a major food crop in many locations and continues to be 
important for Hmong in Thailand in the early 1990s. Most 
foods are eaten boiled, and meat is only rarely part of the diet. 
Hmong plant many varieties of crops in different fields as a 
means of household risk diversification; should one crop fail, 
another can be counted on to take its place. Hmong also raise 
pigs and chickens in as large numbers as possible, and buffalo 
and cattle graze in the surrounding forest and abandoned 
fields with little care or supervision. 



112 



The Society and Its Environment 



Hmong have traditionally grown opium in small quantities 
for medicinal and ritual purposes. From the beginning of their 
colonial presence, the need for revenue prompted the French 
to encourage expanded opium production for sale to the colo- 
nial monopoly and for payment as head taxes. Production, 
therefore, increased considerably under French rule, and by 
the 1930s, opium had become an important cash crop for the 
Hmong and some other Lao Sung groups. Hmong participate 
in the cash market economy somewhat more than other 
upland groups. They need to purchase rice or corn to supple- 
ment inadequate harvests, to buy cloth, clothing, and house- 
hold goods, to save for such emergencies as illness or funerals, 
and to pay bride-prices. In the isolated upland settlements 
favored by the Lao Sung, opium poppies, a cold-season crop, 
are typically planted in cornfields after the main harvest. 
Opium, a sap extracted from the poppy plant, is almost the 
only product that combines high value with low bulk and is 
nonperishable, making it easy to transport. It is thus an ideal 
crop, providing important insurance for the household against 
harvest or health crises. The government has officially out- 
lawed opium production, but, mindful of the critical role it 
plays in the subsistence upland economy, has concentrated 
efforts on education and developing alternatives to poppy 
farming, rather than on stringent enforcement of the ban (see 
Narcotics and Counternarcotics Issues, ch. 5). It also estab- 
lished a special police counternarcotics unit in August 1992. 

Lao Sung farming is not mechanized but depends on house- 
hold labor and simple tools. The number of workers in a 
household thus determines how much land can be cleared and 
farmed each year; the time required for weeding is the main 
labor constraint on farm size. Corn must be weeded at least 
twice, and rice usually requires three weedings during the 
growing season. Peppers, squash, cucumbers, and beans are 
often interplanted with rice or corn, and separate smaller gar- 
dens for taro, arrowroot, cabbage, and so on may be found 
adjacent to the swiddens or in the village. In long-established 
villages, fruit trees such as pears and peaches are planted 
around the houses. 

In response to increasing population pressure in the 
uplands, as well as to government discouragement of swidden 
farming, some Hmong households or villages are in the pro- 
cess of developing small rice paddies in narrow upland valleys 
or relocating to lower elevations, where, after two centuries as 



113 



Laos: A Country Study 



swidden farmers, they are learning paddy technology, how to 
train draft buffalo, and how to identify seed varieties. To vary- 
ing degrees, this same process is also occurring with other Lao 
Sung groups in the early 1990s as it had under the RLG. 

Hmong households traditionally consist of large patrilineal 
extended families, with the parents, children, and wives and 
children of married sons all living under the same roof. House- 
holds of over twenty persons are not uncommon, although ten 
to twelve persons are more likely. Older sons, however, may 
establish separate households with their wives and children 
after achieving economic independence. By the 1990s, a ten- 
dency had developed in Laos for households to be smaller and 
for each son and his wife to establish a separate household 
when the next son married. Thus, the household tends toward 
a stem family pattern consisting of parents and unmarried chil- 
dren, plus perhaps one married son. Following this pattern, 
the youngest son and his wife frequently inherit the parental 
house; gifts of silver and cattle are made to the other sons at 
marriage or when they establish a separate residence. In many 
cases, the new house is physically quite close to the parents' 
house. 

Hmong reckon kinship patrilineally and identify fifteen or 
sixteen patrilineal exogamous clans, each tracing their descent 
back to a common mythical ancestor. There are several subdivi- 
sions in Hmong society, usually named according to features of 
traditional dress. The White Hmong, Striped Hmong, and 
Green Hmong (sometimes called Blue Hmong) are the most 
numerous. Their languages are somewhat different but mutu- 
ally comprehensible, and all recognize the same clans. Each vil- 
lage usually has at least two clans represented, although one 
may be more numerous. Wives almost always live with their hus- 
band's family. 

Marriage is traditionally arranged by go-betweens who repre- 
sent the boy's family to the girl's parents. If the union is accept- 
able, a bride-price is negotiated, typically ranging from three to 
ten silver bars, worth about US$100 each, a partial relic from 
the opium trade. The wedding takes place in two installments, 
first at the bride's house, followed by a procession to the 
groom's house, where a second ceremony occurs. Sometimes 
the young man arranges with his friends to "steal" a bride; the 
young men persuade the girl to come out of her house late at 
night and abduct her to the house of her suitor. Confronted by 



114 




115 



Laos: A Country Study 



the fait accompli, the girl's parents usually accept a consider- 
ably lower bride-price than might otherwise be demanded. 
Although some bride stealing undoubtedly involves actual 
abductions, it more frequently occurs with the connivance of 
the girl and is a form of elopement. 

As a result of a government directive discouraging excessive 
expenditures on weddings, some districts with substantial 
Hmong populations decided in the early 1980s to abolish the 
institution of the bride-price, which had already been adminis- 
tratively limited by the government to between one and three 
silver bars. In addition, most marriages reportedly occurred by 
"wife stealing" or elopement, rather than by arrangement. In 
the past, males had to wait for marriage until they had saved an 
adequate sum for the bride-price, occasionally until their mid- 
twenties; with its abolition, they seemed to be marrying earlier. 
Hmong women typically marry between fourteen and eighteen 
years of age. 

The Hmong practice polygyny, although the government 
officially discourages the custom. Given the regular need for 
labor in the swidden fields, an additional wife and children can 
improve the fortunes of a family by changing the consumer/ 
worker balance in the household and facilitating expansion of 
cropped areas, particularly the labor-intensive opium crop. Yet 
the need to pay a bride-price limits the numbers of men who 
can afford a second (or third) wife. Anthropological reports 
for Hmong in Thailand and Laos in the 1970s suggested that 
between 20 and 30 percent of marriages were polygynous. 
However, more recent studies since the mid-1980s indicate a 
lower rate not exceeding 10 percent of all households. Divorce 
is possible but discouraged. In the case of marital conflict, 
elders of the two clans attempt to reconcile the husband and 
wife, and a hearing is convened before the village headman. If 
reconciliation is not possible, the wife may return to her family. 
Disposition of the bride-price and custody of the children 
depend largely on the circumstances of the divorce and which 
party initiates the separation. 

Hmong gender roles are strongly differentiated. Women are 
responsible for all household chores, including cooking, grind- 
ing corn, husking rice, and child care, in addition to regular 
farming tasks. Patrilocal residence and strong deference 
expected toward men and elders of either sex often make the 
role of daughter-in-law a difficult one. Under the direction of 



116 



The Society and Its Environment 



her mother-in-law, the young bride is commonly expected to 
carry out many of the general household tasks. This subordi- 
nate role may be a source of considerable hardship and ten- 
sion. Farm tasks are the responsibility of both men and women, 
with some specialization by gender. Only men fell trees in the 
swidden clearing operation, although both sexes clear the grass 
and smaller brush; only men are involved in the burning oper- 
ation. During planting, men punch the holes followed by the 
women, who place and cover the seeds. Both men and women 
are involved in the weeding process, but it appears that women 
do more of this task, as well as carry more than half of the har- 
vested grain from the fields to the village. Harvesting and 
threshing are shared. Women primarily care for such small ani- 
mals as chickens and pigs, while men are in charge of buffalo, 
oxen, and horses. Except for the rare household with some 
paddy fields, the buffalo are not trained but simply turned out 
to forage most of the year. 

As with all Laotian ethnic groups, there is virtually no occu- 
pational specialization in Hmong villages. Everyone is first and 
foremost a subsistence farmer, although some people may have 
additional specialized skills or social roles. 

Hmong are animists, although a small number have con- 
verted to Christianity as a result of contact with Protestant and 
Roman Catholic missionaries. Most believe that spirits are a 
common cause for illness. Shamans (txiv neeb) who can treat 
spirit-induced illness are respected and play an important role 
in the village, often being consulted to tell fortunes. Shamans 
may be either male or female and are usually "chosen" by the 
spirits after the former have suffered a long illness. Other men 
and women may know curing rites but do not enter a trance as 
a shaman does (see Religion, this ch.). 

Village stratification is limited but based primarily on clan 
membership and wealth. Often the clan that founded a village 
dominates it, either because of numerical majority or because 
early settlement facilitated access to the better fields. A family's 
wealth derives primarily from work and good luck. The ability 
to produce enough rice, or even a little to sell, and a decent 
opium harvest depend on having enough workers in the family 
to clear and care for more extensive swidden fields than aver- 
age. Livestock, particularly buffalo and cattle, are another 
important source of mobile wealth. This wealth, however, is 
subject to loss through disease, just as savings of silver, livestock, 



117 



Laos: A Country Study 



or cash can be lost almost overnight if the family experiences a 
serious illness that reduces the workforce at a critical time or 
that requires the sacrifice of chickens, pigs, or even a buffalo 
for curing rituals. Proceeds from sales of opium and livestock 
not immediately consumed are usually converted into silver 
bars or jewelry for safekeeping. 

In contrast to the Buddhist wat or the men's common house 
in Lao Loum, Kammu, and Lamet villages, there is no building 
or other central point in a Hmong village. Hmong cultural 
norms are more individualistic, and the household is more 
important than the village. Despite greater overall village per- 
manence than in former times, individual households may 
come and go, usually in search of better opportunities but 
occasionally because of conflict with relatives or neighbors. 
The decline of migrating villages has been a gradual process 
since the 1940s. As opportunities for pioneering settlements 
have disappeared, households often relocate to be near other 
clan members or less-distant relatives. 

Village governance is usually in the hands of a president and 
administrative committee, but clan elders have important con- 
sultative or advisory roles in all decisions. Interhousehold coop- 
erative relationships occur less often than among the Lao 
Loum and appear limited to labor exchanges for some farming 
tasks and assistance at house raisings. Most cooperation takes 
place among brothers or cousins, and it is primarily close kin 
who can be relied upon for assistance in the case of family 
hardship or emergency. Lacking any other resource, Hmong 
will look for help from any other member of the same clan. 

Hmong and other Lao Sung groups have traditionally lived 
in villages distant from Lao Loum or Lao Theung settlements, 
although trade in rice, forest products, and other market goods 
has stimulated contact between the groups. As the population 
of both Lao Sung and Lao Loum groups increased after the 
war, Lao Sung expansion of swidden fields had an impact on 
the watersheds of Lao Loum rice paddies. Northern Lao Loum 
who cannot produce enough rice on limited paddy fields have 
also begun to clear swiddens in the middle elevations. For the 
most part, there has been no overt conflict, and trade and 
casual contact have continued, but long-standing ethnic preju- 
dice continued to color interethnic relations in these regions 
of closer contact and competition for land in the early 1990s. 



118 



The Society and Its Environment 



At the same time that roads in remote provinces were being 
improved and international trade opened in the late 1980s, the 
Thai government imposed a ban on logging and timber 
exports following extensive deforestation and catastrophic 
floods. Thai logging companies quickly turned to Laos as an 
alternate source of tropical hardwoods. This suddenly 
increased demand for tropical timber has stimulated addi- 
tional competition for hitherto unvalued forestland and pro- 
voked increased criticism of upland swidden farming groups. 
Although traditional levels of swidden farming did not cause 
the same level of land and forest damage as have recent log- 
ging activities, government statements increasingly have attrib- 
uted rapid deforestation to swidden clearing and have 
envisioned the abolition of all upland swidden cultivation soon 
after the year 2000. Thus, in the 1990s, there may be more pres- 
sure on arable land in the uplands than previously. However, 
other analysts have noted the great impact of legal and illegal 
logging, as well as the encroachment of lowland Lao farmers 
into the uplands since the end of the Second Indochina War. A 
continuing low-level insurgency against the government, sub- 
stantially led by Hmong refugees who formerly fought for the 
RLG, is a further source of official mistrust directed at some 
Hmong and other minority groups. Government efforts to 
resettle Hmong and other swidden farming communities in 
lowland sites are motivated by security concerns — as was the 
case under the RLG in the 1960s and 1970s — and by competi- 
tion for timber, but may lead to increased disaffection of the 
minorities affected. 

The Pattern of Rural Life 

For Lao Loum, Lao Theung, and Lao Sung, the rhythm of 
life is strongly tied to the changing seasons and the require- 
ments of farming. For swidden farming villages, the work year 
begins in January or February when new fields are cleared. 
This time of the year is also good for hunting and for moving 
to a new village. Opium farmers harvest the resin between Jan- 
uary and March, depending on location and variety of poppy, 
but otherwise there are few agricultural activities. Swidden 
fields are burned around March and must be planted in May or 
June, just before the first rains. From the time the seeds sprout 
until August, work revolves around the never-ending task of 
weeding. Hunting and fishing continue, and with the coming 



119 



Laos: A Country Study 



of the rains, the forest begins to yield new varieties of wild 
foods. 

For paddy farmers, the agricultural year begins with the first 
rains, when a small seedbed is plowed and planted. The seed- 
lings grow for a month or so while the remaining fields are 
plowed and harrowed in preparation for transplanting. Trans- 
planting requires steady work from every able-bodied person 
over a period of about a month and is one of the main periods 
of labor exchange in lowland villages. 

Swidden farmers begin the corn harvest as early as Septem- 
ber, and short-season rice varieties mature soon after the corn. 
Paddy rice seldom ripens before October, however, and the 
harvest may continue through early December in some areas, 
although mid-November is more usual. Even late swidden rice 
is finished by early November. Harvesting and threshing the 
rice are the principal activities during the second period of 
intense work in the farm year. Dry-season rice farmers repeat 
the same cycle, but vegetables, tobacco, or other cash crops 
require a more even labor input over the season. 

Food availability parallels the seasons. Wild foods and fish 
are abundant during the rainy season, although the months 
just before the corn ripens may be difficult if the previous 
year's harvest was inadequate. Fruit is available during the rainy 
and cool dry seasons, but becomes scarce, as do most vegeta- 
bles, from March through May. Hmong and Mien celebrate 
their new year in December or January, when the harvest is 
complete but before the time to clear new fields. Lowland Lao 
celebrate their new year on April 15, also shortly before the 
start of the farming year. The harvest is marked by the That 
Luang (see Glossary) festival, on the full moon of the twelfth 
lunar month, which falls in late November or early December 
(see Buddhism, this ch.). 

Because most roads are in poor condition, travel in the rainy 
season is generally difficult, and villagers tend to stay close to 
home because of farmwork as well as the ever-present mud. 
The dry season brings easier land travel and the free time it 
allows. Since the late 1980s, a few rural villagers have begun to 
travel to regional population centers in search of temporary 
wage employment, often in construction. 

Urban Society 

With a population of somewhat over 250,000 in 1985, Vien- 



120 



The Society and Its Environment 



tiane is the only city of any size in Laos. Three provincial capi- 
tals have populations of more than 20,000 — Louangphrabang 
with 20,000, Savannakhet with 109,000, and Pakxe with 50,000. 
The 1985 census classified 15 percent of the population as 
"urbanized," but this figure includes the populations of all dis- 
trict centers, most of which are little more than large villages of 
2,000 to 3,000 persons. The expanded marketing and commer- 
cial opportunities resulting from economic liberalization in 
1986 have somewhat stimulated urban growth. Vientiane plan- 
ners anticipate an annual population expansion of 5.4 percent 
through the year 2000, and many of the more rural provincial 
capitals also are growing at a significant rate in the early 1990s. 

Urban centers, for the most part, have developed from vil- 
lages that expanded or grew together around an administrative 
or trading center. Louangphrabang is the historical capital of 
the kingdom of Lan Xang, and Vientiane and Pakxe are also 
centers of earlier kingdoms. Migration of the Lao Loum into 
the region resulted in the establishment of muang (see Glos- 
sary), semi-independent principalities, which sometimes 
formed a larger state entity but which always preserved a cer- 
tain autonomy as a result of transportation and communica- 
tion difficulties. Many of the original districts have since 
become district centers, and the word itself is used for this 
political division (see Party Structure, ch. 4). Although district 
centers rarely had more than a few thousand people as the 
mid-1990s approached, they serve as secondary administrative 
posts and marketing centers for the surrounding villages and 
are the location of the medical clinic and lower-secondary 
school — grades six through eight — for the vast majority of the 
rural population. 

Population displacement during the Second Indochina War 
caused growth in some cities — Vientiane, Louangphrabang, 
and the main lower Mekong Valley towns — but depopulation 
of centers in the eastern liberated zones. Xiangkhoang was 
destroyed by bombing in 1969, and Xam Nua and Phongsali 
were virtually depopulated. These provincial capitals have been 
revived since 1975, but their geographic isolation inhibits rapid 
growth. The capital of Xiangkhoang was relocated twenty kilo- 
meters north to the village of Phonsavan. Administrative cen- 
ters of several districts were also relocated after 1975 in order 
to make them more central to all villages in the district. 



121 



Laos: A Country Study 

Historically, towns were located along major rivers or in 
upland valleys and were primarily populated by Lao Loum and 
small populations of Vietnamese merchants, artisans, and civil 
servants (imported by the French), as well as by Chinese and 
Indian traders. Migration of refugees during the Second 
Indochina War brought an increased minority population, 
which grew even faster after 1975 because officials of the new 
regime, many of whom were Lao Theung and Lao Sung, 
moved into administrative posts in Mekong towns. So many 
Chinese and Indian merchants left Laos during the war that 
these groups accounted for only a small portion of the urban 
population in 1994. Many Vietnamese who were sympathetic to 
the RLG also fled, although an unknown number of advisers 
from North Vietnam were posted to Vientiane and other major 
centers. The Vietnamese population was nevertheless unlikely 
to exceed a few thousand in any towns other than Vientiane 
and Savannakhet. 

All provincial capitals were centers of marketing, administra- 
tion, education, and health care, but not of manufacturing 
because there was almost no industrial production outside the 
Vientiane area (see Industry and Services, ch. 3). As of mid- 
1994, each capital had at least one upper-secondary school — 
often the only one in the province — along with specialized 
technical schools for agriculture, teacher training, or public 
health (see Education, this ch.). Almost every province capital 
also had a hospital, but the quality of care and the availability 
of medicines — although greater than that in villages — were fre- 
quently limited. 

Everywhere, the basic village character of society is evident. 
Even in Vientiane, a substantial number of the inhabitants are 
paddy rice farmers, either as their main occupation or as 
important supplemental work. Government officials' salaries 
are inadequate to support a family, and many officials rely on 
family members to secure their basic rice supply by farming. 
Cities and towns are also important markets for vegetables and 
fruit produced in the nearby villages; the trade volume remains 
small outside of Vientiane but has stimulated the gradually 
increasing market orientation of rural producers. 

Traditional festivals and religious ceremonies are observed 
in towns much as in villages and are often organized on the 
basis of a neighborhood, which is typically defined by the 
boundaries of a formerly separate village. Family life-cycle cere- 



122 



The Society and Its Environment 



monies frequently draw guests from outside the neighborhood 
but rely on close neighbors and relatives to help with food and 
other preparations, as in a village. 

Between 1975 and 1990, urban amenities such as hotels, res- 
taurants, and cinemas were virtually absent outside of Vien- 
tiane, Savannakhet, and Louangphrabang. A few towns had 
government-operated guest houses for official travelers and 
one or two restaurants with a limited menu. Travelers in most 
district centers and even some provincial capitals could find a 
meal only by making arrangements with a family or the care- 
taker assigned to the guest house. Town markets are also lim- 
ited in size and number. After the economic reforms of the late 
1980s, however, private restaurants and hotels opened in most 
provincial centers and larger districts. Official travel increased, 
and, more important, Laotian merchants, foreign delegations, 
and tourists again began to travel within the country. 

Sanitation services and utilities are not widespread. As of 
mid-1994, only a few of the larger towns had municipal water 
systems, and none had sewerage services. Electrification is a 
limited but important feature of urban life (see Industrial Out- 
put and Employment, ch. 3). Outside of the Vientiane area, 
Thakhek, Louangphrabang, and Savannakhet, most district 
centers did not have electricity in the early 1990s. Even in 
towns, electric power is limited to a few hours a day. Automo- 
bile batteries and voltage inverters are widely used as a power 
source to watch television or listen to a stereo cassette player. 

The presence of a foreign diplomatic and aid community 
has had a significant effect on the economy of Vientiane, both 
in terms of direct aid and through employment of Laotians by 
the missions and as domestic help (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3). In 
response, Vientiane merchants stock imported consumer 
goods such as electronics, clothing, and food, items purchased 
by Laotians much more than by foreigners. A once dormant 
service sector of automobile and truck repair, tailors, barbers, 
and hairdressers has begun to revive. Patrons at restaurants 
and the six disco establishments are also predominantly Lao- 
tians, reflecting the increased income available to private-sec- 
tor businessmen and employees of foreign organizations. 
Foreign assistance in Vientiane during the early years of the 
LPDR helped to develop several upper-secondary schools and 
technical-training schools and improve the two main hospitals. 



123 



Laos: A Country Study 

However, Laotian cities have failed to attract the rural popu- 
lation, as cities do in other countries, because they offer little 
obvious economic opportunity and because the rural areas 
offer the possibility of making a decent living within communi- 
ties that have not been socially or economically fragmented by 
the forces of modernization. Further, the government initially 
had explicitly anti-urban policies. Other towns have experi- 
enced less in-migration than Vientiane; this pattern is likely to 
change if economic opportunities arise in secondary towns or 
if competition for land and forest resources — or restrictions on 
access — increases to the point of reducing the rural standard of 
living. Nevertheless, even if a town does not dominate the 
region, it has an impact on the lives of people living in the sur- 
rounding area. The larger the population of a town, the 
greater the town's impact on the region. For example, farmers 
within about fifteen kilometers of Louangphrabang grow vege- 
tables for sale in the town market. In Vientiane, this radius 
expands to forty kilometers; some village residents commute 
up to thirty kilometers each way to government or private jobs 
in the capital. Through these contacts, new ideas and material 
goods filter into rural areas. 

Religion 
Buddhism 

Buddhism was the state religion of the Kingdom of Laos, 
and the organization of the Buddhist community of monks and 
novices, the clergy (sangha), paralleled the political hierarchy. 
The faith was introduced beginning in the eighth century by 
Mon Buddhist monks and was widespread by the fourteenth 
century (see Early History, ch. 1). A number of Laotian kings 
were important patrons of Buddhism. Almost all lowland Lao 
were Buddhists in the early 1990s, as well as some Lao Theung 
who have assimilated to lowland culture. Since 1975 the com- 
munist government has not opposed Buddhism but rather has 
attempted to manipulate it to support political goals, and with 
some success. Increased prosperity and a relaxation of political 
control stimulated a revival of popular Buddhist practices in 
the early 1990s. 

Lao Buddhists belong to the Theravada tradition, based on 
the earliest teachings of the Buddha and preserved in Sri 
Lanka after Mahayana Buddhism branched off in the second 



124 



The Society and Its Environment 



century B.C. Theravada Buddhism (see Glossary) is also the 
dominant school in Thailand and Cambodia. 

Theravada Buddhism is neither prescriptive, authoritative, 
nor exclusive in its attitude toward its followers and is tolerant 
of other religions. It is based on three concepts: dharma (see 
Glossary), the doctrine of the Buddha, a guide to right action 
and belief; karma (see Glossary), the retribution of actions, the 
responsibility of a person for all his or her actions in all past 
and present incarnations; and sangha, within which a man can 
improve the sum of his actions. There is no promise of heaven 
or life after death but rather salvation in the form of a final 
extinction of one's being and release from the cycle of births 
and deaths and the inevitable suffering while part of that cycle. 
This state of extinction, nirvana, comes after having achieved 
enlightenment regarding the illusory nature of existence. 

The essence of Buddhism is contained in the Four Noble 
Truths taught by the Buddha: suffering exists; suffering has a 
cause, which is the thirst or craving for existence; this craving 
can be stopped; and there is an Eightfold Path by which a per- 
manent state of peace can be attained. Simply stated, the Eight- 
fold Path consists of right understanding, right purpose, right 
speech, right conduct, right vocation, right effort, right think- 
ing, and right meditation. 

The average person cannot hope for nirvana at the end of 
this life, but by complying with the basic rules of moral con- 
duct, can improve karma and thereby better his or her condi- 
tion in the next incarnation. The doctrine of karma holds that, 
through the working of a just and impersonal cosmic law, 
actions in this life and in all previous incarnations determine 
which position along the hierarchy of living beings a person 
will occupy in the next incarnation. Karma can be favorably 
affected by avoiding these five prohibitions: killing, stealing, 
forbidden sexual pleasures, lying, and taking intoxicants. The 
most effective way to improve karma is to earn merit (het 
boun — literally, to do good — in Lao). Although any act of 
benevolence or generosity can earn merit, Laotians believe the 
best opportunities for merit come from support for the sangha 
and participation in its activities. 

Traditionally, all males are expected to spend a period as a 
monk or novice prior to marriage and possibly in old age, and 
the majority of Lao Loum men probably did so until the 1970s. 
Being ordained also brings great merit to one's parents. The 



125 



Laos: A Country Study 



period of ordination need not be long — it could last only for 
the three-month Lenten retreat period — but many men spend 
years in the sangha gaining both secular and religious knowl- 
edge. Study of the Pali language, in which all Theravada texts 
are written, is a fundamental component of religious training. 
Ordination as a monk also requires a man to comply with the 
227 rules of the monastic order; novices — those under twenty 
years old — must obey seventy-five rules; and lay persons are 
expected to observe the five prohibitions. Only a few women, 
usually elderly, become Buddhist nuns; they live a contempla- 
tive and ascetic life but do not lead religious ceremonies as do 
monks. 

Monks are trying to develop detachment from the world 
and, thus, may have no possessions but must rely on the gener- 
osity of people for food and clothing. These gifts provide an 
important opportunity for the giver to earn merit. Women are 
more active than men in preparing and presenting rice and 
other food to monks, who make their morning rounds through 
the town carrying a bowl to receive offerings that are their only 
nourishment for the day. In villages where there are only a few 
monks or novices, the women of the village often take turns 
bringing food to the wat each morning. Attendance at prayers 
held at the wat on the quarter, full, and new moon of each 
lunar cycle also provides a regular means of gaining merit. 

Major religious festivals occur several times a year. The 
beginning and end of the Lenten retreat period at the full 
moon of the eighth and eleventh months are occasions for spe- 
cial offerings of robes and religious articles to the monks. Dur- 
ing Buddhist Lent, both monks and laity attempt to observe 
Buddhist precepts more closely. Monks must sleep at their own 
wat every night — rather than being free to travel — and are 
expected to spend more time in meditation. Offerings to 
monks and attendance at full-moon prayers are also greater 
than at other times. Vixakha Bouxa, which celebrates the birth, 
enlightenment, and death of Buddha at the full moon of the 
sixth month — usually May — corresponds with the rocket festi- 
val (boun bangfai), which heralds the start of the rains. The 
date of Boun Phavet, which commemorates the charity and 
detachment of Prince Vessantara, an earlier incarnation of the 
Buddha, varies within the dry season, and, aside from its reli- 
gious orientation, serves as an important opportunity for a vil- 
lage to host its neighbors in a twenty-four-hour celebration 
centering on monks reciting the entire scripture related to Ves- 



126 



Monk standing by the door 
of That Luang, Vientiane 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



Monks sawing logs for 
charcoal, Louangphrabang 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



Laos: A Country Study 



santara. That Luang, a Lao-style stupa, is the most sacred Bud- 
dhist monument in Laos and the location of the nationally 
important festival and fair in November. 

For the Lao Loum, the wat is one of the two focal points of 
village life (the other is the school). The wat provides a symbol 
of village identity as well as a location for ceremonies and festi- 
vals. Prior to the establishment of secular schools, village boys 
received basic education from monks at the wat. Nearly every 
lowland village has a wat, and some have two. Minimally, a wat 
must have a residence building for the monks and novices 
(vihari), and a main building housing the Buddha statues 
(sim), which is used for secular village meetings as well as for 
prayer sessions. Depending on the wealth and contributions of 
the villagers, the buildings vary from simple wood and bamboo 
structures to large, ornate brick and concrete edifices deco- 
rated with colorful murals and tile roofs shaped to mimic the 
curve of the naga, the mythical snake or water dragon. An 
administrative committee made up of respected older men 
manages the financial and organizational affairs of the wat. 

Buddhist ceremonies generally do not mark events in a life- 
cycle, with the exception of death. Funerals may be quite elabo- 
rate if the family can afford it but are rather simple in rural set- 
tings. The body lies in a coffin at home for several days, during 
which monks pray and a continual stream of visitors pays their 
respects to the family and shares food and drink. After this 
period, the body is taken in the coffin to a cremation ground 
and burned, again attended by monks. The ashes are then 
interred in a small shrine on the wat grounds. 

Beginning in the late 1950s, the Pathet Lao attempted to 
convert monks to the leftist cause and to use the status of the 
sangha to influence the thoughts and attitudes of the populace. 
The effort was in many ways successful, despite efforts by the 
RLG to place the sangha under close civil administrative con- 
trol and to enlist monks in development and refugee assistance 
programs. Political scientist Stuart-Fox attributed the success of 
the Pathet Lao to the inability of the Lao Loum elite to inte- 
grate the monarchy, government, and sangha into a set of 
mutually supportive institutions. Popular resentment of the 
aristocracy, division of the sangha into two antagonistic sects, 
the low level of its religious education and discipline, and 
opposition to foreign (i.e., Western) influence all contributed 
to the receptiveness of many monks to Pathet Lao overtures. 



128 



The Society and Its Environment 



The politicization of the sangha by both sides lowered its status 
in the eyes of many, but its influence at the village level aug- 
mented popular support for the Pathet Lao political platform, 
which paved the way for the change in government in 1975. 

The LPDR government's successful efforts to consolidate its 
authority also continue to influence Buddhism. In political 
seminars at all levels, the government taught that Marxism and 
Buddhism are basically compatible because both disciplines 
state that all men are equal, and both aim to end suffering. 
Political seminars further discouraged "wasteful" expenditures 
on religious activities of all kinds because some monks were 
sent to political reeducation centers and others were forbidden 
to preach. The renunciation of private property by the monks 
was seen as approaching the ideal of a future communist soci- 
ety. However, Buddhist principles of detachment and nonmate- 
rialism are clearly at odds with the Marxist doctrine of 
economic development, and popular expenditures on reli- 
gious donations for merit making are also seen as depriving the 
state of resources. Thus, although overtly espousing tolerance 
of Buddhism, the state undercut the authority and moral stand- 
ing of the sangha by compelling monks to spread party propa- 
ganda and by keeping local monks from their traditional 
participation in most village decisions and activities. During 
this period of political consolidation, many monks left the 
sangha or fled to Thailand. Other pro-Pathet Lao monks joined 
the newly formed Lao United Buddhists Association, which 
replaced the former religious hierarchy. The numbers of men 
and boys being ordained declined abruptly, and many w at fell 
empty. Participation at weekly and monthly religious ceremo- 
nies also dropped off as villagers under the watchful eye of 
local political cadre were fearful of any behavior not specifi- 
cally encouraged. 

The nadir of Buddhism in Laos occurred around 1979, after 
which a strategic liberalization of policy occurred. Since that 
time, the number of monks has gradually increased, although 
as of 1993, the main concentrations continue to be in Vien- 
tiane and other Mekong Valley cities. Buddhist schools in the 
cities remain but have come to include a significant political 
component in the curriculum. Party officials are allowed to 
participate at Buddhist ceremonies and even to be ordained as 
monks to earn religious merit following the death of close rela- 
tives. The level of religious understanding and orthodoxy of 
the sangha, however, is no higher than it had been before 1975, 



129 



Laos: A Country Study 

when it was justly criticized by many as backward and unobser- 
vant of the precepts. 

From the late 1980s, stimulated as much by economic 
reform as political relaxation, donations to the wat and partici- 
pation at Buddhist festivals began to increase sharply. Festivals 
at the village and neighborhood level became more elaborate, 
and the That Luang festival and fair, which until 1986 had been 
restricted to a three-day observance, lasted for seven days. 
Ordinations also increased, in towns and at the village level, 
and household ceremonies of blessing, in which monks were 
central participants, also began to recur. Although the role of 
Buddhism has been permanently changed by its encounter 
with the socialist government, it appears that Buddhism's fun- 
damental importance to lowland Lao and to the organization 
of Lao Loum society has been difficult to erase, has been recog- 
nized by the government, and will continue for the foreseeable 
future. 

Animism 

Despite the importance of Buddhism to Lao Loum and 
some Lao Theung groups, animist beliefs are widespread 
among all segments of the Lao population. The belief in phi 
(spirits) colors the relationships of many Lao with nature and 
community and provides one explanation for illness and dis- 
ease. Belief in phi is blended with Buddhism, particularly at the 
village level, and some monks are respected as having particu- 
lar abilities to exorcise malevolent spirits from a sick person or 
to keep them out of a house. Many wat have a small spirit hut 
built in one corner of the grounds that is associated with the 
phi khoun wat, the beneficent spirit of the monastery. 

Phi are ubiquitous and diverse. Some are connected with the 
universal elements — earth, heaven, fire, and water. Many Lao 
Loum also believe that they are being protected by khwan 
(thirty-two spirits). Illness occurs when one or more of these 
spirits leaves the body; this condition may be reversed by the 
soukhwan — more commonly called the bad — a ceremony that 
calls all thirty-two khwan back to bestow health, prosperity, and 
well-being on the affected participants. Cotton strings are tied 
around the wrists of the participants to keep the spirits in 
place. The ceremony is often performed to welcome guests, 
before and after making long trips, and as a curing ritual or 
after recovery from an illness; it is also the central ritual in the 



130 



The Society and Its Environment 



Lao Loum wedding ceremony and naming ceremony for new- 
born children. 

Many Lao believe that the khwan of persons who die by acci- 
dent, violence, or in childbirth are not reincarnated, becoming 
instead phi phetu (malevolent spirits). Animist believers also 
fear wild spirits of the forests. Other spirits associated with spe- 
cific places such as the household, the river, or a grove of trees 
are neither inherently benevolent nor evil. However, occa- 
sional offerings ensure their favor and assistance in human 
affairs. In the past, it was common to perform similar rituals 
before the beginning of the farming season to ensure the favor 
of the spirit of the rice. These ceremonies, beginning in the 
late 1960s, were discouraged by the government as successive 
areas began to be liberated. This practice had apparently died 
out by the mid-1980s, at least in the extended area around 
Vientiane. 

Ceremonies oriented to the phi commonly involve an offer- 
ing of a chicken and rice liquor. Once the phi have taken the 
spiritual essence of the offering, people may consume the 
earthly remains. The head of a household or the individual 
who wants to gain the favor of the spirit usually performs the 
ritual. In many villages, a person, usually an older man believed 
to have special knowledge of the phi, may be asked to choose 
an auspicious day for weddings or other important events, or 
for household rites. Each lowland village believes itself pro- 
tected by the phi ban, which requires an annual offering to 
ensure the continued prosperity of the village. The village 
spirit specialist presides over this major ritual, which in the past 
often involved the sacrifice of a water buffalo and is still an 
occasion for closing the village to any outsiders for a day. To 
Hang phi ban (feed the village spirit) also serves an important 
social function by reaffirming the village boundaries and the 
shared interests of all villagers. 

Most Lao Theung and Lao Sung ethnic groups are animists, 
for whom a cult of the ancestors is also important, although 
each group has different practices and beliefs. The Kammu call 
spirits hrooy, and they are similar to the phi of the Lao Loum; 
the house spirit is particularly important, and spirits of wild 
places are to be avoided or barred from the village. Lamet have 
similar beliefs, and each village must have one spirit practitio- 
ner (xemia), who is responsible for making all the sacrifices to 
village spirits. He also supervises the men's communal house 



131 



Laos: A Country Study 

and officiates at the construction of any new houses. When a 
spirit practitioner dies, one of his sons is elected by the married 
men of the village to be his successor. If he has none, one of his 
brother's sons is chosen. Ancestor spirits (mbrong n'a) are very 
important to the Lamet because they look out for the well- 
being of the entire household. They live in the house, and no 
activity is undertaken without informing them of it. Ancestor 
spirits are fond of buffalos; thus buffalo skulls or horns from 
sacrifices are hung at the altar of the ancestors or under the 
gable of the house. Numerous taboos regarding behavior in 
the house are observed to avoid offending ancestral spirits. 

Hmong also believe in a variety of spirits (neeb), some associ- 
ated with the house, some with nature, and some with ances- 
tors. Every house has at least a small altar on one wall, which is 
the center of any ritual related to the household or its mem- 
bers. Annual ceremonies at Hmong New Year renew the gen- 
eral protection of the household and ancestral spirits. The 
spirit of the door is important to household well-being and is 
the object of another annual ceremony and sacrifice. As with 
other Lao groups, illness is frequently attributed to the action 
of spirits, and spirit practitioners are called to carry out curing 
rites. Two classes exist: ordinary practitioners and shamans. 
Ordinary priests or the household head conduct the house- 
hold ceremonies and ordinary divinations. The shaman may be 
called on to engage in significant curing rituals. 

According to Hmong belief, spirits reside in the sky, and the 
shaman can climb a ladder to the heavens on his magical horse 
and contact the spirits there. Sometimes illness is caused by 
one's soul climbing the steps to the sky, and the shaman must 
climb after it, locate it, and bring it back to the body in order to 
effect a cure. During the ritual, the shaman sits in front of the 
altar astride a wooden bench, which becomes his or her horse. 
A black cloth headpiece covers vision of the present world, and 
as the shaman chants and enters a trance, he or she begins to 
shake and may stand on the bench or move, mimicking the 
process of climbing to heaven. The chant evokes the shaman's 
search and the negotiations with the heavenly spirits for a cure 
or for information about the family's fortune. 

Hmong shamans are believed to be chosen by the spirits, 
usually after a serious or prolonged illness. The illness would 
be diagnosed by another shaman as an initiatory illness and 
confrontation with death, which was caused by the spirits. Both 



132 



The Society and Its Environment 



men and women can be summoned in this way by the spirits to 
be shamans. After recovery from the illness, the newly chosen 
shaman begins a period of study with a master shaman, which 
may last two or three years, during which time he or she learns 
the chants, techniques, and procedures of shamanic rites, as 
well as the names and natures of all the spirits that can bring 
fortune or suffering to people. Because the tradition is passed 
orally, there is no uniform technique or ritual; rather, it varies 
within a general framework according to the practice of each 
master and apprentice. 

Education 

Education Prior to the Lao People's Democratic Republic 

Of the many ethnic groups in Laos, only the Lao Loum had 
a tradition of formal education, reflecting the fact that the lan- 
guages of the other groups had no written script. Until the 
mid-twentieth century, education was primarily based in the 
Buddhist wat, where the monks taught novices and other boys 
to read both Lao and Pali scripts, basic arithmetic, and other 
religious and social subjects. Many villages had wat schools for 
novices and other village boys. However, only ordained boys 
and men in urban monasteries had access to advanced study. 

During the colonial period, the French established a secular 
education system patterned after schools in France, and 
French was the language of instruction after the second or 
third grade. This system was largely irrelevant to the needs and 
life-styles of the vast majority of the rural population, despite its 
extension to some district centers and a few villages. However, 
it did produce a small elite drawn primarily from the royal fam- 
ily and noble households. Many children of Vietnamese immi- 
grants to Laos — who made up the majority of the colonial civil 
service — also attended these schools and, in fact, constituted a 
significant proportion of the students at secondary levels in 
urban centers. Post-secondary education was not available in 
Laos, and the few advanced students traveled to Hanoi, 
Danang, and Hue in Vietnam and to Phnom Penh in Cambo- 
dia for specialized training; fewer still continued with univer- 
sity-level studies in France. 

The Pathet Lao began to provide Lao language instruction 
in the schools under its control in the late 1950s, and a Laotian 
curriculum began to be developed in the late 1960s in the RLG 



133 



Laos: A Country Study 



schools. In 1970 about one-third of the civilian employees of 
the RLG were teachers, although the majority of these were 
poorly paid and minimally trained elementary teachers. At that 
time, there were about 200,000 elementary students enrolled 
in RLG schools, around 36 percent of the school-age popula- 
tion. 

Education since 1975 

An important goal of the LPDR government was to establish 
a system of universal primary education by 1985. The LPDR 
took over the existing RLG education system that had been 
established in the 1950s and restructured it, facing many of the 
same problems that had also confronted previous govern- 
ments. The French system of education was replaced with a 
Laotian curriculum, although lack of teaching materials has 
impeded effective instruction. An intensive adult literacy cam- 
paign was initiated in 1983-84, which mobilized educated per- 
sons living in villages and urban neighborhoods to bring basic 
reading and writing skills to over 750,000 adults. Largely as a 
result of this campaign, those able to read and write increased 
to an estimated 44 percent. According to the United Nations 
(UN), by 1985 those able to read and write were estimated at 
92 percent of men and 76 percent of women of the fifteen to 
forty-five age-group. Because few reading materials are avail- 
able, especially in the rural areas, many newly literate adults 
lose much of their proficiency after a few years. 

The decision to establish universal education led the govern- 
ment to focus its efforts on building and staffing schools in 
nearly every village. Because resources are limited, most 
schools are poorly constructed — of bamboo and thatch — and 
staffed by only one or two teachers who are paid low wages, 
usually in arrears. Many village schools have only one or two 
grades, and books, paper, or other teaching materials are con- 
spicuous by their scarcity. 

School enrollment has increased since 1975. In 1988 pri- 
mary school enrollment was estimated at 63 percent of all 
school-age children. In 1992-93 an estimated 603,000 students 
were in primary school, compared to 317,000 students in 1976 
and 100,000 students in 1959. However, the goal of achieving 
universal primary education was postponed from 1985 to 2000 
as a result of the lack of resources. 



134 



The Society and Its Environment 



Because teachers are paid irregularly, they are forced to 
spend significant amounts of time farming or in other liveli- 
hood activities, with the result that in many locations classes are 
actually held for only a few hours a day. Because of irregular 
classes, overcrowding, and lack of learning resources, the aver- 
age student needed eleven to twelve years to complete the five- 
year primary course in the late 1980s. Repetition rates ranged 
from 40 percent for the first grade to 14 percent for the fifth 
grade. Dropouts also were a significant problem, with 22 per- 
cent of all entering first graders leaving school before the sec- 
ond grade. In the late 1980s, only 45 percent of entering first 
graders completed all five years of primary school, up from 18 
percent in 1969. 

Performance statistics vary according to rural-urban loca- 
tion, ethnic group, and gender. Enrollment and school quality 
are higher in urban areas, where the usefulness of a formal 
education is more evident than in rural farming communities. 
Isolated teachers confronted with primitive rural living and 
teaching conditions have a difficult time maintaining their own 
commitment as well as the interest of their pupils. Ethnic 
minority students who have no tradition of literacy and who do 
not speak Lao have a particularly difficult time. Unless the 
teacher is of the same or similar ethnic group as the students, 
communication and culturally appropriate education are lim- 
ited. Because of these factors, in the late 1980s the enrollment 
rate for the Lao Sung was less than half that of the Lao Loum; 
enrollment was also low for Lao Theung children. 

Girls are less likely than boys to attend school and attend for 
fewer years — a discrepancy that was declining, however, in the 
early 1990s. In 1969 only 37 percent of students in primary 
school were girls; by 1989, however, 44 percent of primary 
school students were girls. Because of Lao Sung cultural atti- 
tudes toward girls' and women's responsibilities, girls in these 
groups accounted for only 26 percent of all students. 

Secondary education enrollment has expanded since 1975 
but as of mid-1994 was still limited in availability and scope. In 
1992-93 only about 130,000 students were enrolled in all post- 
primary programs, including lower- and upper-secondary 
schools, vocational programs, and teacher-training schools. 
The exodus of Laotian elite after 1975 deprived vocational and 
secondary schools of many of their staff, a situation that was 
only partly offset by students returning from training in social- 



135 



Laos: A Country Study 



ist countries. Between 1975 and 1990, the government granted 
over 14,000 scholarships for study in at least eight socialist 
countries; just over 7,000 were to the Soviet Union, followed by 
2,500 to Vietnam, and 1,800 to the German Democratic Repub- 
lic (East Germany). 

In mid-1994, the school year was nine months. The typical 
sequence includes five years of primary school, followed by 
three years of lower-secondary school and three years of upper- 
secondary school. Some students go directly from primary or 
lower-secondary school to vocational instruction, for example, 
in teacher-training schools or agriculture schools. 

Local secondary education is concentrated in the provincial 
capitals and some district centers. Dropout rates for students at 
secondary and technical schools are not as high as among pri- 
mary students, but the gender and ethnic group differentials 
are more pronounced. In the late 1980s, only 7 percent of 
lower-secondary students were Lao Sung or Lao Theung, a rate 
that dropped to 3 percent in upper-secondary school. For most 
students who do not live in a provincial center, attendance at 
secondary school requires boarding away from home in make- 
shift facilities. This situation further discourages students in 
rural areas from pursuing further education, with additional 
differential impacts on girls and minorities. Vientiane has the 
majority of advanced schools, including the national teachers' 
training school at Dong Dok, the irrigation college at Tad 
Thong, the agriculture college at Na Phok, the National Poly- 
technic Institute, and the University of Medical Sciences. Even 
so, the level of training available at these schools is low. 

In 1986 the government began to reform the education sys- 
tem, with the goals of linking educational development more 
closely to the socioeconomic situation in each locality, improv- 
ing science training and emphasis, expanding networks to 
remote mountainous regions, and recruiting minority teach- 
ers. The plan envisioned making education more relevant to 
daily realities and building increased cooperation in educa- 
tional activities among the various ministries, mass organiza- 
tions, and the community. However, the ability to implement 
this program through its scheduled completion in 2000 
depends on a significant budgetary increase to the educational 
sector in addition to receiving significant foreign aid. Educa- 
tion accounted for only 8 percent of government expenditures 
in 1988, down from a 10 to 15 percent range during the pre- 



136 



The Society and Its Environment 



ceding seven-year period, and cultural expenditures also were 
not accorded a high priority. 

Although more school texts and general magazines are 
being printed, poor distribution systems and budgetary con- 
straints limit their availability throughout the country (see 
Mass Media, ch. 4). Overall, 3.9 million books were printed in 
1989, including school texts published by the Ministry of Edu- 
cation, and novels, stories, and poems published by the Minis- 
try of Information and Culture. Translations into Lao of 
various Russian-language technical, literary, and children's 
books were available through the Novosti press agency. Almost 
all these materials are inexpensive paperbound editions. Distri- 
bution of school texts is improving, and magazines and novels 
can occasionally be found in district markets distant from Vien- 
tiane. Thai printed material — for the most part, magazines and 
books — was available after the late 1980s in a few shops. Yet, in 
the early 1990s, it was rare to see a book or any other reading 
material in rural villages, with the exception of political posters 
or a months-old edition of the newspaper Xieng Pasason (Voice 
of the People) pasted on a house wall. 

Health And Welfare 
Public Health 

Health and health care in Laos were poor in the early 1990s. 
Although diets are not grossly inadequate, chronic moderate 
vitamin and protein deficiencies are common, particularly 
among upland ethnic groups. Poor sanitation and the preva- 
lence of several tropical diseases have further eroded the 
health of the population. Western medical care is available in 
few locations, and the quality and experience of practitioners 
are, for the most part, marginal, a situation that has not 
improved much since the 1950s. 

The life expectancy at birth for men and women in Laos was 
estimated in 1988 at forty-nine years, the same as in Cambodia 
but at least ten years lower than in any other Southeast Asian 
nation. High child and infant mortality rates strongly affected 
this figure, with the Ministry of Public Health estimating the 
infant mortality rate at 109 per 1,000 and the under-five mortal- 
ity rate at 170 per 1,000 in 1988. The United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF — see Glossary) believed these figures underes- 
timated the true mortality rate but still represented decreases 



137 



Laos: A Country Study 

from comparable rates in 1960. Regional differences were 
great. Whereas the infant mortality rate for Vientiane was 
about 50 per 1,000, in some remote rural areas it was estimated 
to be as high as 350 per 1,000 live births; that is, 35 percent of 
all children died before the age of one. 

Children's deaths are primarily caused by communicable dis- 
eases, with malaria, acute respiratory infections, and diarrhea 
the main causes of mortality as well as morbidity. Vaccination 
against childhood diseases was expanding, but in 1989 Vien- 
tiane's municipal authorities still were unable to vaccinate 
more than 50 percent of targeted children. Other provinces 
have much lower rates of immunization. Malaria is widespread 
among both adults and children, with the parasite Plasmodium 
falciparum involved in 80 to 90 percent of the cases. 

In the first malaria eradication program between 1956-60, 
DDT was sprayed over much of the country. Since 1975 the 
government has steadily increased its activities to eradicate 
malaria. The Ministry of Public Health operates provincial sta- 
tions to monitor and combat malaria through diagnosis and 
treatment. Prevention measures involve chemical prophylaxis 
to high-risk groups, elimination of mosquito breeding sites, 
and promotion of individual protection. The campaign has 
had some success: the ministry reported a decline in the 
infected population from 26 percent to 15 percent between 
1975 and 1990. 

As of 1993, diarrheal diseases were also common, with regu- 
lar outbreaks occurring annually at the beginning of the rainy 
season when drinking water is contaminated by human and 
animal wastes washing down hillsides. Only a few rural house- 
holds have pit or water-seal toilets, and people commonly 
relieve themselves in the brush or forested areas surrounding 
each village. For children in these villages, many of whom are 
chronically undernourished, acute or chronic diarrhea is life- 
threatening because it results in dehydration and can precipi- 
tate severe malnutrition. 

Although nutrition appears to be marginal in the general 
population, health surveys are of varying quality. Some data 
indicate that stunting — low height for age — in the under-five 
population ranged from 2 to 35 percent, while wasting — low 
weight for height — probably does not exceed 10 percent of the 
under-five population. These figures reflect village diets based 
predominantly on rice, with vegetables as a common accompa- 



138 




Laotians bringing offerings to a temple in Ban Houayxay, near the 

Thai border, in Bokeo Province 
Courtesy Randall C. Merris 
Musicians in Vientiane help to raise funds for wat restoration. 

Courtesy Gina Merris 



139 



Laos: A Country Study 

niment and animal protein — fish, chicken, and wild foods — 
eaten irregularly. Children aged six months to two years — the 
weaning period — are particularly susceptible to undernutri- 
tion. The nutritional status of adults is related closely to what is 
being grown on the family farm, as well as to dietary habits. For 
example, fresh vegetables and fruits are not highly valued and 
therefore are not consumed in adequate amounts. As a result, 
it is likely that vitamin A, iron, and calcium deficiencies are 
common in all parts of the country. 

Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 

Permissive attitudes of Laotian men toward sex and prostitu- 
tion facilitated the transmission of human immunodeficiency 
virus (HIV) during the 1980s and 1990s, making HIV infection 
and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) a growing 
concern. In 1992 a focused sample of about 7,600 urban resi- 
dents identified one AIDS case and fourteen persons who 
tested HIV positive. No other statistics were available as of mid- 
1994. 

The government convened a conference on AIDS in 1992, 
which noted the potential for a rapid spread of HIV in the pop- 
ulation. Participants at the conference agreed that the spread 
of AIDS in Laos was inevitable, and, in fact, would likely be 
through young men who migrated to towns and then returned 
to their villages, as well as through women who entered the sex 
trades because of economic necessity. The numbers of HIV-pos- 
itive people could increase to more than 10,000 within the next 
few years, although these numbers would likely not expand at 
the same rate as in Thailand — even though Thai men demon- 
strate similar attitudes toward sex and prostitution — because 
Laos's national policies forbid open prostitution. Through the 
early 1990s, Laos avoided widespread prostitution such as that 
found in neighboring countries, but it is likely to increase, as is 
the temporary migration of Laotian women to neighboring 
countries to work in the sex industry. Other possible routes of 
HIV infection include users of injectable illicit drugs and medi- 
cal injections using unsanitary syringes. Should AIDS spread 
significantly in Laos, it will not only have a devastating effect on 
rural labor and the national economy, but will put impossible 
stress on the health care system. As the best means of prevent- 
ing an epidemic, the conference report emphasized education 
in all sectors of the population through a variety of methods, 
including the media. 



140 



The Society and Its Environment 



Health Infrastructure 

Despite government promises that the urban-oriented 
health system inherited from the RLG would be expanded to 
support rural primary health care and preventative programs, 
little money had been allocated to the health sector as of 1993. 
According to figures from 1988, less than 5 percent of the total 
government budget was targeted for health, with the result that 
the Ministry of Public Health was unable to establish a manage- 
ment and planning system to facilitate the changes envisioned. 
UNICEF considered the effort to construct a primary health 
care system to have failed entirely. 

Official statistics identified hospitals in fifteen of the sixteen 
provinces, plus several in Vientiane, and clinics in 110 districts 
and more than 1,000 tasseng (subdistricts — see Glossary). In 
reality, most subdistrict clinics are unstaffed, unequipped, and 
unsupplied, and in 1989 only twenty of the district clinics actu- 
ally provided services. The physical condition of the facilities is 
poor, with clean water and latrines unavailable at most health 
posts, and electricity unavailable at 85 percent of district clin- 
ics, rendering vaccine storage impossible. Drugs and equip- 
ment stored in the central warehouses are seldom distributed 
to outlying provinces, and in most situations, patients had to 
purchase Western pharmaceuticals from private pharmacies 
that import stock from Thailand or Vietnam. 

The number of health care personnel has been increasing 
since 1975, and in 1990 the ministry reported 1,095 physicians, 
3,313 medical assistants, and 8,143 nurses. Most personnel are 
concentrated in the Vientiane area, where the population per 
physician ratio (1,400 to one) is more than ten times higher 
than in the provinces. In 1989 the national ratio was 2.6 physi- 
cians per 10,000 persons. 

Training of medical personnel at all levels emphasizes the- 
ory at the expense of practical skills and relies on curricula sim- 
ilar to those used prior to 1975. International foreign aid 
donors supported plans for a school of public health, and texts 
were written and published in Lao. As of 1990, however, the 
school did not exist because of delays in approval of its struc- 
ture and difficulties in finding trainers with the appropriate 
background. 

Rural and provincial health personnel work under condi- 
tions similar to their counterparts in education: salaries are low 



141 



Laos: A Country Study 

and seldom paid on time, necessary equipment and supplies 
are unavailable, and superiors offer little supervision or 
encouragement. In these circumstances, morale is low, job 
attendance sporadic, and most health care ineffectual. In gen- 
eral, the population has little confidence in the health care sec- 
tor, although some village medics and a few district or 
provincial hospitals are respected by their communities. 

Use of traditional medical practitioners remains important 
in urban as well as rural locations. Healers who know how to 
use medicinal plants are often consulted for common illnesses. 
The Institute of Traditional Medicine of the Ministry of Public 
Health formulates and markets a number of preparations from 
medicinal plants. Spirit healers are also important for many 
groups, in some cases using medicinal plants but often relying 
on rituals to identify a disease and effect a cure. Many Laotians 
find no contradiction in consulting both spirit curers and West- 
ern-trained medical personnel. 

In the absence of a widespread system of health workers, 
local shops selling drugs became an important source of medi- 
cines and offered advice on prescriptions. However, these phar- 
macies are unregulated and their owners unlicensed. As a 
consequence, mis-prescription is common, both of inappropri- 
ate drugs and incorrect dosages. In rural areas, vendors com- 
monly make up small packets of drugs — typically including an 
antibiotic, several vitamins, and a fever suppressant — and sell 
them as single-dose cures for a variety of ailments. 

Social Welfare 

Despite statistics indicating that Laos is one of the poorest 
countries in the world, it has for the most part been spared the 
acute problems often associated with underdevelopment and 
poverty. Famine and serious epidemics have been absent in the 
twentieth century, urban slums have not existed, and debt 
bondage has been unknown. Because the rural economy was 
not effectively monetized through at least the early 1980s, 
households usually countered seasonal crop shortages by 
increasing their gathering activities and relying on wild tubers 
and other foods as insurance crops. Most villages have customs 
regarding the provision of rice loans — sometimes interest- 
free — to families experiencing a bad year. Most shelter in rural 
areas is self-built and not dependent on land ownership or 
access to money. Thus, it is possible for most families to survive 



142 



The Society and Its Environment 



at least at a subsistence level, although for many the material 
standard of living is not high. Chronic marginal food produc- 
tion and lack of access to or inability to afford medical care and 
education remain pervasive problems, however. 

No reliable statistics regarding income distribution or the 
extent of poverty were available as of mid-1994. A 1988 survey 
of income distribution in urban Vientiane found an average 
household monthly income of about K35,000 (for value of the 
kip — see Glossary), or US$70, with the most common income 
between K25,000 and K30,000 per month— about $US55 at the 
1988 exchange rate. With 4.5 persons per average household, 
the modal figure implied an annual per capita income of about 
US$150, far below the UN poverty line of US$275. Whether 
this survey included noncash income from agricultural produc- 
tion or other exchange is unknown, however; family crop pro- 
duction is still an important element in the economy of many 
urban Vientiane families. These limited statistics emphasize the 
relative sensitivity of urban residents to prices and cash income, 
particularly when compared with rural villagers who are more 
insulated from the effects of inflation and market behavior. 

The government does not maintain a social welfare system, 
but the National Committee for Social Welfare and War Veter- 
ans operates a number of "orphans' schools" in some province 
centers and administers retirement pay to government offi- 
cials. This retirement pay, however, is as insignificant as the offi- 
cials' salaries were before retirement. Orphans, handicapped 
persons, and elderly persons living in rural villages are usually 
supported and cared for by their relatives, although the level of 
support depends on the economic resources of the caretakers. 
Lowland Lao are traditionally tolerant of mentally handi- 
capped members of their community, and these persons, 
although not economically productive, are allowed to live with 
their families and move around the village at will. This family 
approach to social welfare operates in the towns as well, often 
on a neighborhood basis but particularly relying on extended 
kinship networks. As a consequence, urban beggars were 
unknown between 1975 and about 1987, although a small num- 
ber appeared in Vientiane after that date, perhaps reflecting 
the increase in urban economic differentiation as much as any 
increase in acute poverty. 

Regional and ethnic discrepancies remain the greatest 
source of poverty and poor living conditions. Many lowland vil- 



143 



Laos: A Country Study 

lages are prosperous, regularly produce a rice surplus, and 
assist a small number of less well-off households within their 
boundaries. Other villages, particularly those in the uplands or 
of minorities who have recently relocated to lowland sites, are 
less well off and often unable to produce enough rice for vil- 
lage consumption. In these situations, the ability to produce 
other salable commodities, whether livestock, opium, or vege- 
tables, or to find wage-labor jobs, is critical to the well-being of 
the household and the village. In settings where an entire vil- 
lage is rice-deficient, interfamily exchanges and rice loans can- 
not ameliorate the basic shortage affecting the community. 
Acute regional crop shortfalls in several years between 1989 
and 1993 were largely met by rice imports provided through 
foreign aid. As market networks expand and as the economy 
becomes increasingly monetized and population growth and 
resettlement increase pressure on land resources, the number 
of villages in marginal economic situations can be expected to 
increase. 

Future Trends 

In mid-1994 Laotian society was in a period of transition. 
Although firmly based in self-sufficient village agricultural pat- 
terns, it is beginning to experience social and economic 
change stimulated by government policies and slowly growing 
communication with urban centers and neighboring modern- 
izing countries. Most Laotians, however, have little experience 
outside their district of residence and are able to live simply 
and relatively comfortably on the food and other products they 
produce or gather themselves. Limited but expanding trade 
provides basic consumer goods that make life more comfort- 
able or save labor. Trade also provides a stimulus to produce 
somewhat more than the family needs for its immediate con- 
sumption. Nevertheless, villages in mountainous regions are 
less advantaged and less connected to the market network and 
to government influence than those on the plains and river val- 
leys, and some are chronically unable to produce enough food 
to meet their needs. 

As the market economy expands and rural farmers find 
opportunities for cash crop production, village labor exchange 
relationships and other forms of cooperation are likely to 
begin to break down. These changes have already begun in the 
villages on the Vientiane plain, although in outlying provinces 



144 



The Society and Its Environment 



traditional cooperation networks remain more firmly in place. 
Not surprisingly, social and economic stratification increases in 
villages more closely linked to urban areas or markets, where 
some families are quicker to exploit economic or educational 
opportunities. Landownership remains relatively equal, but 
unclaimed good quality land for paddy rice production is 
extremely difficult to locate, thus removing one factor that 
served to minimize stratification in the past. At the end of the 
twentieth century, competition for lowland farms and 
increased pressure and restrictions on upland swidden farming 
may combine to change the character of rural landownership 
and farming. Genuinely landless families are likely to increase 
in number, and urban populations also will likely continue to 
expand at a moderate rate, depending on the continued estab- 
lishment of manufacturing enterprises in provincial centers. 

Substantial changes occurred in the education and health 
systems after 1975, but both sectors are severely underfunded 
and fail to meet the expectations of government policy makers. 
Education is more likely to improve, and as schools improve, 
expand their curriculum, and become more widespread, rural 
youth will gradually acquire the outlook and skills needed for 
work and life in an increasingly open and market-oriented soci- 
ety. Whether improved education also brings political inquiry 
and change remains to be seen. 

Past performance of the state health sector does not gener- 
ate much optimism regarding future developments. In the 
early 1990s, economic growth and stratification were already 
creating a demand for health care that remained unmet by the 
government sector, and since the late 1980s, significant num- 
bers of people have traveled to Thailand for treatment of seri- 
ous illnesses. Private health providers may increase, in much 
the same way as private pharmacies have opened to meet the 
demand for medications that cannot be obtained through the 
state health system. 

Religious traditions that were initially threatened by the 
communist government have made a resurgence, and eco- 
nomic prosperity in lowland Lao areas has stimulated increased 
donations to and support of the Buddhist wat'm many villages. 
As of mid-1994, most ethnic minorities maintained animist tra- 
ditions as well, but were criticized formally and informally by 
officials for being superstitious. 



145 



Laos: A Country Study 

At least through the 1990s, the traditional elements of Lao- 
tian society will very likely continue, and society will maintain 
its predominantly rural character. Self-sufficiency is not widely 
at risk, although there are certain ethnic groups and regions of 
the country experiencing inadequate food production and 
continued lack of access to productive resources. Ethnic diver- 
sity will certainly continue to be a factor in government devel- 
opment policy as well as intervillage relationships but is 
unlikely to be a source of serious conflict. 

* * * 

There have been few contemporary works on Laotian soci- 
ety, and only one researcher, anthropologist Grant Evans, has 
been able to carry out formal ethnographic or sociological 
studies in Laos since 1975. Most recent books and articles have 
focused on economic and political affairs. For information 
about society, it is necessary to search for certain less accessible 
reports prepared for development projects, as well as older 
sources. For some of the better sources, knowledge of French is 
necessary. The best books as of the early 1990s were Evans's Lao 
Peasants Under Socialism, Australian political scientist Martin 
Stuart-Fox's Laos: Politics, Economics, Society, and French social 
geographer Christian Taillard's Le Laos: Strategies d'un etat-tam- 
pon. The UNICEF report, Children and Women in the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, is not easily available but provides an excel- 
lent up-to-date overview of the economic, health, education, 
and agricultural sectors, as well as the socioeconomic status of 
women and children. 

A number of monographs or journal articles on post-1975 
Laos are noteworthy. These include Evans's Agrarian Change in 
Communist Laos; an article entitled '"Rich Peasants' and Cooper- 
atives in Socialist Laos," and another article entitled "Reform 
or Revolution in Heaven? Funerals among Upland Tai." Carol 
Ireson's study, "Women's Forest Work in Laos," outlines 
women's roles regarding gathering of wild foods and other 
resources in rural areas. Three short studies produced for the 
Swedish development aid mission also provide useful details of 
contemporary village life in rural areas: Agneta Hakangard's 
"Road 13: A Socio-Economic Study of Villagers, Transport and 
Use of Road 13 S, Lao P.D.R.;"Jan Ovesen's "Anthropological 
Reconnaissance in Central Laos: A Survey of Local Communi- 
ties in a Hydropower Project Area;" and Ing-Britt Trankell's 
"On the Road in Laos: An Anthropological Study of Road Con- 



146 



The Society and Its Environment 



struction and Rural Communities." Martin Stuart-Fox and Rod 
Bucknell's "Politicization of the Buddhist Sangha in Laos" ana- 
lyzes the religious changes occurring through the early 1980s. 

Several works based on research during the RLG period 
remain valuable. Jacques Lemoine's Un village Hmong vert du 
Haut Laos is the only comprehensive source on the Hmong in 
Laos, as is Karl Gustav Izikowitz's dated, but still fundamentally 
useful account of the Lamet, Lamet: Hill Peasants in French 
Indochina. 

Several publications on the Kammu produced with the col- 
laboration of Kristina Lindell, Damrong Tayanin, and their 
coworkers provide detailed descriptions of Kammu life in Laos 
prior to the revolution. See particularly Lindell, et al., The 
Kammu Year: Its Lore and Music, Damrong and Lindell's Hunting 
and Fishing in a Kammu Village; and Damrong's "Environment 
and Nature Change in Northern Laos." 

Articles by Christian Taillard and Georges Condominas pro- 
vide an understanding of the social dynamics of lowland Lao 
village life unavailable elsewhere, particularly Taillard's "Le vil- 
lage Lao de la region de Vientiane: Un pouvoir local face au 
pouvoir etatique" and "Le dualisme urbain-rural au Laos et la 
recuperation de l'ideologie traditionnelle" and Condominas's 
"Phiban Cults in Rural Laos." Martin John Philip Barber's 
"Migrants and Modernization: A Study of Change in Lao Soci- 
ety" also contains valuable information on village social struc- 
ture in the Vientiane area. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



147 



Chapter 3. The Economy 



Detail from a Red Tai textile, with a spirit figure and a naga (mythical snake 
or water dragon, associated with the rains and rivers) performing a healing 
and spirit-appeasing ceremony; a naga almost forms the shape of a boat. 



IN THE EARLY 1990s, the Lao People's Democratic Republic 
(LPDR, or Laos) was among the ten poorest countries in the 
world, according to a World Bank (see Glossary) ranking, with 
a per capita gross national product (GNP — see Glossary) in 
1991 of just US$200. Its labor force is poorly trained and edu- 
cated, its infrastructure severely damaged from years of inade- 
quate maintenance, and its ability to feed itself precariously 
dependent upon the weather. Development expenditure is 
financed almost entirely by foreign aid, and, by 1991, exports 
financed only 40 percent of imports. By the beginning of the 
1990s, however, Laos, while still an impoverished country 
highly dependent on foreign aid for its development, had 
taken some essential steps toward a free-market economy. 

Despite the many obstacles to economic development that 
remained in the early 1990s, however, in little more than a 
decade, starting in 1979, the government had deliberately 
shifted the focus of its economic policy away from socialist 
goals and had made great strides. Many state-owned enter- 
prises, which had been draining the nation's treasury through 
subsidies, were privatized, and tax collection was boosted tre- 
mendously, helping to bring the fiscal deficit under control. 
Liberal laws on foreign investment and trade were passed, pre- 
cipitating a surge of investment activity. Prices of many com- 
modities were freed from government controls, domestic 
transport restrictions were lifted, and the cooperative farming 
system was ended. 

The Seventh Resolution, passed at a plenary session of the 
Central Committee by the ruling Phak Pasason Pativat Lao 
(Lao People's Revolutionary Party — LPRP; see Glossary) in late 
1979, marked the start of the country's shift toward a market- 
oriented economy. The resolution affirmed the government's 
commitment to begin to open to a market economy, as the nec- 
essary path to economic development. Since its inception in 
1975, the government, in theory, has recognized private prop- 
erty and private enterprise. However, they were not encour- 
aged, and, in fact, the provincial governments of Louang- 
phrabang (Luang Prabang) and Phongsali abolished private 
trade and traders through 1987. The objectives of the First 
Five-Year Plan (1981-85) included self-sufficiency in food pro- 



151 



Laos: A Country Study 



duction, defined as the equivalent of 350 kilograms of paddy 
rice and other foodstuffs per capita per year, and the collectiv- 
ization of agriculture. The plan also focused on developing 
industrial activity, increasing trade with Thailand, improving 
the shattered rural infrastructure, and increasing export reve- 
nues, all goals that received much greater attention as the ten- 
tative steps toward a market-oriented economy continued. 

Growth during the plan period was slower than had been 
anticipated, however, and the government decided to take 
bolder steps toward reform. At the Fourth Party Congress in 
1986, the Second Five-Year Plan (1986-90) was endorsed, and a 
new national development strategy was introduced. The New 
Economic Mechanism, as this program was called, was 
designed to expose the economy to world market forces gradu- 
ally, without sacrificing the nation's goal of food self-sufficiency. 
To implement this plan, many facets of the economy were 
decentralized. Although the central authorities continued to 
set policy guidelines, responsibility for administering and 
financing many programs for economic and social develop- 
ment was delegated to the provinces. About a year after the 
congress, the new policy was promulgated into regulations, and 
changes became rapid and extensive. 

The second plan also sought to encourage foreign and pri- 
vate investment. Among the reforms called for under the New 
Economic Mechanism were the lifting of numerous trade regu- 
lations and the creation of opportunities for foreign invest- 
ment. In a major shift from its economic dependency on 
Vietnam, Laos began to look toward Thailand — and, later, 
toward other socialist countries — for private investment, tech- 
nology transfer, and trade. Through the improvement of trans- 
portation and communications systems, encouragement of the 
private sector, and development of the agroforestry industrial 
processing sector, it was hoped that non-food imports could be 
reduced and exports increased, thus improving the balance of 
payments. Although Laos showed an overall balance of pay- 
ments surplus in 1985 and 1986, the current account deficit 
had been increasing, and during those years exports financed 
less than 30 percent of imports. The government took a new 
interest in environmental protection and sought to limit the 
practice of swidden, or slash-and-burn, cultivation as a means 
of protecting its forest resources and encouraging cash crop- 
ping. It proved difficult, however, to bring about such a change 
because of negative effects on upland farmers' livelihoods. Tra- 



152 



The Economy 



ditional swidden agriculture does not adversely affect forest 
resources to the same extent that commercial exploitation 
does. 

Many reforms were carried out successfully during the late 
1980s, but the Second Five- Year Plan ended with economic per- 
formance lagging well behind planned achievements. Not least 
among the disappointments was the need to import rice during 
the droughts of 1987 and 1988, underlining the fact that an 
objective identified over ten years earlier — sustained self-suffi- 
ciency in food — had not been met. 

Despite economic failures, however, the Fifth Party Con- 
gress, held in March 1991, reaffirmed the government's com- 
mitment to the development of a market-oriented economy. 
The Third Five- Year Plan (1991-95) proposes a "strategy" that 
aims to continue progress made under the previous two plans: 
improving the country's infrastructure, promoting exports, 
and encouraging import-substitution industries. In August 
1991, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA) approved a new 
constitution — the first since the previous constitution was abol- 
ished in 1975 (see The Constitution, ch. 4). Among its provi- 
sions is the affirmation of the right to private ownership; the 
words "democracy and prosperity" replaced "socialism" in the 
national motto. 

Agriculture and Forestry 

Agriculture in the Economic System 

At least 5 million hectares of Laos's total land area of 
23,680,000 hectares are suitable for cultivation; however, just 
17 percent of the land area (between 850,000 and 900,000 
hectares) is, in fact, cultivated, less than 4 percent of the total 
area. Rice accounted for about 80 percent of cultivated land 
during the 1989-90 growing season, including 422,000 hect- 
ares of lowland wet rice and 223,000 hectares of upland rice, 
clearly demonstrating that although there is interplanting of 
upland crops and fish are found in fields, irrigated rice agricul- 
ture remains basically a monoculture system despite govern- 
ment efforts to encourage crop diversification. Cultivated land 
area had increased by about 6 percent from 1975-77, but in 
1987 provided citizens with less than one-fourth of a hectare 
each, given a population of approximately 3.72 million in 1986. 
In addition to land under cultivation, about 800,000 hectares 



153 



Laos: A Country Study 

are used for pastureland or contain ponds for raising fish. Pas- 
tureland is rotated, and its use is not fixed over a long period of 
time. 

In the early 1990s, agriculture remained the foundation of 
the economy. Although a slight downward trend in the sector's 
contribution to gross domestic product (GDP — see Glossary) 
was evident throughout the 1980s and early 1990s — from about 
65 percent of GDP in 1980 to about 61 percent in 1989 and fur- 
ther decreasing to between 53 and 57 percent in 1991 — a simi- 
lar decrease in the percentage of the labor force working in 
that sector was not readily apparent. Some sources identified 
such a downward trend — from 79 percent in 1970 to about 71 
percent in 1991 — but both the LPDR's State Planning Commis- 
sion and the World Bank reported that 80 percent of the labor 
force was employed in agriculture in 1986. Available evidence 
thus suggests that the percentage of the labor force employed 
in agriculture in fact remained relatively steady at about 80 per- 
cent throughout the 1970s and 1980s. 

Agricultural production grew at an average annual rate of 
between 3 and 4 percent between 1980 and 1989, almost dou- 
ble its growth rate in the preceding decade, despite two years of 
drought — in 1987 and 1988 — when production actually 
declined. Paddy rice production declined again in 1991 and 
1992, also because of drought. By 1990 the World Bank esti- 
mated that production was growing at an increasingly faster 
rate of 6.2 percent. Increased production, long one of the gov- 
ernment's goals, is a result, in part, of greater use of improved 
agricultural inputs during the 1970s and 1980s. The area of 
land under irrigation had been expanding at a rate of 12 per- 
cent per annum since 1965, so that by the late 1980s, irrigated 
land constituted between 7 and 13 percent of total agricultural 
land. Although still a small percentage, any increase helps to 
facilitate a continued rise in agricultural productivity. Small- 
scale village irrigation projects rather than large-scale systems 
predominate. Use of fertilizers increased as well, at an average 
annual rate of 7.2 percent; given that commercial fertilizer use 
had been virtually nonexistent in the late 1970s, this, too, is an 
important, if small, achievement in the government's pursuit of 
increased productivity. In addition, the number of tractors in 
use nearly doubled during the decade, from 460 tractors in 
1980 to 860 in 1989. 



154 



The Economy 



Crops and Farming Systems 

Most farmers employ one of two cultivation systems: either 
the wet-field paddy system, practiced primarily in the plains 
and valleys, or the swidden cultivation system, practiced prima- 
rily in the hills. These systems are not mutually exclusive, espe- 
cially among the Lao Loum (see Glossary), or lowland Lao, in 
areas remote from major river valleys (see Lowland Lao Society, 
ch. 2). Swidden cultivation was practiced by approximately 1 
million farmers in 1990, who grew mostly rice on about 40 per- 
cent of the total land area planted to rice. 

Swidden agriculture is highly destructive to the forest envi- 
ronment because it entails shifting from old to new plots of 
land to allow exhausted soil to rejuvenate, a process that is esti- 
mated to require at least four to six years. The extent of 
destruction, however, depends on the techniques used by the 
farmers and the overall demographic and environmental cir- 
cumstances that relate to the length of the fallow period 
between farming cycles. Further, traditional agricultural prac- 
tices allowed for forest regeneration and not the stripping of 
forest cover, which is a current commercial logging practice. 
Swidden fields are typically cultivated only for a year, and then 
allowed to lie fallow, although Kammu (alternate spellings 
include Khamu and Khmu) anthropologist Tayanin Damrong 
reports that at least through the 1970s some fields were planted 
two years in a row. An increasing population, encroachment on 
traditional swidden farming areas by other villages or ethnic 
groups, and gradual deterioration of the soil as a result of these 
pressures have led to increasingly frequent shortfalls in the har- 
vests of midland swidden farmers. 

The swidden farming process begins with clearing the 
selected fields in January or February, allowing the cut brush 
and trees to dry for a month, and then burning them. Rice or 
other crops are seeded by dibble shortly before the rains begin 
in June, and the growing crops must be weeded two or three 
times before the harvest in October. Swidden farming house- 
holds are seldom able to harvest a rice surplus; in fact, the har- 
vest usually falls one to six months short of families' annual rice 
requirements. 

Swidden cultivation is less productive than wet-field cultiva- 
tion because it requires between ten and fifty times as much 
land per capita — if one includes the fallow fields in the calcula- 
tion — yet produces just 20 percent of the national rice harvest. 



155 



Laos: A Country Study 

Mature fallows or young forests have other benefits such as wild 
food gathering, animal habitat, and watershed protection. Gov- 
ernment policy since the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism has discouraged the practice of swidden cultivation 
because it works against the goals of increased agricultural pro- 
ductivity and an improved forest environment. Also, the gov- 
ernment wishes to control the population in close clusters. 
Farmers have resisted the change, however, largely because 
wet-field cultivation often is not feasible in their areas and 
because no alternative method of subsistence has presented 
itself, especially given the lack of markets and infrastructure 
necessary for cash-cropping to be an attractive, or even a possi- 
ble, venture. Further, government traders' defaults on pur- 
chase contracts with farmers in the late 1980s made farmers 
with better physical access to markets skeptical about cash-crop 
production. In general, despite government efforts to increase 
export-oriented agricultural production, the "rice monocul- 
ture" persisted in Laos through the early 1990s. 

Rice 

Rice is the main crop grown during the rainy season, and, 
under usual conditions, rainfall is adequate for rice produc- 
tion. However, if rain ceases to fall for several weeks to a month 
at a critical time in the rice growing cycle, yields will be signifi- 
cantly affected. Upland rice varieties, although adapted to a 
lower moisture requirement, are also affected by intermittent 
rains because farmers have no means of storing water in their 
fields. 

Rice accounted for over 80 percent of agricultural land and 
between 73 percent and 84 percent of total agricultural output 
of major crops throughout the 1980s, except in 1988, and into 
the early 1990s (see table 4, Appendix). Rice paddies also yield 
fish in irrigation ditches in na (lowland rice fields). Production 
of rice more than doubled between 1974 and 1986, from fewer 
than 700,000 tons to 1.4 million tons; however, drought in 1987 
and 1988 cut annual yields by nearly one-third, to about 1 mil- 
lion tons, forcing the government to rely on food aid for its 
domestic requirements. In 1988 and 1989, some 140,000 tons 
of rice were donated or sold to Laos. With improved weather 
and the gradual decollectivization of agriculture — an impor- 
tant measure under the New Economic Mechanism — rice pro- 
duction surged by 40 percent in 1989. The increase in 
production reflected the importance of the agricultural sector 



156 



Sticky rice harvest, Vientiane 
Rice padi, Louangphrabang 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



157 



Laos: A Country Study 



to the economy and was largely responsible for the economic 
recovery following the droughts. In 1990 production contin- 
ued to increase, although at a much slower rate, and the point 
of self-sufficiency in rice was reached: a record 1.5 million tons. 
Sufficiency at a national level, however, masks considerable 
regional differences. The southern Mekong provinces of 
Khammouan, Savannakhet, and Champasak regularly produce 
surpluses, as do Vientiane and Oudomxai provinces, but an 
inadequate transportation system often makes it easier for 
provinces with shortages to purchase rice from Thailand or 
Vietnam than to purchase it from other provinces. 

According to some sources, the percentage of the labor 
force engaged in rice production declined gradually, by over 30 
percent between 1986 and 1991, a trend encouraged by the 
government because it tended to increase export-oriented pro- 
duction. Some feared, however, that this trend would threaten 
sustained self-sufficiency in food, another key goal of the gov- 
ernment. But sustained self-sufficiency more likely depends on 
a continued increase in the use of agricultural inputs such as 
fertilizers and improved strains of rice, and on the implementa- 
tion of extension and research services, rather than on the 
actual number of workers involved in planting. 

The overall increase in rice production throughout the 
1980s was the result of higher productivity per hectare, rather 
than of an increase in the land area planted in rice; in fact, the 
area planted in rice decreased during the 1980s, from 732,000 
hectares in 1980 to 657,000 hectares in 1990. Because farmers 
make little use of fertilizers or irrigation, however, most land 
still yielded only one annual crop in the early 1990s, despite 
government efforts to foster the use of double-crop rice. 

Other Crops 

Only about 150,000 hectares were planted with major crops 
other than rice in 1990, an increase from approximately 80,000 
hectares in 1980. Principal non-rice crops include cardamom — 
sometimes considered a forestry product — coffee, corn, cot- 
ton, fruit, mung beans, peanuts, soybeans, sugarcane, sweet 
potatoes, tobacco, and vegetables. The only crop produced for 
export in substantial quantities is coffee. Although the total 
area planted to these crops is small relative to the area planted 
to rice, it increased from 10 percent of the total cropped area 
in 1980 to about 18 percent in 1990. The increase in part 
reflects the drop in rice production during the drought years; 



158 



The Economy 



it also demonstrates some success in the government's push to 
diversify crops. Yields for all the major crops except coffee, veg- 
etables, and cardamom — for which some figures are only avail- 
able from 1986 — increased gradually between 1980 and 1990, 
most notably corn (by 70 percent), fruit (by 65 percent), pea- 
nuts (by 28 percent), and mung beans (by 25 percent) (see 
table 5, Appendix). Despite increasing agricultural output, 
however, Laos is still an importer of food, heavily dependent on 
food aid. 

Statistics for agricultural production do not reflect either the 
nature of the subsistence agricultural economy or the impor- 
tance of opium to the hill economy. Opium, legal in Laos and 
once even accepted as a tax payment, is a lucrative cash crop 
for the Lao Sung (see Glossary) — including the Hmong (see 
Glossary) — who have resisted government efforts to replace 
opium production with the production of other goods, for 
which the market is much less profitable (see Upland Lao Soci- 
ety, ch. 2). Opium production provides the funds necessary to 
the household when there is a rice deficiency, common among 
swidden farmers. Crop substitution programs, however, have 
had some effect, and to some extent tougher laws against drug 
trafficking and government cooperation on training programs 
have also contributed to reduced output. 

In 1994 Laos remained the third largest producer of illicit 
opium for the world market, according to United States drug 
enforcement officials (see Narcotics and Counternarcotics 
Issues, ch. 5). These officials estimate that the potential yield of 
opium declined 47 percent — from 380 tons in 1989 when a 
memorandum of understanding on narcotics cooperation 
between the United States and Laos was signed — to an esti- 
mated 180 tons in 1993. The 22 percent decline in opium pro- 
duction in 1993 from 1992, however, was largely attributed to 
adverse weather conditions. 

Livestock 

The government encourages animal husbandry through 
programs for cattle breeding, veterinary services, cultivation of 
pasture crops, and improvement of fish, poultry, and pig 
stocks. Between 1976-78 and 1986-88, the stock of all farm ani- 
mals increased greatly: cattle by 69 percent to 588,000 head; 
goats by 128 percent to 73,000; pigs by 103 percent to 1.5 mil- 
lion; horses by 59 percent to 42,000; buffaloes by 55 percent to 
1 million; and chickens by 101 percent to 8 million. Increases, 



159 



Laos: A Country Study 



however, would have been significantly greater without diseases 
and a persistent shortage of animal feed. Disease is a serious 
problem: there is a significant annual mortality of chickens and 
pigs in most villages, and buffaloes are also frequently subject 
to epidemics. 

Fishing 

For many Laotians, freshwater fish are the principal source 
of protein; per capita consumption averages 5.1 kilograms 
annually. Fishpond culture began in the mid-1960s, and pro- 
duction — mainly carp raised in small home lots — grew an aver- 
age 30 percent annually thereafter, the highest rate in Asia 
between 1975 and 1985. The Mekong districts in the south 
have especially high potential for greater increases in fish pro- 
duction. In the 1982-84 period, the average annual catch was 
20,000 tons, all of which was consumed domestically. 

Forestry 

In the 1950s, forests covered 70 percent of the land area; yet, 
by 1992, according to government estimates, forest coverage 
had decreased by nearly one-third, to just 47 percent of total 
land area. Despite the dwindling expanse, timber (including 
ironwood, mahogany, pine, redwood, and teak) and other for- 
estry products (benzoin (resin), charcoal, and sticklac) consti- 
tute a valuable supply of potential export goods. The forest has 
also been an important source of wild foods, herbal medicines, 
and timber for house construction and even into the 1990s 
continues to be a valued reserve of natural products for non- 
commercial household consumption. Since the mid-1980s, 
however, widespread commercial harvesting of timber for the 
export market has disrupted the traditional gathering of forest 
products in a number of locations and contributed to 
extremely rapid deforestation throughout the country (see 
Environmental Problems and Policy, this ch.). 

Deforestation increased steadily throughout the 1980s, at an 
annual average rate of about 1.2 percent in the first half of the 
decade according to the United Nations (UN) and other moni- 
toring agencies. This rate represents the destruction of about 
150,000 to 160,000 hectares annually, as compared with annual 
reforestation of about 2,000 hectares. The government, how- 
ever, reported a deforestation rate double this figure. Defores- 
tation results from clearing forestland for shifting cultivation 



160 



The Economy 



and removing logs for industrial uses and fuel. The volume of 
logs (roundwood) removed for industrial purposes increased 
by about 70 percent between 1975-77 and 1985-87, to about 
330,000 cubic meters; however, this volume was dwarfed by that 
removed for domestic (fuel) purposes. Between 1980 and 
1989, the volume of logs removed for fuel increased by about 
25 percent, to about 3.7 million cubic meters; only about 
100,000 cubic meters were removed for industrial purposes. By 
1991 these figures had increased to approximately 3.9 million 
cubic meters and 106,000 cubic meters, respectively. 

Following the introduction of the New Economic Mecha- 
nism, decentralization of forest management to autonomous 
forest enterprises at the provincial level encouraged increased 
exploitation of forests. At the central and provincial levels, 
autonomous forest enterprises are responsible for forest man- 
agement. 

Timber resources have been commercially exploited on a 
small scale since the colonial period and are an important 
source of foreign exchange. In 1988 wood products accounted 
for more than one-half of all export earnings. In 1992 timber 
and wood products were almost one-third of the total principal 
exports. 

The government needed to reconcile its opposing objectives 
of decentralized forestry management and environmental pro- 
tection. In January 1989, the government imposed a ban on 
logging — initially announced in January 1988 as a ban on the 
export of unprocessed wood — although exemptions are 
granted on a case-by-case basis. This measure was followed by 
the imposition of high export taxes on timber and other wood 
products, included in the June 1989 tax reforms. Toward the 
end of 1989, logging was again permitted, but only based on 
quotas extended to individual forestry enterprises. In response 
to the restrictions, production of unprocessed logs (round- 
wood or timber) decreased slightly in 1989, but, according to 
the Asian Development Bank (see Glossary), production more 
than recovered the following year. The effect of the restrictions 
is most clearly shown in the export statistics for 1989 — exports 
of timber and wood products had decreased by 30 percent 
from the previous year. In 1991 a new decree banned all log- 
ging until further notice, in hopes of controlling widespread 
illegal logging and subsequent environmental destruction. 
However, there was little practical impact, and illegal logging 



161 



Laos: A Country Study 



remains widespread. The smuggling of logs to Thailand also is 
significant. 

Agricultural Policy 

Agriculture, the most important sector of the economy, 
clearly benefited from the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism. The changes positively affected performance by 
establishing a consistent policy that induced increased agricul- 
tural production over a number of years — before the droughts 
in 1987 and 1988 — particularly in paddy production. 

In June 1988, in line with the policies described by the New 
Economic Mechanism, the government passed a resolution to 
reform the agricultural sector. As announced at the Fourth 
Party Congress in 1986, the principal goal was to reorient the 
sector toward a market economy. The abolition of the much 
hated agricultural tax as well as the socialist restrictions on mar- 
keting helped to create necessary incentives for farmers. 

The major change was in the pricing policy. The practice of 
setting low producer prices for a wide range of crops was 
ended, boosting incomes in rural areas. (In 1987 the procure- 
ment price of rice was only 30 percent of the market price) . 

Other changes were implemented. Restrictions on internal 
trade of agricultural products were removed, allowing free 
markets to operate, at least for important crops such as rice. 
Laws also were enacted to guarantee farmers' rights to private 
ownership of land, including the right to use, transfer commer- 
cially, and bequeath. Tax exemptions for specified periods also 
were decreed. 

The reforms emphasize the government's belief that further 
increasing and diversifying agricultural production requires 
the participation and encouragement of the private sector. 
Food security, as always, remains a key objective, but the focus 
of the new agricultural policy is on the production of cash 
crops that can be processed — to increase their value — and then 
exported. The means for reaching that goal include the popu- 
lar 1989 measure of abandoning the poorly developed 
attempts at establishing the socialist infrastructure of agricul- 
ture — a cooperative farming system. 

The primary objective of the cooperative farming system, 
based on the Vietnamese model, had been to help the nation 
achieve self-sufficiency in food. Reflecting the government's 



162 



The Economy 



pursuit of this goal, the number of government-assisted coop- 
erative farms nearly tripled between 1978, when the drive to 
reorganize agriculture began, and the introduction of the New 
Economic Mechanism in 1986. At that time, cooperative farms 
numbered about 4,000 and employed about 75 percent of the 
agricultural labor force, although most were cooperatives only 
on paper, and there was no practical cooperative management. 
By 1988, however, employment in the cooperatives had 
decreased and included only 53 percent of all rural families 
and about half of all rice fields. 

The distribution and sale of collectively managed land to 
families began in 1989. Most families in the old settled areas 
had their original land returned, which they still recognized. 
By mid-1990 most state farms and agricultural cooperatives had 
been disbanded. This move, in conjunction with the removal of 
many restrictions on food prices and the distribution of agri- 
cultural goods, helped to precipitate a modest growth in agri- 
cultural output of about 7 percent in 1990. 

At the Fifth Party Congress in March 1991, the government 
reiterated the basic objective of its agricultural policy: a shift 
from subsistence production to cash crop production through 
crop diversification and improved linkages to export markets. 
Although rural farmers have limited experience in marketing 
their farm produce and are cautious about participating 
actively in the market, they are beginning to produce and sell 
their specialized crops and livestock and buy manufactured 
goods on a regular basis. At the congress, the government also 
affirmed its support for the private ownership of land and its 
intent to protect farmers' rights to long-term use of land, to 
bequeath land to their children, and to transfer their land 
rights in exchange for compensation. These assurances, among 
other improvements in the economic atmosphere, are an 
attempt to make Laos more attractive to foreign investors. 

Environmental Problems and Policy 

Laos suffers from a number of environmental problems, the 
most important of which are related to deforestation. Expand- 
ing commercial exploitation of the forests, plans for additional 
hydroelectric facilities, foreign demand for wild animals and 
non-wood forest products for food and traditional medicines, 
and a growing population put increasing pressure on the for- 
ests. Deforestation not only destroyed at least 150,000 to 



163 



Laos: A Country Study 

160,000 hectares of valuable forest annually in the 1980s, but 
also caused erosion — leading to siltation of reservoirs, naviga- 
tion channels, and irrigation systems downstream — and 
reduced groundwater levels. The practice of swidden cultiva- 
tion not only contributes greatly to deforestation, but also in 
1987 made Laos one of eleven countries in the world that 
together were responsible for over 80 percent of net world car- 
bon emissions amounting to a per capita emission of ten tons 
annually, compared with the world average of 1.17 tons per 
capita. Further, during the Second Indochina War (1954-75), 
Laos was heavily bombed and left with tons of unexploded ord- 
nance and bomb craters that ultimately altered the local ecol- 
ogy- 

The government's desire to preserve valuable hardwoods for 
commercial extraction and to protect the forest environment, 
as well as international concern about environmental degrada- 
tion and the loss of many wildlife species unique to Laos, have 
motivated efforts to prohibit swidden cultivation throughout 
the country (see Natural Resources, ch. 2). This policy has had 
a significant effect on the livelihoods of upland villagers depen- 
dent on swidden cultivation of rice. Traditionally, villagers 
relied on forest products as a food reserve during years of poor 
rice harvest and as a regular source of fruits and vegetables. By 
the 1990s, however, these gathering systems were breaking 
down in many areas. The government has restricted the clear- 
ing of forestland for swidden cropping since the late 1980s and 
is attempting to resettle upland swidden farming villages in 
lowland locations where paddy rice cultivation is possible. How- 
ever, both the government's inability to ensure compliance 
with the measures and the attraction of Thai money for forest 
products inhibits implementation of the restrictions. 

Although a lack of environmental planning, surveys, and leg- 
islation diminishes the likelihood of substantial improvement 
of the environment in the near future, a number of decrees 
have been issued to encourage environmental protection. 
These decrees include general principles for protecting forest- 
land; prohibitions on cutting certain tree species; regulations 
on hunting, fishing, and the use of fire during the dry season; 
and regulations on the management and protection of forest- 
land, wildlife, and fish. The use of manure and compost have 
been encouraged to help rejuvenate soil. Managed burning 
also encourages many forms of forest growth. 



164 




Rural housing and rice padis, Louangphrabang 
Harvesting vegetables outside Vientiane 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



165 



Laos: A Country Study 



The government's commitment to environmental protec- 
tion is affirmed in the constitution and in its policy of finding 
new occupations for swidden cultivators. In 1991 the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Forestry established a land use program 
under the National Forest Resource Conservation and Devel- 
opment Strategy. The program reserves 17.0 million hectares, 
including 9.6 million hectares for forest protection, 2.4 million 
hectares for wildlife reserves and national parks, and 5.0 mil- 
lion hectares for production. The commitment, however, is 
mainly on paper: the highest priority park — Nam Theun — will 
be flooded by a hydroelectric dam by 2000. 

Industry and Services 

Industrial Output and Employment 

Estimates of the industrial sector's contribution (including 
construction) to GDP vary, but most sources find it to be slowly 
increasing, from about 10 percent in 1984 to about 17 percent 
in 1993. The World Bank estimated the sector's contribution at 
14 percent in 1989. Most sources also indicated an increase in 
the percentage of the labor force employed in the sector, from 
about 5 percent in 1970 to about 7 percent in 1980. However, 
World Bank figures available in mid-1993 indicated that the 
sector employed only just over 2 percent of the labor force in 
1986. All sources agree that the growth of the industrial sector 
had increased throughout the 1980s; the World Bank estimated 
an average annual growth rate of 3.4 percent between 1980 and 
1989, despite negative growth in the drought years of 1987 and 

1988 during which exports of hydroelectricity were substan- 
tially lowered. By 1990 the growth rate had leveled off, from a 
surge of nearly 32.0 percent in 1989 to about 12.7 percent in 
1992. The virtual end of the command economy fueled the 

1989 industrial boom and supported steady growth for at least 
the medium term. Principal activities in the industrial sector 
include manufacturing, construction, mining, processing agri- 
cultural and forestry goods, and producing hydroelectricity. 

Manufacturing 

There is a paucity of any real industry in Laos outside of tim- 
ber harvesting and electricity generation. Nonetheless, "manu- 
facturing" represents about half of all industrial activity. Other 
manufacturing activities include the production of agricultural 
tools, animal feed, bricks, cigarettes, detergents, handicrafts, 



166 



The Economy 



insecticides, matches, oxygen, plastics, rubber footwear, salt, 
soft drinks and beer, textiles and clothing, and veterinary prod- 
ucts. Manufacturing employed only approximately 2 percent of 
the labor force in 1991. As of 1994, the garment industry was 
"booming," with investment from China, France, Taiwan, and 
Thailand; there were more than forty garment factories in the 
Vientiane area. 

The manufacturing subsector was composed of over 600 fac- 
tories and plants, of which one-third were state-owned in 1991. 
Most manufacturing is for domestic consumption and is cen- 
tered in the Vientiane area. As of mid-1994, there was little 
manufacturing in or near Laotian towns. In 1989 and 1990, 
there was a rapid increase in cottage industries such as cotton 
spinning and weaving, traditional village crafts, basket-weaving, 
and the production of alcoholic beverages. As part of the infor- 
mal business sector, however, cottage industries are not covered 
by national statistics. 

Between 1980 and 1990, over 80 percent of manufacturing 
was in the production of clothing, food and beverages, metal 
products, tobacco products, and wood products (see table 6, 
Appendix). Industrial roundwood production increased 71 
percent between 1975-77 and 1985-87 to an annual average of 
330,000 cubic meters and then declined to 309,400 cubic 
meters in 1990. Sources differ over the growth trend for lum- 
ber production; the UN reported a decrease in production of 
61 percent between 1980 and 1988, and the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank showed an increase of nearly 400 percent in the 
same period. Cigarette production rose from 1.10 billion units 
per year from 1981-84; to 1.12 billion units in 1985 and an esti- 
mated 1.20 billion units per year for 1986-90. Statistics over a 
lengthy period of time for the production of other major goods 
are not readily available; however, the Asian Development 
Bank estimated that the value of metal products, food and bev- 
erages, and clothing (at 1991 prices) had increased greatly 
between 1980 and 1990, by 55 percent, 195 percent, and 196 
percent, respectively (see table 7, Appendix). A general 
upward trend in the growth of production is borne out by offi- 
cial LPDR statistics from the first half of the decade. The World 
Bank reported that the manufacturing subsector grew by 35 
percent in 1989, slowing to about 4 percent the following year. 

Energy 

Mountainous terrain and heavy annual rainfall give Laos 



167 



Laos: A Country Study 

considerable hydroelectric potential. The Mekong River and its 
uibutaries in Laos have an estimated hydroelectric potential of 
between 18,000 and 22,000 megawatts, or roughly half that of 
the river as a whole. The remaining potential belongs to Cam- 
bodia and other riparian countries. Total installed capacity in 
1991 was 212 megawatts, the majority of it hydroelectric, or 
only about 1 percent of the potential. 

Production of hydroelectricity, the country's major export 
until 1987, expanded slowly throughout the 1980s, from 930 
thousand megawatt-hours in 1980 to about 1.1 million mega- 
watt-hours in 1989, an increase of about 17 percent. The major- 
ity of electricity produced — approximately 75 to 80 percent, as 
of 1992 — is exported to Thailand, which has an agreement to 
purchase all surplus electricity. The remainder is supplied to 
power networks for domestic consumption. Through 1986 the 
sale of electricity to Thailand was the country's most important 
source of foreign exchange. Despite increased production, in 
1987 hydroelectricity yielded its place as the principal export to 
wood products, because of the drought, which lowered water 
levels, and a reduction in the unit price of electricity to Thai- 
land. By 1991 a new agreement between Laos and Thailand 
had raised the unit price of electric power. 

The largest hydropower facility in Laos is the Nam Ngum 
dam, sited on the Nam Ngum River, north of Vientiane. The 
Nam Ngum plant began operation in 1971 with an installed 
generating capacity of thirty megawatts; by 1987 additional tur- 
bines had increased capacity to 150 megawatts. In the early 
1970s, the Nam Ngum facility provided electricity to Vientiane; 
the supply was gradually extended to surrounding villages on 
the Vientiane plain. As of the early 1990s, approximately 80 
percent of the power produced at Nam Ngum was exported to 
Thailand; some was diverted to the south for town and village 
electrification. 

A second hydroelectric dam was completed at Xeset near 
Saravan (Salavan) in southern Laos in 1991. The Xeset plant 
has an installed capacity of twenty megawatts. 

About twenty smaller hydropower facilities and diesel plants 
supply additional power. Since the mid-1980s, Thakhek and 
Savannakhet had access to a regular power supply through a 
repurchase agreement with Thailand whereby a cable under 
the Mekong diverts power from the Thai electrical grid; villages 
along Route 9 east of Savannakhet have been receiving electric- 



168 



The Economy 



ity since the late 1980s. Louangphrabang has seasonal access to 
power from a hydroelectric dam supplemented by diesel gener- 
ators. A power transmission line from Nam Ngum to Louang- 
phrabang is scheduled for completion in the mid-1990s and 
will bring electrification to many villages near Route 13 that 
previously relied on kerosene lamps and battery-operated flo- 
rescent lights. 

Hydroelectric capacity will further increase as a result of 
agreements signed either for construction of new facilities or 
for conducting feasibility studies for additional sites. Thailand 
is the primary investor in the hydroelectric sector; Australia, 
Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, and Sweden also have com- 
panies with interests in various projects. 

As of 1992, other provincial centers relied primarily on die- 
sel generators, which are run for three to four hours nightly 
and serve only a fraction of the surrounding population. Most 
district centers do not have electricity other than small private 
generators that light the houses of a few dozen subscribers for 
several hours each evening. Automobile batteries and voltage 
inverters are used as a means of supplementing the limited 
hours of power. These devices enable Laotians to watch televi- 
sion and listen to stereo cassette players, even in remote loca- 
tions. 

Despite assistance from the International Development 
Association, the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP — see Glossary), and other 
donors to increase rural electrification services, national con- 
sumption of electricity increased slowly. The average annual 
increase between 1970 and 1980 was 14.5 percent — an overall 
increase of 287 percent — to 325 million kilowatt-hours. After 
1980 the growth of consumption slowed greatly, to an average 
annual rate of just 1.5 percent, reaching 365 million kilowatt- 
hours in 1988. Per capita consumption was just 93.6 kilowatt- 
hours, one of the lowest rates in the region. 

According to the World Bank, energy consumption grew at 
an average annual rate of 4.2 percent between 1965 and 1980, 
slowing to 1.8 percent in the 1980-90 period. Fuelwood consti- 
tutes about 85 percent of total energy consumption. Per capita 
consumption of fuelwood is between one and three cubic 
meters annually, accounting for more than ten times the con- 
sumption of wood for commercial purposes. Total usage — 
including fuelwood and charcoal — was 3.9 million cubic 



169 



Laos: A Country Study 

meters in the 1985-87 period, a 21 percent increase over the 
1975-77 period (see Forestry, this ch.). In 1985 hydroelectric 
power accounted for approximately 5 percent of annual energy 
consumption. Most consumption was in Vientiane; domestic 
use accounted for about 89 percent in 1983 and industrial use 
only about 10 percent. The transportation sector, especially 
civil aviation, which consumes imported petroleum products, 
accounted for the remaining 5 percent of energy consumption. 

The cost of fuel imports — primarily from the Soviet Union 
until 1991 — has placed a heavy burden on the economy, consti- 
tuting nearly 19 percent of all imports in 1986. In 1989 approx- 
imately 124,000 tons of petroleum fuel were imported, an 
increase of nearly 40 percent over the preceding year (see 
Transportation, this ch.). 

In 1987 an oil pipeline of 396 kilometers was laid from Vien- 
tiane to the border with Vietnam, close to the port of Vinh, 
facilitating the import of oil from the Soviet Union. The pipe- 
line's capacity is 300,000 tons annually, considerably in excess 
of the annual national oil consumption rate of approximately 
100,000 tons. 

Mining 

Assessments of mineral reserves are imprecise, because even 
by 1991 most of the country had not been geologically sur- 
veyed in a detailed manner. According to 1991 estimates, 
deposits of gemstones, gold, gypsum, iron, lead, potash, silver, 
tin, and zinc have relatively high commercial development 
potential, but mining activity is on an extremely small scale. In 
addition, Laos has small deposits of aluminum, antimony, chro- 
mium, coal, and manganese, as well as potential for oil and nat- 
ural gas. In 1989 exploration agreements for oil and gas were 
signed with British, French, and United States companies. 

Mining operations are carried out by state mining enter- 
prises and supervised by the Department of Geology and Mines 
and small-scale miners. Production of tin — the principal min- 
eral export — decreased 50 percent between 1975 and 1988, to 
about 240 tons. Gypsum production increased 167 percent 
between 1980 and 1988, to about 80,000 tons. Salt production 
increased 233 percent between 1981 and 1988, to eleven tons. 
Coal production increased more than 600 percent between 
1982 and 1988, to about 800 tons. In addition to commercial 
enterprises, some individual households pan for alluvial gold 



170 



Loading a truck onto a boat on the Mekong River, Vientiane 
Mekong River transport, Louangphrabang 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



171 



Laos: A Country Study 

on the Mekong as well as on small streams during the dry sea- 
son to supplement household incomes. 

Further development of the mineral sector is contingent 
upon the willingness of private companies to invest. However, 
the lack of adequate data, a trained labor force, dependable 
and adequate infrastructure, and legislation (a mining code 
was being drafted as of 1991) inhibit private companies from 
major investments. Nonetheless, private investment was grow- 
ing as of 1993. 

Construction 

Throughout the 1980s, the construction subsector grew at 
an average annual rate of 1.1 percent, surging by 24 percent in 
1989. Vigorous growth continued the following year at a rate of 
15 percent, reflecting a big increase in private demand for new 
construction. Several sources estimate the construction subsec- 
tor's contribution to the gross national product (GNP — see 
Glossary) at about 5 percent throughout the decade. Accord- 
ing to one estimate, the construction subsector employed more 
than one-fourth of all industrial workers in 1986. 

Services 

Estimates of the services sector's contribution to GDP — 
including wholesale and retail trade, transport and communi- 
cations, tourism, and public administration — vary. However, 
the trend throughout the 1980s was an increasing share, from 
about 15 percent of GDP in 1982 to about 25 percent in 1991. 
Employment in the services sector, as a percentage of the labor 
force, increased from 13 percent in 1960 to 17 percent in 1980, 
remaining fairly stable through 1989. The sector grew at an 
average annual rate of between 3 and 6 percent from 1980 to 
1989, reaching a growth rate of about 13 percent in 1989 but 
slowing to about 6 percent the following year. 

Wholesale and Retail Trade 

According to government statistics, the number of retail 
shops increased dramatically — by 44 percent — in just one year, 
to 21,600 in 1991, reflecting the response to relaxed restric- 
tions on private trade and entrepreneurship as well as a 
renewed social acceptability of petty trade. Of these establish- 
ments, 97 percent are privately owned. During the same 
period, the number of state-owned shops decreased by one- 



172 



The Economy 



third, to 600 stores. Wholesale and retail trade grew at a rate of 
20 percent in 1989 and 1990. Retail trade was worth about 
K563,000 million (for value of the kip — see Glossary) in 1991, 
an increase of 38 percent over the preceding year. 

Tourism 

In line with the government's desire to increase foreign 
exchange earnings, Western tourists were first permitted to 
enter Laos in 1988, although just 600 persons visited, well 
within the official limit of 1,000. The following year, 2,600 tour- 
ists visited, and in 1990, the figure increased by 130 percent, to 
approximately 6,000 tourists. The Ministry of Trade was 
assigned responsibility for the development of the tourism 
industry in 1989. In the following year, the government 
monopoly on the industry was removed, and nine private tour- 
ist agencies were authorized. As of 1992, tourism was somewhat 
limited to group travel. However, if an individual has a Laotian 
sponsor who provides individual sponsorship assurances, it is 
possible to receive a visa without being a member of an orga- 
nized tour group. 

Industrial Policy 

The organization of the industrial sector prior to 1986 was 
centered on the state. Between 1979 and 1984, most state- 
owned enterprises incurred huge losses, and industrial sector 
output decreased by 10 percent. At the same time, gross indus- 
trial production began to shift slightly to the private sector: pri- 
vate industrial output as a percentage of gross industrial output 
doubled to 8 percent between 1980 and 1983, whereas state 
output decreased slightly from 93 percent to 89 percent. In the 
early 1980s, a slow increase in the number of private enter- 
prises began, reflecting both the government's newly relaxed 
policy on the private sector and the private sector's greater effi- 
ciency and profitability compared to that of the state sector. 

Following the introduction of the New Economic Mecha- 
nism, the private sector's involvement in industry increased 
even more, as industrial management was decentralized and 
most prices — except prices of basic utilities, air transport, 
postal service, and telecommunications — were freed from 
price controls. In 1988 Decree 19 granted state-owned enter- 
prises expanded financial and managerial responsibilities. 



173 



Laos: A Country Study 

As a result of these changes, some state-owned enterprises 
were forced to curtail production sharply or to close down 
entirely, precipitating a short-run drop in manufacturing out- 
put. It was not until March 1990, however, that the government 
provided a legal basis for the actual privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, through the promulgation of Decree 17. Under 
this decree, most state-owned enterprises were transformed 
into enterprises under other forms of ownership, through leas- 
ing, sale, joint ownership, or contracting with workers' collec- 
tives. Exceptions included enterprises deemed necessary to the 
nation's security or economic and social health, such as utilities 
and educational facilities. The extension of credit to unprofit- 
able state-owned enterprises was discontinued, and state-owned 
enterprises were required to set prices and salaries at free mar- 
ket levels. By the end of the year, the private sector's contribu- 
tion to net material product (see Glossary) had increased 
dramatically, to 65 percent. 

The government reported at the Fifth Party Congress in 
1991 that its "disengagement" policy was succeeding; two-thirds 
of the approximately 600 state-owned enterprises had been 
either partially privatized or leased to domestic or foreign par- 
ties. The remaining state-owned enterprises were granted 
greater autonomy in making investment decisions and setting 
input and output targets, in hopes of improving their produc- 
tivity. 

Transportation and Telecommunications 

Because of its mountainous topography and lack of develop- 
ment, Laos has few reliable transportation routes, and as of 
mid-1994, there were no railroads. This inaccessibility has his- 
torically limited the ability of the government to maintain a 
presence in areas distant from the national or provincial capi- 
tals and to some extent limits communication among villages 
and ethnic groups (see Population; Rural Life, ch. 2). The 
Mekong and Nam Ou are the only natural channels suitable 
for large draft boat transportation, and from December 
through April low water limits the size of the craft that may be 
used on many routes. Between 1985 and 1990, freight and pas- 
senger traffic increased at rates of 14 percent and 8 percent, 
respectively. This occurred largely as a result of the govern- 
ment's abolishment, in 1986, of restrictions on the interprovin- 
cial movement of goods, which had artificially isolated markets 



174 



The Economy 



throughout the country. In 1991 approximately 91 percent of 
freight traffic — measured in ton-kilometers — was carried by 
road and 9 percent by river, whereas 95 percent of passenger 
traffic — measured in passenger-kilometers — was carried by 
road, 3 percent by river, and the remaining 2 percent by 
domestic air service. 

As of 1991, freight transport services were provided by four 
state transport enterprises, a number of provincial transport 
enterprises, and the private sector. The state has a monopoly 
on freight transport between Laos and ports in Vietnam. 
Although no longer regulated by provincial government, the 
private sector's participation in road transport remains severely 
restricted by government regulations; in 1990 the private sector 
accounted for just 13 percent of freight transport and 43 per- 
cent of passenger transport. According to the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, it is considered unlikely that the transportation 
subsector will eventually be a focus of the government's privati- 
zation efforts because poor road conditions, lack of spare parts, 
an aging vehicle fleet, and low transport tariffs — in some cases 
below operating costs — make such a move doubtful, at least for 
the short term. The Ministry of Communications, Transport, 
Posts, and Construction oversees transport and telecommuni- 
cations. 

Roads 

Laos had a minimal road network in the early 1990s. By 1991 
the country's total road length was about 13,970 kilometers, an 
increase of just 22 percent over 1976. Of the total length, 24 
percent, or 3,353 kilometers, is paved and 30 percent gravel; 
the remaining roads are trails unusable during the rainy sea- 
son. 

Route 13, a main north-south road, was built under French 
colonial rule. The highway parallels the Mekong and extends 
from the Cambodian border to Louangphrabang; the quality 
of the road varies over its length. Together with a few trans- 
mountain roads, Route 13 connects Laos with Vietnam and 
provides a rudimentary national road system. In addition, 
there are three east-west roads, Routes 7, 8, and 9, which are 
linked to Routes 7, 8, and 9 in Vietnam to facilitate access to 
Vietnamese seaports (see fig. 7). 

In the late 1960s, China constructed a network of paved 
roads in northern Laos, linking most of the northern provin- 



175 



Laos: A Country Study 




Figure 7. Transportation and Selected Industrial and Agricultural 
Activity, 1994 

Source: Based on information from Germany, Statistisches Bundesamt, Landerbericht 
Laos, 1990, Wiesbaden, October 1990, 11. 



cial capitals and for the first time facilitating motorized trans- 
portation across this region. These roads enabled government 
officials to reach some hitherto remote areas of the country, 
which helped begin the process of national integration that 
continues in the 1990s. These roads were maintained in rea- 
sonably good repair into the 1990s, providing an important 
new means of increased intervillage communication and move- 



176 



The Economy 



ment of market goods, as well as a locale for additional settle- 
ments. However, as of 1993, the link between this network and 
Louangphrabang was a 100-kilometer stretch of dirt track pass- 
able only during the dry season. 

During the 1990s, all major routes in the center and south 
are being improved and/or surfaced, and a larger network of 
feeder roads is gradually being constructed by provincial gov- 
ernments. Development of these roads will facilitate a greater 
government presence at the village level and easier travel by vil- 
lagers to district and provincial centers. Such improved trans- 
portation will also assist villagers seeking medical care and 
those sending children to school at district centers. Improved 
transportation may also be an additional stimulus to villagers 
looking for wage labor outside the village; tribal groups in 
northern Laos have engaged in seasonal labor in northern 
Thailand since at least the 1930s. 

As roads improve and marketing networks expand, the gov- 
ernment has encouraged commercial production for trade and 
export. As a result, the independence and relative isolation of 
lowland villages have been reduced. Travel, whether for visiting 
or marketing — particularly the extensive market network devel- 
oped as a result of the long-standing opium trade — or because 
of military conscription, broadens the outlook of villagers and 
makes then aware of the relationships between Laos and its 
neighbors, of national policy issues, and of the possibility of a 
different material standard of living. Lao in lowland villages 
travel by oxcart over level terrain, or on foot. The steep moun- 
tains and lack of roads have caused upland ethnic groups to 
rely entirely on pack baskets and pack horses for transporta- 
tion. Wheeled vehicles traditionally have not been used. Travel 
in most areas is still difficult and expensive, and most villagers 
travel only limited distances if at all. 

Despite the fact that the road network is the backbone of the 
transportation network, it had received very little maintenance 
work prior to 1985. The protracted war and period of govern- 
ment reorganization, limited financial resources, and lack of 
maintenance equipment have contributed to the road net- 
work's deterioration. The deterioration has had serious conse- 
quences throughout the economy, including hindering 
domestic and foreign trade, discouraging foreign investors, 
and slowing domestic revenue collection. 



177 



Laos: A Country Study 



In early 1990, an agreement was signed with Thailand and 
Australia for the construction of the 750-meter Friendship 
Bridge — which opened in April 1994 — across the Mekong 
River, linking Thailand and Laos by road for the first time. As a 
result, tourism is expected to increase dramatically and freight 
transport costs to decrease, facilitating regional trade. 

Motor Vehicles 

In 1987 there were about 30,000 motor vehicles, divided 
equally between commercial and private vehicles; this number 
represents an increase of about 67 percent from 1979. Between 
1977 and 1990, the number grew by an estimated 12.3 percent 
annually. Although government statistics estimated close to 1 
million vehicles in 1990, this estimate included scrapped vehi- 
cles. 

Inland Waterways 

Inland waterways, including the Mekong River, constitute 
the second most important transport network in the country. 
There are about 4,600 kilometers of navigable waterways, 
including sections of the Mekong, the Ou, and nine other riv- 
ers. The Mekong accounts for about 1,330 kilometers of the 
total navigable length. Although the Mekong flows through 
Laos for approximately 2,030 kilometers, it is only navigable for 
about 70 percent of this length, mainly because of rapids and 
low water levels in the dry season. Between Vientiane and 
Savannakhet, the river can accommodate boats with between 
seventy and 140 deadweight tons; otherwise it can carry 
between fifteen and fifty deadweight tons, depending on the 
season. Residents of lowland villages located on the banks of 
smaller rivers have traditionally traveled in pirogues for fishing, 
trading, or visiting up and down the river for limited distances. 

Both public and private trade associations handle river traf- 
fic, including the State River Transport Company, based in 
Vientiane. In mid-1987 the State Water Transport Company 
had thirty-seven boats, most built with help from Vietnam. 
There are state warehouses at Savannakhet, Xeno, and Vien- 
tiane, in addition to a number of ports. River transportation 
has improved as government policy has emphasized expanded 
trade with Vietnam and with rural regions. 



178 



The Economy 



Civil Aviation 

Lao Aviation, the national airline, services domestic and for- 
eign points from Wattai Airport, the primary airport, located 
outside Vientiane. Domestic air service was already somewhat 
well developed prior to the beginning of the Indochina War 
years and offered limited international service from the 1950s. 
Lao Aviation has domestic flights to provincial capitals, includ- 
ing Louangphrabang, Louang Namtha, Pakxe, Saravan, and 
Xiangkhoang. Improvements in civil air service are encour- 
aged by the government as a way to boost tourism and commer- 
cial appeal. New airports and renovations — primarily 
expansion projects, so as to have the capability to handle larger 
aircraft — are planned for Khamkeut, Louang Namtha, Louang- 
phrabang, Oudomxai, and Phongsali. As of mid-1993, however, 
work had not begun. International service is provided to 
Hanoi, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Kunming and 
Guangzhou in China. Flights to Burma, Chiang Mai (Thai- 
land), Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taipei are in the planning 
stages. Lao Aviation has formed a joint venture with firms from 
Australia, Thailand, and the United States to increase and 
upgrade its international flights. 

Telecommunications 

In mid-1994, the Lao telecommunications system was rudi- 
mentary, with a telephone system that serves primarily govern- 
ment offices and broadcast facilities in only a few large towns. 
In 1986 there were approximately 8,000 telephones for the 
entire country, or fewer than 2 telephones per 1,000 people. 
There reportedly was a substantial expansion of telephone 
lines in Vientiane beginning in 1989, but no updated figures 
are available. 

One powerful amplitude modulation (AM) station is located 
in Vientiane; the other nine AM stations are low-powered trans- 
mitters scattered in other cities. Seven shortwave stations 
broadcasting in six tribal languages reach remote areas, includ- 
ing one that broadcasts in Cambodian, French, Thai, and Viet- 
namese to neighboring countries in Southeast Asia. The capital 
also has two lower-power television transmitters and one fre- 
quency modulation (FM) station. The number of radios 
increased from 350,000 in 1980 to 520,000 in 1990. 

The first domestic television service was established in 1983, 
and the second, in 1988, broadcasting from Savannakhet. 



179 



Laos: A Country Study 

Southern Laos receives transmissions from Thailand, and all of 
Laos receives satellite-relayed transmissions from a ground sat- 
ellite station linked to Intersputnik. There were about 31,000 
television sets in 1990. 

International communications improved greatly with the 
installation in 1990 of a new satellite ground station. In 1991 
agreements were concluded with China and France to relay 
their broadcasts to Laos by satellite. 

Public Finance 

The Budget Deficit 

Laos ran a fiscal deficit throughout the 1980s. The deficit 
expanded greatly in the second half of the decade, from about 
12 percent of GDP in 1985 to between 25 percent and 30 per- 
cent of GDP in 1988 and 1989. This deficit was fueled by both a 
sharp decrease in non-tax revenue (mainly from surpluses of 
state-owned enterprises) and a large jump in expenditures, par- 
ticularly for wages and salaries (see table 8, Appendix). By 
1990, however, the deficit had decreased (relatively) to about 
17 percent of GDP and was continuing to decrease as previ- 
ously implemented reforms, especially of taxes and the bank- 
ing system, took effect. 

Government Revenue 

From the outset of the founding of the LPDR in 1975, devel- 
opment expenditures depended primarily on foreign aid, con- 
tinuing a pattern begun in the 1950s. In July 1990, more than 
half of the state's total revenue came from foreign aid and 
loans. Until 1988 the bulk of current government revenue — 
excluding capital receipts — came from non-tax sources, mainly 
from surpluses of state-owned enterprises. Revenue increased 
nearly four times between 1984 and 1986, and again by more 
than one-half between 1986 and 1988, almost entirely from 
non-tax sources. Tax collection is difficult because of the widely 
dispersed population and poor organization and management 
of the collection process. 

An annual rice tax was assessed on all paddy land. The tax 
collected was in principle divided between provincial and 
national budgets, but in practice much was retained in the dis- 
trict of collection for in-kind salary support of local officials 
and military personnel. Where villages had schools, a portion 



180 



The Economy 



of the tax collected was delivered to the local teachers(s). The 
paddy tax rate varied between sixty and 120 kilograms per hect- 
are, depending on the quality of the land and was reduced to 
forty to 100 kilograms per hectare in the early 1990s. The 
paddy tax rate amounted to roughly 5 percent of the seasonal 
yield but could be forgiven in the event of a crop failure. A sep- 
arate, lower tax was assessed on swidden rice fields. Collection 
from more remote villages without road access was always prob- 
lematic. Since March 1993, the land tax has been assessed in 
cash. The rates vary between 500 to 6,000 kip per hectare, 
depending on land quality and productivity. Between 1983 and 
1986, an improved system of business taxation was imple- 
mented; despite this, by 1987 the share of non-tax sources had 
exceeded 90 percent of current revenue, from about 70 per- 
cent in the early 1980s. 

Substantial qualitative changes in fiscal management begin- 
ning in 1988 were introduced at most levels of government, 
and the implementation of limited tax reforms changed the fis- 
cal situation dramatically, with 75 percent of state revenue com- 
ing from taxes. Non-tax revenues declined by 62 percent, 
however, as the traditional revenue source — profits from the 
state-owned enterprises — continued to decrease; thus, current 
revenue increased only by 42 percent. To increase revenue, 
Decree 47 — on the national tax and customs system — was pro- 
mulgated in June 1989; the decree broadened the tax base by 
expanding coverage of personal income and corporate taxes 
and improving collection and revenue administration meth- 
ods. Import, profit, and turnover taxes were also increased. Fis- 
cal revenue responded positively to the new tax reforms, 
increasing substantially from 1989, to about 11 percent of GDP 
in 1990; revenue from taxes alone increased by 62 percent. 
Transfers from public enterprises rose by 63 percent in 1990 
over 1989 figures, and other non-tax revenue increased as well, 
including lease payments to the government and overflight 
charges. The composition of revenue remained about 75 per- 
cent tax-based through the early 1990s. 

Government revenue actually dropped from 11 percent of 
GNP in 1986 to 9.6 percent in 1990. However, its annual 
growth rate increased dramatically, from 9 percent in 1987 to 
63 percent in 1990 — partially a rebound from the drop in reve- 
nue in 1989. GNP also is subject to dramatic fluctuations, fall- 
ing from almost US$2.4 billion in 1985 to about US$600 
million in 1988. By 1991 GNP had increased to approximately 



181 



Laos: A Country Study 

US$1 billion, from approximately US$863 million the previous 
year. 

Government Expenditure 

Capital expenditures rose slowly throughout the 1980s, from 
about 55 percent of total expenditures in 1983 to about 66 per- 
cent in 1988; however, by 1989 they had begun to decrease as a 
result of limited absorptive capacity, a critical factor in the eco- 
nomic picture because it seriously affects economic develop- 
ment. Wages and salaries accounted for the largest portion of 
expenditures, increasing from 11 percent of expenditures in 
1983 to 42 percent in 1988. A substantial amount of this por- 
tion in the late 1980s was spent on salary increases and arrears 
payments: many civil servants had not been paid for up to two 
years. Subsidies to state-owned enterprises make up most of the 
remainder of expenditures, but by the end of the decade these 
subsidies were cut back in response to the reforms of 1988 and 
1990. Expenditures for operation and maintenance of basic 
infrastructure remained inadequate throughout the 1980s. 
Defense expenditure is an important part of the government 
budget; however, no figures are available (see The Defense 
Budget, ch. 5). 

Government expenditure as a percentage of GDP increased 
from 10.7 percent in 1986 to 14.2 percent in 1990; capital 
expenditure increased from 7.7 percent to 12.1 percent in the 
same period. However, although the growth rate of total gov- 
ernment expenditure increased from 8.3 percent in 1987 to 65 
percent in 1990 as wage and salary payments increased, growth 
in capital expenditure slowed dramatically, from 14.9 percent 
to slightly negative growth in the same period, because of lim- 
ited absorptive capacity and decreased aid from nonconvert- 
ible currency area countries. 

Policy 

A new "vertical management system" for budgetary alloca- 
tion was implemented in 1991, directed by the Ministry of 
Finance. Under this system, all revenue collected by provincial 
and local authorities is integrated into the national budget, 
and all expenditures are linked to a national budget expendi- 
ture plan. The primary purpose of the system is to ensure that 
local-level expenditures are consistent with national planned 
expenditures. 



182 



The Economy 



The Financial Sector 

The Banking System 

In March 1988, Decree 11 on the reform of the banking sys- 
tem was passed, separating commercial bank functions from 
central bank functions. The Vientiane branch of the old State 
Bank, the Banque d'Etat de la Republique Democratique Pop- 
ulaire du Laos (RDPL), became the central monetary agency. 
In June 1990, the Central Banking Law was passed, establishing 
the Bank of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, or Central 
Bank, to replace the State Bank. Under this law, the Central 
Bank assumes responsibility for regulation and supervision of 
commercial and regional banks; maintenance of foreign 
exchange reserves; issuance and supervision of money for cir- 
culation; licensing, supervision, and regulation of financial ser- 
vices; and management of the monetary and credit system. The 
Central Bank has about ninety regional branches; as of 1991, 
the government was considering separating these branches 
into three regional banks, serving the southern, northern, and 
central regions. 

Other branches of the former State Bank were transformed 
into autonomous commercial banks to promote private invest- 
ment. These banks are responsible for accepting savings depos- 
its from enterprises, government departments, and individuals, 
and for granting credit to state entities, joint ventures, and 
individuals for capital investment and business start-ups or 
expansion. Commercial banks are prohibited from granting 
credit to economic units experiencing deficits and losses. 
These banks do not receive subsidies, although they do render 
60 percent of their profits to the government. 

By 1991 Laos had seven commercial banks, including the 
Joint Development Bank — a Lao-Thai joint venture — and six 
wholly state-owned banks. Government policy encourages 
privatization of these six banks. However, in part because of the 
absence of laws governing banking activities and in part 
because of the relatively small size of the economy, foreign 
bankers have not expressed much interest in these ventures. 

The Foreign Trade Bank (Banque pour le Commerce 
Exterieur Lao — BCEL), a subsidiary of the Central Bank, is the 
country's foreign exchange and foreign trade bank. By Decree 
48 of July 1989, the Central Bank is assigned sole responsibility 
for setting and managing the exchange rate. BCEL was granted 



183 



Laos: A Country Study 



autonomy in November 1989 and was charged with handling 
foreign exchange transactions relating to trade; as of 1991, 
BCEL had arrangements with sixty-four banks internationally 
However, a Foreign Exchange Decree was scheduled to go into 
effect soon after 1991, allowing all commercial banks already 
authorized to deal in foreign exchange to carry out foreign 
exchange transactions themselves, thus removing BCEL's 
monopoly on such activities. Information on the status of this 
decree was unavailable as of mid-1994. 

Responsibility for state-owned enterprise debts was trans- 
ferred to the commercial banks, giving them enormous liquid- 
ity problems. To alleviate the precarious situation, in 1989 the 
government allowed foreign banks to begin operations in Laos. 
That October the Joint Development Bank became the first pri- 
vate commercial bank permitted to operate since 1975, fol- 
lowed soon thereafter by the Thai Military Bank. In addition, 
new reform measures stipulate that enterprises will have to 
clear all debts owed to the banks before being considered for 
new loans. In 1990 the Asian Development Bank granted Laos 
a soft loan of US$25 million to recapitalize the banking system. 

Interest rates on commercial bank deposits with the Central 
Bank are uniform across the country and are generally higher 
than rates for enterprises depositing at the commercial banks. 
Since August 1989, only minimum interest rates have been set 
by authorities; banks are allowed to set specific rates on their 
own. Interest rates on deposits vary from bank to bank, 
depending on the type and currency of deposits. The annual 
rate on kip deposits at the end of 1991 was between zero and 
1.2 percent for most banks; fixed deposits in kip earned 
between 16 and 24 percent annually, and deposits in United 
States dollars at some banks, including BCEL, earned 7 percent 
annually. Rates for loans depend on the term and currency of 
the loan and on the sector for which the investment is 
intended. Loans for the agriculture and forestry sectors carry 
rates ranging from 7 to 12 percent, for example, and loans for 
the services sector carry rates between 12 and 30 percent. 

Money and Prices 

By Decree 14 of March 1988, prices of most goods are no 
longer set by the government; exceptions include basic utility 
and mineral prices. Instead, a new system of "unified prices" — 
free market prices — was instituted. As a result, prices of 



184 



A street scene in Vientiane 
A motorized cart — typical means of transportation in 

Louangphrabang 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



185 



Laos: A Country Study 



rationed and subsidized goods such as rice, sugar, cloth, and 
petroleum increased, and procurement prices were raised by 
50 percent to 100 percent. 

In addition, in 1988 the wages of state employees, previously 
paid through coupons redeemable for subsidized goods at state 
stores, began to be gradually remonetized. Very high inflation 
rates soon caused a real drop in annual wages, however, and 
low rates of tax collection gave the government less revenue to 
spend on wages. As a result, large arrears built up on salaries 
that are quite small. In 1990 salaries were increased by 83 per- 
cent, and arrears began to be paid off, contributing to the 
increase of 65 percent in government expenditure. Once paid, 
however, salaries almost immediately go again into arrears. 
Moreover, the salary increase is not sufficient for state employ- 
ees to recoup real losses from inflation. 

Money Supply and Inflation 

Money supply — measured by both Ml (demand deposits 
and currency outside banks) and M2 (Ml plus quasi-money 
such as checking accounts) — expanded between 1980 and 
1989 (statistics are available only from 1980 on), in part 
because of the remonetization of government salaries, rising 
wage and price levels in industry, and extension of credit to 
indebted state-owned enterprises. World Bank figures indi- 
cated that money supply as measured by M2 increased at an 
annual rate of between 35 and 75 percent — except for 1984, 
when money supply was steady — until 1987, when, fueled by 
increases in domestic credit to public enterprises and foreign 
currency deposits from public enterprises, it jumped by over 
300 percent. During the next two years, the money supply con- 
tinued to grow rapidly, reaching a growth rate close to 90 per- 
cent in 1989. 

The average annual inflation rate was about 11.5 percent 
from 1985 to 1989. In 1989, however, inflation increased dra- 
matically, to 52 percent, fueled by the massive increase in the 
money supply and a devaluation of the kip and exacerbated by 
a reduction in foreign exchange caused by the ban on forestry 
exports and the temporary reduction in exports of hydroelec- 
tricity to Thailand. Monetary policy was tightened in 1990; 
credit allocated to unprofitable state-owned enterprises was 
restricted through Decree 17 and through higher interest 
rates. As a result, growth in M2 was held to just 2.3 percent in 



186 



The Economy 



1990. Lower food prices as a result of good harvests in 1989 
and 1990 following the years of drought also helped to slow 
inflation to about 20 percent; inflation continued to decline 
slowly through 1994 — to about 9 percent. 

The Balance of Payments 

The Foreign Exchange Rate 

In June 1976, the "liberation kip" replaced the old kip at a 
rate of twenty to one. Three years later, following a massive col- 
lapse of the value of the currency, a "new kip," or National 
Bank kip, was introduced, worth 100 liberation kip, and the 
official exchange rate was fixed at thirty-five new kip to one 
United States dollar. A system of multiple exchange rates has 
been implemented in an effort to control inflation; different 
rates are applied to the transactions of businessmen, tourists, 
senders of remittances, and aid agencies. In September 1987, 
however, with a devaluation of the commercial rate of roughly 
900 percent relative to the United States dollar, the multiple 
rates were abandoned in favor of a single floating exchange 
rate applicable to all transactions. 

The exchange rate is adjusted periodically relative to the dol- 
lar. In 1988 it stabilized at about K340 to the dollar, in part 
because the government stopped accepting United States dol- 
lars and Thai baht in payment for commercial or customs 
taxes, thus reducing holdings of kip. By late 1989, the kip had 
been devalued by 100 percent — relative to the 1987 rate — 
where it remained stable at about K700 to the dollar through 
1992. The exchange rate was K721 to the dollar in June 1994 — 
in part because of the government's decision to allow the free 
exchange of hard currencies. 

In September 1990, Decree 53 ordered that all transactions 
within the country be conducted exclusively in kip; in practice, 
however, foreign currencies remain in daily use because con- 
sumers do not have enough confidence in their own currency. 
The kip, Thai baht, and United States dollar are used inter- 
changeably. Under Decree 16, state-owned enterprises and pri- 
vate enterprises are allowed to maintain accounts in both kip 
and foreign exchange. 

Foreign Trade 

Foreign trade figures for Laos do not reflect the large vol- 



187 



Laos: A Country Study 



ume of illegal trade in opium and other products, mostly with 
Thailand; some estimates put smuggling at half of all trade, 
legal and illegal. Although Laos continued to run a trade defi- 
cit throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the volume of trade 
increased substantially during the latter half of that period. 
The increase was the result of increased production of export- 
able goods, the shift in trade patterns from the Soviet bloc to 
the convertible currency bloc, especially Thailand, and the 
removal of many regulations on trade, as the government con- 
tinues to implement the orders of the New Economic Mecha- 
nism. Despite these improvements, however, by 1990 exports 
still financed only about 40 percent of imports (see table 9, 
Appendix). 

Exports 

According to World Bank and International Monetary Fund 
(IMF — see Glossary) estimates, merchandise exports grew 
from about US$40.0 million in 1982 — the first year statistics 
were available — to about US$64.3 million in 1987, when 
droughts and lower prices for Thailand — the only buyer — cut 
revenue from exports of hydroelectricity by 40 percent (see 
table 10, Appendix). As a result, the value of exports dropped 
to US$57.8 million by 1988 but recovered the following year 
and continued to expand, reaching US$77.9 million in 1991 — 
an overall increase in exports of 95 percent from 1982 to 1991. 
Between 1982 and 1988 — when they decreased by 10 percent — 
exports grew at an average annual rate of 6.8 percent; however, 
after trade reforms were enacted, the growth rate increased — 
to 10.7 percent between 1988 and 1991; Exports increased 
again in 1992 and 1993 to an estimated US$133 million (free 
on board) and US$203 million, respectively. 

Principal exports are hydroelectricity and timber and wood 
products. In addition, much smaller quantities of coffee, gyp- 
sum, and tin concentrates are exported. The composition of 
major export commodities did not change throughout the 
1980s; however, the relative importance of the commodities 
did. In 1987 lower export earnings from hydroelectricity pre- 
cipitated a shift toward exports of forestry products. The value 
of hydroelectricity exports decreased from US$30 million in 
1986 to US$12 million in 1987, while the value of timber and 
wood exports increased from US$8 million to US$33 million. 
Timber and wood products thus replaced hydroelectricity as 
the major export, and despite restrictions on logging and high 



188 



The Economy 



export taxes implemented in 1989 — which decreased its share 
of total exports by 36 percent — timber and wood products 
remained the major export through 1992. 

Imports 

Although the level of imports remained relatively stable 
beginning in the mid-1980s, droughts and the subsequent 
need to import rice influenced import totals. Principal imports 
include manufactured goods, including transport equipment; 
food items, including rice; and fuel. According to 1986 UN sta- 
tistics, manufactured goods accounted for 53.5 percent of 
imports — of which 14.1 percent was transport equipment; food 
items for 20.8 percent — of which 16.2 percent was cereals, 
including rice; and 18.9 percent for petroleum. Limited infor- 
mation shows that the composition of imports did not change 
significantly through 1989. A substantial portion of imports is 
linked to aid programs, although a government source indi- 
cated that these imports accounted for a slowly decreasing 
share of total imports, from about 40 percent in 1982 to about 
28 percent in 1987. 

Trade Partners 

Although the overall composition of trade did not change 
significantly throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the direc- 
tion of trade did change. Until 1989 major trading partners 
were from nonconvertible currency areas — mainly China, the 
Soviet Union, and Vietnam; Laos also traded with Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, and Poland. From 1984 — the first 
year with accurate data — to 1988, the nonconvertible currency 
area accounted for over half of all imports. Although the non- 
convertible currency area never had a monopoly on exports 
(mostly because the largest export until 1987, hydroelectricity, 
was sold only to Thailand) it accounted for over half of the 
total trade volume through the end of the decade. However, 
following the easing of some trade restrictions in 1988 and the 
improvement of relations with Thailand, including a reduction 
in the Thai list of 273 strategic goods in which trade has been 
prohibited, the pattern of trade began to shift in favor of the 
convertible currency area. Bilateral trade with Thailand 
increased 26 percent over 1987, and imports from the noncon- 
vertible currency area dropped to about 35 percent of total 
imports. 



189 



Laos: A Country Study 

Eager to avoid Thai domination of its foreign trade, Laos 
sought to improve relations with China, and in December 1989 
the two countries signed their first bilateral agreement in a 
decade, including notes on cross-border trade. As a result, 
trade with China grew by roughly 40 percent in 1990. Despite 
the positive effect of this move on the growth of regional trade, 
new agreements with members of the former Soviet bloc work 
against the trend. In 1990, at a Soviet-Lao Cooperation Com- 
mission meeting, it was determined that henceforth Soviet 
exports and loans would be paid for in convertible currencies 
at world prices. Previously, payments had been made in non- 
convertible currencies and often on barter terms. Trade with 
Vietnam also shifted to a hard currency basis, in addition, the 
eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union clinched the shift 
in trade patterns toward the convertible currency area: in 1991 
trade with the nonconvertible area accounted for just 2 to 3 
percent of total imports and total exports. The convertible cur- 
rency area was more than able to make up for this loss: trade 
volume actually increased that year, although by only 4.3 per- 
cent. 

Major trading partners from the convertible currency area 
include Britain, France, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thai- 
land. Of these, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand accounted 
for roughly 45 percent of imports from 1970 to 1978; their 
share increased to about 51 percent by 1987. Similarly, Japan's 
share of imports from the convertible currency area increased 
from 7 percent in 1978 to 19 percent in 1987. The United 
States accounted for less than 1 percent of imports from the 
convertible currency area in 1987, although the LPDR's first 
trade mission to the United States in 1991 signaled its eager- 
ness to expand trade. Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand 
accounted for 65 percent of Laos's exports to the convertible 
currency area in 1987, up from 43 percent in 1978. This 
increase in regional trade made up for the decrease in the 
shares in exports from the United States and Japan: from 33 
percent to 6 percent for Japan, and from 9 percent to 4 percent 
for the United States. Thailand's removal of the ban on trade 
in strategic goods in late 1989 gave regional trade another 
boost. 

Trade Balance 

The trade deficit increased from US$92.2 million in 1982 to 
US$114.9 million in 1991, reaching a decade high of US$151.9 



190 



Construction of a Thai 
bank, Vientiane 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



Gasoline station, 
Louangphrabang 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



million in 1987, the first year of the drought (see table 11, 
Appendix). Before 1987 the deficit had increased by an aver- 
age annual rate of 10.9 percent. However, after the introduc- 
tion of the New Economic Mechanism and subsequent 
loosening of many restrictions on trade, it actually began to 
decrease at an annual average of 7 percent, although in 1991 it 
increased slightly, by 3.2 percent. The deficit was largely 
financed through external assistance, including direct grants 
and highly concessional loans, and constituted approximately 
16 percent of GDP in 1989-90. As the deficit decreased in 
response to increasing export volumes, the country's trade 
position also improved in terms of import financing. Between 
1982 and 1987, exports financed less than one-third of imports, 
but beginning in 1990, import financing improved consider- 
ably, with exports financing over 40 percent of imports. This 
fact put Laos in a more secure position in view of sharply 
decreased foreign aid from the nonconvertible currency area. 



191 



Laos: A Country Study 
Trade Policy 

Trade policy prior to the introduction of the New Economic 
Mechanism had been highly restrictive, revolving around the 
centralized allocation of goods for export. In 1988, however, in 
line with the New Economic Mechanism, the government 
began to progressively decentralize some of its trade-oriented 
responsibilities, including planning and arranging trade con- 
tracts with foreign suppliers. Trade, controlled by the minis- 
tries of trade and finance, is conducted by about twenty-four 
state trading companies and some provincial trading compa- 
nies. Several measures promulgated in March 1988 modified 
trade policy. According to Decree 16, the government became 
the sole exporter through state import-export organizations. 
Under Decree 13, the State Committee for Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade, provincial administrative committees, and 
municipalities are empowered to supervise the management 
and control of import and export activities. The decree also 
authorizes trade agents at TPDR embassies worldwide to make 
direct trade contacts. 

Decree 18 identifies a number of "strategic" goods, includ- 
ing coffee, tobacco, wood products (such as timber, sawn wood, 
pressed wood, and rattan), other forestry products (such as 
benzoin and sticklac) , and minerals, for which the state has an 
export monopoly: in short, all the major export commodities. 
Only the central government's import-export organization, the 
Lao Import-Export Company (Societe Lao Import-Export), 
and certain provincial and state enterprises are permitted to 
export these goods to fulfill national trade agreements with the 
nonconvertible currency area. All importing units are required 
to submit plans for their trading operations to the State Com- 
mittee for Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in order to 
formulate the national import-export plan. However, import- 
ers are permitted to trade in all commodities not on the strate- 
gic or restricted lists. Under Decree 18, export businesses are 
permitted to export goods on the strategic list directly, after 
national requirements have been met. The decree thus consid- 
erably liberalizes trade regulations. The main reason for the 
restriction on trade in strategic goods is that the government 
has to plan its supply of export goods to coincide with its multi- 
year trade arrangements with the nonconvertible currency 
area countries. After 1990, however, this issue was moot 
because the trade volume with these countries dropped to a 
negligible amount. 



192 



The Economy 



The import of certain items, including automobiles and mil- 
itary vehicles, fertilizers, drugs, and "decadent cultural prod- 
ucts and pictures," is subject to quotas and other restrictions. In 
addition, trade in certain goods is entirely prohibited, includ- 
ing poisons, weapons, and other goods related to national secu- 
rity. 

At the end of the 1980s, the authority of the Lao Import- 
Export Company had begun to diminish because import- 
export licenses were being granted to increasing numbers of 
private organizations. By 1991 the national trade company was 
slated for privatization. 

Transit 

Because Laos is a landlocked country, its foreign trade vol- 
ume is highly dependent on transit routes through neighbor- 
ing countries. Bangkok serves as the major port, but the 
Vietnamese ports of Da Nang — the most distant from Vien- 
tiane at 1,000 kilometers — and Cua Lo — the closest to Vien- 
tiane at 460 kilometers — are also used. The Express Transit 
Organization of Thailand has a monopoly on the LPDR's tran- 
sit business through Thailand, initially imposed as a way to reg- 
ulate trade in strategic goods. Transshipment of goods through 
Vietnam and especially Thailand increases the prices of Laos's 
goods greatly — by as much as 60 percent, or, according to some 
sources, as much as 300 percent — severely reducing the com- 
petitiveness of export commodities on the world market. In 
December 1991, and again in the fall of 1993, Cambodia 
offered Laos the use of its seaport at Kompong Som, but Cam- 
bodia's poor infrastructure and lawlessness make this an empty 
gesture. 

As of 1991, limitations on trade resulting from transship- 
ment began to ease. Plans were made to establish a Thai-Lao 
joint venture responsible for handling transit goods to Laos, 
with the potential of cutting transit costs in half. To further 
reduce the Thai company's monopoly on transshipment of 
goods to Laos, Thai import duties on more than twenty agricul- 
tural goods, including one of Laos's major exports, coffee, were 
reduced from a 40 to 80 percent range to a maximum of 20 
percent. By 1991 Thailand had expanded from three to eight 
the number of approved border transit points with Laos. Com- 
pletion of the first bridge over the Mekong, which opened in 
April 1994, is likely to further encourage regional trade. 



193 



Laos: A Country Study 



Direct Foreign Investment 

Policy 

The Foreign Investment Law of July 1988 is modeled on leg- 
islation that has already been adopted in Vietnam and China. 
Laos seeks to encourage foreign investment as a means of facil- 
itating economic development as called for by the New Eco- 
nomic Mechanism. The government hopes that foreign 
investment projects will help to shift the economy from a sub- 
sistence to a commodity production basis by improving the 
management skills of the labor force; introducing advanced 
technology to the manufacturing sector; fostering economic, 
scientific, and technological cooperation with other countries; 
and increasing the production of goods for export. 

The Foreign Investment Law allows investors to enter into 
three types of investment arrangements. The first type of 
arrangement, contractual or cooperative businesses, entails 
investment in existing state or private companies, or with Lao- 
tian individuals; in this way, the law is more liberal than compa- 
rable legislation in either Vietnam or China. The second type 
of arrangement, joint ventures, requires foreigners to invest a 
minimum of 30 percent of total capital. In general, terms for 
either of these arrangements are not to exceed twenty years. 
The third type of arrangement, private ventures, requires for- 
eigners to invest 30 percent of total capital, up to a maximum 
of 100 percent. Terms are generally limited to fifteen years. Tax 
exemptions or reductions for joint ventures and private enter- 
prises are available for two to six years after the first year of 
profit, depending on the size of the investment, the volume of 
goods exported as a result of the project, the location of the 
project, and the sector on which it focuses. 

Tax incentives — a reduction of 2 to 5 percent in the profit 
tax — are also used to encourage foreign investment. In order 
to qualify for the reduction, a foreign investment project has to 
meet three of the following criteria: the project will export 
more than 70 percent of the goods it produces; will obtain 
domestically more than 70 percent of the raw materials it uses; 
will use advanced technology; will aim to overcome unfavor- 
able natural or socioeconomic conditions; will contribute to 
national economic development despite low profit margins; or 
will be established before 1995. The Foreign Investment Law 
allows foreign investors to remit profits to the countries of their 



194 



The Economy 



choice; in addition, it prohibits the nationalization of their cap- 
ital and property. 

Other laws also seek to facilitate foreign investment. In early 
1989, Decree 27 established the Foreign Investment Manage- 
ment Committee to centralize foreign investment approval 
procedures, thus enabling the Foreign Investment Law to be 
implemented. The Lao Chamber of Commerce was established 
in January 1990 to assist in attracting new business ventures. 
Private domestic and foreign investments have been encour- 
aged by the gradual improvement of the legal environment, 
including the passage of laws regarding property rights (1990), 
contractual obligation (1990), inheritance (1990), crime 
(1990), civil procedures (1990), and labor (1991). The 1991 
approval of the constitution, which protects the right to private 
ownership, is also an important factor in encouraging foreign 
investment. Also, as of late 1993, an arbitration law was being 
drafted that will provide a legal mechanism for the settlement 
of disputes. There was an informal arbitration procedure, but 
the lack of a law or decree made decisions nonbinding. 

Investment Projects 

Decree 20 of 1988 identifies sectors open to foreign invest- 
ment under the Foreign Investment Law: these include agricul- 
ture and forestry; industry; communication, transportation, 
and construction; and services and tourism. Five criteria are 
used to judge the desirability of investment projects: whether 
the project uses advanced techniques, technology, and scien- 
tific management to produce goods that could compete in the 
world market and make efficient use of energy, raw materials, 
and equipment; provides export merchandise or services that 
generate foreign-exchange earnings and use domestic raw 
materials as much as possible; has low labor requirements but 
provides managerial and/ or technical training; involves infra- 
structure development, especially of roads, bridges, and irriga- 
tion; and is deemed by the government to be important to 
economic development. Projects are discouraged if they do not 
conform to economic and social development, or disturb the 
sovereignty, order, or security of the country; seriously damage 
the environment; make long-run use of imported materials 
and do not promote import substitution; create large debts; or 
are prohibited by the government. 

The law spurred a steady increase in foreign direct invest- 
ment. Within one year of the law's promulgation, Laos received 



195 



Laos: A Country Study 



124 investment proposals, of which sixty were approved that 
same year. 

As of 1992, some 109 proposals had been accepted out of a 
total of about 200, worth about US$231 million, of which the 
government share is roughly 3 percent; most are worth less 
than US$5 million each. Almost 50 percent of the proposals 
were signed with Thai companies. Most proposed investment is 
in foreign trade, manufacturing, handicrafts, services, tourism, 
and the agriculture, forestry, and mining sectors. About ten 
proposals were subsequently canceled, usually because of a fail- 
ure to receive expected financing. 

Despite the positive response of foreign investors to liberal- 
ization measures, in the early 1990s, foreign investment is still 
handicapped. Hindrances include the poor infrastructure, the 
unskilled labor force, and the lack of an intellectual property 
rights law, although regulations on patents and industrial prop- 
erty have been drafted. 

Foreign Aid 

Between 1975 and 1990, total foreign aid to Laos, including 
grants and loans, was approximately US$2.3 billion. Of this 
sum, only 65 percent had been spent as of 1989, of which 
grants and loans made up approximately equal quantities. 
Fifty-five percent of spent aid derived from the nonconvertible 
currency area, 17.8 percent from convertible currency area 
countries, and 27.2 percent from international organizations 
and financial institutions (see table 12, Appendix). 

According to the World Bank and the IMF, long-term loans 
increased nearly threefold, from about US$38.8 million in 
1982 to about US$111.4 million in 1988. Drawings on loans 
received from the nonconvertible currency area had averaged 
73 percent of the total annually through 1988; in 1989, how- 
ever, drawings from the area dropped to 23 percent of the 
total, and by 1991 they were nonexistent. In January 1991, the 
Soviet Union suspended all its aid and credits to Laos although 
loan repayments were postponed until the end of the decade. 
Drawings from the convertible currency area during this 
period increased, but not enough to support spending at the 
level of the mid-1980s; by 1991 drawings on all loans received 
had dropped nearly 50 percent from 1988. In response, grants 
from the convertible currency area, which had decreased from 



196 



Women in the market at Talat, Louangphrabang, selling 
water buffalo legs, ears, and innards 
Courtesy Gina Merris 

approximately US$45.4 million in 1985 to just US$14.7 million 
in 1989, spiraled to US$63.9 million in 1991. 

Aid from the nonconvertible currency area was primarily 
from the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Until 1991 Soviet aid con- 
stituted over half of all aid to Laos, including the stationing of 
over 1,000 Soviet technical personnel in Laos, and donations of 
construction equipment, vehicles, and aircraft. The second 
largest donor was Vietnam, which sent roughly 5,000 advisers 
and technicians to the country and participated in the joint 
exploitation of mineral and forest resources. 

The cutback in aid from the nonconvertible currency area 
caused Laos to seek improved ties with Western nations. Austra- 
lia, Japan, and Sweden accounted for virtually all foreign aid 
from the convertible currency area until 1988; but by 1990, 
their combined share had dropped to about 78 percent 
because other developed nations began to increase their aid 
programs to Laos. Japan and France became more important 
aid donors in the early 1990s. The United States does not have 
an "aid program" in the traditional sense because Laos is a 
communist country and is prohibited from receiving aid under 
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended). The crop 



197 



Laos: A Country Study 



substitution program, begun in October 1989 following reas- 
sessment of the country's involvement in the world opium 
trade, is possible because of separate legislative authority. In 
December 1990, following an improvement in Chinese-Laotian 
relations, China pledged a US$9.3 million credit for a five-year 
economic and technical cooperation program in Laos. 

Other aid is provided by international organizations such as 
the UNDP, the Asian Development Bank, the International 
Development Association, and the IMF. Multilateral organiza- 
tions provide large loans in support of government reforms; in 
1990 and 1991, the IMF and the Asian Development Bank 
made loans worth US$37 million for this purpose. 

Aid to Laos covers a wide range of activities, including tech- 
nical and capital assistance for such projects as hydroelectric 
power stations (Sweden), a livestock vaccination program (the 
UNDP), and scholarships for agricultural study (Thailand). 
The IMF approved a US$50 million loan in 1993 in support of 
economic development, inflation reduction, and compensa- 
tion for depleted reserves. Other loans have been granted for 
such infrastructure development as road construction, hydro- 
power projects, and telecommunications systems. Aid has also 
been extended for irrigation projects and forestry and fisheries 
programs. 

Other types of aid include loan forgiveness: in 1991 Japan 
and Germany forgave loan liabilities worth US$32.3 million. 
Despite the country's continued striving to reach food self-suf- 
ficiency, it relies on food aid for its domestic needs during years 
of poor harvest. In 1988 and 1989, for example, 140,000 tons of 
food aid were donated or sold to Laos to make up for shortfalls 
caused by drought. Food aid in cash or in kind was donated to 
Laos in 1991 by the Food and Agriculture Organization and 
the UNDP, and by the United States, Australia, Thailand, and 
the Netherlands. 

Although foreign grants and loans remain sufficient to 
finance Laos's trade deficit and development expenditure, at 
least for the medium term, poor absorptive capacity, the result 
(in part) of a poorly educated and trained labor force, reduces 
its ability to make efficient use of the available funds. The bal- 
ance of payments actually went into surplus in 1989 and 1990. 
However, there remains the question of whether flows from the 
convertible currency area will continue to increase enough to 
make up for the losses from the nonconvertible currency area. 



198 



The Economy 



Because the country's fiscal and trade position is not likely to 
improve dramatically in the early 1990s, this is an important 
concern. 

External Debt 

The total external debt grew by an average annual rate of 
22.5 percent from 1985 to 1989, slowing to 8.5 percent annu- 
ally through 1991. Debt to the nonconvertible currency area is 
large but difficult to quantify, in part because available statistics 
often use different ruble-to-dollar exchange rates. World Bank 
figures showed that between 68 and 77 percent of the external 
debt was held by countries from the nonconvertible currency 
area through 1991. However, debt service to nonconvertible 
currency area countries as a percentage of total debt service 
decreased from about 33 percent of the total in 1984 to less 
than 10 percent in 1990. Debt service as a ratio of total exports 
increased from 10.2 percent in 1984 to a high of 16 percent in 
1988, when it began a slow decline to nearly 10 percent in 
1990, as exports increased (see table 13, Appendix). Although 
statistics on debt as a percentage of GDP are highly variable, 
sources agree that external debt constituted considerably more 
than 60 percent of GDP throughout the 1980s, surpassing total 
GDP in 1987 or 1988. 

Through mid-1987, Laos was able to meet its non-ruble debt 
repayment schedule mainly because many multilateral loans 
had been made on highly concessional terms — about 99 per- 
cent of all long-term debt throughout the 1980s. Japan, which 
accounted for approximately 33 to 45 percent of all debt to 
bilateral donors in the convertible currency area in the late 
1980s, eased debt pressures by forgiving parts of its debt. In the 
nonconvertible currency area, the Soviet Union allowed trade 
deficits of up to 400 percent of the value of imports annually; 
deficits at year's end were then converted into long-term loans. 
In 1991 the Soviet Union agreed to reschedule some of its 
long-run debt payments and to continue accepting repayments 
in commodities, rather than switching over to a hard currency 
basis as had previously been agreed by the Soviet-Lao Coopera- 
tion Commission. 

Prospects for Growth 

By the start of the 1990s, Laos had obtained some impressive 
results from the implementation of economic reforms under 



199 



Laos: A Country Study 



the New Economic Mechanism. Although the experiment in 
cooperative farming had ended as an ideological failure, rice 
harvests had reached self-sufficiency levels in favorable weather 
conditions. New decrees also guarantee farmers the right to 
long-term use and transfer of property. In response to the 
encouragement of the manufacturing and services sectors 
through privatization, investment promotion, and other 
means, these sectors have slowly begun to supplant agricul- 
ture's share of GDP. The private retail sector has blossomed. 
Removal of restrictions on interregional transit and improve- 
ment of foreign relations with Thailand have fueled growth in 
the transport subsector, simplified trade activities, and are 
likely to reduce the prices of many goods. The potential for 
tourism as a foreign exchange earner has brightened as foreign 
investors join with Laotian companies to provide improved avi- 
ation and tourism services. The opening of the Friendship 
Bridge between Thailand and Laos symbolizes the new rela- 
tionship with countries outside the former Soviet bloc: trade 
with and aid from both developed and neighboring countries 
have increased. Despite an inflationary surge in the late 1980s, 
the reduction of credit to money-losing state-owned enterprises 
and a tight monetary policy helped to bring inflation down to 
more manageable levels in the early 1990s. Tax reform has also 
worked to slow the increase in the fiscal deficit. 

Despite these successes, however, many of the troubles that 
saddled Laos at the beginning of the 1990s remain. Perhaps 
the two most crucial constraints continue to be a poorly edu- 
cated and trained labor force and a limited, poorly maintained 
transportation network with endemic problems. Many of Laos's 
most experienced and educated citizens fled the country in the 
late 1970s, and the poorly run and underfunded educational 
system is inadequate to make up for this important loss of man- 
agerial and technical skill. Similarly, insufficient investment in 
operations and maintenance over the years has resulted in a 
road system poorly equipped to handle the increased traffic 
that liberalization precipitated. Without a better educated and 
trained labor force and an improved infrastructure, measures 
to increase foreign investment and encourage export-oriented 
production are not likely to yield sustainable economic 
progress. Even the push to privatize state-owned enterprises 
and encourage efficient, profit-oriented production depends 
upon the availability of trained managers to direct production. 
Thus, the sustainability of reforms implemented by the start of 



200 



The Economy 



the 1990s depends, at least in part, upon the ability of the gov- 
ernment to turn its attention to the long-term infrastructure 
and human capital requirements of a market-based economy. 

* * * 

Writing about the LPDR economy presents special chal- 
lenges because the measurement of crucial variables such as 
population, size of the labor force, GDP, trade and aid flows, 
and other economic indicators differs from source to source. 
In addition, information is often out of date; most of the few 
important books that cover the economy, such as Martin Stu- 
art-Fox's Laos: Politics, Economics, and Society, were published 
before the New Economic Mechanism was introduced. 

Among the most useful sources available are various World 
Bank publications, including World Tables, and especially Histor- 
ically Planned Economies, A Guide to the Data, as well as the IMF's 
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook. Frequently conflicting sta- 
tistical information is given in such publications as the Organi- 
sation for Economic and Co-operation and Development's 
Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 
and the UN's The Least Developed Countries Report. Three 
extremely useful publications with a wide variety of statistics 
that frequently coincide with those of other sources are the 
UN's Statistical Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific and Economic and 
Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific, and the Asian Development 
Bank's Asian Development Outlook. Of these publications, the first 
is perhaps the only up-to-date publication with reasonably 
detailed sectoral and production time series. For a more histor- 
ical perspective on the growth of various economic sectors, the 
Asian Economic Handbook and the Laos government's 10 Years of 
Socio-Economic Development in the Lao People's Democratic Republic 
are very informative, if not always in agreement with other 
sources. 

For information on specific sectors, a number of publica- 
tions provide very useful data. The World Resources Institute's 
World Resources statistical tables contain otherwise scarce infor- 
mation on forestry and agricultural activities, deforestation, 
energy, and pollution. Two publications are indispensable for 
information on trade and investment: the UN's Traders' Manual 
for Asia and the Pacific: Lao People's Democratic Republic and Lau- 
rence J. Brahm and Neill T. Macpherson's Investment in the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic. A collection of papers from the 
Asian Development Bank and the Thai-Canada Economic Co- 



201 



Laos: A Country Study 



operation Foundation's Thai-Lao Forum on Investment and Trade 
Opportunities in Lao PDR provide some excellent sectoral back- 
ground information. 

A number of excellent, although brief, surveys of the econ- 
omy are available, including Martin Stuart-Fox's article "Laos in 
1991: On the Defensive" and the section on Laos in The Far East 
and Australasia; the latter publication also contains some useful 
statistical tables. For the most wide-ranging, up-to-date infor- 
mation, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Profile and 
Country Report series for Indochina are essential; see also Asian 
Survey's annual summary and the annual Asia Yearbook series. 
The increase in foreign investment in Laos and the general 
upswing in private activity in the marketplace may result in the 
dissemination of more accurate, comprehensive, and timely 
information about the economy. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



202 



Chapter 4. Government and Politics 



Parallel dragons form the sides of long steps leading to Wat Houa Xieng in 
Louangphrabang. 



AS A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY until 1975, Laos was a conser- 
vative monarchy, dominated by a small number of powerful 
families. In 1975 it was transformed into a communist oligar- 
chy, but its social makeup remained much the same. In the 600- 
year-old monarchy, the Lao king ruled from Louangphrabang 
(Luang Prabang), while in other regions there were families 
with royal pretensions rooted in the royal histories of Cham- 
pasak (Bassac), Vientiane (Viangchan), and Xiangkhoang 
(Tran Ninh) . They were surrounded by lesser aristocrats from 
prominent families, who in turn became patrons to clients of 
lower status, thus building a complex network of allegiances. 
The king reigned from Louangphrabang but did not rule over 
much of the outlying regions of the country. 

In December 1975, with the declaration of the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic (LPDR, or Laos), the king abdicated. 
Although Laos was reorganized as a communist "people's 
democracy," important vestiges of traditional political and 
social behavior remained. The aristocratic families were shorn 
of their influence, but a new elite with privileged access to the 
communist roots of power emerged, and clients of lower status 
searched them out as patrons. In addition, some of the old 
families who had links to the new revolutionary elite managed 
to survive and wield significant influence. As newly dominant 
elites replaced the old, they demanded a similar deference. 

Lao Loum (lowland Lao; see Glossary) families continue to 
wield the greatest influence (see Lowland Lao Society, ch. 2). 
Despite the rhetoric of the revolutionary elite concerning eth- 
nic equality, Lao Theung (midland Lao; see Glossary) and Lao 
Sung (upland Lao; see Glossary) minorities are low on the 
scale of national influence, just as they were in pre-1975 society. 
However, the power of the central government over the outly- 
ing regions has remained tenuous; the government still relies 
upon bargains with tribal chieftains to secure the loyalty of 
their peoples. 

Although manifesting many of the characteristics of a tradi- 
tional Lao monarchy dominated by a lowland Lao Buddhist 
elite, the country also has exhibited many of the characteristics 
of other communist regimes. It has shown a similar heavy 
bureaucratic style, with emphasis within the bureaucracy on 



205 



Laos: A Country Study 



political training and long sessions of criticism and self-criti- 
cism for its civil servants. Laos imported from its Vietnamese 
mentor the concept of reeducation centers or "seminar 
camps," where, during the early years of the LPDR, thousands 
of former Royal Lao Government (RLG — see Glossary) adver- 
saries were incarcerated. This communist overlay on traditional 
society, however, has been moderated by two important factors: 
Lao Buddhism and government administrative incompetence 
in implementing socialist doctrine. Thus, what emerged in 
Laos has been a system aptly labeled by Prince Souvanna 
Phouma, former prime minister of the RLG, as "socialisme a la 
laotienne" (Lao-style socialism). 

The melange of traditional politics, accompanied by patron- 
client relations, with communist-style intra-institutional compe- 
tition, has produced a unique political culture. Power centers 
tend to cluster around key personalities, and those in power 
become targets of opportunity for members of their extended 
family and friends (see Leadership, this ch.) 

The Lao People's Revolutionary Party 

Whereas communist parties in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe have crumbled, in Laos, the ruling communist 
party, the Phak Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolution- 
ary Party — LPRP; see Glossary) has retained undiluted political 
control. The constitution, adopted in August 1991, notes sim- 
ply in Article 3 that the LPRP is the "leading nucleus" of the 
political system. LPRP statutes, revised following the Fifth Party 
Congress held in 1991, leave no doubt regarding the dominant 
role of the party: 

The party is . . . the leading core of the entire politi- 
cal system, hub of intelligence, and representative of 
the interest of the people of all strata. The party for- 
mulates and revises the major lines and policies on 
national development in all spheres; finds solutions 
to major problems; determines the policies regard- 
ing personnel management, training of cadres, and 
supplying key cadres for different levels; controls and 
supervises activities of party cadres and members, 
state agencies and mass organizations. 

Origins of the Party 

The LPRP has its roots in the Indochinese Communist Party 



206 



Government and Politics 



(ICP), founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1930. (Ho Chi Minh led the 
struggle for Vietnamese independence and was the president 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) from 
1945 until his death in 1969.) The ICP, composed entirely of 
Vietnamese members in its early years, formed the Committee 
for Laos (or a "Lao section") in 1936. Only in the mid-1940s 
did the Vietnamese communist revolutionaries step up active 
recruitment of Laotian members. In 1946 or early 1947, Kay- 
sone Phomvihan, a law student at the University of Hanoi, was 
recruited, and Nouhak Phoumsavan, engaged in a trucking 
business in Vietnam, joined in 1947. 

In February 1951, the Second Congress of the ICP resolved 
to disband the party and to form three separate parties repre- 
senting the three states of Indochina (see The Pathet Lao, ch. 
1). However, it was not until March 22, 1955, at the First Party 
Congress, that the Phak Pasason Lao (Lao People's Party — 
LPP) was formally proclaimed. (The name LPRP was adopted 
at the Second Party Congress in 1972.) It seems likely that from 
1951 to 1955, key Laotian former members of the ICP provided 
leadership for the "resistance" movement in Laos, under the 
tutelage of their Vietnamese senior partners. In 1956 the LPP 
founded the Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front — LPF), the 
political party of the Pathet Lao (Lao Nation — see Glossary), to 
act as the public mass political organization. Meanwhile, the 
LPP remained clandestine, directing the activities of the front. 

The Vietnamese communists provided critical guidance and 
support to the growing party during the revolutionary period. 
They helped to recruit the leadership of the Laotian commu- 
nist movement; from its inception, the LPRP Political Bureau 
(Politburo) was made up of individuals closely associated with 
the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese furnished facilities and guid- 
ance for training not only the top leadership, but also the 
entire Laotian communist movement. The Vietnamese 
assigned advisers to the party, as well as to the military forces of 
the LPF. Under the guidance of North Vietnamese mentors, 
LPRP leaders shaped a Marxist-Leninist party, political and 
mass organizations, an army, and a bureaucracy, all based upon 
the North Vietnamese model. 

From their perspective, Laotian communists had not com- 
promised their legitimacy as a nationalist movement by their 
dependence on Hanoi. During the revolutionary period prior 
to 1975, when LPRP leaders looked to the North Vietnamese 



207 



Laos: A Country Study 



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210 



Government and Politics 



Since 1972 the genuine center of political power, as in other 
communist parties, has resided in the Politburo. Membership 
of the Politburo, and formerly that of the Secretariat, is drawn 
from the Central Committee. A small group of men — seven in 
1972 and eleven by 1993 — have provided the critical leadership 
of the communist movement in Laos. A signal attribute of this 
group has been its remarkable cohesion and continuity. The 
Politburo has been dominated for more than fifteen years of 
communist rule by the same stalwart band of revolutionary vet- 
erans. The twenty-five Laotian former members of the ICP who 
founded the LPP in 1955, and from whom the Politburo was 
drawn, remained in almost identical rank until illness and age 
began to take their toll in the 1980s. Kaysone was named secre- 
tary general of the then secret LPP upon its establishment, a 
post he retained until his death in 1992. Nouhak retained his 
number-two position on the Politburo into 1993. It was not 
until the Fifth Party Congress that Souphanouvong, Phoumi 
Vongvichit, and Sisomphone Lovansai (ranking third, fourth, 
and seventh, respectively) were retired with honorific titles as 
counselors to the Central Committee. Prime Minister Khamtai 
Siphandon was promoted to succeed Kaysone as chief of the 
party, and Phoun Sipaseut advanced a notch in rank. In 1991 
the Politburo numbered ten, including only two new members. 

Although the exact manner of Politburo decision making 
has never been revealed, a collegiality, based on long years of 
common experience, appears to have developed. In addition 
to their powerful position on the Politburo, members exercise 
additional political power — perhaps even more than in most 
other communist systems — through important posts within the 
governmental structure. In fact, for many years, five Politburo 
members also held seats on the Secretariat. 

At the Fifth Party Congress, the party abolished the nine-per- 
son Secretariat of the Central Committee and changed the des- 
ignation of the head of the party (Kaysone) from secretary 
general to chairman. Until it was abolished, the Secretariat 
wielded influence second only to that of the Politburo. The 
Secretariat issued party directives and acted on behalf of the 
Central Committee when it was not in session, in effect manag- 
ing the day-to-day business of the party. Khamtai Siphandon 
became party chairman in November 1992, but it is not certain 
whether he will accrue the same power and influence as his 
predecessor. 



211 



Laos: A Country Study 



Each of the sixteen provinces (khoueng — see Glossary) is 
directed by a party committee, chaired by a party secretary, 
who is the dominant political figure in the province. At a lower 
level are 112 districts (muang — see Glossary), further divided 
into subdistricts (tasseng — see Glossary), each with their own 
party committees. Administratively, subdistricts have been abol- 
ished in principle since around 1993, but implementation has 
been uneven across provinces. It is unknown whether subdis- 
trict-level party committees have also been abolished. At the 
base of the country's administrative structure are more than 
11,000 villages (ban — see Glossary), only some of which have 
party branches. 

Semisecrecy of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 

Unlike other communist regimes, the LPRP has long main- 
tained a semisecrecy about its mode of operation and the iden- 
tity of its rank-and-file members. However, the LPRP follows 
the standard communist practice of planting party members 
within all principal institutions of society — in government, in 
mass organizations, and, formerly, in agricultural collectives. 
These individuals serve as leaders and transmit party policy. 
They also act as the eyes and ears of the central party organiza- 
tion. Although party members are admonished not to reveal 
themselves, it is not difficult for knowledgeable persons to pick 
out the party members in their organization. In each ministry, 
for example, the key power wielders are party members. All 
party members do not, of course, hold positions of authority. 
Some occupy the lower ranks, serving, for example, as messen- 
gers, drivers, and maintenance personnel. 

By the late 1980s, some of the LPRP's semisecrecy had 
eroded. Party leadership lists, which, during revolutionary and 
early postrevolutionary days had been secret, were published. 
But a quasi-clandestine attitude remains among the party rank 
and file that can be explained by several factors. Clandestine 
behavior is an old habit that is not easily shed. Secrecy adds to 
the party's mystery, inspires anxiety and fear, and contributes to 
control. In view of its long history of revolutionary activity, 
party veterans fear infiltration and subversion. LPRP pro- 
nouncements during its first decade of rule frequently alluded 
to "CIA and Thai-reactionary-inspired agents," and later, when 
relations with China grew tense, to the danger of "big power 
hegemonism." Moreover, party leaders appear to lack confi- 



212 



Government and Politics 



dence in the quality of their membership, speaking from time 
to time about "bad elements" within the party. 

The LPRP is relatively small compared with other incumbent 
parties. For example, the 40,000 members that the party 
claimed in 1985 represented 1.1 percent of the population 
(estimating 3.5 million inhabitants). In 1979 the Vietnamese 
Communist Party had 1.5 million members in a population of 
53 million, or approximately 3 percent. 

Ideology of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party 

When LPRP leaders came to power in 1975 as victorious rev- 
olutionaries guided by Marxism-Leninism, they retained a zeal 
for creating a "new socialist society and a new socialist man." 
They declared their twin economic goals as the achievement of 
"socialist transformation with socialist construction." They 
asserted that in establishing the LPDR in 1975, they had com- 
pleted the "national democratic revolution." (The national 
goal had been to expel the French colonialists and the United 
States imperialists. The democratic goal was to overthrow "reac- 
tionary traitors, comprador bourgeoisie, bureaucrats, reaction- 
aries, feudalists and militarists. . . .") The LPRP claimed that it 
had won the national democratic revolution by winning a "peo- 
ple's war" with a "worker-peasant" alliance, under the secret 
leadership of the LPRP working through a national front. It 
proclaimed a commitment to "proletarian internationalism" 
and the "law of Indochinese solidarity," and at the same time 
defined Vietnam and the Soviet Union as friends and the 
"unholy alliance" among United States imperialism, Chinese 
"great power hegemonism," and Thai militarism as enemies. 

By the late 1980s, as communism was undergoing a radical 
transformation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Kay- 
sone and his colleagues on the Politburo still professed an 
adherence to Marxism-Leninism, but they emphasized the 
necessity for Laos to pass through a stage of "state capitalism." 
Following Mikhail Gorbachev's example of perestroika, Kay- 
sone proclaimed in 1989 that state enterprises were being sev- 
ered from central direction and would be financially 
autonomous. V.I. Lenin's New Economic Policy was frequently 
cited to legitimize the movement toward a market economy 
and the necessity to stimulate private initiative. 

By the early 1990s, even less of the Marxist-Leninist rhetoric 
remained. The party has continued to move internally toward 



213 



Laos: A Country Study 



more free-market measures and externally toward reliance 
upon the capitalist countries and the international institutions 
on which they depend for investment and assistance. The "law" 
of Indochinese solidarity has been amended, and the LPDR's 
"special relations" with its former senior partner are no longer 
invoked, even though party spokesmen still insist that Laos 
retains a solid friendship and "all-round cooperation" with 
Vietnam (see Bilateral Relations, this ch.). 

Despite this erosion of communist ideology, retaining exclu- 
sive political power remains a primary goal of the party. In a 
speech in 1990, Secretary General Kaysone asserted the basis of 
legitimacy of the party: 

The party is the center of our wisdom. It has laid 
down the correct and constructive line, patterns, and 
steps compatible with realities in our country and 
hence has led the Lao people in overcoming difficul- 
ties and numerous tests to win victory after victory, 
until the final victory. History has shown that our 
party is the only party which has won the credibility 
and trust of the people. Our party's leadership in our 
country's revolution is an objective requirement and 
historic duty entrusted to it by the Lao multiethnic 
people. Other political parties which had existed in 
our country have dissolved in the process of histori- 
cal transformation. They failed to win the control 
and support of the people because they did not 
defend the national interest or fight for the interests 
and aspirations of the people. 

Leadership 

Internal Stability and External Influences 

Since the LPDR was proclaimed in December 1975, its lead- 
ership has been remarkably stable and cohesive. The record of 
continuous service at the highest ranks is equaled by few, if any, 
regimes in the contemporary world. Laotian leaders have an 
equally impressive record of unity. Although outside observers 
have scrutinized the leadership for factions — and some have 
postulated at various times that such factions might be divided 
along the lines of Marxist-Leninist ideologues versus pragma- 
tists or pro-Vietnamese versus nationalists (or pro-Chinese), 
there is no solid evidence that the leadership is seriously 
divided on any critical issues. 



214 



Government and Politics 



In 1975 the Laotian communist leaders, most of whom had 
spent the revolutionary decade from 1964 to 1974 operating 
from Pathet Lao headquarters in the caves of Sam Neua Prov- 
ince (now Houaphan), came down from the mountains to 
Vientiane to direct the new government. At the outset of their 
accession to power, they were suspicious, secretive, and inacces- 
sible, and lower-level cadres were maladroit in imposing heavy 
bureaucratic controls. Travel within the country was limited, 
personal and family behavior was monitored by newly orga- 
nized revolutionary administrative committees, cadres were 
assigned to disseminate propaganda, and seminars were held 
to provide political education for all sorts of groups. During 
these early years, the party squandered much of the goodwill 
and friendly acceptance from a population tired of war and the 
corruption of the old regime. 

At first, Laotian communist leaders were committed to ful- 
filling their revolutionary goals of fundamentally altering soci- 
ety through "socialist transformation and socialist 
construction." After 1979 the regime modified its earlier zeal- 
ous pursuit of socialism and pursued more liberal economic 
and social policies, in much the same manner as Vietnam. 

For more than a decade after 1975, the Vietnamese contin- 
ued to exercise significant influence upon the Laotian leader- 
ship through a variety of party, military, and economic 
channels. By the end of the 1980s, however — in particular fol- 
lowing the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc in 
1991 and diminishing assistance from the Soviet Union to Viet- 
nam and Laos — Vietnam turned inward to concentrate on its 
own problems of development. This emboldened Laotians 
leaders to jettison even more of their socialist ideological bag- 
gage, abandon agricultural collectivization, and move toward a 
market economy. Laos was also free to pursue an independent 
foreign policy. The single most important vestige of the former 
communist system was the solitary ruling party, the LPRP. 

Key Leaders 

Kaysone Phomvihan was preeminent leader of both the 
party and the state until his death in November 1992. Kaysone's 
unusual career had taken him through two decades of revolu- 
tion and almost another two decades of independence. Born in 
1920, Kaysone studied at the Faculty of Law at the University of 
Hanoi where, in 1942, he joined the struggle against the 



215 



Laos: A Country Study 

French colonialists, according to his official biography. Kay- 
sone was known in Hanoi by his Vietnamese name, Quoc. 

For at least a decade after independence, Kaysone avoided 
contact with the masses, Western diplomats, and journalists, 
remaining heavily guarded and secretive, in some ways continu- 
ing an earlier shadowy revolutionary style. Kaysone's caution 
may have been influenced by concern for his safety because 
several attempts had been made on his life during the first few 
years of his rule. During 1989 and 1990, however, Kaysone 
moved about more freely in Laos and showed himself more 
openly to the outside world. For the first time, he made state 
visits to Japan, China, and Sweden. He gave interviews to West- 
ern journalists and was more available to meet with Western 
officials. His public statements suggested that he was impressed 
by the level of development he had seen in affluent nations 
and that he was open to new techniques to bring economic 
progress to Laos under the leadership of the LPRP. 

Although the political careers of most communist leaders in 
Europe and Asia had been terminated when fundamental new 
policies were introduced to their regimes, Kaysone continued 
his leadership without challenge, showing unusual political 
agility and ideological flexibility. Kaysone had long embraced 
Marxism-Leninism, following the pattern of his Vietnamese 
and Soviet mentors. When evidence of change in the commu- 
nist world began to appear, Kaysone propounded the New Eco- 
nomic Mechanism in 1986, invoking Lenin, but soon moved 
control of state enterprises to autonomous firms, and by 1989 
edged more deliberately toward a market economy (see Indus- 
trial Policy, ch. 3). Kaysone appeared to be a pragmatic com- 
munist leader, open to the ideas of outsiders and zealous for — 
although unsuccessful at producing — economic growth. 

Upon Kaysone's death, the person who had been second in 
party Politburo rank for as long as Kaysone had been first, Nou- 
hak Phoumsavan, born in 1914, was passed over as party chair- 
man — presumably for reasons of age and ill health — in favor of 
the third-ranking member, General Khamtai Siphandon. In 
keeping with the Laotian communist practice of maintaining 
continuity and honoring seniority, however, Nouhak was pro- 
moted from deputy prime minister to president of state. 

As of 1994, the new LPRP chairman, Khamtai, also retained 
his government post as prime minister, suggesting that he had 
consolidated his role as the preeminent political leader. Born 



216 



Khamtai Siphandon, Prime 
Minister, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic 
Courtesy Embassy of the Lao 
People's Democratic 
Republic, Washington 



Nouhak Phoumsavan, 
President, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic 
Courtesy Embassy of the Lao 
People's Democratic 
Republic, Washington 



in 1924 in Champasak Province, Khamtai is the youngest sur- 
viving member of the group that founded the Neo Lao Issara 
(Free Laos Front — see Glossary) in 1950 and the LPP in 1955. 
He is thought to have spent part of World War II (1939-45) in 
India and was employed as a postal worker in southern Laos 
after the war. He joined the Lao Issara (Free Laos — see Glos- 
sary) in 1946 and remained with the Pathet Lao group that 
split with the Lao Issara in 1949 (see The Coming of Indepen- 
dence, ch. 1). Assigned to military and political functions in 
the southern Laos sector, Khamtai was elected to the Central 
Committee of the Neo Lao Issara in 1950. According to a biog- 
raphy published in the Vietnamese newspaper, Nhan Dan (Peo- 
ple), Khamtai was appointed chief of staff of the Lao People's 
Liberation Army (LPLA — see Glossary) in 1954, and in 1957 



217 



Laos: A Country Study 



he was elected to membership in the Central Committee of the 
LPP. He directed the party's propaganda and training func- 
tions during 1959 and 1960 and in 1961 was named supreme 
commander of the LPLA. In 1962 he was appointed to the 
Standing Committee of the party's Central Committee and 
named deputy secretary of the General Military Committee. 

Khamtai moved steadily forward in the LPRP Politburo to 
the third ranking position, serving as minister of national 
defense from 1975 to 1991 and as deputy prime minister 
before his elevation to the post of prime minister in 1991. 
Khamtai's background in the military establishment, which has 
been a conservative force in Laotian politics, is thought to 
make him particularly sensitive to security concerns. He has a 
reputation as a hardliner and appears to be more inclined 
toward secrecy than Kaysone. Before assuming the post of 
prime minister, he had little exposure to Westerners, although 
his contacts increased when he took on his new task. 

The deputy prime minister for foreign affairs in 1994 was 
Phoun Sipaseut, a veteran Politburo member who headed the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for seventeen years. Below him, in 
the rank of minister of foreign affairs, was Somsavat Lengsavat, 
who ranked fifty-first in the LPRP Central Committee. In Kay- 
sone's time, an "inner cabinet" of six party leaders carried the 
major decision-making responsibility for the government. Of 
this group, only three members were living as of mid-1994 — 
Nouhak, Khamtai, and Phoun. It is uncertain whether Kay- 
sone's successors will continue the inner cabinet, but there 
appears to be some generational conflict between the leaders 
who were educated by service in the secret revolutionary party 
and those who may have studied abroad — very likely in 
France — before 1975 and whose membership in the party 
came during a more open era. One of the vice ministers of for- 
eign affairs in 1992, for example, studied at the French military 
academy, Saint Cyr, as did a former minister of external eco- 
nomic relations. The latter was dealing very adroitly in 1991 
with foreign donors, and at the Fifth Party Congress, his rank 
on the Central Committee rose from twenty-sixth to sixteenth. 
His counterpart in the Ministry of Finance, however, a former 
provincial governor with more than three decades of service in 
the revolutionary movement, was propelled from forty-third to 
tenth in the Central Committee and gained membership in the 
Politburo. 



218 



Government and Politics 



The Constitution 

Development of the Constitution 

On August 14, 1991, sixteen years after the establishment of 
the LPDR, the Supreme People's Assembly (SPA), the country's 
highest legislative organ, adopted a constitution. Although the 
SPA had been charged with drafting a constitution in 1975, the 
task had low priority. It was not until the Third Party Congress 
that party Secretary General Kaysone stated that the LPRP 
should "urgently undertake the major task ... of preparing a 
socialist constitution at an early date." Laotian press reports 
subsequently revealed that a constitutional drafting committee 
was working informally under the chairmanship of Politburo 
member Sisomphone Lovansai, a specialist in party organiza- 
tion, with the help of East German advisers. Despite the pro- 
claimed urgency of the task, only on May 22, 1984, did the SPA 
Standing Committee formalize the appointment of Sisom- 
phone to head a fifteen-person drafting committee. 

Although the political institutions had functioned without a 
written constitution for fifteen years, the lack of a constitution 
created serious drawbacks for the country. International devel- 
opment agencies were reluctant to invest in Laos given the 
absence of a fixed, knowable law. Amnesty International, in a 
1985 report on Laos, asserted that without a constitution or 
published penal and criminal codes, citizens were "effectively 
denied proper legal guarantees of their internationally recog- 
nized human rights." Even the party newspaper, Xieng Pasason 
(Voice of the People), commenting in June 1990 on the 
absence of a constitution and a general body of laws, acknowl- 
edged that "having no laws is ... a source of injustice and viola- 
tion, thus leading to a breakdown of social order and peace, 
the breeding of anarchy, and the lack of democracy." 

Reasons for the leisurely pace of constitution drafting, 
unusually slow even for the plodding bureaucracy, were not 
readily apparent. Vietnam had adopted a revised constitution 
in 1980 and Cambodia in 1981, only two years after the ouster 
of the Khmer Rouge. According to some reports, progress in 
Laos had been blocked by differences within the Politburo over 
certain substantive clauses. Perhaps most important, the party 
leadership, accustomed to rule without question, may have 
assigned a low priority to producing a document that might 



219 



Laos: A Country Study 



eventually lead to challenging their authority, despite rhetoric 
to the contrary. Further, the public seemed not to care. 

After the new SPA was elected in March 1989, it formally 
appointed a seventeen-member constitutional drafting com- 
mittee. The National Radio of Laos reported that the drafting 
committee was working "under the close supervision of the 
Political Bureau and the Secretariat of the Party Central Com- 
mittee." Six members of the drafting committee were members 
of the Central Committee; two of these members also served 
on the SPA, which also had six members on the drafting com- 
mittee. 

In April 1990, after securing approval of its document from 
the LPRP Politburo and the Secretariat, the SPA finally made 
public the draft constitution. With its publication, the party 
Central Committee issued Directive Number 21, on April 30, 
1990, calling for discussion of the draft, first among party and 
government officials and then among the public. The discus- 
sions, although orchestrated by party cadres, did not always 
please party authorities. An LPRP spokesman released a memo 
complaining that "people in many major towns" had dwelled 
too much on what the constitution had to say about the organi- 
zation of the state. In June a member of the Central Committee 
cautioned against demonstrations to "demand a multiparty sys- 
tem" and warned that demonstrators would be arrested. Com- 
peting parties would not be tolerated, he asserted, adding that 
"our multi-ethnic Lao people have remained faithfully under 
the leadership of the LPRP." In a later pronouncement, he said 
that "the Party has proved to the people in the last 35 years that 
it is the only party that can take care of them" and he lectured 
that "too many parties invite division." A Central Committee 
directive, dated June 14, 1990, hinted at the quality of the pub- 
lic discussion, noting that "in many cases where people were 
convoked to a meeting, they were simply given question and 
answer sheets to study." 

Not all discussions of the draft constitution were perfunc- 
tory, however. Undoubtedly inspired by the examples of East- 
ern Europe and the Soviet Union — where the monopoly of 
power by communist parties had crumbled — a group of some 
forty government officials and intellectuals began criticizing 
the country's one-party system in a series of letters and meet- 
ings in April 1990. Organized in the unofficial "Social Demo- 
cratic Club," the group called for a multiparty system in Laos. 



220 



Government and Politics 



One member of the group, an assistant to the minister of sci- 
ence and technology, submitted a letter of resignation to Prime 
Minister Kaysone in which he labeled Laos a "communist mon- 
archy" and a "dynasty of the Politburo," declaring that the 
country should "change into a multi-party system in order to 
bring democracy, freedom and prosperity to the people." 

Criticism of the draft document gathered strength in the 
succeeding months; Laotian students in Paris, Prague, and 
Warsaw joined in the call for free elections. Criticism broad- 
ened as a group of young, educated party cadres associated 
with nonparty bureaucrats — many educated in France and 
Canada — targeted veteran party leaders. These groups charged 
that the new policies of the old guard were fostering corrup- 
tion and increased social and economic inequality. It was not 
until October 1990 that the government finally cracked down 
on these calls for democratic reforms, with the arrest of several 
protesters, including a former vice minister in the State Plan- 
ning Commission and a director in the Ministry of Justice who 
were sentenced to long prison terms in Houaphan. 

Thus, although the constitution purports to guarantee free- 
dom of speech and petition and its framers give lip service to 
the desirability of public discussion, the ruling party sent a 
clear message with these arrests that it will not tolerate chal- 
lenges to its exclusive exercise of power. Veteran party leaders 
were clearly more impressed by the political models of Vietnam 
and China than by the examples of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. Although willing to experiment with economic 
liberalization, party leaders seemed determined to retain polit- 
ical domination — if they could — through a Leninist-style party. 

Highlights of the Constitution 

The 1991 constitution, which contains elements of an earlier 
revolutionary orthodoxy, is clearly influenced by the economic 
and political liberalization within Laos, as well as by the dra- 
matic changes in the socialist world and the international bal- 
ance of forces. The constitution specifies the functions and 
powers of the various organs of government and defines the 
rights and duties of citizens. Several chapters prescribing the 
structure of the state define the function and powers of the 
National Assembly (the renamed SPA), the president, the gov- 
ernment, the local administration, and the judicial system. The 
constitution has little to say, however, about the limitations on 



221 




222 



View of the Mekong River from Phousi courtyard, Louangphrabang 

Courtesy Gina Merris 



223 



Laos: A Country Study 



government. In foreign policy, the principles of peaceful coex- 
istence are followed. 

The constitution legally establishes a set of authorities that 
resembles the traditional differentiation among executive, leg- 
islative, and judicial branches of government. The delineation 
does not imitate any particular model (neither Vietnamese, 
nor Russian, nor French), but it pays respect to the idea of a 
basic blueprint of responsibilities lodged in designated institu- 
tions. There is room for evolution of government authority, but 
there are also specific boundaries. 

Government outside Vientiane has developed an indepen- 
dence over the years, reflecting the exigencies of the Pathet 
Lao armed struggle and of economic self-reliance during the 
postwar socialist pitfalls. The constitution eliminated elected 
people's councils at the provincial and district level as neces- 
sary "no more," in an effort to fit the state apparatus to the 
needs of building and developing the regime under "the actual 
conditions of the country." Again, the will of the ruling party 
determines which road the administration follows in regard to 
local governance, but the constitution has left governors, may- 
ors, and district and village chiefs free to "administer their 
regions and localities without any assistance from popularly 
elected bodies." The leading role of the party within the 
administration of the nation overall is illustrated by the fact 
that party Politburo members are found in state offices — the 
offices of the president of state, and prime minister, deputy 
prime ministers (two), chair of the National Assembly, minister 
of defense, and chair of the Party and State Inspection Board. 

The first words of the Preamble refer to the "multi-ethnic 
Lao people," and frequent use of this term is made throughout 
the text, a clear rhetorical attempt to promote unity within an 
ethnically diverse society. The "key components" of the people 
are specified as workers, farmers, and intellectuals. The Pream- 
ble celebrates a revolution carried out "for more than 60 years" 
under the "correct leadership" of the ICR 

The dominant role played by the LPRP, however, is scarcely 
mentioned, and the constitution is almost silent about the 
party's functions and powers. One brief reference to the ruling 
party is made in Article 3, which states that the "rights of the 
multi-ethnic people to be the masters of the country are exer- 
cised and ensured through the functioning of the political sys- 



224 



Government and Politics 



tern with the Lao People's Revolutionary Party as its leading 
nucleus." 

Article 5 notes that the National Assembly and all other state 
organizations "function in accordance with the principle of 
democratic centralism." This stricture is an obvious reference 
to the Marxist-Leninist principle, which calls for open discus- 
sion within a unit but prescribes that the minority must accede 
to the will of the majority, and lower echelons must obey the 
decisions of higher ones. 

Article 7 calls upon mass organizations, such as the Lao 
Front for National Construction, the Federation of Trade 
Unions, the People's Revolutionary Youth Union, and the Fed- 
eration of Women's Unions, to "unite and mobilize the peo- 
ple." The Lao Front for National Construction, the successor to 
the LPF, served as the political front for the party during the 
revolutionary struggle. Its mandate is to mobilize political sup- 
port and raise political consciousness for the party's goals 
among various organizations, ethnic groups, and social classes 
within society. Other mass organizations are assigned to pursue 
these goals among their target populations of workers, youths, 
and women. 

The constitution proclaims that the state will respect the 
"principle of equality among ethnic tribes," which have the 
right to promote "their fine customs and culture." Further, the 
state is committed to upgrading the "socio-economy of all eth- 
nic groups." 

Regarding religion, the state "respects and protects all lawful 
activities of the Buddhists and of other religious followers." 
Buddhist monks and other clergy are reminded that the state 
encourages them to "participate in the activities which are ben- 
eficial to the country" (see Buddhism, ch. 2). 

The chapter on the socioeconomic system does not mention 
the establishment of socialism, a principal goal of earlier 
dogma. Instead, the objective of economic policy is to trans- 
form the "natural economy into a goods economy." Private 
property appears to be assured by the statement that the "state 
protects the right of ownership," including the right of transfer 
and inheritance. The state is authorized to undertake such 
tasks as managing the economy, providing education, expand- 
ing public health, and caring for war veterans, the aging, and 
the sick (see Health and Welfare, ch. 2). The constitution 



225 



Laos: A Country Study 



admonishes that "all organizations and citizens must protect 
the environment." 

A chapter on the rights and obligations of citizens sets forth 
a cluster of well-known rights found in modern constitutions, 
including freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly. 
Women and men are proclaimed equal, and all citizens can 
vote at age eighteen and hold office at twenty-one. In return, 
citizens are obliged to respect the laws, pay taxes, and defend 
the country, which includes military service (see Manpower 
and Conditions of Service, ch. 5). In commenting on this chap- 
ter in 1990, Amnesty International, clearly concerned about 
past human rights abuses, criticized the document for what was 
not included. Amnesty International noted the absence of pro- 
visions for protecting the right to life, abolishing the death 
penalty, guaranteeing the inalienability of fundamental rights, 
prohibiting torture, safeguarding against arbitrary arrest and 
detention, protecting people deprived of their liberty, and pro- 
viding for a fair trial. No safeguards exist to protect the rights 
to freedom of opinion and expression, peaceful assembly and 
association, and independence of the judiciary. 

Laos is made up of provinces, municipalities, districts, and 
villages. The constitution gives no clear guidance on provincial 
and district responsibilities except to specify that the leaders at 
each echelon must ensure the implementation of the constitu- 
tion and the law and must carry out decisions taken by a higher 
level. In spite of the party's inclination to centralize decision 
making, provinces and localities have enjoyed a surprising 
degree of autonomy in shaping social policy. This indepen- 
dence is partly a result of limited resources and poor communi- 
cations with Vientiane. But the central government has also 
encouraged direct contacts along the borders with China, Thai- 
land, and Vietnam, and trading agreements with neighboring 
jurisdictions. 

Although it is unlikely that the constitution will immediately 
change the embedded patterns of the Laotian political system 
or threaten the dominant role of the party, it has the potential 
to protect human rights and respect for the law, by the rulers as 
well as the ruled. The crumbling of communist regimes in East- 
ern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as strains in commu- 
nist systems elsewhere, accompanied by widespread 
movements for democracy, suggest that Laos will not be 



226 



Government and Politics 



immune to growing demands for a more dependable rule of 
law. 

Government Structure 

Bureaucratic Culture 

The historical evolution of Laos created identifiable layers of 
bureaucratic behavior. Traditional royal customs and Buddhist 
practices set the foundation. Next, there was an overlay of 
French influence, the product of colonial rule from 1890 to 
1954. During this period, several generations of Laotian 
bureaucrats were trained and often placed in subordinate rank 
to French-imported Vietnamese civil servants. The administra- 
tion used French as the official language and followed French 
colonial administrative practices. From 1954 to 1975, there was 
an increase in United States influence, and the United States 
provided training and educational opportunities for future 
bureaucrats as well as employment in United States agencies. 
Because of its brevity, however, the United States impact was far 
less pervasive than the French. 

When the communists seized power in 1975, a new layer of 
bureaucrats — strongly influenced by North Vietnam and the 
Soviet Union and its allies — was added. Many of the French- 
trained and United States-influenced bureaucrats fled across 
the Mekong River. Of those who stayed, perhaps 10,000 to 
15,000 were sent to "seminar camps," or reeducation centers 
(see "Seminar Camps" and the Death of Savang Vatthana, ch. 1; 
Detention Centers, ch. 5). The few Western-trained bureau- 
crats who remained possessed French- or English-language 
skills and the technical competence needed to deal effectively 
with the Western foreign aid donors so critical to the economy. 
The Western-trained bureaucrats were essential because not 
many of the new revolutionary cadres who moved into key posi- 
tions of bureaucratic authority had much formal education, 
knowledge of a foreign language, or competence in the techni- 
cal and managerial skills necessary to run a national economy. 
The few cadres in each ministry who were capable of managing 
the economy were often unavailable because there were so 
many demands for their services: for example, meeting with 
visiting foreign delegations, traveling to international meet- 
ings, and attending political training sessions. 



227 



Laos: A Country Study 

Since its inception, the LPDR bureaucracy has been lethar- 
gic and discouraged individual initiative. It has been dangerous 
to take unorthodox positions. Some officials have been 
arrested on suspicion of corruption or ideological deviation: 
for example, "pro-Chinese" sentiment. Initiative has been fur- 
ther constrained by the lack of legal safeguards, formal trial 
procedures, and an organized system of appeal. The begin- 
nings of a penal code, which the SPA endorsed in 1989, and 
the promulgation of a constitution in 1991, however, may solid- 
ify the system of justice and provide a clear definition as to what 
constitutes a crime against socialist morality, the party, or the 
state. 

The lethargy of the bureaucracy is understandable within 
the cultural context of Laos. As a peasant society at the lower 
end of the modernization scale, the LPDR has adopted few of 
the work routines associated with modern administration. For- 
eign aid administrators frequently point out that Laotian 
administrators have difficulty creating patterns or precedents, 
or learning from experience. Laotians are known for their 
light-hearted, easy-going manner. This bo pink nyang (never 
mind — don't worry about it) attitude is reflected in the languid 
pace of administration. Official corruption has also been 
acknowledged as problematic. 

Kaysone acknowledged the bureaucracy's low level of com- 
petence. In his report to the Fourth Party Congress in 1986, he 
chided those in authority who gave "preference only to (their 
friends) or those from the same locality or race; paying atten- 
tion to only their birth origin, habits and one particular sphere 
of education." Patronage is but one area that has come under 
scrutiny and resulted in admonishments to strengthen inspec- 
tion and control. Kaysone further railed against "dogmatism, 
privatism, racial narrow-mindedness, regionalism and local- 
ism." 

Executive 

The president of the country is elected by a two-thirds vote 
of the National Assembly for a term of five years. One surpris- 
ing constitutional provision transforms the presidency from a 
ceremonial position to one with important political power. The 
president appoints and can dismiss the prime minister and 
members of the government, with the approval of the National 
Assembly — parliamentary responsibility that has not yet 



228 



Government and Politics 



occurred in the short life of the current constitutional regime. 
He also presides over meetings of the government, "when nec- 
essary," and appoints and dismisses provincial governors and 
mayors of municipalities as well as generals of the armed 
forces, upon the recommendation of the prime minister. In 
addition, the president receives and appoints ambassadors and 
declares states of emergency or war. 

The powers accorded to the president grew perceptibly dur- 
ing the drafting process of the constitution, but the sudden 
death of Kaysone, who had moved from prime minister to state 
president after the promulgation of the constitution, tempo- 
rarily introduced doubts regarding the relative power potential 
of the two offices. Nonetheless, the president of state heads the 
armed forces and has the right and duty to promulgate laws 
and issue decrees and state acts. 

The primary organization for administration is the govern- 
ment, which consists of the prime minister — its head — and 
deputy prime ministers, ministers, and chairs of ministry-equiv- 
alent state committees. The prime minister, appointed by the 
president with the approval of the National Assembly, serves a 
five-year term. Duties of this office include the guidance and 
supervision of the work of government ministries and commit- 
tees, as well as of the governors of provinces and mayors of 
municipalities. The prime minister appoints all the deputies at 
these levels of government, as well as the local district chiefs 
(see fig. 9). 

Legislature 

The National Assembly, the country's supreme legislative 
body, is to be elected every five years. Significantly, this designa- 
tion was used in RLG and French colonial times, before the 
introduction of the title "Supreme People's Assembly" in late 
1975. It is located in a new building, far larger than the previ- 
ous structure built in colonial times, and contains an audito- 
rium seating 800 persons. 

The National Assembly makes decisions on fundamental 
issues and oversees administrative and judicial organs. Its most 
significant powers include electing and removing the president 
of state, the president of the Supreme People's Court, and the 
prosecutor general, "on the recommendation of the National 
Assembly Standing Committee." Its prestige has been further 
enhanced by the constitutional mandate to "make decisions on 



229 



Laos: A Country Study 




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230 



Government and Politics 



the fundamental issues of the country" and to "elect or remove 
the President of state and the Vice President of state," by a two- 
thirds vote, and to approve the removal of members of the gov- 
ernment on the recommendation of the president of state. Its 
powers encompass amending the constitution, determining 
taxes, approving the state budget, endorsing or abrogating 
laws, and electing or removing the two top judicial figures in 
the system. Members of the National Assembly have the "right 
to interpellate the members of the government." The National 
Assembly also ratifies treaties and decides questions of war and 
peace. These powers may prove to be limited, however, by a 
provision in the constitution that the National Assembly will 
generally meet in ordinary session only twice a year. The Stand- 
ing Committee meeting in the interim may convene an 
extraordinary session if it deems this necessary. 

The constitution does not specify the number of members in 
the National Assembly, whose candidates are screened by the 
LPRP. The 1989 election placed seventy-nine members in this 
body, representing districts of between 40,000 and 50,000 per- 
sons each. The election campaign lasted two months, and can- 
didates appeared before voters at night in local schools or 
pagodas. Voting consisted of crossing out unfavored candi- 
dates, and every ballot contained at least two candidates. The 
number of party members elected by this process was officially 
placed at sixty-five. 

Between sessions, the Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly, consisting of the president and the vice president 
elected by the National Assembly and an unspecified number 
of other members, prepares for future sessions and "super- 
vise [s] and oversee [s] the activities of the administrative and 
judicial organizations." It is empowered to appoint or remove 
the vice president of the Supreme People's Court and judges at 
all levels of the lower courts. Its supervisory role can be rein- 
forced by National Assembly committees established to con- 
sider draft laws and decrees and to help in the supervision and 
administration of the courts. The special National Assembly 
Law passed March 25, 1993, specifies five substantive areas for 
National Assembly committees: secretarial; law; economic plan- 
ning and finances; cultural, social, and nationalities; and for- 
eign affairs. The membership of the committees includes not 
only National Assembly members but also chiefs and deputy 
chiefs, who "guide the work," and technical cadres. 



231 



Laos: A Country Study 



Judiciary 

The development of the legal and judicial system did not 
begin until almost fifteen years after the state was proclaimed. 
In November 1989, a criminal code and laws establishing a 
judicial system were adopted. In 1993 the government began 
publishing an official gazette to disseminate laws, decrees, and 
regulations. 

In 1990 the judicial branch was upgraded. New legislation 
provided a draft of a criminal code, established procedures for 
criminal cases, set up a court system, and established a law 
school. Moreover, the Ministry of Justice added a fourth year of 
studies to a law program for training magistrates and judges. 

Also in 1990, the functions of the Supreme People's Court 
were separated from those of the Office of the Public Prosecu- 
tor General. Until then, the minister of justice served as both 
president of the court and director of public prosecutions. 

Although the implementation of judicial reforms proceeded 
slowly and had not significantly improved the administration of 
justice by mid-1994, the new legal framework offers the possi- 
bility of moving away from the arbitrary use of power toward 
the rule of law. In late 1992, however, the government sus- 
pended the bar until it formulates regulations for fees and 
activities of (the few) private lawyers who are able to advise in 
civil cases. Lawyers are not allowed to promote themselves as 
attorneys-at-law. Theoretically, the government provides legal 
counsel to the accused, although in practice persons accused 
of crimes must defend themselves, without outside legal coun- 
sel. This situation is changing, however, and the assessors (legal 
advisers) — who are often untrained — and the party functionar- 
ies are being increasingly replaced by professional personnel 
trained at the Institute of Law and Administration. 

The constitution empowers the National Assembly to elect 
or remove the president of the Supreme People's Court and 
the public prosecutor general on the recommendation of its 
Standing Committee. The Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly appoints or removes judges (previously elected) of 
the provincial, municipal, and disuict levels. 

Further evidence of an attempt to shift toward a professional 
judicial system is found in the public prosecution institutes pro- 
vided for at each level of administration. The task of these insti- 
tutes is to control the uniform observance of laws by all 



232 



Government and Politics 



ministries, organizations, state employees, and citizens. They 
prosecute under the guidance of the public prosecutor gen- 
eral, who appoints and removes deputy public prosecutors at 
all levels. 

Challenges to the Regime 
Human Rights 

Human rights have been gaining a measure of respect in 
Laos. In the early years of the LPDR, party authorities arbi- 
trarily sent people labeled as social deviants — "prostitutes, 
addicts, gamblers, hippies, thieves, and lost children" — to semi- 
nar camps. Political opponents associated with the former 
RLG — perhaps as many as 30,000 to 50,000 — were also con- 
fined to these camps. 

By the late 1980s, there was a slight liberalization in the 
granting of human rights. Many, although not all, of the semi- 
nar camps had been closed, and some former inmates were 
assigned to labor and construction units and collective farms 
near the camps. It became easier for a citizen to travel within 
the country and gain permission to cross the Mekong River to 
Thailand or travel abroad. As of April 1994, any Laotian with 
an identification card and foreigners with valid visas were per- 
mitted to travel anywhere in the country — with specific travel 
papers — except to a few unspecified "restricted areas." Restric- 
tions on Buddhist religious practices became more relaxed, 
and even high-level government officials routinely attended 
Buddhist functions. The number of Buddhist monks increased, 
with some 30,000 reported to be practicing in 1991 (see Bud- 
dhism, ch. 2). The agents of state internal security, principally 
the police and other cadres of the Ministry of Interior, seemed 
less oppressive. In 1991 twenty-five detainees who had been 
held at seminar camps since 1975 were released. The number 
the government was known to be holding as of 1993 had dimin- 
ished to fewer than twelve, all former officials or military offic- 
ers of the RLG. The LPDR claimed that the remaining 
detainees were free to travel in Houaphan Province, where they 
were confined. 

Nonetheless, many freedoms remain inaccessible. The gov- 
ernment controls most large public gatherings, and, except for 
religious, athletic, and communal events, generally organizes 
them. Political demonstrations, protest marches, and other 



233 



Laos: A Country Study 



"destabilizing subversive activities" are expressly banned by the 
new penal code. The constitution guarantees the freedoms of 
speech and the press, but the exercise of these freedoms is sub- 
ject to a wide range of government controls (see Mass Media, 
this ch.). 

Insurgents 

A small-scale insurgency that has existed since 1975 contin- 
ues in the early 1990s, although at a much lower level than in 
previous years. This insurgency has never seriously threatened 
the regime, but it is troublesome because the insurgents com- 
mit sabotage, blow up bridges, and threaten transport and 
communications. The great majority of insurgents are Hmong 
(see Glossary), led by ex-soldiers from United States Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA)-supported units who fought against 
Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese troops in the 1960s. Hmong 
groups, most of them formerly associated with the RLG, draw 
recruits and support from Hmong refugee camps and operate 
from bases in Thailand with the cooperation of local Thai mili- 
tary officers. As relations between Thailand and Laos contin- 
ued to improve in the 1990s, support for this insurgent activity 
declined (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). Resistance spokesmen 
claim that their principal source of funds for weapons and sup- 
plies comes from Laotian expatriate communities overseas, 
including the 180,000 Laotians in the United States. 

Even though the government lacks widespread public sup- 
port, insurgency is less a measure of discontent than evidence 
of a serious ethnic problem. The LPDR, like the RLG that pre- 
ceded it, has been dominated by lowland Lao. The two govern- 
ments exemplify the traditional Lao disdain for upland 
peoples, in spite of Pathet Lao rhetoric in favor of ethnic equal- 
ity. On the one hand, because many Hmong fought on the side 
of the "American imperialists," government leaders feel addi- 
tionally suspicious of them. On the other hand, Hmong and 
other upland minorities who served with the United States-sup- 
ported forces have been suspicious and uncomfortable under 
their former enemies. Thus, a core of insurgents, composed 
largely of ethnic minorities, continues to fight against the 
authorities. It will be extremely difficult — perhaps impossi- 
ble — for the government to pacify them, especially without 
help from Vietnamese military units, if the insurgents enjoy 
access to sanctuary in Thailand along the easily crossed, 1,000- 
kilometer Mekong River border. 



234 



Government and Politics 



In the early 1980s, Hmong insurgents claimed that the Lao 
People's Army (LPA — see Glossary) was using lethal chemical 
agents against them. The Hmong refugees in Thailand often 
referred to the chemical agents as "poisons from above;" for- 
eign journalists used the term "yellow rain." The government 
vehemently denied these charges. The United States Depart- 
ment of State noted in 1992 that "considerable investigative 
efforts in recent years have revealed no evidence of chemical 
weapons use" in the post-1983 period. 

Refugees 

From 1975 to 1985, after the communists had seized power 
and were consolidating their hold, some 350,000 persons fled 
across the Mekong River to Thailand and, in most cases, reset- 
tled in third countries. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, this 
outflow had declined substantially. In 1990, for example, an 
estimated 1,000 to 2,000 lowland Lao and 4,000 to 5,000 
upland Lao departed illegally for Thailand. The Thai govern- 
ment refused to admit these refugees as immigrants. Emigrants 
who claim to be "victims of communism" may face more prob- 
lems being accepted for third-country resettlement as a result 
of the end of the Cold War. Moreover, Laos has become more 
liberal in granting exit permits to those desiring to emigrate. 

By the early 1990s, almost as many Laotians were returning 
to Laos as were leaving. Under a voluntary repatriation pro- 
gram worked out in 1980 by Laos and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR — see Glossary), nearly 
19,000 Laotians had voluntarily returned to their homeland by 
the end of 1993, and an estimated 30,000 more had returned 
without official involvement. Most of the returnees are lowland 
Lao. Of the approximately 30,000 Laotian refugees remaining 
in camps in Thailand in 1993, the majority are upland Lao. 
Approximately 1,700 Laotian refugees remain in China. Emi- 
gres who had resettled in third countries are returning in 
increasing numbers to visit relatives and, in a few cases, to sur- 
vey business opportunities in the more liberal economy. 

Political Opposition 

Over the centuries, residents of the Laotian Buddhist king- 
dom developed gentle techniques of accommodation, often 
searching for more powerful patrons either outside the coun- 
try or within. Authorities governed during the early years after 



235 



Laos: A Country Study 



1975 with little popular support, but most Laotians simply sub- 
mitted to their authority because they had little alternative. 
However, the authorities were not harsh compared to other 
communist regimes of the 1970s and 1980s, most of which — by 
mid-1994 — had toppled. 

The relatively passive Laotian political culture inspires few 
direct challenges to one-party domination, and party authori- 
ties firmly assert the limits of political dissent. LPRP spokesmen 
invoke a litany of explanations to justify the party's monopoly 
of power — for example, the country is too underdeveloped 
and the people too little educated to permit more than one 
party. Further, there are too many ethnic groups, and open 
political participation would lead to disunity and chaos. Politi- 
cal stability, provided by the leadership of a single party, is said 
to be necessary for economic growth. The LPRP has also 
pointed out the corrupt multiparty system of the RLG. An abid- 
ing political reality, however, is that those who have power wish 
to retain it. 

Restrictions on political opposition do not appear to be a 
serious issue among a majority of the population, although a 
small number of educated Laotians in intellectual, student, 
and bureaucratic circles have raised a few protests. Despite the 
toll of age and failing health among the aged Politburo mem- 
bers, the leadership governs without active opposition. Even 
when communist leaders were unceremoniously dumped in 
Eastern Europe, vigorously challenged in the Soviet Union, 
and confronted by students in China, communist leaders in 
Laos retained their hold as they guided the regime into the 
uncharted realm of reform. It is not clear why there was so little 
challenge to these aging leaders. They maintained a cohesion 
among themselves, perhaps a product of their many years as 
comrades in revolution, living in caves and dodging United 
States bombs. They may also have earned an enduring respect 
from party stalwarts who followed them during twenty-five years 
of revolution. Whether the government will encounter political 
opposition from a broader segment of Laotian society as it 
moves to a more market-oriented economy and increasingly 
opens its doors to Western influence remains to be seen. 

Mass Media 

Information and communication have been tightly con- 
trolled in Laos since the days of French colonialism. During 



236 



Main entrance of the Royal Palace, Louangphrabang with an honor guard 
at rest in front of the doors in 1975. The palace is now a national museum. 

Courtesy Ernest Kuhn 



237 



Laos: A Country Study 



the years of revolutionary struggle against the RLG, the LPRP 
relied heavily upon radio broadcasts in the Lao and Hmong 
languages. Starting in 1960, with technical assistance from 
North Vietnam, these radio broadcasts, lasting four hours a 
day, reached a largely illiterate and mountain-dwelling audi- 
ence. Press operations, oriented to the towns of the Mekong 
Valley, were conducted secretly, if at all, by the clandestine 
Pathet Lao. Radio broadcasters never mentioned the official 
name of the party until a few months before the seizure of 
power in December 1975. 

Given such a heritage of party control, it is not surprising 
that the postrevolutionary operation of the mass media is a 
tightly controlled party monopoly without private participa- 
tion. The joint party-government organization of the media is 
reflected in the Ministry of Information and Culture and the 
State Board of News Agency, Newspaper, Radio, and Television. 
The party maintains the more narrowly focused Propaganda 
and Training Committee, whose chairman is also the head of 
the state board. The overall goal of the press is stated as making 
the mass media into a link among the party, the state, and the 
masses. 

In mid-1994 the official media consisted of the party-spon- 
sored daily newspaper, Xieng Pasason (The Voice of the Peo- 
ple), in Lao language only. Khaosan Pathet Lao (Lao News 
Agency), a news service of the Committee of Information, 
Press, Radio and Television Broadcasting, distributes daily bul- 
letins in Lao, English, and French. The National Radio of Laos, 
the state-owned radio service, has a national network and seven 
regional stations that broadcast in Lao and tribal languages. 
The four government-owned Laotian television stations broad- 
cast daily for a few hours each. Regional stations broadcast in 
Lao and in tribal languages. 

Other media are specialized for particular audiences. For 
example, the daily Vientiane Mai (Vientiane News), covers local 
matters of significance to the party. The journal Sangkhom 
Thoulakit (Society and Business), in Lao, targets readers inter- 
ested in Vientiane business and society. A theoretical quarterly, 
Aloun Mai (New Dawn), established in 1985, appears with some 
regularity to disseminate major speeches by party leaders, 
among other official pronouncements. An arts and letters 
monthly, Vannasin, is surviving, but the print output of various 
mass organizations such as the People's Revolutionary Youth 



238 



Government and Politics 



Union's Noum Lao (Lao Youth), a fortnightly journal, or those 
of the Federation of Women Unions is only intermittent. Lao 
Dong (Labor) is the fortnightly journal of the Federation of 
Trade Unions. 

Laotian media output is sporadic and relatively insignificant 
compared with the impressions made by Thai television, radio, 
and commercials, and the daily newspapers carried into Vien- 
tiane by international travelers. Given the proximity of Thai 
radio and television, Thailand both remains an open window 
to a different economic system and provides a perspective on 
the news. Further, outside information and culture have 
proven to be too pervasive to be worth eradicating by surveil- 
lance or jamming. 

So far as publishing is concerned, the Ministry of Informa- 
tion and Culture held a seminar in 1992, which reviewed its 
activities over the previous sixteen years and worked out a "plan 
of action" for the coming period that included "provisional reg- 
ulations on publication, printing, and distribution in the Lao 
PDR." Reinforcement of this type of intellectual planning is 
achieved through periodic conferences with delegations from 
the official news agencies of Vietnam and Cambodia, and 
through visits to China. A delegation of Thai writers was also 
entertained. 

Foreign Policy 

More than most countries, Laos suffers the constraints of 
physical location in shaping its foreign policy. Historically, the 
landlocked Laotian kingdom of Lan Xang, situated along the 
middle stretch of the Mekong River, had to contend with the 
predatory kingdoms of Burma to the north, Vietnam to the 
east, and Siam (present-day Thailand) to the west. After these 
kingdoms' seventeenth-century period of ascendancy, the low- 
land Lao kingdom broke up into the principality of Louang- 
phrabang (Luang Prabang), which survived by offering tribute 
to both east and west, and Vientiane and Champasak (Bassac), 
which were reduced by the end of the eighteenth century to 
tributaries of Siam. Vietnam then asserted suzerainty over 
Xiangkhoang and Khammouan to the west (see Early History, 
ch. 1). Thus, the foreign relations of the Laotians reflected 
their geography — landlocked and narrowly confined by valleys 
and mountains that supported a limited, overwhelmingly agri- 
cultural population exposed to more numerous and produc- 



239 



Laos: A Country Study 



tive neighbors. In addition, the lack of national cohesion 
among various tribal groups subsisting in the mountains dimin- 
ished the thrust of Laotian statehood. 

Starting in 1893, Laotian kingdoms were subjected to the 
"protection" of France, which reasserted Vietnamese claims 
against Siam to all Laotian territories east of the Mekong River 
and in Xaignabouri and Champasak. This period of subordina- 
tion was followed by the intervention of the United States and 
Thailand after 1954, succeeded by the Vietnamese communists 
after 1975. More recently, since 1989, foreign policy has veered 
back toward more independence, in relinquishing both Marx- 
ist-Leninist ideology and the special influence of Vietnam. 

The geographical and demographic confines of Laos have 
not been the only constraints on its foreign policy. Given the 
weakness of the state, the international environment has 
largely determined both the opportunities and the limits of 
national strategy. The most obvious recent example is the eco- 
nomic collapse and political breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the consequent retrenchment of its economic assistance 
throughout Indochina. This series of events helped cause Viet- 
nam's withdrawal of its troops from Cambodia and Laos by 
1990, which encouraged Thailand to reenter Indochina as a 
field for business. In turn, Vietnam sought to normalize rela- 
tions with China, which also withdrew its military support from 
Cambodia. 

These policy shifts redefined the conceivable strategies for a 
government concerned with economic development and polit- 
ical leeway. The shibboleths of Marxism-Leninism and state- 
organized agriculture and industry were no longer appropri- 
ate. In need of economic advice and investment, Laos looked 
beyond Vietnam and the Soviet bloc to the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP — see Glossary) and other 
international organizations and to aid from a few Western 
nations and Japan. Besides increasing dramatically the pres- 
ence of Thai traders and investors, Laos responded positively 
to suggestions from the International Monetary Fund (IMF — 
see Glossary) and advice from various United Nations (UN) 
agencies (see Foreign Aid, ch. 3). At the same time, it began to 
establish a legal foundation for the protection of business risk- 
takers. Thus, the road to "national uplift" no longer stretched 
through the alien fields of Soviet/Vietnamese collectivism; 
people in Mekong Valley towns could see more products in 



240 



Government and Politics 



their markets, and peasants began to believe that communal 
agriculture was a government imposition not likely to return. 

Despite the security gained during the French protectorate, 
Laos lost ground economically because of its slowness in 
absorbing European technology and in developing trade 
beyond its borders. By and large, it failed to tap the mineral 
resources beneath its mountains, except for tin, which was 
mined by the French, and to investigate its oil potential. It did 
next to nothing to build an infrastructure for international 
trade. Even if a railroad system and reliable roads had been 
built, Laos still would have confronted potential controls over 
its access to the sea from Thailand or Vietnam. The hydroelec- 
tric capacity of the country has, however, provided a major 
export that Thailand cannot afford to do without (see Indus- 
trial Output and Employment, ch. 3). 

Because the rugged Annamite Mountains separate the 
Mekong Valley from Vietnamese population centers to the east, 
physical communication with the Thai nation to the west has 
always been easier than communication with Vietnam, even 
before the Friendship Bridge across the river was completed in 
April 1994. Thus, the threat of Thai intervention across the 
Mekong River cannot be treated lightly by the LPDR's military 
planners, particularly under dry season conditions. At the same 
time, the ease of Vietnamese infiltration through the Annamite 
Mountains was thoroughly demonstrated during the years of 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which led across southeastern Laos into 
the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). 

Basic Goals 

The basic goals of foreign policy have not differed from one 
regime to another. National security or survival are fundamen- 
tal concerns, and both the RLG and the LPDR have striven to 
preserve a Laotian state, even though their philosophies for 
organizing and serving the people differed fundamentally. In 
the 1990s, ideology shifted away from relentless Marxism- 
Leninism to "state capitalism" and single-party "democracy." 
Such formulations place Laos outside any rigid ideological 
camp and leave the national agenda open to the general prom- 
ise of economic development. Officially, the government has 
dedicated itself to a foreign policy of peace, "independence, 
friendship and non-alignment," with the instrument for achiev- 
ing those conditions being the LPRP. 



241 



Laos: A Country Study 



In the 1940s, the ICP provided the most assertive challenge 
to colonialism. With the ending of French and United States 
dominance over the Laotian peoples, the communist-inspired 
LPRP has wrestled with the next challenge — economic and 
national development. The success of that undertaking and the 
survival of the party that has assumed it remains in the balance 
in the 1990s. The key to success, however, lies in developing 
and maintaining fruitful foreign relations. 

Bureaucratic Complications 

A serious need for skilled technical and economic personnel 
still hinders the government's dealings with international agen- 
cies and businesspeople. Thousands of the most trained and 
enterprising citizens fled the country after 1975. A related 
problem for foreign policy makers is the relative lack of young 
university graduates who are fluent in English and familiar with 
international economics. The several thousand Laotian stu- 
dents sent between 1975 and the late 1980s to the Soviet Union 
and its East European allies for several years of training often 
have returned without tangible or relevant skills. The hundreds 
of training years provided in the Soviet Union did not produce 
a solid base of junior diplomatic officers intellectually prepared 
to move easily among UN economic development agencies or 
in Western state capitals. In the 1990s, education in Western 
states has become essential for advancement. As the horizon 
broadened for Laotian diplomats and businesspersons, elite 
families in Laos sought training in United States or Australian 
universities. Thailand is also willing to pick up some of the 
demand for educational opportunity, and other Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN — -see Glossary) states are also 
a potential source for scholarships. 

Recruitment of a professional foreign service is no easier in 
these circumstances. Moreover, party experience seems to 
count more heavily than sophistication in language and diplo- 
matic training, even in the realm of foreign relations. 

Economic Factors 

The retarded economic diversification and development of 
Laos has constrained its foreign policy opportunities and gen- 
erated its dependency in succession upon France, the United 
States, and the Soviet bloc. Following the economic collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Laos has become heavily dependent upon 



242 



Grand Presidential Palace, Vientiane 
Courtesy Gina Merris 



the advice and contributions of UN agencies and the readiness 
of regional states such as Australia, Japan, and Thailand to 
invest in its economy. Sweden has also made significant eco- 
nomic contributions. 

There has been a dramatic shift away from maintaining basic 
solidarity with a military/political bloc of mentors — first, the 
United States regional security alliance and then the "special 
relations" of Vietnamese-influenced Marxism-Leninism — to 
maximizing donor-recipient relations with UN agencies, state 
donors, and private investors. Although the universe of rela- 
tions has not essentially grown, especially with Russia cutting 
back on its assistance, the expectation of genuine economic 
progress has begun to creep into economic dealings with out- 
siders. By moving resolutely and responding to Thai and Chi- 
nese gestures, Laos has broadened its range of donors, trading 



243 



Laos: A Country Study 

partners, and investors. The presence of Thai traders and 
investors has increased dramatically. 

The degree to which Laos has depended upon outside 
donors and investors, and which ones, has been a function not 
only of need but also of political choice, a dependence that was 
carefully controlled during Kaysone Phomvihan's tutorship. 
Without his pervasive leadership, foreign economic relations 
might have fallen victim to internal rivalries between ministries 
and factions within the party. 

Through legislation enacted by the National Assembly in 
1991 of a basic criminal and investment code and the creation 
of a judiciary, however, Laos opened its doors wider to serious 
investors. In addition, the stabilization of foreign exchange 
rates and inflation signaled major steps toward engaging con- 
structively with countries outside the ideological blocs within 
which it used to confine itself. The new institutions require a 
few years of serious testing, but a Burma-like return to stagna- 
tion seems unlikely, even with Kaysone's departure from the 
helm. The tantalizing images of Thailand's growth and pros- 
perity, conveyed by television along the Mekong border, and 
increasingly easier travel across the river — in both directions — 
make the economic policy of openness seem all but irrevers- 
ible. 

Bilatera! Relations 

Relations urith Vietnam 

Relations with Vietnam had secretly set the strategy for the 
LPRP during the struggle to achieve full power, and the "sud- 
den" opportunity to establish the LPDR in 1975 left no leeway 
to consider foreign policy alignments other than a continua- 
tion of the "special relations" with Vietnam. The relationship 
cultivated in the revolutionary stage predisposed Laos to 
Indochinese solidarity in the reconstruction and "socialist con- 
struction" phases and all but ensured that relations or align- 
ments with China and Thailand would be wary and potentially 
unfriendly. Further, the LPRP, unlike the Cambodian commu- 
nists under Pol Pot, was far too accustomed to accepting Viet- 
namese advice to consider striking out on its own. The final 
seizure of power by the hitherto secret LPRP in 1975 brought 
both a public acknowledgment of the previously hidden North 
Vietnamese guidance of the party and genuine expressions of 
gratitude by the LPRP to its Vietnamese partners. The chal- 



244 



Government and Politics 



lenge facing the ruling group — the construction of a socialist 
society — was seen as a natural extension of past collaboration 
with North Vietnam. The revolution was simply entering a new 
phase in 1975, and the LPRP leaders congratulated themselves 
upon ousting the "imperialists" and looked forward to advice 
and economic as well as military support, which was not avail- 
able from any neighbor or counterrevolutionary state. 

LPRP leaders were accustomed to discussing policies as well 
as studying doctrine in Hanoi. They formalized governmental 
contacts with their mentors at biannual meetings of the foreign 
ministers of Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam starting in 1980 and 
through the joint Vietnam-Laos Cooperative Commission, 
which met annually to review progress of various projects. 
Other levels of cooperation between Laos and Vietnam existed, 
for example, party-to-party meetings and province-to-province 
exchanges, as well as mass organizations for youths and 
women. Meetings of the commission were held regularly. 

The primary channels for Vietnam's influence in Laos, how- 
ever, were the LPRP and the LPA (see Structure and Adminis- 
tration of the Armed Forces, ch. 5). In the LPRP, long-standing 
collaboration and consultation at the very top made special 
committees unnecessary, whereas in the LPA, the Vietnamese 
advisers, instructors, and troops on station constituted a perva- 
sive, inescapable influence, even though they scrupulously 
avoided public exposure by sticking to their designated base 
areas. Cooperation in the military field was probably the most 
extensive, with logistics, training, and communications largely 
supplied by Vietnam throughout the 1970s and 1980s (heavy 
ordnance and aircraft were provided by the Soviet Union). 

The phrase "special relations" came into general use by 
both parties after 1976, and in July 1977, the signing of the 
twenty-five-year Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation legitimized the stationing of Vietnamese army 
troops in Laos for its protecdon against hostile or counterrevo- 
lutionary neighbors. Another element of cooperation involved 
hundreds of Vietnamese advisers who mentored their Laotian 
counterparts in virtually all the ministries in Vientiane. Hun- 
dreds of LPRP stalwarts and technicians studied in institutes of 
Marxism-Leninism or technical schools in Hanoi. 

The resources that Vietnam was able to bestow upon its revo- 
lutionary partner were severely limited by the physical destruc- 
tion of war and the deadening orthodoxy of its economic 



245 



Laos: A Country Study 



structures and policies. It could, however, put in a good word 
for its Laotian apprentices with the Soviet Union, which in turn 
could recommend economic assistance projects to its East 
European satellite states. Yet, Vietnam's influence on Laos was 
determined by economic assistance and ideology as well as by 
geographical and historical proximity. The two nations fit 
together, as the leaders liked to say, "like lips and teeth." Viet- 
nam provided landlocked Laos a route to the sea, and the 
mountainous region of eastern Laos provided Vietnam a for- 
ward strategic position for challenging Thai hegemony in the 
Mekong Valley. 

During the 1980s, Vietnam's regional opponents attributed 
to it a neocolonial ambition to create an "Indochina Federa- 
tion." This phrase can be found in early pronouncements of 
the ICP in its struggle against the French colonial structures in 
Indochina. The charge, exaggerated as it was, lost its currency 
once Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989 and 
subsequently from Laos. Laos's dependence on Vietnam since 
1975 could then be perceived as a natural extension of their 
collaboration and solidarity in revolution rather than as domi- 
nation by Vietnam. 

With the departure of Vietnamese military forces — except 
for some construction engineers — and the passing of most 
senior Vietnamese revolutionary partners, the magnetism of 
the special relationship lost its grip. Further, Vietnam was never 
able to muster large-scale economic aid programs. It launched 
only 200 assistance projects between 1975 and 1985, whereas 
the Soviet Union generated considerably more in the way of 
contributions. In 1992 the long-standing Vietnamese ambassa- 
dor to Laos, a veteran of fourteen years' service, characterized 
the relationship as composed "d'amitie et de cooperation mul- 
tiforme entre les pays" (of friendship and diverse cooperation 
between the two countries). This pronouncement was far less 
compelling than the "objective law of existence and develop- 
ment" formulation sometimes expressed in the past. 

Although Vietnam's historical record of leadership in the 
revolution and its military power and proximity will not cease 
to exist, Laos struck out ahead of Vietnam with its New Eco- 
nomic Mechanism to introduce market mechanisms into its 
economy. In so doing, Laos has opened the door to rapproche- 
ment with Thailand and China at some expense to its special 
dependence on Vietnam. Laos might have reached the same 



246 



One of the royal elephants in 
a New Year's parade in 
Louangphrabang in 1975, 
ridden by its Lao Theung 
handler 
Courtesy Ernest Kuhn 




point of normalization in following Vietnam's economic and 
diplomatic change, but by moving ahead resolutely and 
responding to Thai and Chinese gestures, Laos has broadened 
its range of donors, trading partners, and investors indepen- 
dent of Vietnam's attempts to accomplish the same goal. Thus, 
Vietnam remains in the shadows as a mentor and emergency 
ally, and the tutelage of Laos has shifted dramatically to devel- 
opment banks and international entrepreneurs. 

Relations with Thailand 

In some respects, Thailand can be seen as a greater threat to 
the country's independence than Vietnam because of its closer 
cultural affinity (Theravada Buddhism — see Glossary), its eas- 
ier access, and its control over the railroad and highway routes 
to the sea. The Mekong River, which both sides have an interest 
in making a "river of true peace and friendship" — as their 
respective prime ministers called for in 1976 — also provides a 
north-south artery during the rainy season. 

Relations with Thailand have been uneven. An alarming 
patrol boat shooting incident occurred in 1980, but this brief 
encounter was overshadowed by the border disputes and mili- 
tary clashes of 1984 and 1987 in Xaignabouri Province west of 
the Mekong. These conflicts originated in rival claims to forest 



247 



Laos: A Country Study 



resources based on maps from the early days of the French pro- 
tectorate. 

The determination in 1988 of Thai prime minister Chatichai 
Choonhaven to open up the Indochina market abruptly 
turned a deadly conflict into a wave of goodwill gestures and 
business ventures. Kaysone paid an official visit to Bangkok in 
1989, his first since the brief 1979 rapprochement with Prime 
Minister General Kriangsak Chomanand. These gestures were 
followed by official visits by Princess Maha Chakkri in March 
1990 and Crown Prince Maha Wachirolongkon in June 1992. 
An irony of this process of reacquaintance was the dropping 
from the Politburo in 1992 of Army Chief of Staff General Sisa- 
vat Keobounphan, who had dealt closely and effectively with 
the Thai military command in restoring neighborly relations, 
but who apparently was considered by his party colleagues to 
have indulged in personal gains. Indeed, this corruption of a 
senior party leader symbolizes the fear among some Laotian 
leaders that Thailand, with its materialism and business 
strength and greed, "wants to eat us." 

Two political issues slowed rapprochement during the 1980s: 
first, the continuing issue of Laotian migrants and refugees 
remaining in temporary camps — whom Thailand had no 
desire to accept as immigrants — and second, Laotian and 
Hmong resistance groups who used the camps as a base. The 
Hmong constituted half of the camp dwellers and were 
expected to avoid repatriation the longest, out of fear of 
reprisal and hope for national autonomy. Thailand announced 
in July 1992, however, that Laotian refugees who have not 
returned home or found third-country resettlement by 1995 
will be classified as illegal immigrants and face deportation. 

In the first few years of rapprochement, Thai businessper- 
sons have not threatened to buy up long-term economic oppor- 
tunities in Laos because they seem to seek shorter-term 
commercial ventures. Yet the possibility of heavy interdepen- 
dence generated by Thai investors remains. A Thai business 
presence in Laos will probably depend on the continuing dem- 
onstration of Laos's independence from Vietnam. 

The persistence of a resistance movement since 1975 is 
attributable to permissive policies on the part of Thailand on 
behalf of their former Laotian cohorts. With the demise of the 
Cold War, the motivation to harass the LPDR and its Vietnam- 
ese military partners has dwindled. The Ministry of Foreign 



248 



Government and Politics 



Affairs will continue to press the Thai military command to live 
up to its March 1991 agreement to disarm rebels and discour- 
age Laotian sabotage operations. At the same time, Thailand 
has made clear its unwillingness to assimilate Hmong refugees. 

The threat of a return of Vietnamese troops remains as a 
cautionary note to the Thai military, who prefer to keep Laos 
as a buffer rather than a military line of contact with the Viet- 
namese. The Friendship Bridge should open the interior to 
more foreign trucking and commerce and more openly reveal 
any foreign military presence in Laos. 

The exodus of tens of thousands of middle-class lowland Lao 
and mountain dwelling Hmong across the Mekong into Thai- 
land created a tense border that Thailand preferred to close 
off to commerce of any kind. Future Laotian-Thai relations, 
however, have a visible path toward mutually beneficial trade 
and investment, which need not be obscured by refugees or 
economic migrants, by one-sided economic dealings of an 
exploitative kind, or by inflamed border disputes. An improved 
trade relationship has been achieved in spite of past feelings of 
superiority or victimization, and growing interdependence may 
make the path easier to follow. 

Relations with China 

Relations with China have traditionally consisted of trade 
and aid, largely in road construction in the northern provinces 
of Laos, without directly challenging the interests of Thailand 
or Vietnam in the central and southern regions. However, Viet- 
nam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 to unseat then 
prime minister Pol Pot, which provoked China into a limited 
invasion of Vietnam — approximately nineteen kilometers 
deep — to "teach Vietnam a lesson," put Laos in a dangerous 
bind. It did not want to further provoke China, but it was not 
able to oppose its special partner, Vietnam. The Laotian leader- 
ship survived the dilemma by making slightly delayed pro- 
nouncements in support of Vietnam after some intraparty 
debate and by sharply reducing diplomatic relations with 
China to the charge d'affaires level — without a full break. The 
low point in Sino-Laotian relations came in 1979, with reports 
of Chinese assistance and training of Hmong resistance forces 
under General Vang Pao in China's Yunnan Province (see 
Internal Threats and Resistance Movements, ch. 5). 



249 



Laos: A Country Study 



This hostile relationship gradually softened, however, and in 
1989 Prime Minister Kaysone paid a state visit to Beijing. In 
1991 Kaysone chose to spend his vacation in China rather than 
make his customary visit to the Soviet Union. Diplomatic and 
party-to-party relations were normalized in 1989. Trade 
expanded from the local sale of consumer goods to the grant- 
ing of eleven investment licenses in 1991 — including an auto- 
motive assembly plant. Following the establishment of the 
Laotian-Chinese Joint Border Committee in 1991, meetings 
held during 1992 resulted in an agreement delineating their 
common border. China's commercial investments and trade 
with Laos expanded quietly, but not dramatically, in 1993 and 
early 1994. 

Unlike its other neighbors, China has not historically domi- 
nated the Laotians. In the final analysis, China represents the 
most powerful remaining communist state to which Laos might 
turn for support against Thai or Vietnamese hegemony. 

Relations zirith the Soviet Union 

The Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc involvement with Laos 
originated as a secondary element in the East-West contest over 
the communist-led revolution in Vietnam and in the Sino- 
Soviet rivalry that this contest exacerbated. Even though the 
Laos subtheater was formally neutralized by the Geneva Agree- 
ment of 1962, the superpower involvement in Laos continued 
in the form of military supplies, advice, and diplomatic and 
propaganda support to the opposing sides up to the end of the 
war. The succeeding period of coalition government in Vien- 
tiane lasted fewer than two years and left the Soviets not only 
enjoying the prestige of supporting the winning party — the 
Marxist-Leninist LPRP, which by then had publicly revealed 
itself — but also holding the bag of vast economic development 
needs in a nation losing its most skilled persons across the bor- 
der to the West. The Soviet Union had helped its friends pre- 
vail over the opponents of the revolution, but the Marxist- 
Leninist model for building up an overwhelmingly agricultural 
nation was not effective with the complaisant Lao peasantry. 

Since 1989, aid from the Soviet Union and its successor 
states — which once accounted for more than half the aid to 
Laos and approximately 1,500 technicians and advisers — has 
slowly dwindled. The memorial to Soviet efforts in Laos lies in 
dozens of projects such as bridges, roads, airports, hospitals, 
and broadcast facilities; in tons of military equipment, includ- 



250 



Boats on the Mekong River, Louangphrabang 
Courtesy Gina Merris 

ing MiG jet fighters and air transports; and in the hundreds of 
students with a faltering command of the Russian language, 
some of whom are trained for such jobs as railroad operator or 
circus clown, for which Laos has no market. 

The Laotian leadership has resolutely sought to take up the 
slack among its previous bilateral and multilateral donors. By 
1990 bilateral external assistance disbursed by Russia was down 
to 36 percent of the total, from a previous 60 percent; Hun- 
gary, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Mon- 
golia, and Vietnam contributed a mere 3.7 percent. The 
number of student fellowships to the Soviet Union — usually 
300 per year — decreased dramatically. The downward spiral 
continued as the Russians shifted their dwindling influence in 
the region to cooperation with the five permanent members of 
the UN in settling the war in Cambodia. And, in a further move 
away from dependence, the coming generation of national 
leaders was eager to obtain useful education in the West for 
their children, even if they could still get by with Vietnamese 
and French. 

Relations with the United States 

Relations with the United States suffered some of the same 



251 



Laos: A Country Study 



cutbacks as those experienced by Vietnam and Cambodia after 
the United States withdrawal from Indochina in 1973, but 
there were important differences. After 1975 Laos provided the 
United States the only official window to its former enemy 
states in Indochina. The United States was also willing to treat 
all departing Laotians as political refugees entitled to asylum, 
with hopes that third countries might eventually accept them 
for resettlement. And, in spite of the full economic and diplo- 
matic embargo imposed by the United States on Vietnam and 
Cambodia in 1975, United States diplomatic relations with 
Laos facilitated such occasional humanitarian aid projects as 
food and prosthetics. In this manner, the door to full diplo- 
matic relations was kept ajar. 

Diplomatic relations with the United States were never bro- 
ken, even though the United States Agency for International 
Development (AID) and the United States Information Agency 
(USIA) both withdrew, under harassment, and diplomatic rep- 
resentation in Vientiane and in Washington was reduced to the 
level of charge d'affaires, with a limit of twelve persons and no 
military attaches. Relations eventually were reciprocally 
restored to the ambassadorial level in the summer of 1992. 

A tentative agreement to allow United States Peace Corps 
personnel in Laos fell through in the spring of 1992. The 
admission of Peace Corps workers was initially approved but 
then rejected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Apparently 
some party leaders feared that the volunteers might have a sub- 
versive impact on the Laotians, especially if deployed outside 
Vientiane. As of 1993, a country agreement was on the table, 
and the Peace Corps remained interested in sending volun- 
teers but was waiting for Laos to initiate a program. 

Other United States agencies run small programs in Laos. In 
1992 AID made a US$1.3 million grant for a prosthetics 
project. Because AID does not have an office in Laos, the pro- 
gram is administered from AID's office in Bangkok. The 
United States Information Service, the overseas branch office 
of the USIA, reopened a one-officer post in Vientiane in Octo- 
ber 1992. The post concentrates on supporting English-lan- 
guage teaching activities and publications, press activities, and 
cultural and educational exchanges. Two Laotian Fulbright 
grantees were in the United States in 1993. 

Since the establishment of the LPDR, Laos and the United 
States have cooperated in varying degrees on two major issues 



252 



Government and Politics 



of high priority to the United States. One is the search for 
information on the more than 500 United States servicemen 
listed as missing in action (MIA) in Laos (see The Origins of 
the Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Question, ch. 1; Rela- 
tions with the United States, ch. 5). This problem has proved to 
be a surprisingly durable issue, which delayed an otherwise 
uncomplicated and mutually beneficial rapprochement 
between the two countries. Starting in 1985, Laos treated the 
MIA issue seriously enough to undertake joint searches of 
known wartime crash sites of United States aircraft. However, 
the United States Senate Select Committee on Prisoner of 
War/MIA Affairs concluded in January 1993 that "The current 
leaders of Laos, who are the successors to the Pathet Lao forces 
that contended for power during the war, almost certainly have 
some information concerning missing Americans that they 
have not yet shared." Further cooperation has brightened the 
atmosphere of Laos-United States relations, even though a full 
accounting of United States military personnel lost in the Laos 
theater of war can probably never be achieved. 

The second long-standing issue is the production and export 
of opium. In April 1993, Laos received a national interest certi- 
fication on the issue of cooperation in counternarcotics activi- 
ties. Opium traffic out of Laos is a tangible irritant to relations, 
however, particularly because of the suspicion that high-rank- 
ing Laotian officials, especially those in the military, are 
involved in protecting the trade. The United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration worked with the LPDR to main- 
tain Laos's eligibility — despite its opium trade — as a potential 
United States aid recipient. In 1990 an economic aid project 
worth US$8.7 million was provided to help the hill tribes that 
grow poppies turn to substitute crops. Thus, the legal barriers 
to expanding Laos-United States consultation and commerce 
were essentially removed. Yet most-favored-nation treatment 
for imports such as coffee from Laos might conceivably have to 
await the full release of the last of the political prisoners held in 
the mountainous eastern provinces since 1975. 

An irritant in Laos-United States relations was the United 
States charge in 1981 that Laos had engaged in aerial spraying 
with deadly toxins — yellow rain — against Hmong villages. The 
United States government adopted the position that chemical 
weapons were used in Laos in the late 1970s through 1983. 
Such reports lost credibility after 1984, however, when the 



253 



Laos: A Country Study 

United States stationed scientific personnel in Bangkok to test 
any incoming evidence, which never appeared. 

Capitalist Donor States 

Laotian leaders have increased their visibility among capital- 
ist nations. A small coterie of dedicated government officials, 
including President Kaysone, has taken advantage of a sympa- 
thetic attitude toward Laos within the key international govern- 
mental organizations. Similarly, the UN, Australia, and Japan 
saw an opportunity in the opening of Laos. The Australian- 
funded Friendship Bridge over the Mekong River at Nong 
Khai, Thailand, and the generation of 280 foreign investment 
ventures from twenty-four countries during 1988-92 testify to 
creative communication in proper channels. Germany and 
France each supplied approximately US$6 million of aid in 
1990. 

Australia, Japan, and Sweden have established significant 
economic aid relationships with Laos. In 1992 the Laos Round- 
table for bilateral aid and pledges recorded approximately 
US$134.62 million for eight bilateral projects led by Australia, 
Japan, and Sweden. France has also begun to increase its aid to 
Laos, beginning with projects worth approximately 
US$900,000 in 1989 and increasing to approximately US$5.2 
million in 1993. 

Australia has established itself as a special friend, even 
though not in a "special relationship" with Laos. The Friend- 
ship Bridge, authorized in October 1991 and opened in April 
1994, is expected to stimulate trade and stable relations 
between Laos and its neighbors. Australia has sustained a gen- 
erosity toward Laos that put it in first place among aid-pledging 
nations in March 1992, even though Australian political inter- 
ests in the nation are far from vital. In addition to its pledge of 
US$45 million in aid in 1992, Australia is hosting more than 
100 Laotian university students. 

Japan is also responding to the economic needs of Laos, pro- 
viding almost 12 percent of disbursed bilateral aid in 1990. In 
1992 Japan made the third largest pledge of bilateral economic 
assistance at an aid-pledging conference of the UNDP in 
Geneva. Among the projects Japanese assistance has provided 
are buses and a bus terminal in Vientiane and health and food 
production projects. The somewhat modest Japanese invest- 
ments in Laos were likely raised by Kaysone and Nouhak dur- 



254 



Man transporting bamboo; posters, removed around 1990, proclaim the 
New Economic Mechanism and urge a stop to United States bombing. 

Courtesy Gina Merris 

ing their historic state visits to Japan in November 1989 and 
January 1992, respectively. Kaysone's trip to Tokyo was his first 
to an industrialized capitalist state, and it preceded by a month 
a similar visit to France. 

Multilateral Donors 

The international governmental organizations active in Laos 
constitute a distinguished list, and, in a sense, Laos has become 
one of their star pupils. The World Bank (see Glossary), IMF, 
UNDP, and Asian Development Bank (see Glossary) work 
closely with the small coterie of economic planners within Laos 
and can point to notable economic progress in the 1990s as a 
result of the application of their advice. The national currency, 
the kip, has remained stable at its official rate since 1990, for- 
eign reserves have grown, and inflation has fallen dramatically. 
The party leadership undertook tough measures such as reduc- 
ing government employment, encouraging privatization, and 
ending special subsidies, in line with advice from international 
advisers. The resident IMF representative received private tele- 
phone calls from the president in search of economic counsel. 
In the early 1990s, an unusual level of satisfaction with the Lao- 
tian leadership's willingness to receive economic advice from 



255 



Laos: A Country Study 



experts could be found among international governmental 
organizations' personnel in Laos. 

In 1990 the UNDP coordinated approximately US$12.3 mil- 
lion in economic assistance from various UN financial and 
development agencies, and thirteen international governmen- 
tal organizations disbursed approximately US$4.1 million (see 
Foreign Aid, ch. 3). The most active among these were the 
UNHCR, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF— see 
Glossary), the UN Drug Control Program, and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization. In March 1992, the Laos Roundtable 
for bilateral aid and pledges recorded approximately US$472 
million in project aid from international governmental organi- 
zations. In 1992 and 1993, the Asian Development Bank was 
funding such projects as road construction, hydropower, and 
water supply. 

Nongovernmental organizations have tried to make an 
impact on Laos, particularly in the lives of villagers outside the 
privileged Mekong Valley towns adjacent to prospering Thai- 
land. Twenty-two such organizations disbursed approximately 
US$3,259 million in 1990, with the American Friends Service 
Committee (Quakers) and the Mennonite Central Committee 
(Mennonites) contributing approximately 15 percent and 10 
percent of the total, respectively, and concentrating on health 
and agricultural programs. From 1990 to 1993, the American 
Friends Service Committee budgeted slightly more than 
US$2.3 million for programs in Laos. These included small- 
scale irrigation and rice-based integrated farming system 
projects, women's development and veterinary vaccination pro- 
grams, and emergency relief projects that include assisting 
internally-displaced communities. The Mennonite Central 
Committee contributed approximately US$1.2 million during 
the 1990-93 period for programs in agriculture and integrated 
development, emergency assistance, education, health, and 
social services, economic and technical assistance, and "mate- 
rial resources in kind." 

Constraints on foreign policy nonetheless remain in the 
ideological commitment, pronounced since 1975, to the social- 
ist road to social welfare, mapped out exclusively by the party. 
This theoretical baggage, however, has not precluded generous 
foreign aid from Australia, Japan, and Sweden, or Laos's atten- 
dance at conferences of the Nonaligned Movement (see Glos- 
sary). The country's obtaining of observer status in ASEAN in 



256 



Government and Politics 



1992 also was constructive and points toward possible member- 
ship in that organization before the end of the century. But the 
punitive seminar camps and the unrecorded death of the 
sequestered former King Savang Vatthana have left a negative 
impression on democratic nations that Laos cannot afford to 
disregard or exacerbate as it seeks investors and donors among 
the capitalist states. 

In the early 1990s, the possibility that a domineering neigh- 
bor might arise from the competing rivalries of the regional 
states seemed unlikely, and Laos's policy of encouraging the 
economic engagement of many states in its economy appeared 
to suit the circumstances. That Thailand, Vietnam, or China 
would consider aligning with Laos, thereby creating tension 
with their neighbors, also seemed unlikely. It was easier to fore- 
see the gradual assimilation of Laos into ASEAN and the 
regional states continuing to compete for Laos's dormant and 
modest market. 

* * * 

Few books dealing exclusively with contemporary Laos have 
been published since the establishment of the LPDR in 1975. 
Among those with political analyses are MacAlister Brown and 
Joseph J. Zasloffs Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Communist 
Movement in Laos, 1930-1985, which includes examinations of 
the LPDR's leadership and ruling party, political institutions 
and policies, economic policies and political doctrine, social 
politics, and external relations. A more recent volume is Laos: 
Beyond the Revolution, edited by Zasloff and Leonard Unger, 
which contains essays on politics, economics, society, external 
relations, and United States policy toward Laos. Two books 
written or edited by the Australian scholar Martin Stuart-Fox 
are also useful: Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Soci- 
ety of the Lao People's Democratic Republic has essays on various 
subjects by international experts, and Laos: Politics, Economics 
and Society provides a succinct, insightful account of the social, 
political, and economic systems of the country and its domestic 
and foreign policies. 

For the reader who wishes information in English about pol- 
itics in Laos since 1975, the following periodicals with occa- 
sional articles on Laos are helpful: Asian Survey, Current History, 
Southeast Asian Affairs, and Indochina Issues. The best journalis- 
tic coverage of Laos is found in the weekly Far Eastern Economic 
Review, and its annual Asia Yearbook. The United States govern- 



257 



Laos: A Country Study 



ment provides two valuable sources of translations from the 
Lao media: the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's Daily 
Report: East Asia, and the Joint Publications Research Service's 
Report: East Asia/ Southeast Asia. Summaries of important items 
on Laos appearing in these two publications are found in the 
quarterly Indochina Chronology. (For further information and 
complete citations, see Bibliography.) 



258 



Chapter 5. National Security 




The Anousavari, on Lan Xang Avenue in Vientiane, built to commemorate 
those who died in the prerevolutionary wars, was begun in the early 1 960s and 
completed in 1 969. 



LAOS HAS HISTORICALLY FACED a number of unique prob- 
lems in national defense and internal security, stemming from 
its central position in mainland Southeast Asia and its histori- 
cally stronger neighbors. This continued to be true after the 
Phak Pasason Pativat Lao (Lao People's Revolutionary Party — 
LPRP; see Glossary) came to power and proclaimed the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic (LPDR, or Laos) in December 
1975. By mid-1994, however, Laos had succeeded in stabilizing 
its relations with its neighbors, so it faced no immediate foreign 
threat and only a small continuing internal threat. 

Laos is geopolitically vulnerable, a landlocked nation sur- 
rounded by more powerful neighbors. Its closest foreign ally 
has been Vietnam, with whom it signed a twenty-five-year 
mutual security treaty in July 1977. Laos is also on close terms 
with China, whose long-term interest in Laos is to limit Viet- 
nam's ambitions in Southeast Asia while sharing with Hanoi 
and Vientiane (Viangchan) a common aim in maintaining 
Marxist-Leninist single-party regimes in power. In view of the 
strong presence of senior military officers in the top ranks of 
the party and government, it is not surprising that the country 
maintains close ties with the military-controlled State Law and 
Order Restoration Council in Burma. Relations are also close 
with the royal government of war-torn Cambodia. With Thai- 
land, relations have changed over the years. Prior to 1975, 
Thailand saw Laos as a buffer against an expansionist Vietnam, 
but by 1994 Thailand looked upon Laos as the likeliest place 
for commercial expansion of its own. The country shares with 
Burma and Thailand possession of the Golden Triangle, the 
area where a significant portion of the world's heroin traffic 
originates. 

Laos is also vulnerable because its small population — esti- 
mated at approximately 4.7 million people as of July 1994 — 
limits its ability to deter foreign intervention in the event of a 
crisis. Furthermore, the significant population of ethnic minor- 
ities — about 50 percent of the total — is always a potential factor 
for instability. In 1994 ethnic minorities continued to suffer dis- 
crimination in terms of their representation in the country's 
institutions and their access to government services, although 
to what extent this discrimination feeds political and cultural 



261 



Laos: A Country Study 



tension vis-a-vis the government in Vientiane is speculative. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that although 1.5 mil- 
lion ethnic Lao reside in Laos, ten times that number live in 
northeastern Thailand. Similarly, Hmong (see Glossary) and 
Mien (Yao) tribes live in southern China, and Hmong and 
many tribal mountain Tai reside in northwestern Vietnam. 

Other factors contribute to the vulnerability of Laos. The 
underdeveloped state of the economy and the lack of adequate 
means of transportation and communication encourage 
regionalism, which facilitates insurgent movements against the 
government. Additionally, the mountains and jungles of Laos 
provide an ideal environment for guerrilla warfare because the 
terrain and lack of infrastructure inhibit the concentration of 
military forces to counter guerrilla action. Such forces, more- 
over, expose themselves to ambush in narrow mountain defiles 
if guerrillas control the surrounding high ground. There are 
few places in Laos where a conventional army does not risk a 
siege such as that of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. If the insurgents 
have bases outside permeable borders, they are virtually secure 
from pursuit and are able to mount raids with impunity. 

The Armed Forces 

The Lao People's Army (LPA — see Glossary), the armed 
forces of the country, is the product of the successful transition 
from a guerrilla army in the 1950s and 1960s to a conventional 
military organization with three branches of service (ground, 
air, and water). The term "liberation" was dropped from the 
nomenclature of the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA — 
see Glossary) after the army was restructured in 1976. 

Historical Background 

Historically, Laos was subject to the will of its stronger neigh- 
bors, enforced by military means. By force of circumstances in 
warding off repeated foreign invasions, Laotians developed 
battle skills using elephants and compiled a history full of war- 
like deeds. Lan Xang, or the Kingdom of the Million Ele- 
phants, the first state in the recorded history of Laos, 
maintained a standing army of 150,000 men (see The Found- 
ing of Lan Xang, ch. 1). Regiments included cavalry, infantry, 
and an elephant corps. Prince Fa Ngum, Lan Xang's founder, 
redeveloped the old Mongol model of an army composed of 
units of 10,000, which gave rise to the name of the successive 



262 



National Security 



reign, Sam Sen Thai, or 10,000 Thai. The army's strength 
enabled Fa Ngum to expand Lan Xang's borders to the western 
escarpment of the Khorat Plateau, the crest of the Annamite 
Chain in the east, and the northern edge of Khmer and Cham 
civilizations in the south. To the north and east especially, how- 
ever, mountain tribes resisted absorption and maintained a 
degree of independence. 

Following Fa Ngum's death, struggles with Siamese and Bur- 
mese states in which his successors became embroiled sapped 
the strength of the army and led to the decline and eventual 
splitting up of Lan Xang. In 1778 the capital of the Vientiane 
kingdom was attacked and destroyed for the first time by a 
Siamese army. By the 1820s, Laos had reestablished sovereignty 
over its own borders, enough so that the king of Vientiane 
launched a disastrous military expedition against Siam 
(present-day Thailand). Laotian forces were overwhelmed by 
the superior firepower and strategy of the Siamese army, which 
attacked and destroyed Vientiane for a second time in 1828. 

The Colonial Era 

Following the destruction of Vientiane, Laotian affairs were 
dominated militarily by Siam, although the Vietnamese also 
involved themselves over the mountains (see Developments in 
the Nineteenth Century, ch. 1). It was not until 1884, when 
France guaranteed Annam the integrity of its territorial 
domain, that Siamese hegemony over the left bank of the 
Mekong encountered a new challenge. Using Annam's claims 
to Laotian territories as a diplomatic pretext, France forced 
Siam to renounce all claims to territory east of the Mekong and 
even to islands in the river by successive treaties between 1893 
and 1907. 

To preserve order in the new administrative structure and to 
reinforce their security forces, which up to the twentieth cen- 
tury consisted largely of Vietnamese militia, the French formed 
local Laotian police and military constabulary units and pro- 
vided them with some modern weapons, equipment, and rudi- 
mentary training. The Laotian units, whose salaries were paid 
for by the royal house of Louangphrabang (Luang Prabang), 
pledged allegiance to the monarchy, establishing a military tra- 
dition that ended only in 1975. 

Between 1901 and 1907, France's colonial forces in Laos 
directed their attention to putting down a group of southern 



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Laos: A Country Study 



mountain Mon-Khmer rebels who had become angered over 
France's suppressing their customary slave-trading activities. 
Bandits from China's Yunnan Province also kept the colonial 
army occupied in the north between 1914 and 1916. The 
army's final major action — from 1919 to 1921 — was led by Pa 
Chai against the Hmong, who were conducting raids on the 
Lao and other groups in Houaphan and Xiangkhoang prov- 
inces with the aim of expelling the French and establishing an 
independent Hmong kingdom. 

The first entirely Laotian military unit was formed by the 
French in 1941 and was known as the First Battalion of Chas- 
seurs Laotiens (light infantry). It was used for internal security 
and did not see action until after the Japanese coup de force of 
March 9, 1945, when Japan occupied Laos. The unit then went 
into the mountains, supplied and commanded by Free French 
agents who had received special jungle training in camps in 
India and who had parachuted into Laos beginning in Decem- 
ber 1944 with the aim of creating a resistance network. 

Meanwhile, taking advantage of the temporary absence of 
French authority in the towns, the Lao Issara (Free Laos — see 
Glossary) government armed itself to defend the Laotian inde- 
pendence it claimed on behalf of the people (see World War II 
and After, ch. 1). For the most part, effective components of 
the Lao Issara armed forces consisted of Vietnamese residents 
of the towns of Laos, who either had received weapons given 
them by the surrendering Japanese troops — sold by the Chi- 
nese Nationalist soldiers who occupied northern Laos under 
the 1945 Potsdam Conference agreements — or looted from 
French arsenals. In the Battle of Thakhek (Khammouan) in 
March 1946, which decided the issue of sovereignty in Laos in 
favor of the French, the Lao Issara used mortars and light 
machine guns against French armored vehicles and planes. 
One of the main preoccupations of the members of the Lao 
Issara government exiled in Bangkok between 1946 and 1949 
was to procure weapons to fight back against the French. 

French efforts to train and expand the Royal Lao Army con- 
tinued during the First Indochina War (1946-54), by which 
time Laos had a standing army of 15,000 troops (see The Com- 
ing of Independence, ch. 1). The French knew the lightly 
equipped Royal Lao Army was not in a position to defend Laos 
against Viet Minh (see Glossary) regular forces formed by 
General Vo Nguyen Giap. To counter Viet Minh invasions of 



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National Security 



Laos in 1953 and 1954, the French Union High Command 
diverted regular colonial units from the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam (North Vietnam) into Laos; Giap exploited this 
weakness to disperse French Union forces. The French origi- 
nally picked Dien Bien Phu as the site of a major strong point 
because it blocked a main invasion route into Laos, which they 
felt they had to defend at all costs in order to preserve their 
credibility with the king of Louangphrabang, who sought 
France's protection. Some of the most effective fighters against 
the Viet Minh were Hmong from Xiangkhoang whom the 
French recruited and formed into guerrilla units; one of these 
units, under a sergeant named Vang Pao, was on the march to 
Dien Bien Phu when the garrison fell in May 1954. 

Under the terms of the armistice signed at the Geneva Con- 
ference on Indochina on July 20, 1954, by the French Union 
High Command and the Viet Minh, all Viet Minh troops had to 
withdraw from Laos within 120 days. Laos was prohibited from 
having foreign military bases or personnel on its soil and from 
joining any military alliance. The agreements provided for the 
regrouping of Pathet Lao (Lao Nation — see Glossary) guerril- 
las in the provinces of Houaphan and Phongsali and their inte- 
gration into the Royal Lao Army. The Pathet Lao, however, 
taking advantage of their easy access across the border to North 
Vietnam, immediately began to expand their guerrilla army, 
the first unit of which, the Latsavong detachment, had been 
formed in 1949 by Kaysone Phomvihan. 

The Royal Lao Army 

With the end of the war, Laos was no longer under the 
French Union but entirely sovereign. The country was divided 
into five military regions. The chain of command of the Royal 
Lao Army was placed under the Ministry of Defense in Vien- 
tiane. 

To meet the threat represented by the Pathet Lao, the Royal 
Lao Army depended on a small French military training mis- 
sion, headed by a general officer, an exceptional arrangement 
permitted under the Geneva agreement. Military organization 
and tactical training reflected French traditions. Most of the 
equipment was of United States origin, however, because early 
in the First Indochina War, the United States had been supply- 
ing the French with war materiel ranging from guns to aircraft. 
A small United States legation in Vientiane kept Washington 
informed about the status of the Royal Lao Army. There was 



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Laos: A Country Study 

real concern that Laotians were not maintaining their equip- 
ment properly and that much of it was becoming useless under 
the tropical sun and rain. The question also arose of who was to 
pay the salaries of the Royal Lao Army because France was no 
longer responsible for Laos's finances. 

It seemed evident to the legation that only United States per- 
sonnel in Laos could ensure that the Royal Lao Army was capa- 
ble of meeting the threat posed by the Pathet Lao backed by 
North Vietnam. To circumvent the prohibition against foreign 
military personnel imposed by the 1954 Geneva agreement — 
which the United States had pledged to honor — the Depart- 
ment of Defense in December 1955 established a disguised mil- 
itary mission in Laos called the Programs Evaluation Office 
(PEO). The PEO worked under the cover of the civilian aid 
mission and was staffed by military personnel and headed by a 
general officer who wore civilian clothes. Over the 1955-61 
period, the PEO gradually supplanted the French military mis- 
sion in providing equipment and training to the Royal Lao 
Army. With increasing numbers of Laotian officers receiving 
training in Thailand and at staff schools in the United States, 
there was a perception that the French military mission in Laos 
was a relic of colonialism. By 1959 the PEO had more than 100 
members on its staff, and the United States was paying the 
entire cost of the Royal Lao Army's salaries. 

The prohibition against joining any military alliance pre- 
vented Laos from joining the Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza- 
tion (SEATO — see Glossary), formed by Australia, Britain, 
France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, and 
the United States in September 1954. A protocol to the treaty, 
however, designated Laos as a country to which its mutual secu- 
rity provisions would apply in the event it became the victim of 
aggression. When fighting broke out along Laos's border with 
North Vietnam in July-September 1959 following the collapse 
of efforts to integrate two battalions of Pathet Lao into the 
Royal Lao Army, the Royal Lao Government (RLG) wanted to 
appeal to SEATO for help. The RLG was dissuaded from doing 
so by the United States, which felt that such an appeal risked 
involving United States troops in combat in Laos. The nature 
of the fighting — by guerrillas belonging to ethnic tribes that 
lived on both sides of the border — made the question of 
aggression ambiguous. Similarly, in January 1961, when the 
RLG proposed appealing to SEATO to counter North Viet- 



266 



Pathet Lao honor guard at Wat Ong Teu, Vientiane, in November 
1974, participating in an annual ceremony during which the ranking 

officials of Laos pay homage to the king 
Courtesy Ernest Kuhn 

nam's intervention on behalf of the Pathet Lao and Kong Le, it 
was discouraged from doing so by the United States. 

Kong Le's coup d'etat on August 9, 1960, threatened to split 
the army between Kong Le's Lao Neutralist Revolutionary 
Organization — known as the Neuualists, whose troops' unoffi- 
cial name was the Neutralist Armed Forces — and the rest of the 
army under General Phoumi Nosavan, the former minister of 
defense (see The Attempt to Restore Neutrality, ch. 1). PEO 
headquarters in Vientiane became inactive because United 
States diplomats were instructed to find a way to isolate the 
rebellious paratrooper. Finally, aid was cut off. Meanwhile, the 
PEO branch office in Savannakhet — Phoumi's headquarters — 
continued to supply and pay Phoumi's troops. After Phoumi 
captured Vientiane, the Neutralists were compelled — for their 
survival — to enter into an alliance with the Pathet Lao and 
their North Vietnamese backers, on whom they thereafter 
depended for supplies. 

In April 1961, the PEO was upgraded to a Military Assistance 
Advisory Group (MAAG), and its members were allowed to 
wear uniforms. The MAAG was withdrawn in 1962 under the 



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Laos: A Country Study 



terms of the Geneva Agreement, which was supposed to neu- 
tralize Laos (see International Pressure and the Advent of the 
Second Coalition, ch. 1). Because the North Vietnamese did 
not respect the withdrawal requirement, however, the United 
States stepped up military aid to the RLG, but avoided sending 
ground troops into Laos, which would have violated the agree- 
ment. 

As part of this effort, United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) personnel operating from a base at Udon Thani, 
Thailand, took over the support of 30,000 to 36,000 irregulars, 
including Hmong guerrillas who bore the brunt of the fighting 
in northern Laos. A CIA-chartered airline, Air America, 
dropped rice and ammunition from its C-46s and C-47s to iso- 
lated Hmong outposts, which were sometimes behind enemy 
lines. A variety of short-takeoff-and-landing aircraft used dirt 
airstrips carved out of the jungle by the Hmong. The irregulars 
were instrumental in helping to rescue a large number of 
United States airmen who were shot down over Laos. By this 
time, the Hmong leader Vang Pao had risen to the rank of gen- 
eral in the Royal Lao Army and commanded the Second Mili- 
tary Region. 

In October 1964, in response to an offensive by the Pathet 
Lao and North Vietnamese to expel the Neutralists from the 
Plain of Jars, the United States began providing air support 
against Pathet Lao positions and North Vietnamese supply 
lines. However, it was not until March 1966 at Phoukout, north- 
west of the Plain of Jars, that the Pathet Lao started to win 
major battles against the Royal Lao Army. In July 1966, the 
Pathet Lao won another major battle in the Nambak Valley in 
northern Louangphrabang Province by overrunning a Royal 
Lao Army base and inflicting heavy casualties. These victories 
gave the Pathet Lao new momentum in the war for control of 
Laos. 

Meanwhile, in southern Laos, where the North Vietnamese 
had been working steadily every dry season to expand the Ho 
Chi Minh Trail network leading into the Republic of Vietnam 
(South Vietnam), the intensity of the air war also grew. The air 
war in Laos operated under a complicated command-and-con- 
trol system that involved the United States embassy in Vien- 
tiane, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam in Saigon, 
Royal Thai air bases in Thailand, the commander in chief, 
Pacific, in Honolulu, and sometimes even the White House. 



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National Security 



The United States ambassador in Vientiane had the final say on 
target selection, using criteria that included taking into 
account the distance of targets from civilian habitations and 
the types of ordnance to be expended. The ambassador also 
was to keep the RLG informed so as to avoid, or at least mini- 
mize, the latter' s embarrassment vis-a-vis the British and Soviet 
embassies in Vientiane and the heads of the Indian, Canadian, 
and Polish delegations to the International Control Commis- 
sion, who were jointly responsible for enforcing the 1962 Dec- 
laration on the Neutrality of Laos signed in Geneva. 

During the June 1969 rainy season, the Pathet Lao and two 
North Vietnamese battalions, using Soviet tanks, pushed the 
Royal Lao Army and the Neutralists out of their base at Muang 
Souy northwest of the Plain of Jars. Fighting continued during 
the monsoon season. In September 1969, Vang Pao's Hmong, 
supported by United States bombing, launched a series of sur- 
prise attacks against key points on the Plain of Jars. A new 
North Vietnamese army division joined the battle shortly there- 
after and by February 1970 had regained all of the devastated 
plain. 

In 1970, despite eight years of ground offensives by the 
Royal Lao Army and massive United States air support, the 
Pathet Lao had grown into an army of 48,000 troops and was 
prepared to challenge Royal Lao Army forces on their own ter- 
ritory by mounting large offensives in the south, engaging an 
even greater number of North Vietnamese forces. The intro- 
duction of Soviet-made long-range 130-mm artillery pieces 
onto the battlefield in that year allowed the Pathet Lao and 
North Vietnamese to neutralize to some extent the Royal Lao 
Army's advantage of air superiority. 

In 1970 the combat elements of the Royal Lao Army were 
organized into fifty-eight infantry battalions and one artillery 
regiment of four battalions. The largest tactical unit was the 
battalion, which was composed of a headquarters, a headquar- 
ters company, and three rifle companies. Royal Lao Army units 
were devoted primarily to static defense and were stationed 
near population centers, lines of communication, depots, and 
airfields. These units were complemented by military police 
and armored, engineer, and communications units. Between 
1962 and 1971, the United States provided Laos with an esti- 
mated US$500 million in military assistance, not including the 
cost of equipping and training irregular and paramilitary 



269 



Laos: A Country Study 



forces. During the 1971-75 period, it added about seventy-five 
T-28 light-strike or training aircraft, about twenty C-47s in 
both transport and gunship configurations, fewer than ten H- 
34 helicopters, and some small U-l and U-17 aircraft. 

In February 1971, a major offensive by the South Vietnam- 
ese army, with United States logistical and air support, sent two 
divisions into Laos in the vicinity of Xepon with the objective of 
cutting North Vietnamese supply lines. However, once inside 
Laos, South Vietnamese commanders were separated from 
their resupply bases by long logistics lines, resulting in an early 
termination of the offensive. By December 1971, the Pathet 
Lao had taken Paksong on the Bolovens Plateau and had sur- 
rounded the main Hmong base at Longtiang. Communist 
advances continued into 1972 and encircled Thakhek on the 
Mekong, and Vientiane. 

The cease-fire of February 22, 1973, ended United States 
bombing and temporarily halted ground offensives. The Pathet 
Lao, however, following their usual practice, used the cessation 
of military operations to resupply their forces over the long 
and exposed roads from North Vietnam. In further fighting in 
the spring of 1975, the Pathet Lao finally broke the resistance 
of Vang Pao's Hmong, blocking the road junction linking Vien- 
tiane, Louangphrabang, and the Plain of Jars. Under the watch 
of two battalions of Pathet Lao troops, which had been flown 
into Vientiane and Louangphrabang on Soviet and Chinese 
planes for neutralizing those towns under the cease-fire agree- 
ment, the communists organized demonstrations to support 
their political and military demands, leading to the final, 
bloodless seizure of power in the towns held by the RLG up to 
then. 

Structure and Administration of the Armed Forces 

As of mid-1994, the most powerful military officer in Laos 
was Lieutenant General Choummali Saignason, concurrently 
minister of national defense and commander in chief of the 
LPA. In addition to his military position, he was also the sev- 
enth highest ranking member of the ruling LPRP Political 
Bureau (Politburo). He took over as chief of the LPA in 1991 
when General Khamtai Siphandon was elevated to prime minis- 
ter (see The Lao People's Revolutionary Party, ch. 4). As a 
ranking member of the Politburo, Choummali is responsible 
for formulating both government and military policy. As com- 



270 



National Security 



mander in chief, he has absolute power over all internal and 
external security matters. All state security personnel, com- 
manders of the air and naval forces, and police officials report 
to Choummali. 

Lao People's Army 

The Pathet Lao guerrillas became the LPLA in October 
1965; in 1976 it was renamed the LPA. In the beginning, the 
LPLA consisted of regular forces organized under a central 
military command, with regionally recruited units and local 
forces operating on a part-time basis at the village level as a 
people's militia. These three levels of the armed forces were 
derived from the wartime structure of the main force units and 
regional and local guerrillas. 

In December 1975, the LPA had a total strength of about 
60,000 personnel, including 35,000 Pathet Lao troops and dis- 
sident Neutralists (see table 14, Appendix). In a January 20, 
1976 broadcast, government authorities outlined five principal 
tasks for the LPA in defending the nation against Thai reac- 
tionaries and exiled Laotian counterrevolutionaries. The first 
task was to heighten vigilance in preserving peace and public 
order. The second was to raise political and ideological under- 
standing in the armed forces, improve discipline, and imple- 
ment government policy. The third and fourth tasks were to 
reinforce traditions of solidarity with the people and raise the 
quality of the army through political and military study. Finally, 
the army was called upon to strengthen its organization and 
improve internal defense. 

By 1976 the LPA was organized along North Vietnamese mil- 
itary lines, with approximately 42,500 troops in sixty-five infan- 
try battalions, divided among four military regions. By 1979 
there were as many as 50,000 Vietnamese troops in Laos, advis- 
ing and working side by side with their Laotian counterparts to 
suppress the remaining opposition forces. In the mid-1980s, 
Vietnamese troops began their withdrawal; by late 1988, all 
operational elements had been withdrawn. It is likely, however, 
that a few Vietnamese military technical specialists remained in 
Laos as of mid-1994. 

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the armed forces were 
reequipped with military hardware, including MiG jet fighters 
from the Soviet Union. Despite the influx of new equipment, 
however, the bleak economic situation of the country pre- 



271 



Laos: A Country Study 



vented the allotment of a large enough military budget for a 
modern fighting force. In the absence of military support from 
the former Soviet Union and with limited equipment pur- 
chases from China and Vietnam, the LPA had embarked on 
private business ventures to support itself. In the early 1990s, 
aging equipment and lack of funds precluded further modern- 
ization. 

Dependence on direct foreign military aid ended with the 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and Soviet and Vietnamese 
military advisers in the mid- to late 1980s. The mutual security 
treaty with Vietnam, however, allows Vietnamese troops to 
reenter Laos in case of need. 

By mid-1994, the LPA had approximately 33,000 troops, 
divided into four military regions. The LPA headquarters in 
Vientiane controls all four military regions, which in turn are 
responsible for LPA elements in the provinces. Military Region 
One is headquartered in Louangphrabang, Louangphrabang 
Province; Military Region Two, in Muang Phonsavan, 
Xiangkhoang Province; Military Region Three, in Xeno, Savan- 
nakhet Province; and Military Region Four, in Pakxe, Cham- 
pasak Province. 

The LPA ground component consists of five infantry divi- 
sions. The First Division is situated in the Vientiane area. The 
Second Division monitors the Laos-Thailand border and north- 
central Laos. The Third Division monitors the Laos-China bor- 
der. The Fourth Division and the Fifth Division patrol southern 
Laos. 

LPA ground equipment generally is of vintage Soviet design, 
with PT-76s (light tanks); T-34/85s and T-54/55s (main bat- 
tle tanks); and 122mm and 130mm artillery (see table 15, 
Appendix). For the most part, United States-made equipment 
captured from the Royal Lao Army in 1975 has been retired 
from active service. 

By the early 1990s, because of the lack of any real external 
threats, the armed forces were largely responsible for internal 
security, support against dissidents, and border patrol against 
incursions from Thailand-based resistance elements. The LPA 
also played a significant role in combatting the armed Laotian 
resistance movement, especially those troops stationed along 
the Thai border. And, presumably, the LPA is responsible for 
any further border conflicts such as occurred with Thailand in 



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National Security 



1988 (see The Confrontational Relationship with Thailand, 
this ch.; Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). 

Lao People's Air Force 

In 1975 the LPA took possession from the Royal Lao Air 
Force of an inventory of 150 United States-made aircraft rang- 
ing from T-28 ground attack to UH-34 helicopters. Without 
an air force of its own, the LPA had to rebuild the United 
States-backed and United States-trained Royal Lao Air Force. 
In order to do so, Laos turned to Vietnam and the Soviet 
Union. 

By the end of 1976, Vietnamese advisers had laid the founda- 
tion for the Lao People's Air Force. Vietnamese technicians 
developed and implemented the training of Laotian cadres for 
command and operational positions. With the exception of 
new aircraft, Vietnam also provided the majority of equipment 
needed by the air force for day-to-day functioning. Laotian air 
force officers of promise were sent to schools in Vietnam for 
specialized training. Vietnamese and Soviet technical advisers 
had withdrawn from Laos by 1990. 

In 1977, in order to modernize and make the transition 
from a United States-supplied counterinsurgency air force into 
one capable of providing air-to-air intercepts, a high-level Lao- 
tian military delegation visited the Soviet Union. Later that 
year, Laos received ten MiG— 21 fighter aircraft, six An-24 trans- 
port aircraft, and four Mi-8 helicopters from the Soviet Union, 
along with in-country technical expertise. In addition, the Sovi- 
ets funded construction of air bases and radar sites. Together, 
the Soviets and Vietnamese constructed a large air force base at 
Muang Phonsavan on the Plain of Jars, 240 kilometers north of 
Vientiane, and rebuilt the former French air base at Xeno, 
near Savannakhet. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Soviets 
built early-warning radar systems in northern and western Laos 
to monitor Vietnamese, Chinese, and Thai aircraft movements. 

Over time, the air force inventory measurably decreased. In 
1975 there were 150 aircraft. By the mid-1980s, however, the 
inventory had been reduced to seventy aircraft of predomi- 
nantly Soviet design. In the 1988-94 period, budgetary prob- 
lems further reduced the air force inventory to approximately 
fifty aircraft. Few of the former Royal Lao Air Force's United 
States-made aircraft are still in use. As of mid-1994, there were 
approximately twenty-nine MiG-21s armed with AA-2 Anab 



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Laos: A Country Study 



air-to-air missiles that provided Laos with a credible air defense 
against its neighbors and principal adversaries, Cambodia and 
Thailand. However, the MiG— 21 force, assessed as moderately 
capable in the mid-1980s, has deteriorated from age and poor 
maintenance and is marginal at best. Funds for replacing air- 
craft are not available. There were approximately 3,500 per- 
sons in the air force as of mid-1994. 

Lao People's Navy 

In 1975 the Lao People's Navy was established with the rem- 
nants of the Royal Lao Navy. Composed of approximately 
twenty United States-made river patrol boats and sixteen 
amphibious landing craft, the navy in mid-1994 had a person- 
nel strength of around 500. As with the air force, Vietnamese 
advisers helped organize the Lao People's Navy and trained 
Laotian cadres in river operations and boat maintenance. The 
force is responsible for maintaining the security of inland 
waterways, which includes controlling the movement of resis- 
tance forces from their sanctuaries in Thailand, across the 
Mekong River. In the early 1980s, the navy received six used 
Soviet Shmel patrol boats and at least twelve more river patrol 
boats, bringing its total inventory to around thirty-one patrol 
boats. By mid-1994, the navy had a total of fewer than fifty river 
patrol boats and continued to provide a marginal level of secu- 
rity for inland waterways. 

Other Military Units 

The LPA is augmented by provincial forces, numbering 
20,000 to 30,000 men and women, and the local militia, or 
Irregular People's Army, estimated at somewhat more than 
100,000 men and women. Provincial forces receive little pay, 
have few weapons, and are minimally trained. They are under 
the operational control of provincial authorities for border 
control and internal security. The militia is lightly armed and 
receives no pay and little or no military U aining. The irregular 
forces are organized in their workplaces and local villages, have 
a role in local security, and act as a reserve for the regular 
armed forces. Promising recruits from the provincial forces 
and militia units frequently advance to regular army duty. 

Manpower and Conditions of Service 

As of mid-1994, there were approximately 37,000 persons, or 
slightly more than 4 percent of the labor force of approxi- 



274 



New Year's parade in Louangphrabang, 1975; royal elephant and 
marchers accompanied by Royal Lao Police on left and Royal Lao Army 

soldier on right 
Courtesy Ernest Kuhn 

mately 1,574,100 males and females between the ages of thir- 
teen and thirty-two, in the military. There is an eighteen-month 
minimum military conscription draft for males seventeen to 
twenty-six years. Most draftees serve the minimum time. The 
ground forces are the primary destination for draftees. The 
other, smaller services seem to get sufficient numbers of volun- 
tary recruits to fill their ranks. 

Life in the LPA is austere. Pay is low, and there is a shortage 
of uniforms and equipment, including most basic supplies. 
Consequently, it is not a popular career path for most young 
Laotian males. In late 1989, LPRP chairman Kaysone Phomvi- 
han in a major speech to senior LPA officers complained that 
"Our youths throughout the country have failed to associate 



275 



Laos: A Country Study 



with the army and failed to use the army as a school to carry 
out practices as they were expected to do in the past." Seminars 
were held in many districts during 1989-90 to discuss requiring 
local authorities to help enforce compliance with draft laws, 
which many Laotian youths were actively seeking to avoid. 

During the Pathet Lao's struggle against the RLG, women — 
for the most part voluntarily — played a significant role fighting 
alongside men in combat units. Women also served in a medi- 
cal corps and as porters for combat units. Since 1975, however, 
the role of women in the armed forces has changed signifi- 
cantly. Although not subject to the draft, women are part of the 
active armed forces but perform only minor administrative 
functions. Women do, however, serve in police and militia 
forces. 

The Defense Budget 

As of mid-1994, Laos had the smallest defense budget in 
Southeast Asia, but it also is one of the region's poorest coun- 
tries. Since 1975, Laos has relied heavily on Vietnamese and 
Soviet military aid; by the early 1990s the loss of this aid had 
affected military capabilities. 

There is little available information on the defense budget 
(see table 16, Appendix). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
Laos undertook a concerted effort to eliminate internal armed 
resistance and was preoccupied with a continuous border con- 
flict with Thailand (see The Confrontational Relationship with 
Thailand, this ch.). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, 
a noticeable improvement in the security situation, marked by 
better relations with its neighbors and a reduced internal secu- 
rity threat from resistance groups, enabled the leadership to 
reduce the defense budget. In 1992 military expenditures — 
which included public security — were approximately US$102.2 
million, or 11.7 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP— 
see Glossary). In 1993 military expenditures had increased 
slightly to about US$104.9 million, approximately 12.4 percent 
of the US$1.3 billion estimated GDP. 

Threats to National Security 

Internal Threats and Resistance Movements 

After December 1975, the newly formed LPDR was faced 
with disarming and neutralizing former rightist soldiers and 



276 



National Security 



police, countering armed resistance efforts by those who had 
fled to Thailand and by their supporters who had remained in 
Laos, and preventing Thailand from interfering in political 
developments in Laos. The ease with which the Pathet Lao had 
managed to neutralize the rightist armed forces and police and 
form a coalition government reflected how tired the Laotians 
were of war. The prevailing attitude at the time seemed to be 
general relief that the civil war was over. Even most middle- and 
lower-ranking officers in the Royal Lao Army — who had spent 
their adult lives fighting the insurgents of the Neo Lao Hak Xat 
(Lao Patriotic Front — LPF; see Glossary) — were prepared to 
cooperate in building a united and socialist Laos. When oppo- 
sition to the new regime materialized, it came mainly from 
across the Mekong River in Thailand. Insurgents found sanctu- 
ary across the 1,000-kilometer boundary with Thailand, where, 
under the new, strongly anticommunist government, the mili- 
tary provided them with supplies and intelligence data. 

The armed resistance movement — a shadow force of several 
thousand persons — never gained enough momentum to 
become any more than a nuisance to the communist govern- 
ment because the combination of approximately 50,000 Viet- 
namese troops stationed in Laos and the LPA ensured 
adequate protection against this relatively minor threat. Broad 
security measures, including control of the media, were imple- 
mented. 

The armed resistance was led mainly by individuals who had 
played a military role during the hostilities of the 1970s. 
Former members of the Royal Lao Army and the special guer- 
rilla units supported by the CIA intermittently harassed govern- 
ment installations such as police stations and army posts, 
blasted bridges, ambushed vehicles, and blocked roads. The 
honeymoon period following the communist takeover ended 
abruptly when thousands of members of the previous govern- 
ment and military apparatus failed to be released from remote 
reeducation centers or "seminar camps" (see "Seminar Camps" 
and the Death of King Savang Vatthana, ch. 1). 

In cooperation with Vietnamese forces in Laos, the govern- 
ment launched a military campaign intended to control dissi- 
dents, notably the irregular forces — made up of ethnic tribes 
who had long resisted Vietnamese and Laotian communists 
from their mountain hideouts. The military campaign, along 
with deteriorating economic conditions and government 



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Laos: A Country Study 

attempts to enforce political control, prompted an exodus of 
lowland Lao and Hmong in the early years of LPDR rule. 
About 10 percent of the population — approximately 300,000 
persons — fled Laos after 1975, passing through refugee camps 
in Thailand on their way to receiving refugee status and taking 
up residence in the United States, France, Australia, and other 
countries. Those who remained in the refugee camps in Thai- 
land provided the recruits for the resistance movements, sup- 
ported by funds sent from their friends and relatives who had 
resettled abroad. Resistance forces continued operating from 
sanctuaries in refugee camps across the border in Thailand — 
with numerous reports of cross-border resistance actions — 
much as the Pathet Lao had originally operated from sanctuar- 
ies in North Vietnam. Resistance forces are perceived as a stum- 
bling block for the repatriation of individuals in refugee camps 
in Thailand. 

The deteriorating political situation between China and 
Laos in 1980 worked in favor of the resistance forces. And, fol- 
lowing the outbreak of hostilities between China and Vietnam, 
China took a greater interest in the Laotian resistance move- 
ment by providing sanctuary, military training, and equipment 
to various resistance elements, including Kong Le's Neutralists. 
China's involvement was intended both to tie up the Vietnam- 
ese troops stationed in Laos and to provide China with intelli- 
gence on Vietnamese troop movements along the border. 
China also supported the political activity of Laotian exiles and 
reportedly established insurgent training camps in Yunnan 
Province for as many as 3,000 Laotian resistance fighters. 
Despite training and equipment from China, the newly trained 
resistance fighters were no match for the LPA and Vietnamese 
troops. The resistance was relegated to committing acts of sabo- 
tage against government facilities and mounting small unit 
attacks on troops. China cut off support to the resistance when 
moves toward normalization of relations between Laos and 
China began in 1986. 

In 1985 the resistance movement escalated its military cam- 
paign against the government. Laodan resistance groups based 
in Thailand claimed to have as many as 7,000 to 8,000 members 
in 1985. These groups were active in mounting limited guer- 
rilla operations, such as harassing LPA transportation routes 
and sabotaging military supply depots, and reportedly bombed 
the Wattai Airport in Vientiane in 1985. In April 1985, the 
guerrillas reportedly downed a helicopter, killing several senior 



278 



National Security 



LPA officers, as well as three Soviet military advisers and two 
Vietnamese major generals. General Phoumi Nosavan's death 
in exile in Thailand in November 1985, however, left a signifi- 
cant leadership void and caused a serious setback to the resis- 
tance movement. 

Although the resistance movement was losing momentum in 
the early 1990s, and resistance operations did not appear to 
threaten the stability of the communist government in Vien- 
tiane, incidents continued. In March 1992, fighting between 
resistance forces and Laotian troops took place at Ban Tak 
Huai Sao. Scores of people on both sides were wounded and 
killed by artillery and small arms fire. In June 1992, there were 
reports of 300 Laotian rebels attacking LPDR military positions 
in Muang Sanakham across the Mekong from Chiang Khan, 
Thailand. In July 1992, Thai military officials reported sporadic 
antigovernment activities and skirmishes in different parts of 
Laos, especially in the remote mountainous border areas with 
Thailand. 

Laos continued to seek Thai action against rebel forces 
remaining in Thailand, and the decline in resistance activity 
was attributable both to an improvement in relations between 
Laos and Thailand and to the once isolationist LPDR's success- 
ful negotiations with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (see Glossary) to close refugee camps in Thailand 
and repatriate the remaining inmates, mostly Hmong tribes- 
people. Not only did these negotiations cut off the sanctuaries, 
but they also cut off the traditional sources of new recruits and 
arms. Further, the Thai government began steps in 1992 to 
stop anti-LPDR forces from using Thailand as a base to stage 
attacks into Laos. Also, the United States pressured Thailand to 
cut back on tacit military assistance to Hmong resistance ele- 
ments. As a result of these developments, armed resistance was 
reduced by mid-1994 to isolated incidents of little more than 
armed banditry — hardly a threat to the stability of Laos. 

As of the early 1990s, it remained difficult to garner and con- 
firm information about the strength of the various resistance 
forces and their activities because of the nature of their opera- 
tions and the remoteness of their locations. The main resis- 
tance forces are the Lao National Liberation Movement (also 
known as the United Lao National Liberation Front) and the 
Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos. The former resistance 
movement, remnants of the Hmong irregulars led by Vang Pao, 



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Laos: A Country Study 

is estimated to have approximately 2,000 members in the early 
1990s and is a bitter enemy of the latter. The Lao National Lib- 
eration Movement continues to work toward replacing the gov- 
ernment with a coalition of opposition groups. 

The Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos 

The Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos is the largest 
opposition group. The organization grew out of a major 
Hmong resistance group, the Chao Fa (Lords of the Sky, or 
God's Disciples). The Chao Fa was organized in 1975 by Zhong 
Zhua Her (Pak Au Her, or Pa Kao Her), a senior resistance 
fighter who had received aid from the United States in his fight 
against Pathet Lao and Vietnamese forces. 

In the late 1970s, the Chao Fa boasted of having 20,000 
members; however, only 2,000 to 4,000 were armed. By the 
mid-1980s, the number of armed Chao Fa was probably around 
2,000. Because it had been subjected to years of attacks by gov- 
ernment and Vietnamese forces, the group was split and forced 
to flee into China, which provided it with assistance. 

By late 1984, China had sent Laotian resistance groups back 
across the border. In 1985 Zhong Zhua Her reorganized the 
Chao Fa under the banner of the Ethnic Liberation Organiza- 
tion of Laos and set up his base camp in Xaignabouri Province 
near the border with Thailand. From his base, Zhong Zhua 
Her attempted to organize resistance elements in the northern 
provinces of Laos and sought to establish an autonomous 
region for the Hmong. 

In 1990 the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos report- 
edly had 3,000 members in armed units and another 6,000 per- 
sons trained but without weapons. Individual weapons 
reportedly were variants of the AK-47, a few M-79 grenade 
launchers, RPG-2s, RPG-7s, and a few 60mm mortars. In the 
early 1990s, the group concentrated on mounting small-unit 
operations and consolidating support. Beginning in 1992, rela- 
tions with the other resistance groups were poor to nonexist- 
ent. This fact greatly hampered efforts of resistance movements 
to organize a broader agenda and larger operations, as did 
closer relations between Laos and Thailand. As of mid-1994, 
the strength of the Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos was 
estimated at approximately 2,000 persons. 



280 



Royal Lao Army soldier 
standing guard at the 
Royal Palace, 

Louangphrabang, 1975 
Courtesy Ernest Kuhn 



The Hmong 

The Hmong are one of the principal ethnic minorities 
inhabiting the higher elevations of Laos, living in mountain vil- 
lages situated above 1,000 meters where they grow rice and 
corn using swidden (shifting, or slash-and-burn) agriculture, 
raise livestock, and grow opium as a cash crop. Several million 
Hmong also live in Thailand, Vietnam, and China (see Popula- 
tion, ch. 2). The Hmong traditionally have aggressively pro- 
tected their independent life-style, and their independence has 
kept them at odds with the central government. 

Throughout the twentieth century, the Hmong maintained 
their tradition of rebellion. In the 1920s, successful Hmong 
uprisings against the French colonial power in northeastern 
Laos led to negotiated settlements rather than defeat. The 
French colonial government later used the Hmong to help sub- 
jugate lowland Lao dissidents. In the mid-1960s, the United 
States, recognizing the Hmong's tenacious fighting ability and 
superior knowledge of mountainous terrain, employed them as 
irregular mercenary units against the Pathet Lao (see The 
"Secret War," ch. 1). Hmong forces, trained and supplied by 
the United States, fought alongside the Royal Lao Army and 
were used extensively in many of the most pitched battles of 



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Laos: A Country Study 

the Indochina wars. As a consequence, a disproportionate 
number of Hmong were wounded and/or died in combat (see 
Historical Background, this ch.). 

After the disastrous defeat of two major Hmong armies in 
March and April 1975 at Sala Phou Khoun by North Vietnam- 
ese and Pathet Lao forces, the United States evacuated Vang 
Pao from Longtiang to Thailand on May 14, 1975. Thousands 
of his followers were left to their fate because the United States 
evacuation aircraft requested by Vang Pao did not materialize. 
The vast majority of Hmong who made it safely to Thailand did 
so on their own. This defeat left the Hmong who had not fled 
to Thailand in great disarray. One group of Hmong, after a 
long and dangerous march through hostile countryside, fled to 
Thailand, where 25,000 persons reached safety. But a larger 
group of some 60,000 persons retreated to the heights of the 
Phou Bia Massif south of the Plain of Jars, where they set up 
defensive positions. Aside from occasional harassing attacks by 
Pathet Lao forces, no serious attempt was made to interfere 
with the Hmong for more than a year after the communist 
takeover. 

In 1977 Vietnamese troops backed by Soviet 130mm long- 
range artillery encircled and attacked the Hmong sanctuary in 
the Pho Bia Massif. Hmong defenses held and drove off the 
attackers. Later that same year, however, Vietnamese forces, 
unable to penetrate the Hmong ground defenses, began to 
overfly the redoubt, reportedly dropping napalm, gas, and a 
mycotoxin known as trichothecene, or "yellow rain," on 
Hmong villages (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). An unknown 
number of Hmong died, while others tried to escape into Thai- 
land. 

As a result of decades of warfare, dislocation, and a cam- 
paign mounted against them by Vietnamese and RLG forces in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Hmong population was 
reduced to approximately 200,000 in Laos and about the same 
number in Thailand in the early 1990s. From their sanctuary in 
Thailand, the Hmong continued their armed resistance efforts 
against the communists throughout the 1980s and into the 
1990s. Many thousands of other Hmong, however, had sided 
with the Pathet Lao and were living peacefully in Laos, particu- 
larly in the northeastern provinces; others went to Thailand 
and on to the United States. Nevertheless, by 1992, cross-bor- 
der Hmong raids into Laos were reduced to little more than 



282 



National Security 



banditry — a casualty of wavering Thai support and apathy 
among the Hmong themselves. 

In 1992 a major Hmong refuge, the Ban Vinai Hmong refu- 
gee camp in Thailand, was closed as part of a Thai effort to 
close all camps holding Laotian refugees. In late 1992, there 
were an estimated 30,000 Laotian refugees in Thailand and 
about 1,700 in China. In March 1993, Thailand announced 
that it was closing two more refugee camps, one in Nakhon 
Phanom Province, the other in Phayao Province. These two 
camps held more than 27,000 Laotians, the majority of whom 
were Hmong. Although the government is making attempts to 
reintegrate the Hmong, the lack of resources limits these 
efforts. Continuing participation of Hmong in resistance activi- 
ties poses no threat to the stability of the government of Laos, 
but it does complicate the repatriation process. 

Foreign Military Presence 

Since 1975 Laos has maintained a special relationship with 
Vietnam, formalized by the Treaty of Friendship and Coopera- 
tion signed in July 1977. Article 1 of the treaty states that "the 
two parties undertake to deploy all of their efforts to safeguard 
and develop the special relationship between Laos and Viet- 
nam, to reinforce their solidarity and mutual confidence, their 
long-term cooperation and mutual aid in all domains in a spirit 
of proletarian internationalism." Article 4 of the treaty stipu- 
lates that "the two sides affirm their determination to build the 
Vietnamese-Lao border into a border of lasting friendship and 
fraternity." 

The treaty is much more than its name implies because it 
gives Vietnam almost carte blanche in the internal affairs of 
Laos, especially in the military. Vietnamese military forces have 
been continuously present in Laos since 1961, if not earlier. 
The strength of these forces has varied over the years from 
30,000 to 50,000 troops in the 1975-83 period, to several hun- 
dred advisers in late 1987. In November 1988, the LPDR Minis- 
try of Foreign Affairs formally announced that all Vietnamese 
troops had been withdrawn from Laos. Although Western intel- 
ligence sources initially doubted the claim of total withdrawal, 
later they reportedly confirmed that it was true. Indeed, there 
was no Vietnamese presence in the two border conflicts 
between Laos and Thailand in the late 1980s. Moreover, expa- 
triate employees of international organizations working in 



283 



Laos: A Country Study 

Vientiane had noticed the removal of many Vietnamese techni- 
cal and advisory personnel from the capital. It is likely that a 
full withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and a reduction of aid per- 
sonnel occurred in order to advance economic agreements 
between Vietnam and China. 

Vietnamese troops performed a variety of functions during 
their long stay in Laos. They fought alongside Pathet Lao insur- 
gents in their struggle to overthrow the RLG. They trained 
and, along with the Soviets, equipped the military. Vietnamese 
cadres played a primary role in combatting the insurgency 
against the LPDR, undertaking security tasks such as guarding 
access to airport perimeters, controlling important road junc- 
tions, and patrolling sensitive areas. They performed border 
patrol duties and carried out joint military maneuvers with LPA 
units along the Cambodian, Chinese, and Thai borders to dem- 
onstrate strong Laotian-Vietnamese military cooperation. 
These maneuvers were especially evident during periods of 
border tension between Vietnam or Laos and their neighbors. 
The Vietnamese also rendered valuable engineering services 
such as building roads and improving infrastructure damaged 
by years of war. 

The Confrontational Relationship with Thailand 

Despite cultural and linguistic ties between Laos and Thai- 
land, after 1975 relations between these two countries were 
often marked by severe strains (see Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). 
Such strains often resulted in exchanges of gunfire followed by 
border closures. 

Relations between Laos and Thailand entered a new phase 
of tension in the middle of 1984 after a period of relative calm. 
Thai Army roadbuilding crews encountered three remote vil- 
lages whose location on available maps they apparently took to 
favor Thai sovereignty. The LPDR government and army 
thought otherwise, and a military and diplomatic standoff 
ensued for several months. Laos took the dispute to the United 
Nations (UN), where Thailand was striving for election to the 
Security Council. In keeping with such aspirations, Thailand 
announced that it would remove its troops from the three vil- 
lages and seek a peaceful settlement through a resurvey of the 
watershed border. 

Further complicating the border situation, in late 1984 Thai- 
land accused Vietnam of meddling in Laotian affairs by push- 



284 



National Security 



ing Laos into hostilities with Thailand in order to draw 
attention away from the situation in Cambodia. Thailand also 
complained that Laos was harboring Thai communists belong- 
ing to a new organization called Green Star, whose cadres num- 
bered 2,000 and who were said to be training in six insurgent 
camps along the Laos-Thailand border. Little came of Thai 
accusations because world attention was focused on Vietnam's 
activity in Cambodia, not on Laos. 

Following the mid-1984 incident and until early 1986, rela- 
tions were tense. However, by mid-1986 tension began to ease 
as both sides attempted to downplay the various minor border 
incidents. For example, in mid-July 1986, approximately thirty- 
five Laotian ethnic minority refugees were killed in Thailand. 
Thailand alleged that LPA troops had attacked a refugee settle- 
ment near the village of Ban Huai Pong, Phayao Province, kill- 
ing the refugees. The government said Thailand fabricated the 
accusation. Previously, less significant border incidents had 
become contentious; this time, however, after Laos and Thai- 
land traded vitriolic charges in both countries' media, the issue 
died down, foreshadowing an improvement in cross-border 
relations. 

In late 1986, relations between Laos and Thailand moved 
forward when several delegations were exchanged in order to 
work out border differences. Of significance were discussions 
between military and police delegations, who exchanged infor- 
mation on problems with resistance groups, infiltration, smug- 
gling, and bandit gangs. Laos was concerned with the embargo 
Thailand had placed on strategic goods crossing Thailand for 
import into the country. As a landlocked country, Laos is 
dependent upon goods transiting from and through its neigh- 
bors. Negotiations ended the embargo on these goods, exclud- 
ing some military-related items. Laos was also concerned about 
restrictions on commercial goods. 

Between 1986 and 1990, the number of border incidents 
along the Laos-Thailand border declined significantly. There 
was, however, a major border dispute in December 1987. A 
cease-fire was proclaimed in February 1988, ending the fight- 
ing that had resulted in 1,000 deaths, and meetings were held 
to defuse the conflict (see Developments in the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, ch. 1). 

Other factors helped to soften the confrontational relation- 
ship. Thailand's criticism of Laotian-Vietnamese military ties 



285 



Laos: A Country Study 

lessened after 1988, when the majority of Vietnamese troops 
had departed Laos. Commercial trade continued to be a stabi- 
lizing force. Diplomatic relations between the two countries 
were normal but wary. The fact that resistance fighters oper- 
ated from refugee camps in Thailand, however, remained a 
constant source of irritation. 

In 1991 several high-level Laotian-Thai military delegations 
were exchanged in hopes of resolving remaining border inci- 
dents. These talks resulted in agreements in which both sides 
agreed to withdraw military forces from disputed areas in 
Xaignabouri Province. The withdrawals, which took the form 
of a mutually supervised pullback, created several unpopulated 
demilitarized zones. Thailand also promised to help curtail the 
illegal activities of Laotian refugees and exiles residing in Thai- 
land. Specifically, it agreed to cooperate in disarming and 
arresting any armed individuals apprehended crossing the bor- 
der. In 1992 Thailand reportedly made good on its promise to 
arrest border violators, and the brother of General Vang Pao 
and a group of Hmong were taken into custody in northern 
Thailand as they were attempting to stage a cross-border incur- 
sion. 

In August 1992, Laos again called for increased Laotian-Thai 
cooperation to suppress anti-LPDR activity by ethnic resistance 
fighters. Cooperation was to include tougher restrictions on 
exiled Hmong wishing to travel to and within Thailand. Vien- 
tiane wanted Bangkok to strengthen its screening procedures 
of visa applications from exiled and ethnic Lao living in third 
countries of resettlement. It was also seeking Thai cooperation 
in patrolling the common border to combat the resistance 
movement. In 1993 the LPDR's ambassador to Thailand, 
Bounkeut Sangsomsak, summed up the resistance problem 
when he noted that the two countries still needed to resolve 
the problem, that both sides had been consulting each other at 
government and military levels, but that stringent measures 
were needed to further disrupt resistance efforts. 

Relations with the United States 

Since the mid-1980s, relations between the United States 
and Laos have been largely concerned with accounting for 
those persons classified as prisoner of war/missing in action 
(POW/MIA) in Laos from the Indochina wars (1946-75) and 
on counternarcotics issues (see Narcotics and Counternarcot- 



286 



A group of senior Royal Lao Government officials in November 1974. 
At the center is Prince Saykham Southakakaoumal, then governor of 

Xiangkhoang Province. 
Courtesy Ernest Kuhn 

ics Issues, this ch.; The Origins of the Prisoner of War/Missing 
in Action Question, ch. 1; Bilateral Relations, ch. 4). In Febru- 
ary 1985, a Laotian-United States team conducted the first joint 
excavation of a plane crash site, resulting in the identification 
of the remains of thirteen missing servicemen. Progress in 
Laos-United States relations accelerated after 1988, with Laos 
agreeing to expand POW/MIA activities. The two countries 
have conducted numerous site surveys and recovery operations 
since January 1989. 

National Police and Paramilitary Forces 

One of the first priorities for the LPDR was restructuring 
defense and security forces and improving effectiveness in 
these new roles. After the major Mekong River towns were lib- 
erated, soldiers were assigned police duties, although they 
lacked the necessary training. As the pace of political change 
quickened and the government became increasingly con- 
cerned about security, the public expressed dissatisfaction with 
heavy-handed military controls, Pathet Lao arrogance, and the 
excesses committed by some guerrillas. 

The emphasis on discipline, training, and reorganization 
reflected the difficulties encountered by the former Pathet Lao 
cadres in converting from a guerrilla insurgency into a national 
security force. Men taught to think of urban-dwelling lowland 
Lao as their bitter enemies found it difficult at first to treat 
them as liberated brothers (see Lowland Lao Society, ch. 2). 



287 



Laos: A Country Study 

Also, most young Pathet Lao guerrillas brought in to keep 
order in the Mekong towns were members of upland minori- 
ties who had never before been confronted with the tempta- 
tions of city life (see Upland Lao Society, ch. 2). Consequently, 
there were reports of abuses such as extortion and robbery by 
drunken Pathet Lao police officers. 

By the end of 1976, an effective police force had been estab- 
lished. Its mission was simple: to maintain basic law and order 
and strictly enforce government policies, often with little 
regard for human rights. A police academy was established at 
the former United States-built police school at Ban Donnoun, 
ten kilometers east of Vientiane, where Vietnamese and Soviet 
instructors began teaching Laotian cadres basic police proce- 
dures. The crime rate reportedly was very low. 

The academy also trained a Laotian secret police organiza- 
tion similar to the Vietnamese internal security apparatus. The 
secret police were to provide internal security for the party and 
to look for dissidents within the population, that is, those indi- 
viduals who disagreed with the LPRP's pro-Vietnamese line and 
who expressed pro-Chinese or Laotian nationalist sentiments 
that could be construed as anti-Vietnamese. By late 1978, there 
were reportedly 800 Vietnamese secret police in Laos engaged 
in military and civilian surveillance activities. By the late 1980s, 
their presence had been reduced to a few senior advisers. 

The Criminal Justice System 

Civil Liberties and Human Rights 

The criminal justice system, like every aspect of life in Laos, 
is controlled by the party and the government. There are few 
legal restraints on the often arbitrary actions — including 
arrests — by the government, and dissent is handled by sup- 
pressing basic civil rights. Although the constitution provides 
for the freedoms of worship, speech, and press, as of the early 
1990s, citizens did not feel free to exercise these rights fully. 
There are no legal safeguards, and people are frequently 
arrested on vague charges. Although a penal code and a consti- 
tution that guarantee certain civil liberties have been promul- 
gated, implementation is another matter, particularly where 
freedom of political expression is concerned. And, the media 
are state-controlled (see Mass Media, ch. 4). 



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National Security 



Nonetheless, there is a system for prosecuting criminal 
behavior. Common crimes are evaluated at the local village 
level. More serious cases, especially politically sensitive ones, 
are referred to higher authorities. People's tribunals operate at 
district and provincial levels with judges appointed by the gov- 
ernment. 

Both Laotian journalists and Western officials are critical of 
the limitations on personal freedoms. In 1987 a Laotian jour- 
nalist living in Thailand noted that there was little popular sup- 
port for the government, but that most Laotians accepted its 
authority because they had little choice. In 1988 a Laotian jour- 
nalist protested that open criticism of the government was for- 
bidden and noted that one of his friends had been imprisoned 
after he complained about the continuing lack of a constitu- 
tion. In 1988 Western diplomats reported that hundreds — per- 
haps thousands — of individuals were being held in detention 
centers around the country and that people still were being 
arrested and held for months without being charged. 

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the government instituted 
the New Economic Mechanism, a series of sweeping economic 
reforms geared toward establishing a market-oriented econ- 
omy. Along with these economic reforms came a slight opening 
to the West, which provided some opportunity for scrutiny of 
human rights violations. However, few foreign journalists are 
allowed to visit Laos, and travel by diplomats and foreign aid 
workers is restricted. Both domestic and foreign travel by Lao- 
tians also is subject to scrutiny and restriction. 

The Ministry of Interior is the main instrument of state con- 
trol and guardianship over the criminal justice system. Ministry 
of Interior police monitor both Laotians and foreign nationals 
who live in Laos, and there is a system of informants in work- 
place committees and in residential areas. According to the 
United States Department of State's Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1993, both the party and state monitor vari- 
ous aspects of family and social life through neighborhood and 
workplace committees. These committees are responsible for 
maintaining public order and reporting "bad elements" to the 
police, as well as carrying out political training and disciplining 
employees. 

The criminal justice system is deficient in the area of legal 
precedent and representation. Trials are not held in public, 
although trial verdicts are publicly announced. Although there 



289 



Laos: A Country Study 



is some provision for appeal, it does not apply to important 
political cases. Under the constitution, judges and prosecutors 
are supposed to be independent and their decisions free from 
outside scrutiny. In practice, however, the courts appear to 
accept recommendations of other government agencies, espe- 
cially the Ministry of Interior, in making their decisions. Theo- 
retically, the government provides legal counsel to the accused. 
In practice, however, defendants represent themselves without 
outside counsel. The government suspended the bar in late 
1992, pending new rules on the activities of private lawyers, 
thereby paving the way for private lawyers to practice in Laos. 
Meanwhile, persons accused of crimes have to defend them- 
selves. 

In 1992 the government launched a campaign to dissemi- 
nate the new constitution, adopted by the National Assembly in 
1991. The leadership touted its efforts at developing a legal sys- 
tem with a codified body of laws and a penal code. By most 
Western accounts, however, as of mid-1994, there had been lit- 
tle, if any, progress in implementing the freedoms provided for 
in the constitution. Although the National Assembly had 
enacted a criminal code and laws establishing a judiciary in 
November 1989, as of mid-1994 these codes still had not been 
implemented. Individuals are still being held without being 
informed of the charges or their accusers' identities. 

Detention Centers 

There were four categories of persons held in confinement. 
Aside from common criminals, there were political, social, and 
ideological deviants. The crimes of the three latter groups were 
often vaguely defined, their arrests arbitrary, and their length 
of confinement ambiguous. 

The LPDR established four different types of detention cen- 
ters: prisons, reeducation centers or seminar camps, rehabilita- 
tion camps, and remolding centers. Social deviants or common 
criminals were considered less threatening to the regime than 
persons accused of political crimes, who were considered 
potential counterrevolutionaries. Social deviants were confined 
in rehabilitation camps. According to MacAlister Brown and 
Joseph J. Zasloff, prisons were primarily for common criminals, 
but political prisoners also were held there for short periods, 
usually six to twelve months. Ideologically suspect persons were 
sent to remolding centers. Reeducation centers were for those 



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National Security 



deemed politically risky, usually former RLG officials. Political 
prisoners usually served three- to five-year terms or longer. As 
at the prisons, inmates worked hard under rugged conditions 
and had limited supplies of food. Oddly, there was little politi- 
cal indoctrination. Bribery in order to secure food and medi- 
cine was reported. 

In 1986 Brown and Zasloff also reported that prisoners were 
not tried but were incarcerated simply by administrative fiat. 
Former inmates said that they were arrested, informed by the 
security officials that they had been charged with crimes, and 
then sent off to camps for indeterminate periods. Typically, 
prisoners were told one day prior to their release to prepare for 
departure. 

The status of the detention centers also is vague. In 1984 
Vientiane declared that all reeducation centers had been 
closed. At that time, Amnesty International estimated 6,000 to 
7,000 political prisoners were held in these centers. The gov- 
ernment acknowledged that there were some former inmates 
in remote areas but claimed that their confinement was volun- 
tary. In the late 1980s, the government released most of the 
detainees. As of mid-1994, the exact number of political prison- 
ers was unknown. 

In 1989 Laos took steps to reduce the number of political 
prisoners, many of whom had been held since 1975. Several 
hundred detainees, including many high-ranking officials and 
officers from the former United States-backed RLG and Royal 
Lao Army, were released from reeducation centers in the 
northeastern province of Houaphan. Released prisoners 
reported that hundreds of individuals remained in custody in 
as many as eight camps. Included among those in custody were 
at least six generals and former high-ranking members of the 
RLG. These individuals reportedly performed manual labor 
such as cutting logs, repairing roads, and building irrigation 
systems. In 1993 Amnesty International reported human rights 
violations in the continued detention of three "prisoners of 
conscience" — detained since 1975 but not sentenced until 
1992 — as well as those held under restrictions or the subjects of 
unfair trials according to international standards. 

As of 1993, reports indicated that some high-ranking offi- 
cials of the RLG and military remained in state custody. Those 
accused of hostility to the regime are subject to arrest and con- 
finement for long periods of time. Prison conditions are harsh, 



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Laos: A Country Study 

and prisoners are routinely denied family visitation and proper 
medical care. Prisons are not independently monitored. 

Narcotics and Counternarcotics Issues 

Laos is the world's third largest producer of opium — prima- 
rily in the northern provinces. Narcotics trafficking in Laos is 
difficult to control because of the remoteness of many border 
areas, their attendant lack of communications, and the scarcity 
of resources, all of which which make stationing officials at 
many of the border crossings difficult. Nevertheless, several 
counternarcotics policy initiatives have been undertaken. 

During the late 1980s, narcotics control became an impor- 
tant United States concern because Laos is a major producer of 
opium and marijuana. In 1987 Laos began to cooperate with 
the United States in drug control efforts when it requested 
assistance in providing a viable crop alternative to opium farm- 
ers. Increased efforts on counternarcotics cooperation have 
been evident since January 1990 when a memorandum of 
understanding on the Bilateral Cooperation of Narcotics Issues 
was signed. This agreement focused on ways for the United 
States to provide antinarcotics programs. The United States 
provided narcotics-related training to a number of Laotian offi- 
cials in June 1990 and again in August 1991. And, in 1992 
United States Customs Service officials held a training session 
in Vientiane for Laotian customs officers and other officials. 
Since then, Laotian officials have also traveled to Australia, 
Japan, and Europe for counternarcotics cooperation training. 

In late 1992, as part of the continuing counternarcotics 
effort, the LPDR Customs Department set up an antismuggling 
unit in Vientiane. The Council of Ministers approved the for- 
mation of this counternarcotics police unit, operationally 
under the Ministry of Interior but with policy controlled by the 
Lao National Committee on Drug Control and Supervision. 
Progress in the configuration of the unit was negligible. As of 
mid-1993, however, the United States was working with the 
LPDR to provide support and training for the unit, and the site 
for the unit was being renovated. 

Estimated opium production has declined annually since 
1989, largely through successful crop reduction and replace- 
ment programs that target specific areas and are funded and 
initiated by the United States and the UN Drug Control Pro- 
gram. Laos has facilitated these crop substitution programs — 



292 



United States landing craft on land along the Mekong River in 
Vientiane, now used as storage containers 
Courtesy Gina Merris 

aimed at developing alternative crops and occupations — in 
Houaphan, Vientiane, and Xiangkhoang provinces. In 1989 
there were an estimated 42,130 hectares of land deemed 
"potentially harvestable" for cultivating opium. By 1993 there 
were approximately 26,040 hectares. The potential opium yield 
declined from 380 tons in 1989 to 230 tons in 1992 and to 180 
tons in 1993. The United States government estimated that 
opium production in Laos had declined some 27 percent in 

1990 over the previous year, approximately 13 percent from 

1991 to 1992, and about 22 percent from 1992 to 1993, the lat- 
ter mainly as a result of adverse weather because the estimated 
hectarage under cultivation did not decrease. 

Decreased opium cultivation and production are also the 
result of increased law enforcement efforts, narcotics-related 
arrests and crop seizures, and a greater effort to disseminate 
information on the disadvantages of drug trafficking. Although 
the government tends to deny that it has a domestic drug prob- 
lem, a public awareness program stressing the dangers of drug 
use and trafficking has been established, and, as part of the 
information and education campaign, there has been 
increased publicity on penalties for offenses. 

In April 1993, Laos was certified ("with explanation") for 
narcotics cooperation in 1992 by the United States Department 
of State. (Certification is granted for performance in narcotics 
cooperation in the previous calendar year and is categorized by 
cooperation or certification, noncooperation or decertifica- 
tion, and national interest waiver.) Certification guarantees 
Laos increased United States cooperation and funding of coun- 



293 



Laos: A Country Study 



ternarcotics programs. Certification (with explanation), how- 
ever, stipulates that in order to receive full United States 
support. Laos has to take visible, significant, and continuing 
action to improve the enforcement of antinarcotics laws, which 
were first enacted in November 1989. Other reasons for the 
designation certification with explanation include the slow 
pace of cooperation with officials from the United States Drug 
Enforcement Administration and allegations of involvement in 
drusr trafficking bv higrh-level members of the government. 

In April 1994, the United States granted Laos a national 
interest waiver for certification of narcotics cooperation in 
1993. It was determined that the waiver was preferable to 
decertification or certification and was in the United States 
national interest in order to exact continued cooperation on 
the POW ML\ issue. 

Previous efforts — although modest — to curb the drug trade 
continue. At the same time, however, corruption among Chil- 
ian and military personnel and their collusion in narcotics 
activities reportedly continue as well. In 1993 the prime minis- 
ter ordered the provinces to organize antidrug committees and 
cooperate with the Lao National Committee on Drug Control 
and Supervision. Cooperation is to take the form of publicizing 
existing laws and regulations and educating the public on the 
dangers of drugs. 

For the foreseeable future, drug production and trafficking 
will likely remain serious problems. Still, the 27 percent drop in 
opium cultivation, coupled with the arrests of drug traffickers 
and the government's stated commitment to take further 
action on enforcement, are encouraging. Laos has also signed 
a memorandum of understanding with China and Thailand on 
strengthening regional cooperation in controlling illicit drugs. 
In the near term, the United States will probably continue to 
assist Laos in efforts to decrease opium cultivation and produc- 
tion through crop substitution programs. 

This improvement in the narcotics arena is indicative of the 
overall improvement in the country's national security situa- 
tion. Since 1988 Laos has experienced a period of relative calm 
in its turbulent historv. It has been at peace with its neighbors, 
and its internal armed resistance movement has been reduced 
to a mere annoyance. It is doubtful, however, that the armed 
forces will modernize much in the 1990s, unless the country's 
overall economic situation improves or a new political patron 



294 



National Security 



emerges. It is more likely that the military will lag farther and 
farther behind its stronger neighbors. 

One of the last holdouts of communist ideology in the 
world, Laos has slowly opened its doors to the West in order to 
improve its economic situation. In mid-1994, however, Laos was 
still a long way from providing its citizens with the basic civil 
rights fundamental to Western societies: there are few personal 
freedoms, no freedom of the press or assembly, and harsh 
prison conditions for citizens who deviate from the party line. 

* * * 

Detailed and current reference material on the military 
forces and judicial and penal systems is difficult to obtain. Sev- 
eral books written in the mid- to late 1980s are recommended 
for a good overview of the security situation. These include 
Martin Stuart-Fox's Contemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and 
Society of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and MacAlister 
Brown and Joseph Zasloffs Apprentice Revolutionaries: The Com- 
munist Movement in Laos, 1930-85. Written information on mili- 
tary training and equipment is sparse. The Institute for 
Strategic Studies' annual Military Balance is the best source of 
information on the status of military equipment. The Asia Year- 
book also yields some information on national security issues. 
The United States Department of State's annual publications, 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report and Country Reports 
on Human Rights Practices, provide yearly updates on narcotics 
production, counternarcotics operations, and human rights. 
(For further information and complete citations, see Bibliogra- 
phy.) 



295 



Appendix 



Table 

1 Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

2 Estimated Population by Province, 1992 

3 Population by Ethnic Group, 1985 

4 Production of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90 

5 Yields of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90 

6 Industrial Production, Selected Years, 1980-90 

7 Value of Major Manufactures, Selected Years, 1980-90 

8 Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90 

9 Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985-91 

10 Major Exports, 1985, 1987, and 1989 

11 Balance of Trade in Convertible and Nonconvertible Cur- 

rencies, Selected Years, 1982-91 

12 Foreign Aid Statistics, Selected Years, 1984-91 

13 External Debt, Selected Years, 1985-91 

14 Armed Forces Personnel, Selected Years, 1974-93 

15 Major Equipment of the Armed Forces, 1994 

16 Military Expenditures Compared with the Gross National 

Product, Selected Years, 1974-93 



297 



Appendix 



Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors 

When you know Multiply by To find 



Millimeters 


0.04 


inches 




0.39 


inches 


Meters 


3.3 


feet 


Kilometers 


0.62 


miles 




2.47 


acres 


Square kilometers 


0.39 


square miles 


Cubic meters 


35.3 


cubic feet 


Liters 


0.26 


gallons 


Kilograms 


2.2 


pounds 


Metric tons 


0.98 


long tons 




1.1 


short tons 




2,204 


pounds 


Degrees Celsius (Centigrade) 


1.8 


degrees Fahrenheit 



and add 32 



299 



Laos: A Country Study 

Table 2. Estimated Population by Province, 1992 

Province Population 



Attapu 83,000 

Bokeo 1 104,000 

Bolikhamxai 151,000 

Champasak 477,000 

Houaphan 232,000 

Khammouan 258,000 

LouangNamtha 125,000 

Louangphrabang 355,000 

Oudomxai 1 188,000 

Phongsali 149,000 

Saravan 237,000 

Savannakhet 673,000 

Xaignabouri 195,000 

Xekong 59,000 

Xiangkhoang 191,000 

Vientiane 321,000 

Vientiane Municipality 489,000 

Special zone 2 73,000 

TOTAL 4,360,000 

1 The populations of Bokeo and Oudomxai provinces have been adjusted to reflect the redistricting of Pak- 
tha and Pha Oudom districts from Oudomxai Province to Bokeo Province in 1992. 

2 The special zone consists of Hongsa and Xianghon districts, formerly of Xaignabouri Province. 

Source: Based on information from Laos, State Statistical Centre, Committee for Plan- 
ning and Cooperation, Basic Statistics about the Socio-economic Development in thi 
Lao P.D.R, Vientiane, 1993, 26. 



300 



Appendix 



Table 3. Population by Ethnic Group, 1985 

Ethnic Group 
Subgroup 



Lao Loum 

Lao 1,804,101 

PhuThai 441,497 

Lue 102,760 

Total Lao Loum 2,348,358 

Lao Theung 

Kammu 389,694 

Katang 72,391 

Makong 70,382 

Suai 49,049 

Nyuan 33,240 

Loven 28,057 

Ta-oi 24,577 

Taliang 23,665 

Chali 20,902 

Phong 18,165 

Lavae 16,434 

Katu 14,676 

Lamet 14,355 

Htin 13,977 

Alak ; 13,217 

Pako 12,293 

Oi 11,194 

Ngae 8,917 

Chaeng 4,540 

Nyaheun 3,960 

Yang 3,447 

Yae 3,376 

Saek 2,459 

SamTao 2,359 

SingMun 2,164 

Turn 2,042 

Mon 2,022 

Bit 1,530 

Sila 1,518 

Nguan 988 

Lolo 842 

Hayi 727 

Lawi 584 

Sedang 520 

Khmer 169 

Kri.. 110 



301 



Laos: A Country Study 

Table 3. Population by Ethnic Group, 1985 

Ethnic Group „ . . 

„ , r Population 

Subgroup r 

Numbri 67 

Total Lao Theung 868,609 

Lao Sung 

Hmong 231,168 

Akha 57,500 

Phu Noi . 23,618 

Mien(Yao) 18,091 

Lahu '. 9,200 

Kui 6,493 

Ho 6,361 

Total Lao Sung 352,431 

Other 

Vietnamese 12,086 

Chinese 2,624 

Thai 1,459 

Cambodian 274 

Burmese 185 

Indian 44 

French 13 

Total Other 16,685 

TOTAL 3,586,083 

Source: Based on information from Laos, National Committee of Plan, Population Cen- 
sus of 1985, Vientiane, 1986. 



302 



Appendix 



Table 4. Production oj Major Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90 
(in thousands of tons) 



Crop 


1980 


1985 


1987 


1989 


1990 1 


Cardamom 


n.a 2 


n.a. 


0.4 


1.7 


2.7 


Coffee 3 


4.4 


6.1 


7.0 


5.4 


5.3 


Corn 


28.4 


33.3 


35.7 


43.8 


81.9 


Cotton 


4.9 


2.9 


4.0 


4.4 


5.0 


Fruit 


15.2 


48.0 


32.2 


53.0 


55.0 


Mung beans 


1.6 


1.5 


1.9 


3.1 


3.2 


Peanuts 


7.9 


5.2 


5.8 


5.9 


8.0 


Rice 


1,053.1 


1,395.2 


1,232.5 


1,404.0 


1,508.4 


Soybeans 


3.3 


2.1 


3.4 


4.9 


4.5 


Sugarcane 


24.1 


73.0 


81.8 


126.0 


111.9 


Sweet potatoes 


80.3 


85.4 


103.5 


159.2 


162.8 


Tobacco 4 


16.6 


15.7 


22.7 


33.5 


58.4 


Vegetables 


42.6 


39.4 


40.6 


65.7 


60.7 



Estimated. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

3 In dried beans. 

4 In green leaves. 



Source: Based on information from Environment, Natural Resources, and the Future Devel- 
opment of Laos and Vietnam: Papers from a Seminar, Fairfax, Virginia, 1991, 32. 



303 



Laos: A Country Study 



Table 5. Yields of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1980-90 
(in tons per hectare) 



Crop 


1980 


1985 


1987 


1989 


1990 1 


Card am o m 


na 2 


n.a. 2 


0.21 


0.30 


0.26 


Coffee 3 


68 


0.49 


0.48 


0.34 


0.31 


Corn 


1 00 


1 94 


1.44 


1.44 


1.70 


Cotton 


0.70 


0.56 


0.71 


0.61 


0.72 


Fruit 


6.06 


6.15 


10.49 


10.60 


10.00 


Mung beans 


0.56 


0.62 


0.65 


0.63 


0.70 


Peanuts 


0.74 


0.78 


1.23 


0.97 


0.95 


Rice 


1.44 


2.10 


2.16 


2.32 


2.30 


Soybeans 


0.69 


0.67 


0.60 


0.81 


0.81 


Sugarcane 


26.73 


27.66 


27.73 


32.93 


27.83 


Sweet potatoes 


8.80 


8.37 


7.05 


5.81 


9.32 


Tobacco 4 


4.16 


4.30 


4.11 


4.14 


4.86 


Vegetables 


8.14 


5.70 


6.79 


8.54 


7.70 



Estimated. 

2 n.a. — not available. 

3 In dried beans. 

4 In green leaves. 



Source: Based on information from Environment, Natural Resources, and the Future Devel- 
opment of Laos and Vietnam: Papers from a Seminar, Fairfax, Virginia, 1991, 32. 



304 



Appendix 



Table6. Industrial Production, Selected Years, 1980-90 

1980 1983 1985 1987 1989 1990 



Wood products (in thousands 
of cubic meters) 





04. D 


n.a. 


1/11 K 

141. i> 


oOO.U 


9Q1 Q 


3Uy.4 




119 


n.a. 


41.7 


55 


114 


7ft A 
1 o.t 




n.a. 


n.a. 


143. U 


OOO.U 


i.uoy.u 


^ can i*k 
1 ,OoU.U 


Cigarettes (in millions) . . . 


1,100 


1,100 


1,125 


1,200 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Metal products (in tons) . . 


489.2 


472.4 


138.7 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Tin plate (in thousands of 
sheets) 


981 


820 


664 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Food (in tons) 


1,037 


742 2 


1,255 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Beverages (in thousands of 
hectoliters) 


21.9 


22.8 


19.6 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Clothing (in thousands of 


260 


363 


440 


n.a. 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Hydroelectricity (in millions 
of kilowatt-hours) 


930 


1,030 


1,000 


1,050 


1,095 


n.a. 


Mining and quarrying .... 














Tin (in tons) , 


400 


362 


520 


450 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Gypsum (in thousands of 


30 


70 


100 


70 


n.a. 


n.a. 


tons) 














Salt (in tons) 


n.a. 


6.5 


9.1 


12.8 


n.a. 


n.a. 




n.a. 


750 


1,000 


1,550 


n.a. 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 
2 Excludes fish. 



Source: Based on information from Edu H. Hassing, "Potential for Private Sector 
Investments in the Industrial and Mining Sector," in Asian Development Bank 
and The Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on 
Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thai- 
land, Bangkok, 1991. 



305 



Laos: A Country Study 



Table 7. Value of Major Manufactures, Selected Years, 1980-90 
(in millions of kip) 1 

1980 1986 1988 1990 



Wood products (except furniture) 3,246 6,253 8,830 14,692 



Tobacco products 2,746 3,224 1,082 5,417 

Metal products 2,701 3,965 1,298 4,200 

Food and beverages 1,229 2,193 2,117 3,626 

Clothing 833 461 1,662 2,468 



For value of the kip — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Edu H. Hassing,. "Potential for Private Sector 
Investments in the Industrial and Mining Sector," in Asian Development Bank 
and The Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on 
Investment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3—4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thai- 
land, Bangkok, 1991. 

Table 8. Government Budget, Selected Years, 1980-90 
(in millions of kip) 1 

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 



Revenues 

Taxes .'. 98 775 1,669 1,755 21,474 44,270 

Nontax revenues ... . 650 1,980 3,278 16,748 7,057 13,975 

Total revenues .... 748 2,755 4,947 18,503 28,531 58,245 

Expenditures 

Current 1,028 2,259 4,126 14,803 28,038 65,877 

Capital 749 3,216 4,258 11,732 47,006 66,080 

Total expenditures . 1,777 5,475 8,384 26,535 75,044 131,957 

BALANCE -1,029 -2,720 -3,437 -8,032 -46,513 -73,712 



For value of the kip — see Glossary. 

Source: Based on information from Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Profile: 
Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, 1991-92, London, 1991, 54; and United 
Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Statistical 
Yearbook for Asia and the Pacific, 1991, Bangkok, 1991, 214. 



306 



Appendix 



Table 9. Balance of Payments, Selected Years, 1985-91 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1985 1987 1989 1991 





74.9 


90.5 


93.4 


109.2 




-219.3 


-233.8 


-233.9 


-249.5 


Trade balance 


-144.4 


-143.3 


-140.5 


-140.3 


Official transfers and grants (net) 


50.6 


29.1 


25.0 


88.5 


Current account balance 


-93.8 


-114.2 


-115.5 


-51.8 




47.7 


56.4 


42.8 


24.1 


Other 


50.2 


55.0 


83.2 


17.5 


Capital account balance 


97.9 


111.4 


126.0 


41.6 




19.3 


-5.3 


1.6 


-6.7 


Balance of payments 


23.4 


-8.1 


12.1 


-16.9 


Foreign exchange reserves (excluding gold) . 


25.3 


20.6 


16.1 


n.a. 1 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Tables, 1992, Baltimore, 1992, 
371; and International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 
1992, Pt 1, 43, Washington, 1992, 405. 

Table 10. MajorExports, 1985, 1987, and 1989 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

Commodity 1985 1987 1989 



Hydroelectricity 


26 


12 


15 


Timber and wood products 


11 


33 


21 


Coffee 


9 


9 


9 


Tin concentrates 


1 


2 


2 


Gypsum 


1 


2 


n.a. ] 


Other 2 


6 


6 


n.a. 


TOTAL 


54 


64 


47 



n.a. — not available. 
2 Includes gemstones, gold, and clothing. 

Source: Based on information from The Asia and Pacific Review, 1991-1992: The Economic 
and Business Report, Saffron, Walden, United Kingdom, 1991, 106; Economist 
Intelligence Unit, Country Report: Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia [London] , 
No. 1, 1992, 5; and Edu H. Hassing, "Potential for Private Sector Investments 
in the Industrial and Mining Sector," in Asian Development Bank and The 
Thai-Canada Economic Co-operation Foundation, Thai-Lao Forum on Invest- 
ment and Trade Opportunities in Lao PDR, 3-4 October 1991, Bangkok, Thailand, 
Bangkok, 1991. 



307 



Laos: A Country Study 



Table 11. Balance of Trade in Convertible and Nonconvertible 
Currencies, SelectedYears, 1982-91 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1982 


1985 


1988 


1991 


Merchandise exports 










Convertible currencies 


n.a. 1 


34.6 


36.8 


75.5 


Nonconvertible currencies 


n.a. 


19.0 


21.0 


2.4 


Total merchandise exports 


40.0 


53.6 


57.8 


77.9 


Merchandise imports 










Convertible currencies 


n.a. 


77.6 


90.4 


188.6 


Nonconvertible currencies 


n.a. 


115.6 


97.6 


4.2 


Total merchandise imports 


132.2 


193.2 


188.0 


192.8 


Balance of trade 


-92.2 


-139.6 


-130.2 


-114.9 


Percentage of imports financed by exports . . . 


20.3 


27.7 


30.7 


40.4 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Tables, 1992, Baltimore, 1992, 
371; and International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 
1992, Pt. 1, 43, Washington, 1992, 405. 



Table 12. Foreign Aid Statistics, SelectedYears, 1984-91 
(in millions of United States dollars) 





1984 


1985 


1988 


1990 


1991 


Long-term loans 












Drawings on loans received 












Convertible currencies 


10.1 


12.1 


23.7 


49.2 


34.5 


Nonconvertible currencies 


30.2 


50.0 


44.2 


2.6 


0.0 


Total drawings on loans received 


40.3 


62.1 


67.9 


51.8 


34.5 


Remaining balance on loans received 


10.9 


-31.8 


43.5 


n.a. 1 


n.a. 


Total long-term loans 


51.2 


30.3 


111.4 


n.a. 


n.a. 


Grants 












Convertible currencies 


26.7 


45.4 


21.0 


22.6 


63.9 


Nonconvertible currencies 


15.4 


4.2 


4.5 


0.8 


5.3 


Total grants 


41.2 


49.6 


25.5 


23.4 


69.2 


TOTAL 


92.4 


79.9 


136.9 


n.a. 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 



Source: Based on information from World Bank, World Tables, 1992, Baltimore, 1992, 
371 ; and International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook, 
1992, Pt. 1, 43, Washington, 1992, 406. 



308 



Appendix 



Table 13. ExternalDebt, Selected Years, 1985-91 
(in millions of United States dollars) 

1985 1987 1989 1991 



External debt 

Convertible currency 135.0 190.0 252.0 n.a. 1 

Comecon 2 342.0 536.0 695.0 n.a. 

Total external debt 3 476.0 726.0 947.0 n.a. 

Debt service 



Convertible currency 


5.0 


11.0 


12.0 


n.a. 


Other 


4.0 


2.0 


1.0 


n.a. 


Total debt service 


9.0 


13.0 


13.0 


n.a. 


Debt service as a percentage of exports 


12.0 


14.4 


13.9 


n.a. 



n.a. — not available 

Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Dissolved January 1991 . 
Figures may not add to totals because of rounding. 



Source: Based on information from Paul Marer et al., Historically Planned Economies, 
Washington, 1992, 171. 



Table 14. Armed Forces Personnel, Selected Years, 1974-93 



Year Army Navy Air Force 



1974 1 60,000 500 2,300 

1976 2 40,000 500 2,000 

1980 46,000 550 2,000 

1982 46,000 1,700 1,000 

1984 50,000 1,700 2,000 

1986 50,000 1,000 2,000 

1988 52,500 1,000 2,000 

1990 52,500 600 3 2,000 

1991 50,000 600 3 2,000 

1992 33,000 500 3 3,500 

1993 33,000 500 3 3,500 



Royal Armed Forces; 35,000 Pathet Lao troops, including dissident Neutralists. 

2 Royal Armed Forces disbanded; figures for Lao People's Army. 

3 Estimated. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance (annuals 1974—1975 through 
1993-1994), London, 1974-93. 



309 



Laos: A Country Study 



Table 15. Major Equipment of the Armed Forces, 1994 



Type and Description 



In Inventory 



Ground forces 
Tanks 

Main battle tanks: T-54-55, T-34/85 

Light tanks: PT-76 

Armored personnel carriers: BTR-40/-60/-152 
Artillery 

75mm (towed): M-l 16 pack 

105mm (towed): M-101 

122mm (towed): M-1938 and D-30 

130mm (towed): M-46 

155mm (towed): M-l 14 

Mortars 

81mm 

82mm 

107mm: M-2A1 and M-1938 

120mm: M-43 

Recoilless guns 

57mm:M-18/Al 

75mm: M-20 

106mm: M-40 

107mm: B-ll 

Air defense guns 

14.5mm: ZPU-1/-4 

23mm: ZU-23 and ZSU-23-4 SP 

37mm: M-1939 

57mm: S-60 

Surface-to-air missiles: SA-3, SA-7 

Naval forces 
Patrol craft 

PCI 

LCM 

Boats 

Air forces 

Fighters, ground attack 

MiG-21 

Transports 

An-24 

An-26 

Yak-iO 

Helicopters 3 

Mi- 

Mi^8 



30 
25 
70 



12 2 
4 

40-50 



310 



Appendix 



Table 15. Major Equipment of the Armed Forces, 1994 

Type and Description In Inventory 
Trainers 

MiG-21U 2* 

Air-to-air missiles 

AA-2 Atoll — 1 

1 Numbers not reported. 

2 Reported as "some." 

3 No armed helicopters. 

4 The Asian Defence Journal reports four MiG-21Us. The International Institute for Strategic Studies counts 
these training craft as combat capable. 

Source: Based on information from The Military Balance, 1994-1995, London, 1994, 
181-82; and Asian Defence Journal [Kuala Lumpur] , January 1993, 108. 



Table 16. Military Expenditures Compared with the Gross National 
Product, Selected Years, 1974-93 
(in millions of United States dollars) 



Year Military Expenditures GNP 



1974 27.0 n.a. 1 

1977 42.0 256 

1978 29.0 260 2 

1979 37.9 n.a. 

1980 21.0 400 

1982-88 . r n.a. 3 n.a. 

1989 18.9 2 n.a. 

1992 102.2 4 n.a. 

1993 104.9 4 n.a. 



n.a. — not available. 

2 Estimated. 

3 Military assistance estimated at US$125 million in 1983. 

4 Includes public security budget. 

Source: Based on information from T/ie Military Balance (annuals 1974-1975 through 
1993-1994), London, 1974-93. 



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United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. 

Background Notes: Laos. (Department of State Publication No. 

8874.) Washington: GPO, March 1991. 
United States. Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. 

"U.S.-Lao POW/MIA Technical Meeting Concludes," Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin, January 1988, 9. 



337 



Laos: A Country Study 



United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1992. (Report submitted to United States 
Congress, 103d, 1st Session, Senate, Committee on Foreign 
Relations, and House of Representatives, Committee on For- 
eign Affairs.) Washington: GPO, 1993. 

United States. Department of State. Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices for 1993. (Report submitted to United States 
Congress, 103d, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Com- 
mittee on Foreign Affairs, and Senate, Committee on For- 
eign Relations.) Washington: GPO, 1994. 

United States. Embassy in Vientiane. Briefing Paper on Lao Nar- 
cotics Issues. Washington: February 1993. 

United States. Embassy in Vientiane. Laos: 1993 World Refugee 
Report, 3. Washington: February 1993. 

United States. Embassy in Vientiane. Soldiers Guide: Laos. Wash- 
ington: February 5, 1993. 

Vongsavanh, Soutchay. RLG Military Operations and Activities in 
the Laotian Panhandle. (Indochina Monographs.) Washing- 
ton: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1981. 

White, Peter T. "Laos," National Geographic, 171, No. 6, June 
1987, 772-95. 

Willwerth, J. "Excavating the Recent Past: Search for MIAs," 
Time, March 4, 1985, 32. 

Wing, Roswell B., et al. Case Study of U.S. Counterinsurgency Oper- 
ations in Laos, 1955-1962. McLean, Virginia: Research Analy- 
sis, 1964. 

Zasloff, Joseph J. The Three-Village Dispute Between Laos and Thai- 
land. (Universities Field Staff International, UFSI Reports, 
No. 23.) Indianapolis: 1985. 

Zasloff, Joseph J. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia: Implications for 
U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia. (Universities Field Staff Interna- 
tional, UFSI Reports, No. 1.) Indianapolis: 1987. 

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in 
the preparation of this chapter: Asian Defence Journal [Kuala 
Lumpur], 1990-94; Asian Survey, 1978-94; Economist Intelli- 
gence Unit, Country Report: Indochina: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia 
[London], 1990-94; Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
Daily Report: East Asia, 1990-94; Indochina Chronology, 1982-94; 
Indochina Digest, 1991 -93. ) 



338 



Glossary 



Asian Development Bank — -Established in 1967, the bank assists 
in economic development and promotes growth and coop- 
eration in developing member countries. The bank is 
owned by its forty-seven member governments, which 
include both developed and developing countries in Asia 
and developed countries in the West. 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Founded in 
1967 primarily for economic cooperation and consisting 
of Brunei (since 1984), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philip- 
pines, Singapore, and Thailand. Laos has had observer sta- 
tus since 1992 and applied for membership in July 1994. 

ban — Village; grouped administratively into tasseng (q.v.) and 
muang {q.v.). 

dharma — Buddhist teaching or moral law; laws of nature, all 
that exists, real or imaginary. 

fiscal year (FY)- — October 1 to September 30. 

gross domestic product (GDP) — A value measure of the flow of 
domestic goods and services produced by an economy 
over a period of time, such as a year. Only output values of 
goods for final consumption and intermediate production 
are assumed to be included in the final prices. GDP is 
sometimes aggregated and shown at market prices, mean- 
ing that indirect taxes and subsidies are included; when 
these indirect taxes and subsidies have been eliminated, 
the result is GDP at factor cost. The word gross indicates 
that deductions for depreciation of physical assets have 
not been made. Income arising from investments and pos- 
sessions owned abroad is not included, only domestic pro- 
duction. Hence, the use of the word domestic to distinguish 
GDP from gross national product (q.v.). 

gross national product (GNP) — The gross domestic product 
(GDP — q.v.) plus net income or loss stemming from trans- 
actions with foreign countries, including income received 
from abroad by residents and subtracting payments remit- 
ted abroad to nonresidents. GNP is the broadest measure- 
ment of the output of goods and services by an economy. 
It can be calculated at market prices, which include indi- 
rect taxes and subsidies. Because indirect taxes and subsi- 
dies are only transfer payments, GNP is often calculated at 



339 



Laos: A Country Study 

factor cost by removing indirect taxes and subsidies. 
Hmong — Largest Lao Sung (q.v.) ethnic group of northern 
Laos. This tribal group dwells at higher elevations than 
other ethnic groups. During the period of the Royal Lao 
Government (RLG — q.v.), the Hmong were referred to as 
Meo. 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) — Established on July 22, 
1944, the IMF began operating along with the World Bank 
(q.v.) on December 27, 1945. The IMF is a specialized 
agency affiliated with the United Nations that takes 
responsibility for stabilizing international exchange rates 
and payments. The IMF's main business is the provision of 
loans to its members when they experience balance of pay- 
ments difficulties. These loans often carry conditions that 
require substantial internal economic adjustments by the 
recipients. In 1994 the IMF had 179 members. 

karma — Buddhist concept of the sum of one's past actions, 
which affect one's current life and future reincarnations. 

khoueng — Province; first-order administrative division. 

kip(K)— Lao currency. In June 1994, US$1=K721. 

Lao Issara (Free Laos) — Movement formed in 1945 to resist 
any attempt to return to French colonial status. 

Lao Loum — Literally translated as the valley Laotian. Inclusive 
term for people of Tai stock living in Laos, including low- 
land Lao and upland Tai. Group of lowland peoples com- 
prising the majority population of Laos; generally used to 
refer to ethnic Lao, the country's dominant ethnic group 
(approximately 66 percent of the population according to 
the 1985 census), and speaking Tai-Kadai languages, 
including Lao, Lue, Tai Dam (Black Tai), and Tai Deng 
(Red Tai). 

Lao Patriotic Front (LPF) (Neo Lao Hak Xat) — Successor to 
Neo Lao Issara (q.v.), the political arm of the Pathet Lao 
(q.v.) during the Indochina Wars (1946-75). The Lao Peo- 
ple's Liberation Army (q.v.) is its military arm. 

Lao People's Army — Formed in 1976 when the Lao People's 
Liberation Army (LPLA — q.v.) was restructured after the 
establishment of the Lao People's Democratic Republic in 
December 1975. 

Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA) — Official title of Pathet 
Lao armed forces, more commonly known as the commu- 
nist revolutionaries, or guerrilla forces. The LPLA origi- 
nated with the Latsavong detachment, formed in January 



340 



Glossary 



1949 by Kaysone Phomvihan, and steadily increased in 
number to an estimated 8,000 guerrillas in 1960 and an 
estimated 48,000 troops between 1962 and 1970. 
Lao People's Revolutionary Party (LPRP) (Phak Pasason Pati- 
vat Lao) — Founded secretly in 1955 as the Phak Pasason 
Lao (Lao People's Party — LPP); name changed in 1972. 
Seized full power and became the ruling party of Laos in 
1975. The LPRP Central Committee formulates party pol- 
icy; it is dominated by the Political Bureau (Politburo) and 
the Secretariat and maintains control by placing its mem- 
bers in key institutions throughout the government and 
the army. 

Lao Sung — Literally translated as the Laotian of the mountain 
top — those who traditionally live in the high altitudes in 
northern Laos. In official use, term denotes a category of 
ethnic groups that speak Tibeto-Burmese, Miao-Yao lan- 
guages; chiefly the Hmong (q.v.) group of highland or 
upland minorities but also the Mien (Yao) and Akha. 
According to the 1985 census, these groups make up 
approximately 10 percent of the population. 

Lao Theung — Literally, Laotian of the mountain slopes; 
group — including Kammu, Loven, and Lamet — that tradi- 
tionally lives in medium altitudes, practices swidden, or 
slash-and-burn agriculture, and speaks Mon-Khmer lan- 
guages and dialects. According to the 1985 census, approx- 
imately 24 percent of the population. Regarded as original 
inhabitants of Laos, formally referred to by ethnic Lao as 
kha, or slave. 

mandala — Indian geopolitical term referring to a variable circle 
of power centered on a ruler, his palace, and the religious 
center from which he drew his legitimacy. 

muang (muong) — Administrative district; also an independent 
principality; comprises several tasseng (q.v.), second-order 
administrative divisions. 

Neo Lao Issara (Free Laos Front) — Organization established 
by former Lao Issara (Free Laos) (q.v.) to continue anti- 
French resistance movement with the Viet Minh (q.v.); suc- 
ceeded by Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front — LPF) 
(q.v.) in 1956. 

net material product — Gross material output minus deprecia- 
tion on capital and excluding "unproductive services." 
According to the World Bank (q.v.), net material product 
is "a socialist concept of national accounts." 



341 



Laos: A Country Study 

Nonaligned Movement — Established in September 1961 with 
the aim of promoting political and military cooperation 
apart from the traditional East and West blocs. As of 1994, 
there were 107 members (plus the Palestine Liberation 
Organization), twenty-one observers, and twenty-one 
"guests." 

Pathet Lao (Lao Nation) — Literally, land of the Lao. Until 
October 1965, the name for the Lao People's Liberation 
Army (q.v.), the military arm of the Lao Patriotic Front 
(q.v.). 

Royal Lao Government (RLG) — The ruling authority in Laos 
from 1947 until the communist seizure of power in 
December 1975 and the proclamation of the Lao People's 
Democratic Republic. 

Sipsong Panna — Region in southern Yunnan Province, China, 
from which migrated many groups that now inhabit Laos. 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) — Established in 
September 1954 as a result of the 1954 Geneva Agree- 
ments to stop the spread of communism in Southeast Asia. 
SEATO never had an active military role and was ulti- 
mately disbanded in June 1977 following the success of the 
communist movements in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam 
in 1975. Original signatories to SEATO were Australia, 
Britain, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Thailand, and the United States. 

tasseng — Administrative unit; territorial subdivision of muang 
{q.v.), subdistrict grouping of ten to twenty villages. 

That Luang — Most sacred Buddhist stupa in Vientiane and site 
of annual festival on the full moon of the twelfth month. 

Theravada Buddhism — Predominant branch of Buddhism 
practiced in Laos, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. 

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) — Acronym 
retained from predecessor organization, United Nations 
International Children's Emergency Fund, established in 
December 1946. Provides funds for establishing child 
health and welfare services. 

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) — Created 
by the United Nations in 1965, the UNDP is the world's 
largest channel for multilateral technical and preinvest- 
ment assistance to low-income countries. It functions as an 
overall programming, financing, and monitoring agency. 
The actual fieldwork is done by other United Nations 
agencies. 



342 



Glossary 



United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) — 
Established by the United Nations in 1949, it did not 
become effective until 1951. The first world institution to 
aid refugees, the UNHCR seeks to ensure the humanitar- 
ian treatment of refugees and find a permanent solution 
to refugee problems. The agency deals with the interna- 
tional protection of refugees and problems arising from 
mass movements of people forced to seek refuge. 

Viet Minh — Coalition of Vietnamese national elements formed 
in May 1941 and dominated by the communists in their 
movement calling for an uprising against the French colo- 
nial government. 

World Bank — Informal name used to designate a group of four 
affiliated international institutions: the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the Interna- 
tional Development Association (IDA), the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Invest- 
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The IBRD, established 
in 1945, has as its primary purpose the provision of loans 
at market-related rates of interest to developing countries 
at more advanced stages of development. The IDA, a 
legally separate loan fund but administered by the staff of 
the IBRD, was set up in 1960 to furnish credits to the poor- 
est developing countries on much easier terms than those 
of conventional IBRD loans. The IFC, founded in 1956, 
supplements the activities of the IBRD through loans and 
assistance designed specifically to encourage the growth of 
productive private enterprises in the less developed coun- 
tries. The MIGA, founded in 1988, insures private foreign 
investment in developing countries against various non- 
commercial risk. The president and certain senior officers 
of the IBRD hold the same positions in the IFC. The four 
institutions are owned by the governments of the countries 
that subscribe their capital. To participate in the World 
Bank group, member states must first belong to the Inten- 
tional Monetary Fund (IMF — q.v.). 



343 



Index 



Abramov, Aleksandr N., 49 

acquired immune deficiency syndrome 

(AIDS), 140 
Administrative Committee of the Party 

and State School for Political Theory, 

209 

Advisory Council, 21 

Agency for International Development. 
See United States Agency for Interna- 
tional Development 

Agreement on Cooperation for the Sus- 
tainable Development of the Mekong 
River Basin (1995), xliii 

agricultural cooperatives, xxxiv, 156, 
162-63, 215 

agricultural policy, 1 62-63 

agricultural production, 85, 154, 156, 
158-59, 163 

agricultural products (see also under indi- 
vidual crops), 99, 113, 155-56, 158-60, 
162; coffee, 158; corn, 89, 158, 159; 
crop substitution for, xxxix, 197-98, 
292-93; diversification of, 153, 158- 
59; opium, 113, 159; rice, xxix, 89, 99, 
112, 153, 154, 156, 158 

agricultural reform, 162-63 

agriculture: and the economic system, 
153-54; foreign investment in, 196; 
labor exchange in, 101-2; loans for, 
184; under New Economic Mecha- 
nism, 156, 161, 162; as percentage of 
gross domestic product, 154; self-suffi- 
ciency in, 158; subsistence, 79; swid- 
den (slash-and-burn), xxxv, 82, 86, 89, 
93,99, 104, 105, 106-7, 110, 111, 112, 
118, 119-20, 155, 164; tax on, 162; in 
urban areas, 122; work force in, 154; 
work year, 119-20 

agroforestry, xxxiii, 152 

AID. See United States Agency for Inter- 
national Development 

AIDS, See acquired immune deficiency 
syndrome 

air force, 273-74 

Akha people, 89, 110 



Aloun Mai (New Dawn) , 238 
American Friends Service Committee, 
256 

Amnesty International, xxxvii, 219, 226, 
291 

animism, xxxii, 79, 109, 117, 130-33 

Annam, 10, 15, 263 

Annamite Chain, 82, 241 

armed forces (see also army; Pathet Lao; 
Royal Lao Army), 262-76; administra- 
tion of, 270-74; budget, 182, 276; busi- 
ness ventures of, 272; conditions of 
service, 275-76; conscription for, 275; 
corruption in, 294; development 
projects of, xl; financial assistance for, 
272; under French rule, 264; historical 
background, 262-70; materiel of, 271- 
72, 284; militia, 274; missions of, 272; 
number of personnel in, xl, 274-75; 
paramilitary, 287-88; party members 
in, xxxvi; provincial, 274; reduced, xl; 
structure of, 270-74; training, 284; 
women in, 276 

army (Lao People's Army), xl, 105, 262, 
271-73; deployment of, 237, 272; joint 
ventures of, xl-xli, 194; Khamtai as 
chief of staff of , 217; training of, 245 

ASEAN. See Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations 

Asian-African Conference (1955), 36 

Asian Development Bank, xxxiv-xxxv, 
169, 184, 198, 255-56 

Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), xxxviii, 256-57 

Australia: financial assistance from, 
xxxiv, 169, 197, 243, 254, 256; food aid 
from, 198; in SEATO, 266; study 
abroad in, 242, 254 

balance of payments, 152, 187-99 
Ban Chiang people, xxix, 5 
Bangkok, 193 

banks and banking, 183-84 
Banque d'Etat de la Republique 
Democratique Populaire du Laos, 183 



345 



Laos: A Country Study 



Banque pour le Commerce Exterieur 
Lao. See Foreign Trade Bank 

Ban Vinai Hmong refugee camp, 283 

Battle of Thakhet (Khammouan) 
(1946), 29, 264 

Battle of Vientiane, 51-52 

BCEL. See Foreign Trade Bank 

Bilateral Cooperation of Narcotics Issues 
(1990), 292 

birth control, 86, 87 

blockades: of Bangkok, 16; by France, 
16; by Thailand, 48,50 

Bong Souvannavong, 34 

border problems: with Thailand, xlii, 4, 
73, 247-18, 283-284-86 

borders, xxix, 81; with Burma, xxix, 82; 
with Cambodia, xxix, 19, 82; with 
China, xxix, 74, 82; with Thailand, 
xxix, xlii, 4, 73, 81, 247-48, 284-86; 
with Vietnam, xxix, 73, 82 

Boungnavath, 27 

Bounkeut Sangsomsak, 286 

Boun Khong, 16, 21 

Boun Ma, 35 

Boun Om, 51, 66 

Boun Oum, 28, 31, 47, 51, 56 

Boun Oum-Phoumi Nosavan govern- 
ment, 55 

Boun Phavet festival, 126-27 

Bounphone Maekthepharak, 35, 69 

Britain, 28, 31,48,54, 170, 190 

Brown, MacAlister, 290, 291 

Brown, Winthrop C, 48, 49 

Buddhism (see also Buddhist clergy; wat), 
xxxiii, 8, 21, 124-26, 128-30, 227; edu- 
cation under, 80, 102, 128, 133; gov- 
ernment control of, xxxii, 70, 124, 
233; in village life, 101, 102, 145 

Buddhism, Mahayana, 7, 124-25 

Buddhism, Tan trie, 6 

Buddhism, Theravada, xxxii, 5, 7, 8, 79, 
124, 125-26 

Buddhist clergy (sangha) , 70, 124, 125- 
26, 128-29, 233 

Buddhist Lent, 126 

budget deficit. See government budget 
Buell, Edgar "Pop", 40 
Bulgaria: trade with, 189 
bureaucracy. See civil service 
Burma, xliii; border with, xxix, 82; inva- 
sions from, 9; relations with, 239, 261 



Cambodia: border with, xxix, 19, 82; in 
Mekong River Commission, xliii; rela- 
tions with, 261 

Canada: in International Control Com- 
mission, 35, 269 

Candapuri kingdom (see also Vientiane), 
5 

Canthaphanit, 7 

census of 1985,86, 121 

Central Bank, 183, 184 

Central Banking Law (1990), 183 

Central Committee, 161, 208-9 

Central Intelligence Agency. See United 

States Central Intelligence Agency 
Cham empire, 3 
Cham people, xxix, 5 
Chamber of People's Representatives, 27 
Champa, 9 

Champasak, Kingdom of, 9, 19 
Champasak, principality of, xxx, 239 
Chao Anou, 9, 10, 11, 12 
Chao Fa (Lords of the Sky), 280 
Chao Hung, 14-15 
Chao Noi, 11-12 
ChaoXan, 12, 13 
Chatichai Choonhaven, 248 
chemical weapons, 235, 253-54, 282 
children: custody of, 98, 116; household 
tasks of, 100; mortality rate of, xxxiii, 
81, 87, 137-38 
China: migration from, 111; withdrawal 

of troops by, 29 
China, People's Republic of, xliii; aid 
from, xxxiv, xxxviii, 198, 249; border 
with, xxix, 74, 82; Hmong in, 262, 283; 
investment by, 250; Mien in, 262; mili- 
tary support from, 278; political sup- 
port from, 48; refugees in, xxxviii, 
235, 283; relations with, xxxviii, 42, 55, 
74, 244, 246, 249-50; state visit to, 216, 
250; trade with, xxxviii, 189, 190, 249, 
250 

China, Republic of (Taiwan), 42 
Chinese People's Liberation Army: joint 

venture with, xl-xli, 194 
Choummali Saignason, 270-71 
Christianity, 117 

CIA. See United States Central Intelli- 
gence Agency 

Civil Air Transport. See United States 
Civil Air Transport 

civil aviation, 179 



346 



Index 



civil rights, 288-90 

civil service, 206, 227-28, 229; and bud- 
get deficit, 182; corruption in, 228; 
and foreign policy, 242; under French 
rule, 21, 227; under Japanese rule, 22- 
23; training of, 242; Vietnamese in, 23, 
227; wages of, 182, 186 

clans, 79, 107-8, 117 

climate, xxix, 79, 82-85, 120, 156, 162 

coffee, xxxiii, 188, 192, 193 

Committee for the Defense of the 
National Interests (CDNI), 41 

Committee for the Propagation of Party 
Policies, 209 

Committee of Independence, 26 

Committee of Information, Press, Radio 
and Television Broadcasting, 238 

communications. See telecommunica- 
tions 

communists. See Indochinese Commu- 
nist Party; Lao People's Party; Lao 
People's Revolutionary Party; Pathet 
Lao 

Constituent Assembly, 30 
constitution of 1947, xxx, 30, 47 
constitution of 1991, xxxvi, 153, 219-21, 
224-27; criticism and discussion of, 
220-21; democratic centralism under, 
225; drafting of, 219, 220; economic 
policy under, 225; environment under, 
226; ethnic groups under, 225; foreign 
investment under, 195; government 
structure under, 221, 224; human 
rights under, 288; legal system under, 
290; legislature under, 229-31; mass 
organizations under, 225; party under, 
206, 224-25; political parties under, 
220-21; private property under, 225; 
religion under, 225; rights under, 225, 
226, 288 
construction, 172 
contraception. See birth control 
Convention Modifying the Treaty Con- 
cluded on October 3, 1893 (1904), 19 
Corporation for Agro-Forestry Develop- 
ment and Service, xl 
corruption, xxxvii, 72, 228, 248, 294 
Counter Coup d'Etat Committee, 47 
counternarcotics, 113; certification, 
xxxix-xl, 253, 286, 293-94; issues, 
292-95; training, 292 
coup deforce (1945) , 22, 264 



coups d'etat: of 1286, 7; of 1960, xxxi, 

45-46, 267 
coups d'etat, attempted: of 1940, 21; of 

1964,59; of 1974, 65 
criminal code, 232, 288, 289, 290 
criminal justice system, 288-92 
Cua Lo, 193 
currency, 187, 255 
Customs Department, 292 
Czechoslovakia: trade with, 189 

Damrong Tayanin, 106, 108, 155 
Da Nang, 193 

Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos 

and its Protocol (1962), 57 
Decouxjean, 20 
defense spending, 182, 276 
de Gaulle, Charles, 25 
Democratic Party (Praxathipatay): in 

elections of 1951, 34; in elections of 

1955, 37 

demonstrations. Apolitical demonstra- 
tions 

Denmark: investment by, 1 69 

Department of Geology and Mines, 170 

detention centers. See seminar camps 

Deuane Sunnalath, 51, 57 

diet, 106, 137, 138, 140 

district centers, 94, 121 

divorce, 98, 116 

Dooley, Tom, 40 

Doudart de Lagree, Ernest, 101 

drought, 85, 153, 156, 162, 166, 168, 187, 

188, 189, 191 
drugs. See opium; narcotics 
Dulles, John Foster, 35, 37, 38-39 
Dvaravati kingdom, 5 

East Germany. See German Democratic 
Republic 

economic planning (see also under indi- 
vidual plans) , 151 

economic plans: First Five-Year Plan 
(1981-85), 151-52; Second Five-Year 
Plan (1986-90), 152, 153; Third Five- 
Year Plan (1991-95), 153 

economic reform, xxxiv, 151, 152, 199- 
200 

economy: command, xxxiii; market, 151, 

162,213-14, 215, 216, 246 
education (see also schools), xxxiii, 80- 

81, 133-37, 145; Buddhist, 80, 102, 



347 



Laos: A Country Study 



128, 133; under French rule, 133, 134; 
foreign, 135-36, 198, 242, 251, 254; as 
percentage of budget, 136-37; pri- 
mary, 134, 136; postsecondary, 136; 
problems in, 80, 135; religious, 80, 
102, 128; in rural areas, 102, 135; sec- 
ondary, 135-36; spending on, 136-37; 
textbooks, 137; in urban areas, 135 

elections, 228; to Constituent Assembly, 
30; to National Assembly, xxxvi-xxxvii, 
34, 40, 229, 231; to Supreme People's 
Assembly, xxxvi, 72; of 1951, 34; of 
1955, 37; of 1958, 40-42; of 1960, 44- 
45; of 1972, 60; of 1975, 67; of 1988, 
72; of 1989, 72, 231; of 1992, xxxvii 

electric power (see also hydroelectric 
power), 123, 168-69 

energy resources (see also electric power; 
see also under individual energy sources) , 
167-70 

environment, 152, 163-66, 226 

ethnic groups (see also under individual 
groups), xxxii, 81, 87, 89, 118, 261; clas- 
sification of, 87, 89; under constitu- 
tion of 1991, 225; discrimination 
against, xxxii, 89, 110, 118, 261-62; 
diversity of, 81, 87-91, 94, 104, 145; 
under French rule, 89; geographic dis- 
tribution of , 81 , 95 , 1 04, 1 1 0, 1 1 7 

Ethnic Liberation Organization of Laos, 
279-80 

exchange rate, 183, 187 

executive branch, 228-29 

exports (see also under individual prod- 
ucts) , xxxiii, 152, 188-93; of coffee, 
xxxiii, 188, 192; of forest products, 
xxxiii, xxxv, 118, 161-62, 188-89; 
growth of, 188; of hydroelectricity, 
xxxiii, xxxv, 166, 168, 186, 188, 241; 
production of, 188; state monopoly 
on, 192 

Express Transit Organization (Thai- 
land), 193 
external debt, 199 

Fabre, (Major) , 24, 26 

families: Hmong, 114; Lao Loum, 98; 

Lao Theung, 1 07 
FaNgieo, 8 

Fa Ngum, xxix, 8, 262-63 
FAO. See United Nations Food and Agri- 
culture Organization 



Fa Phi Fa, 8 

Faydang Lobliayao, 28 

Federal Republic of Germany. See Ger- 
many, Federal Republic of 

Federation of Women's Unions, 87, 225; 
publications of, 239 

financial sector, 183-84, 186-87 

Finland: investment by, 169 

First Battalion of Chasseurs Laotiens, 
264 

fishing, 99-100, 106, 154, 156, 160, 198 
food, xxxiii, 86, 99, 120, 159, 160, 187 
food aid, 156, 159, 198, 252; from Austra- 
lia, 198; from the Netherlands, 198; 
from Thailand, 198; from the United 
States, 198, 252 
foreign assistance, xxxiv, 123, 151, 156, 
196-99, 240, 243-44, 254; from Asian 
Development Bank, xxxiv-xxxv, 169, 
198, 255-56; from Australia, xxxiv, 
197, 254, 256; from China, xxxiv, xxx- 
viii, 198, 249; dependence on, 180, 
198-99, 244, 272, 276; from East Ger- 
many, 251; from France, xxxiv, 197, 
254; from Germany, 198, 254; from 
Hungary, 251; and imports, 189; from 
International Monetary Fund, 255-56; 
from Japan, xxxiv, 197, 198, 240, 254- 
55, 256; from Mongolia, 251; prob- 
lems with, 198-99; from Russia, xxxiv, 
251; from the Soviet Union, xxxiv, 72, 
137, 196, 197, 246, 250, 276; from Swe- 
den, xxxiv, 197, 254, 256; from UNDP, 
169, 198, 255-56; from the United 
States, xxxi, 40, 46-47, 70-71, 252; 
value of, 196-97; from Vietnam, xxxiv, 
197, 251, 276, 284; from the World 
Bank, xxxiv-xxxv, 255-56 
foreign exchange, 161, 168, 187, 244 
Foreign Exchange Decree, 184 
foreign investment, xxxiv, 151, 152, 169, 
194-96, 219, 244, 248, 250, 254; in 
agriculture, 196; by Australia, 169, 
254; by China, 250; by Denmark, 169; 
encouragement of, 194-95; by Fin- 
land, 169; in forestry, 196; in hydro- 
electricity, 169; by Japan, 169; in 
manufacturing, 196; in mining, 196; 
under New Economic Mechanism, 
194; by Norway, 169; in service sector, 
196; by Sweden, 169; by Thailand, 169, 
248; in tourism, 196 



348 



Index 



Foreign Investment Law (1988), 194, 
195 

Foreign Investment Management Com- 
mittee, 195 

foreign policy, xxxv, xxxviii, xxxix, 239- 
57; and economy, 242-44; goals of, 
241-42; influences on, 240 

foreign service, 242 

Foreign Trade Bank (Banque pour le 
Commerce Exterieur Lao — BCEL), 
183-84 

forestry (see also agroforestry; timber), 
160-62; foreign investment in, 196; 
loans for, 184; technical assistance for, 
198 

forests, 82; deforestation of, 160-61, 
163-64; exports from, xxxiii, xxxv, 
118, 161, 188-89; preservation of, 86; 
rival claims to, 247-48 

France: aid from, xxxiv, 197, 254; block- 
ade of Bangkok by (1893), 16; depen- 
dence on, 242; as enemy, 208, 213; 
exploration by, 10; at Geneva Confer- 
ence (1954), 34-35; at Geneva Confer- 
ence (1961-62), 56; migration to, 92; 
and military mission, 42, 266; petro- 
leum exploration by, 170; relations 
with, 30; trade with, 190 

Franco-Lao General Convention (1949), 
31 

Franco-Laotian guerrillas, 22, 23, 24, 27- 
29 

Franco-Laotian Treaty of Protectorate 
between France and the Kingdom of 
Louangphrabang (1941), 20-21 
Franco-Lao Treaty of Amity and Associa- 
tion (1953), 34 
Franco-Siamese agreement (1946), 30 
Franco-Siamese convention (1886), 16 
Franco-Siamese treaty (1856), 15 
Franco-Siamese treaty (1893), 16 
Free Laos Front. SeeNeo Lao Issara 
French protectorate, xxx, 15-16, 19-21, 

22, 23-24, 240, 263-66 
French rule (see also Indochina, French), 
xxx, 3^4, 15-16, 19-30, 34, 227, 266; 
education under, 133, 134; ethnic 
groups under, 89; opium production 
under, 113 
French Union High Command, 265 
Friendship Bridge, xxxv, 178, 193, 249, 
254 



Fun an, 5 

Garnier, Francis, 10 
gas, natural, 170 
GDP. See gross domestic product 
General Military Committee: Khamtai 
in, 218 

Geneva Conference on Indochina 
(1954), xxx, 34-35; armistice agree- 
ment, 4, 265 

Geneva Conference on Laos (1961-62), 
xxxi, 54, 56-57, 267-68 

German Democratic Republic (East Ger- 
many): aid from, 251; study abroad in, 
136 

Germany, Federal Republic of: aid from, 
198, 254 

GNP. See gross national product 

gold, 170, 171 

Golden Triangle, 261 

government (see also Lao People's Revo- 
lutionary Party), xxxvi, 229; export 
monopoly of, 192; inner cabinet of, 
218; structure of, 220, 224, 227-33 

government, coalition (1957), xxxi, 38, 
39 

government, coalition (1962), xxxi, 56- 
57 

government, local, 212, 229; structure, 

under constitution, 224, 226 
government budget and revenue, 180- 

82 

government spending, 182; on defense, 
182; on education, 136-37; on health, 
141; on infrastructure, 182 

Green Star, 285 

gross domestic product, percentage of: 
agriculture, 154; budget deficit, 180; 
defense budget, 276; external debt, 
199; industry, 166; service sector, 172; 
trade deficit, 191 

gross national product, (GNP), 181-82; 
construction as percentage of, 172; 
per capita, xxxiii, 151 

Group 100,43 

Group 959, 43^4, 48, 65 

gypsum, 170, 188 

Harmand, Jules, 10 
Harriman, W. Averell, 56; 58-59 
health and health care, 81, 137-38, 140- 
42; facilities, 122, 141; future of, 145; 



349 



Laos: A Country Study 



government spending on, 141; hospi- 
tals, 141; and nutrition, 138-40; pro- 
fessionals, 40, 141-42; traditional, 142; 
of women, 87 
Hmong guerrillas: anticommunist insur- 
gency of, 234, 248-49, 269, 279-80, 
286; in First Indochina War, 27, 28, 29, 
265, 281-83; offensives against, 60, 66, 
235, 264; raids by, xxxvi, 118, 264; in 
Second Indochina War, 53, 58, 60, 
279-80, 281-83; support for, 249, 268, 
281 

Hmong people (see also villages, 
Hmong), 89, 110, 281-83; agriculture 
of, 111, 113-14; in China, 262, 283; 
clans, 114; emigration by, xxxvii-iii, 
249, 278; evacuation of, 66, 282; festi- 
vals of, 120; gender roles of, 116-17; 
geographic distribution of, 281; 
households, 114; kinship, 114; live- 
stock of, 117; marriage, 114-16; 
migration of, into Laos, 10, 111; New 
Year of, 120, 132; occupations of, 117; 
opium farming by, 10, 159, 281; popu- 
lation of, 110, 111, 282; as refugees, 
92, 110, 118, 234, 248-49, 278, 279, 
283, 286; religion of, 117, 132; resettle- 
ment of, 89, 105, 118; in Second 
Indochina War, 53-54, 62-63; social 
services for, 40; in Vietnam, 262; 
wealth of, 117-18 

Ho Chi Minh, 24, 207 

Ho Chi Minh Trail, 44, 54, 58, 59, 62, 
241, 268 

Ho people, 14-15, 110 

housing: lowland, 96, 102; midland, 1 05— 
6; upland, 112 

human rights, xxxvii, 233-34, 288-91 

Hungary: aid from, 251 

hunting, 99-100, 106 

hydroelectric power, xxxiii, 256; export 
of, xxxiii, xxxv, 166, 168, 186, 188, 
241; installed capacity, 168, 241; 
investment in, 169; as source of for- 
eign exchange, 168; technical assis- 
tance for, 198 

ICC. See International Control Commis- 
sion 

ICR Indochinese Communist Party 
IMF. See International Monetary Fund 
Imfeld, Hans, 23, 27, 28 



imports, xxxiii, 189; duties on, 193; of 
food, 153, 159, 189; of fuel, 170, 189; 
of manufactured goods, 189; restric- 
tions on, 193; from the Soviet Union, 
170 

Independent Party (Phak Seli): in elec- 
tions of 1955, 37; in elections of 1958, 
40 

India: in International Control Commis- 
sion, 35, 269 

Indochina, French (see also French rule), 
xxx, 4 

Indochina War, First (1946-54) , xxx, 31, 
34, 264; armistice agreement for, 34- 
37 

Indochina War, Second (1954-75), 52- 
54; prologue to, 47-52, 57-58; refu- 
gees from, 50, 91, 121, 122, 164; truce 
talks for, 54; United States involve- 
ment in, 4, 267, 268-69 

Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), 
xxx, 24, 32, 206-7, 242 

Indochinese Federation, 20-21 

Indravarman I, 6 

industry, 152, 166-70; 172-74; employ- 
ment in, 166; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 166; principal activ- 
ities in, 166; state-owned, 167 

infant mortality, xxxiii, 81, 87, 137, 138 

inflation, 186-87, 244 

infrastructure: development of, xxxv, 
198; improvement of, 284; rural, 152; 
spending on, 182; technical assistance 
for, 198, 250 

Inpeng Suriyadhay, 51 

Institute of Law and Administration, 232 

Institute of Traditional Medicine, 142 

insurgency (see also Hmong guerrillas; 
Pathet Lao), 234-35, 248-49, 276-83; 
defenses against, 262, 277-78; Mon- 
Khmer, 264; support for, 277, 278 

intelligentsia, 92, 236 

internal security (see also insurgency), 
xxxvii, 276-83 

International Control Commission 
(ICC), 35, 54, 56, 73, 269 

International Development Association 
(IDA), 169, 198 

International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
xxxiv-xxxv, 198, 240, 255-56 

investment: domestic, xxxiv, xxxv, 152; 
foreign, xxxiv, 151, 152, 169, 194, 195, 



350 



Index 



196, 219, 248, 250, 254 
irrigation, xxxv, xl, 154, 156, 198, 256 
Irwin, John N. 11,49 
Israel: relations with, xxxix 
Izikowitz, Karl Gustav, 104 

Japan: coup de force by, 22; dependence 
on, 243; financial assistance from, 

xxxiv, 197, 198, 240, 254-55, 256; 
investment by, 169; state visits to, 216; 
trade with, 190 

Japanese occupation, xxx, 22-23 
Jayavarman Paramesvara, King, 8 
Jayavarman VII, 7 

JCS. See United States Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 

Johnson, U. Alexis, 50 

Joint Central Commission to Implement 

the [Vientiane] Agreement, 64, 65 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. See United States 

Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Joint Commission, 35 
Joint Development Bank, 183, 184 
joint ventures, xl-x'li, 194; with Thailand, 

xxxv, xxxvi, 183, 194 
judiciary, 231,232-33 

Kammu language, 104 

Kammu people, 88, 106, 107, 108; geo- 
graphic distribution of, 91, 104; popu- 
lation of, 104; religion of, 131; 
resettlement of, 105 

Katang people, 88 

Katay Don Sasorith, 34, 36 

Kaysone Phomvihan, 29-30, 31, 52, 207, 
215-16, 219, 275; death of, xli; in 
Indochinese Communist Party, 32; as 
party secretary general, 211, 214; in 
Pathet Lao government, 32; in revolu- 
tion, 67, 68, 265; secrecy of, 72, 216; 
state visits by, 216, 248, 250 

Kennedy, John R, 54, 56 

Khamboui, Queen, 70 

Khamchan Pradith, 69 

Khammao Vilay. SeeXieng Mao 

Khamsai Souphanouvong, 209 

Kham Souk. See Zakarine 

Khamtai Siphandon, xli, 211, 216-18, 
270 

Khamu people. See Kammu people 

Khanti, Prince, 15 

KJiao Pathan Van (Daily News), 57 



Khaosan Pathet Lao (Lao News Agency) , 
238 

Khmer kingdom, xxix, 3, 6-7 
Khmer people, 82 
Khmu people. See Kammu people 
Khrushchev, Nikita S., 56 
Khun Borom, 6 
Khun Cuang, 7 
Khun Lo, 6 
Kindavong, Prince, 22 
King's Council, 38 
Kissinger, Henry A., 63, 64 
Kompong Som: as trade transit point, 
193 

Kong Le, 43, 48, 52, 57, 59; coup d'etat 
by, xxxi, 45-46, 267 

Korea, Democratic People's Republic of 
(North Korea): cooperation projects 
with, xxxix 

Korea, Republic of (South Korea): coop- 
eration projects with, xxxix 

Kou Abhay, 38, 44 

Kou Voravong, 26, 34, 36 

Kouprasith Abhay, 51 

Kriangsak Chomanand, 248 

Kui people, 110 

Lahu people, 89, 110 

Lamet people, 88, 104; clans of, 107-8; 
cooperation among, 107-8; language 
of, 104; religion of, 131-32 

land: arable, xxix, 82, 153; area, 81, 153; 
cultivated, 153; forested, 82; owner- 
ship, 145; pasture, 154; tenure, 106 

language. See under Lao Loum; Lao 
Sung; Lao Theung 

Lan Xang, Kingdom of, xxix, 3, 8-10, 
239; army of, 262-63 

Lao Chamber of Commerce, 195 

Lao Dong (Labor) , 239 

Lao Federation of Trade Unions, xxxvii, 
225, 239 

Lao Front for National Construction, 
225 

Lao Import-Export Company (Societe 
Lao Import-Export), 192, 193 

Lao Issara government, xxx, 4, 26-30, 
31, 264; armed forces under, 264; in 
exile, 29, 31 

Lao Loum people ("lowland" Lao) {see 
also villages, lowland), xxxii, 79, 87- 
88, 89, 95-96, 98-102, 104, 205; agri- 



351 



Laos: A Country Study 



culture of, 87, 99, 155; education of, 
133, 135, 136; ethnic groups of, 95; 
families and households, 98-100, 101- 
2; festivals of, 120; under French rule, 
89; geographic distribution of, 87, 91; 
in government, 95; kinship, 98; lan- 
guages of, 87; marriage of, 98, 131; 
meals of, 96, 99; migrations of, 88, 93, 
121, 249, 278; as party members, 209; 
as percentage of population, 87, 95; 
religion of, 79, 102, 104, 128, 131 

Lao National Council of Trade and 
Industry, xxxiv 

Lao National Liberation Movement, 
279-80 

Lao Neutralist Revolutionary Organiza- 
tion, 267 

Lao News Agency. &?<?Khaosan Pathet 
Lao 

Lao Nhay. See Lao Renovation Movement 
Lao Nhay (New Laos) , 21 
Lao Patriotic Front. SeeNeo Lao Hak Xat 
Lao Pen Kang. See Neutralist Party 
Lao Pen Lao, 21 , 26; in elections of 1958, 
40 

Lao People's Army. See armed forces; 
army 

Lao People's Democratic Republic: pro- 
claimed, xxxi, xxxv, 67-68, 205, 261 
Lao People's Liberation Army. Smarmy 
Lao People's Party (Phak Pasason Lao — 
LPP), xxx, 48; established, xxx, 33, 
207, 208 

Lao People's Revolutionary Party 
(LPRP) {see also Central Committee; 
government; Politburo), xxxi, xli, 68, 
206-9, 211-18, 261; under constitu- 
tion of 1991, 206, 224-25; control of 
media, 238; corruption in, xxxvii; 
Fifth Party Congress (1991), xxxvii, 
153, 163, 174, 208; First Party Con- 
gress (1951), 208; Fourth Party Con- 
gress (1986), 152, 162, 208; ideology 
of, 213-14; members of, xxxvii, 208; 
origins of, 206-8; Second Party Con- 
gress (1972), 208; secrecy in, 212-13, 
215; structure of, 208-9, 211-12; 
Third Party Congress (1982) , 208 

Lao People's Revolutionary Youth 
Union, xxxvi, 225; publications of, 
238-39 

Lao Renovation Movement (Lao Nhay), 



21 

Lao Rouam Lao. See Rally of the Lao Peo- 
ple 

Lao Rouam Samphan. National Lao 
Union 

Laos for the Lao. See Lao Pen Lao 

Laos Roundtable (1992), 254 

Lao Sung people ("upland" Lao) {see also 
villages, upland; Hmong), 79, 110- 
119, 205; agriculture of 111, 112, 113- 
14, 159; animism of, 117; and clan 
membership, 79; discrimination 
against, xxxii, 89; education of, 135, 
136; emigration by, 92; ethnic groups 
of, 110, 117; families and households 
of, 114, 116-17; geographic distribu- 
tion of, 110; in government, 91; lan- 
guages of, 88; migration of, 88-89, 
111-12; in Pathet Lao, 90-91; percent- 
age of population, 88; rebellions by, 
89-90; religion of, 79; resettlement of, 
86, 89, 93; transportation of, 85 

Lao Theung people ("midland" Lao) {see 
also villages, midland), 79, 104-10, 
205; agriculture of, 104, 106-7, 110; 
animism of, 109; discrimination 
against, xxxii, 89, 110; displacement 
of, 89; education of, 135, 136; families 
and households of, 105, 107-9; gen- 
der roles of, 108-9; geographic distri- 
bution of, 110; in government, 91; 
languages of, 88, 104; migration of, 
88; in Pathet Lao, 90-91; rebellions by, 
89-90; religion of, 79 

Laotian-Chinese Joint Border Commit- 
tee, 250 

Lao United Buddhists Association, 129 
Lavae people, 104 
Lawae people, 88 
lawyers, 232, 290 
Le Duan, 73 

legal system. See criminal justice system 
legislative branch, xxxvi, 229-31 
Leuam Insixiengmay, 34 
literacy, 134 

Lithuania: relations with, xxxix 
livestock, 82, 99, 112, 159-60; and 

Hmong, 117; technical assistance for, 

198 

Louangphrabang (city), 93; electricity 
in, 169; growth of, 121; population of, 
93, 121 



352 



Index 



Louangphrabang, Kingdom of {see also 
Muang Sua), xxx, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 
16, 19, 20, 25, 205; attack on Vientiane 
by, 9; migration under, 3; relations of, 
with France, 20; and Siam, 10, 19 

Louangphrabang, principality of, xxx, 
239 

Loven people, 88 
LPP. See Lao People's Party 
LPRP. See Lao People's Revolutionary 
Party 

Luang Prabang. See Louangphrabang 
Lue people, 95 

MAAG. See Military Assistance Advisory 
Group 

McClintock, Robert, 34 

magistrates, 232-33 

Maha Ghakkri, 248 

Maha Sila Viravong, 21 

Maha Wachirolongkon, 248 

Ma Khamphitay, 35 

Makong people, 88 

Malaysia: trade with, 190 

mandala, xxix, 5, 6 

Manta Thourath, 10 

manufacturing, 166-67, 196 

marriage: age, 116; bride-price, 98, 114, 
116; bride stealing, 114-16; Hmong, 
114-16; lowland, 98; and mandala, 5; 
midland, 107, 108; polygyny in, 98, 
108, 116; restrictions on, 107; wed- 
dings, 98, 131 

mass organizations: under constitution 
of 1991, 225; members of, xxxvi 

materiel: air force, 245, 273-74; army, 
271-72; chemical weapons, 235, 253- 
54; from France, 263, 265-66; navy, 
274; police, 263; from the Soviet 
Union, 245, 250-51, 271-72; from the 
United States, 265, 266; from Viet- 
nam, xli, 245, 284 

Matsuoka-Henry Pact (1940), 19 

media, xxxvii, 236-38, 288 

medicine. See health and health care 

Mekong River, 81, 82, 85; hydroelectric 
potential of, 168; transportation on, 
174,178 

Mekong River Commission, xliii 

Mekong Valley, 81; power centers in, 5-7 

men: roles and status of, 100, 108-9, 117 

Mennonite Central Committee, 256 



MIA. See missing in action 

Miao-Yao language group, 88 

Mien people, 89, 110; in China, 262; fes- 
tivals of, 1 20; migration of, 1 1 1 

migration, xxix, 91; from China, 110, 
111-12; and ethnic composition, 81; 
by Hmong, 10, 111-12; under Lan 
Xang kingdom, 3; by Lao Loum, 88, 
121; from Laos, 92, 235, 242, 248-49; 
by Lao Sung, 88-89; of refugees, 122, 
235 

military. See armed forces 

military assistance: from China, 278; for 
Phoumi Nosavan, 267; from the Soviet 
Union, xxxi, 51, 52, 273, 276; from the 
United States, 37, 40-42, 48-49, 53- 
54, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269-70, 281; 
from Vietnam, xli, 51 , 52-53, 272, 276 

Military Assistance Advisory Group 
(MAAG), 267-68 

minerals (see also under individual miner- 
als), 170-72, 184, 241 

Minh Mang, 10-11, 12 

mining, 170-72, 241; exploration, 170; 
foreign investment in, 196; potential, 
170 

Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, 166 
Ministry of Communication, Transport, 

Posts, and Construction, 175 
Ministry of Defense, 265 
Ministry of Education, 137 
Ministry of Finance, 182, 192 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 248-49, 252 
Ministry of Information and Culture, 

137, 238, 239 
Ministry of Interior, 233, 289, 290, 292 
Ministry of Justice, 232 
Ministry of National Defense, xl 
Ministry of Public Health, 137, 141, 142 
Ministry of Trade, 173, 192 
missing in action (MIA) (see also POW/ 

MIA issues) , xxxix, 63, 253 
money supply, 1 86-87 
Mon-Khmer rebels, 264 
Mon people, xxix 

Mongolia: aid from, 251; trade with, 189 
Mongol rule, xxix, 7-9 
Mourin d'Arfeuille, 10 
Muang Phuan,8, 11, 12, 13-14, 15 
Muang Sua {see also Louangphrabang; 
Sri Sattanak), 6, 7, 8, 9 



353 



Laos: A Country Study 



Nam Ngum dam, 168 
Nam Ngum River, 1 68 
Nam Ou River, 85; transportation on, 
174 

Nan-chao kingdom, 6 

narcotics (see also counternarcotics; 
opium): xxxix, 159, 292-93 

National Assembly (see also Supreme Peo- 
ple's Assembly), 30, 65, 231; building, 
229; elections for, xxxvi-xxxvii, 34, 40, 
229, 231; members of, 231; role of, 
xxxvii, 229-31 

National Assembly Law (1993) , 231 

National Committee for Social Welfare 
and War Veterans, 143 

National Committee on Drug Control 
and Supervision, 292, 294 

National Congress of People's Represen- 
tatives, 67 

National Forest Resource Conservation 
and Development Strategy, 166 

National Lao Union (Lao Rouam Sam- 
phan) : in elections of 1 951 , 34 

National Political Consultative Council, 
65, 66, 67 

National Progressive Party (Phak Xat 
Kao Na): in elections of 1951, 34; in 
elections of 1955, 37; in elections of 
1958,40 

National Radio of Laos, 238 

National Railway Company, Ltd., xxxvi 

National Union Party, 37 

natural resources, 86 

navy (Lao People's Navy) , 274 

Neo Lao Hak Xat (Lao Patriotic Front) 
(see ako Pathet Lao), xxx, 38, 110, 207 

Neo Lao Issara (Free Laos Front), 32, 
217 

Netherlands: food aid from, 198 
Neutralist Armed Forces (see also Kong 

Le),xxxi, 52, 55, 267 
Neutralist Party (Lao Pen Rang), 55, 56, 

57, 68 

New Economic Mechanism (1986), 
xxxiii-xxxiv, 96, 152, 240-41, 246; 
agriculture under, 156, 162; foreign 
investment under, 194; forestry under, 
161; industry under, 173; introduction 
of, 4-5, 152, 216, 289; progress under, 
199-200; trade under, 188, 191 
New Economic Policy (Soviet) , 21 3 
newspapers (see also media), 238 



New Year, 120, 132 

Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 256 

North Korea. See Korea, People's Demo- 
cratic Republic of 

North Vietnam. See Vietnam, Democratic 
Republic of 

Norway: investment by, 169 

Nouhak Phoumsavan, 30, 43, 68, 207; at 
Geneva Conference (1954), 35; in 
Indochina War truce talks, 54; in 
Indochinese Communist Party, 32; in 
Pathet Lao government, 32; as presi- 
dent, xli, 211, 216 

Noum Lao (Lao Youth) , 239 

Numbri people, 104 

Nyaheun people, 104 

Office of the Central Committee, 209 

oil (see also petroleum), 170, 241 

opium, 26; as cash crop, 10, 113, 159, 
281; crop substitution programs, 
xxxix, 113, 159, 197-98, 253, 292-93; 
under French rule, 113; and interna- 
tional relations, 71-72, 253; produc- 
tion, xl, 71-72, 113, 119, 159,292, 293, 
294; trade, 28, 177, 188, 253 

Organization Committee, 209 

OSS. United States Office of Strategic 
Services 

Ouan Ratikoun, 45, 50, 69 

Oudone Sananikone, 21 

Oun Huan, 9 

Oun Kham, 10, 15, 16 

Oun Sananikone, 21, 26 

Pak Au Her. See Zhong Zhua Her 

Pa Kao Her. See Zhong Zhua Her 

Paknam incident (1893), 16 

Pakxe,93, 121 

Pali language, 21, 126 

Panya Khamphong, 7, 8 

Panya Lang, 7 

Parsons, J. Graham, 39, 49 

Pathet Lao (see also Neo Lao Hak Xat), 
xxxi, 4, 31-36, 38-39, 55-56, 110, 207, 
269, 270, 271; anti-Hmong offensives, 
60, 66; coalition with, xxx, 38, 39; at 
Geneva Conference (1954), 35, 265; at 
Geneva Conference (1961-62), 56; 
Latsavong detachment of, 31; and mil- 
itary, 287-88; negotiations of, with 
Royal Lao Government, xxx, 37-39, 



354 



Index 



50; popular support for, 48, 110; 
power seized by, 3, 66-67, 270; propa- 
ganda by, 58; publications of, 238; reli- 
gion under, 128-29; in Royal Lao 
Army, 38, 39, 42-43, 266; schools, 133; 
villages controlled by, 48, 55-56, 67, 
105, 270 

Patriotic Neutralists, 57 

Pavie, Auguste, 3,16 

Paxa Sangkhom. See Social Party 

Peace Convention Between France and 
Thailand (1941), 20 

Peace Party (Santiphab), 40 

PEO. See United States Programs Evalua- 
tion Office 

People's Committee, 27 

Phak Pasason Lao. See Lao People's Party 

Phak Seli. See Independent Party 

Phak Xat Kao Na. See National Progres- 
sive Party 

Pham Van Dong, 36 

pharmaceuticals, xli, 142 

Phaya Khammao. SeeXieng Mao 

Pheng Phongsavan, 54, 61, 69 

Phetsarath, Prince, 21, 22, 23, 24-26, 31, 
39,44 

phi. See spirits 

Phone Chantaraj, 63 

Phongsali Province: economy of, 151; 
Pathet Lao in, xxx 

Phoui Sananikone: in elections of 1951, 
34; at Geneva Conference (1954), 34, 
56; government of, 42 

Phoumi Nosavan, 26, 44-45, 46, 47, 59; 
anticommunist offensive under, xxxi, 
50, 54; death of, 279; in elections of 
1951, 34; in elections of 1960, 44-45; 
lack of support for, 49-51, 56; military 
support for, 267; in Phoui govern- 
ment, 42 

Phoumi Vongvichit, 27, 51, 61; arrested, 
43; in coalition government, 40; death 
of, xli; at Geneva Conference (1961- 
62), 56; in Pathet Lao government, 32; 
retirement of, 211 

Phoun Sipaseut, xli, 43, 211, 218 

Phu Noi people, 110 

Phu Tai people, 95 

Pibul Songkram, 20 

PIP. See Public Investment Programme 

Plain of Jars, 82 

Po, Prince, 14 



Poland: in International Control Com- 
mission, 35, 269; trade with, 189 

police, national, xl, 263, 287-88; anti- 
smuggling unit, 292; counternarcotics 
unit, 113; informants, 289 

Politburo (Political Bureau), xxxvi; deci- 
sion making in, 211; Khamtai in, 218; 
members of, 68, 207, 211, 224 

Political Bureau. See Politburo 

political demonstrations: after coup of 
1960, 45-46; procommunist, 66-67, 
270 

political reeducation. See seminar camps 

political unrest: under French rule, 19, 
21, 24 

polygyny, 98, 108, 116 

population, xxxii, 86-94, 153, 213, 261; 
density, xxxiii, 79, 86-87; displace- 
ment of, 60, 121; ethnic distribution 
in, 87, 88, 95; of Hmong, 110, 111, 
282; of Ho, 110; of Kammu, 104; of 
Lao Loum, 87, 95; of Lao Sung, 88; of 
Lao Theung, 104; of Louangphra- 
bang, 93, 121; of Pakxe, 93, 121; rural, 
xxxiii, 93-94; of Savannakhet, 93, 121; 
urban, 93, 94, 121; of Vientiane, 93, 
120; in villages, xxxiii, 93 

population statistics: birth rate, 86, 87; 
child mortality rate, xxxiii, 81, 87, 
137-38; death rate, 86; fertility rate, 
86; growth rate, xxxii-xxxiii , 81, 86, 
121; infant mortality rate, xxxiii, 81, 
87, 137-38; life expectancy, xxxiii, 81, 
137 

postal service, 173 

POW/MIA issues, xxxix, 253, 286, 287, 

294; origins of, 63-65 
POWs. See prisoners of war 
Praxathipatay. See Democratic Party 
president (see also executive branch), 

228-29 

press (See media; newspapers) 

prices, 162, 184-86, 187 

prime minister (see also executive 

branch) , 229 
prison camps: conditions in, 63, 290, 

291-92 

prisoners, political, xxxvii, 233, 290-91 
prisoners of war (POWs) (see also POW/ 

MIA issues), xxxix, 286-87, 294; 

demands for release of, 64; schedule 

for release of, 63, 64 



355 



Laos: A Country Study 



prisons, 290, 291-92 
private sector, 153, 194 
privatization, xxxiv, 151, 174, 255 
Propaganda and Training Committee, 

209, 238 
prostitution, 140 

provinces: capitals of, 121, 122; party 
committees in, 212 

Provisional Government of National 
Union. SeeSouvanna Phouma govern- 
ment, fourth 

Public Investment Programme (PIP), 

XXXV 

Public Prosecutor General, 232 

publishing, 137 

Pushkin, Georgi M., 58-59 

Quinim Pholsena, 51, 52; assassinated, 
57; at Geneva Conference (1961-62), 
56 

Quoc. See Kaysone Phomvihan 

radio, 179; state control of, xxxvii, 238; 

technical assistance for, 238; Thai 

broadcasts, 239 
railroads: construction of, xxxvi 
Rally of the Lao People (Lao Rouam 

Lao), 40 

Rama III, King of Siam, 10-11, 12 
Rama IV, King of Siam, 14 
Rama V, King of Siam, 15 
Ramkhamhaeng, 7-8 
Raynaud, Paul, 20 

rebellions: by Lao Sung, 89-90; by Lao 
Theung, 89-90; by Pathet Lao, 4, 36 

refugee camps, 91, 283; geographic dis- 
tribution of, 91; in Thailand, xxxv, 
xxxvii, 92, 110, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 
286 

refugees, 91-93, 235; asylum for, 252; in 
China, xxxviii, 235, 283; Hmong, 92, 
110, 118, 234, 248-49, 278, 283, 286; 
killed, 285; migration of, 122, 235; 
repatriation of, xxxviii, 92-93, 235, 
279; resettlement of, 91-92; in Thai- 
land, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, 92, 110, 129, 
234, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 286; in the 
United States, 252; Vietnamese, 122 

religion (see also under individual sects), 3, 
124-26, 128-33; animism, xxxii, 79, 
109, 117, 130-33, 145; under constitu- 
tion of 1991, 225; of Hmong, 117; 



under Lan Xang kingdom, 3; under 
Louangphrabang kingdom, 3; resur- 
gence of, 145 
religious ceremonies, 122-23, 130, 131, 
132 

religious festivals, xxxii, 122-23, 126, 
128, 130 

resettlement, 89, 93, 105, 113, 164; of 
district centers, 121; of Hmong, 89, 

105, 118; of Kammu, 105; of Lao 
Sung, 86, 89; of refugees, 91-92 

Revolutionary Committee, 47, 50, 52 
Rheinart, 10 

rice, 156-58; cultivation and harvest of, 
xxix, 5, 82, 89, 95, 112, 120, 122; 
imported, 153, 189; paddies, 95, 99, 
113-14, 155; as percentage of agricul- 
tural production, 153, 156; produc- 
tion, 79, 99, 156-58; self-sufficiency in, 
158; subsidies for, 186; swidden, 104, 

106, 110, 155, 181; tax on, 180-81; 
wet, xxix, 5 

Riley, Herbert D., 49 

roads, 85, 175-78; construction of, xxxv, 
xl, 175-76, 177, 249, 256; improve- 
ments in, 85; maintenance of, xl, 176- 
77 

Royal Lao Army, 264, 265-70; clashes 
with Pathet Lao, 36-37, 48; created, 
31; financial support for, 266; in First 
Indochina War, 264; missions Of, 269; 
number of troops in, 264; organiza- 
tion of, 269; Pathet Lao units in, 38, 
39, 42-43, 266; political role of, 43, 
44-45; preparedness of, 37; training 
of, 264, 265, 266 

Royal Lao Government, xxx; conflict of, 
with Pathet Lao, 4; negotiations of, 
With Pathet Lao, xxx, 37-39, 50; over- 
thrown, 27; Pathet Lao in, xxx, 38, 39; 
Pathet Lao threat to, 36-37 

Royal Lao Navy, 274 

rural areas (see also villages) , 94-120; 
development in, xxxv; electricity in, 
169; infrastructure of, 152; population 
in, xxxiii, 93-94; self-sufficiency in, 99, 
142-43, 145; social welfare in, 142-44; 
work year in, 119-20 
Russia (see also Soviet Union), xxxiv, 251 
Russian Council of Trade and Industry, 
xxxiv 



356 



Index 



Saisompheng Phomvihan, 209 

Sali Vongkhamsao, xlii 

Sam Tao language, 104 

Sangkhom Thoulakit (Society and Busi- 
ness), 238 

Santiphab Party. See Peace Party 

SaritThanarat, 44-45, 46, 47, 50, 56 

Savang Vatthana, King, 44, 49; abdica- 
tion of, xxxi, 67, 205; as crown prince, 
22, 34, 36, 37; death of, 70, 256 

Savannakhet, 93, 121 

Say Vongsavang, 70 

schools, xxxiii; curriculum of, 133; 
enrollments, xxxiii, 134, 135; Hmong, 
40; locations of, 122; secondary, 135- 
36; village, 134 

SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Orga- 
nization 

Secretariat, 21 1 

Sedange people, 104 

seminar camps, xxxvii, 67, 68-70, 206, 
233, 256, 277, 289, 290-92; civil ser- 
vants in, 227; closed, 233; monks in, 
129; types of, 290 

Sengsouvan Souvannarath, 59, 69 

service sector, 172-73, 196 

shamans, 79-80, 117 , 132-33 

Siam (see also Thailand) , xxix-xxx, 3; 
attack on Ho by, 14; campaigns against 
Vientiane by, 9-13, 263; and Lan 
Xang, 239; and Louangphrabang, 10, 
16; relations of, with Vietnam, 12 

Siamese rule, xxix-xxx, 9-15; depopula- 
tion policy of, 13; emigration under, 
13; end of, 15-16; resistance to, 13 

Sikhottabong, 5 

Singapore: trade with, 190 

Sing Chanthakoummane, 69 

Singkapo, 35, 43 

Sing Ratanassamay, 27, 50, 54 

Sino-Vietnamese War (1979), 74, 278 

Sipsong Panna, 6, 7 

Sisana Sisan, 67 

Sisavang Vong, King, xxx, 20, 26, 44; 

abdication of, 27; constitution under, 

30; reinstatement of, 29 
Sisavat Keobounphan, 35, 248 
Sisomphone Lovansai: on constitution 

drafting committee, 219; death of, xlii; 

retirement of, 21 1 
Sisouk na Ghampasak, 66 
Sithon Kommadan, 43 



slave trade, 89, 264 

Smith, Horace H.,42 

Social Party (Paxa Sangkhom) , 45 

social services, xxxiii, 80, 142-44 

Societe Lao Import-Export. See Lao 
Import-Export Company 

Socio-economic Development Plan 
(1993-2000), xxxv 

Somlat Ghanthamath, xli-xlii 

Somsanith, 45, 46 

Somsavat Lengsavat, 218 

Somseun Khamphithoun, 72 

Soth Petrasy, 63, 64 

Soukhan Vilaysan, 69 

Souligna Vongsa, King, xxix 

Souphanouvong, 43, 67-68; in coalition 
government, 39, 56; death of, xlii; in 
exile, 60; in Lao Issara government, 
26, 31; negotiations of, with Vietnam, 
24; in Pathet Lao government, 31; as 
president, xxxi, 68; retirement of, 211; 
in revolution, 67 

South Africa: relations with, xxxix 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 
(SEATO), 266-67 

South Korea. See Korea, Republic of 

Souvanna Phouma, Prince, xxxi-xxxii; 
in coalition government, 56; death of, 
70; following coup of 1960, 45-46; in 
elections of 1951, 34; in elections of 
1960, 45; meeting of, with Zhou Enlai, 
59; negotiations of, with Pathet Lao, 
50; resignation of, 39; in revolution, 
67; in rival government, 55, 60; sup- 
port for, 48; visit to Beijing and Hanoi 
by, 38, 59; visits to Washington by, 39, 
40, 57 

Souvanna Phouma governments: first 
(1957), xxxi, 34, 37-38, 39; second 
(I960), xxxi, 39; third (1962), xxxi, 
46, 47-51, 54, 57; fourth (1975), xxxi, 
65 

Souvannarath, Prince, 30 
Soviet-Lao Cooperation Commission, 
190 

Soviet Union (see also Russia): aid from, 
xxxiv, 72, 137, 196, 197, 246, 250; 
dependence on, 242; imports from, 
170; materiel from, 245, 250-51, 271- 
72; military aid from, xxxi, 51, 52, 273, 
276; relations with, 250-51; study 
abroad in, 136, 242, 251; trade with, 



357 



Laos: A Country Study 



189, 190, 199 
spirits {phi), 130-31; of ancestors, 109, 

133; practitioners, 109, 131-32 
Sri Sattanak, Kingdom of {see also Muang 

Sua), 7 

Standing Committee, 231, 232 
State Bank, 183 

State Board of News Agency, Newspaper, 

Radio, and Television, 238 
State Committee for Foreign Economic 

Relations and Trade, 192 
state enterprises, 167, 173; privatization 

of, xxxiv, 151, 213, 216; revenue from, 

181; subsidies for, 182; trade by, 172- 

73 

State Planning Commission, 154 
State River Transport Company, 178 
State Water Transport Company, 178 
Stuart-Fox, Martin, 92, 128 
subsidies, 182, 186, 255 
Sukhothai empire, 3 
Sullivan, William H., 58-59 
Supreme People's Assembly {see also 

National Assembly), 153, 219, 229; 

appointments to, 231; elections to, 

xxxvi, 72 
Supreme People's Court, 229, 232 
Sweden: financial assistance from, xxxiv, 

169, 197, 198, 243, 254, 256; state visits 

to, 216 

swidden (slash-and-burn) farming, xxxv, 
82, 86, 89, 93, 99, 104, 106-7, 110, 112, 
155; destruction by, 155, 164; prohib- 
ited, 86, 118, 145, 152-53, 156, 164, 
166; and relocation, 93, 105, 111, 118; 
schedules for, 119-20 

Tai Dam language, 87 

Tai Dam people, 95 

Tai Deng language, 87 

Tai Deng people, 95 

Tai-Lao people, 89 

Taillard, Christian, 104 

Tai people, 262 

Taiwan. See China, Republic of 

taxes: on agriculture, 162, 180-81; col- 
lection of, 151, 180; on opium 
exports, 28; as percentage of gross 
domestic product, 181; revenue from, 
181 

tax incentives, 194 
tax reform, 181, 200 



teachers, xxxiii, 134, 135 
telecommunications, 175, 179-80; under 

New Economic Mechanism, 152, 173 
telephones, 179 

television, 179-80; state control of, xxx- 

vii; Thai broadcasts, 239 
Thai Isan people, 91 

Thailand {see also Siam) , 137; blockade 
by, 48, 50; border with, xxix, xxxv, 4, 
81; border problems with, 4, 73, 247, 
284-86; broadcasts from, 239; diplo- 
matic relations with, xxxv; electricity 
exported to, xxxv, 168, 186, 188, 241; 
embargo by, 285; food aid from, 198; 
Hmong in, 110, 234, 283; import 
duties of, 193; insurgents in, 286; 
investment by, 169, 243, 248; joint ven- 
tures with, xxxv, 183, 194; Lao in, 104, 
262; in Mekong River Commission, 
xliii; nationalist threat from, 19-20; 
refugee camps in, xxxv, xxxvii, 92, 
110, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 286; refu- 
gees in, xxxv, xxxvii, xxxviii, 92, 110, 
129, 234, 248-49, 278, 279, 283, 286; 
relations with, xxxv, 73, 240, 244, 246, 
247-49, 261,284-86; state visits to, 248; 
study abroad in, 242; support of, for 
insurgents, 277; trade with, xxxv, 152, 
188, 189, 190 

Thai Military Bank, 184 

Thammayano, 70 

Tham Sayasithena, 21 

Thao O Anourack, 29-30, 31 

That Luang festival, 120, 128, 130 

Thongdy Sounthonvichit, 21 

Thongvin Phomvihan, 209 

Tiantha Koumane, King, 14 

Tiao Sisoumang Sisaleumsak, 51-52, 69 

Tiao Souk Vongsak, 32 

Tibeto-Burmese language group, 88 

timber {see also forestry): export of, 
xxxiii, xxxv, 118, 161, 188-89; logging 
of, 160-62; industry, 167; state export 
monopoly on, 192 

tin, 170, 188, 241 

Tin Lao (News of Laos) , 21 

topography, 81-82 

Touby Lyfoung, 27, 69 

tourism, 173, 196 

trade {see also balance of payments; 
exports; imports), 187-93, 250; of 
agricultural products, 162; control of, 



358 



Index 



192; cooperation, xxxiv; deficit, 188, 
190-91; foreign investment in, 196; 
and mandala, 5; opium, 177, 188; part- 
ners, 189-90, 249; pattern, 188; policy, 
151, 192; private, 151, 172; regula- 
tions, 188; state-owned, 172-73; with 
Thailand, 152, 188; transit, 193; and 
villages, 144; volume of, 188 

Tran Ninh Phu Tarn Vien, 12 

transportation, 174-79; air, 179; and cli- 
mate, xxix; of freight, 174, 175; motor 
vehicles, 178; under New Economic 
Mechanism, 152; price controls on, 
173; roads, 175-78; routes, 85; upland, 
177; water, 81,85,174, 178 

travel: problems of, 120, 200; restrictions 
on, 123,215, 233,289 

Treaty Between France and Siam (1907) , 
19 

Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
(Laos and Vietnam) (1977), 73, 245, 
261, 283 

treaty of protectorate (France and 

Annam) (1884), 15 
trials, 289-90 
Truman, Harry S., 25 
Tu Due, 14 

UN. See United Nations 

UNDP. See United Nations Development 

Programme 
Unger, Leonard, 46 

UNHCR. See United Nations High Com- 
missioner for Refugees 

UNICEF. See United Nations Children's 
Fund 

United Nations, 36, 240, 243, 254 

United Nations Children's Fund 
(UNICEF), 137, 141,256 

United Nations Convention on Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho- 
tropic Substances (1988) , xxxix 

United Nations Development Pro- 
gramme (UNDP), xliii, 240; aid from, 
169, 198, 255-56; crop substitution 
program, xxxix 

United Nations Drug Control Program, 
256, 292 

United Nations Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), 198, 256 

United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), xxxviii, 92, 235, 



256 

United States: advisers from, 52, 58-60; 
aid from, xxxi, 40, 46-47, 70-71 , 252; 
bombing by, 62; counternarcotics cer- 
tification, xxxix-xl, 253, 286, 293-94; 
covert missions of, 37, 46-47, 48, 58- 
60, 266; crop substitution program, 
xxxix, 197-98, 253, 292-93; diplo- 
matic missions of, 49-50; economic 
relations with, xliii, 197-98; evacua- 
tion of Hmong by, 66, 282; explora- 
tion by, for petroleum products, 170; 
food aid from, 198, 252; at Geneva 
Conference (1954), 35; at Geneva 
Conference (1961-62), 56; influences 
of, 227; and Kingdom of Laos, 31; 
materiel from, 265, 266; migration to, 
92; military assistance from, 37, 40^2, 
48-49, 53-54, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269- 
70, 281; and opium production, 71- 
72, 253; policy, 38-39, 42-43, 48-50; 
POW/MIA issues, xxxix, 63, 64, 286- 
87; refugees in, 252; relations with, 
xxxix, 70-72, 240, 251-54, 286-87; in 
Second Indochina War, 4, 240; study 
abroad in, 242; trade with, 190 

United States Agency for International 
Development (AID), 252 

United States Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), 46, 58, 63, 234, 268 

United States Civil Air Transport, 46 

United States Drug Enforcement Admin- 
istration, 253, 294 

United States Information Agency 
(USIA), 252 

United States Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 
46 

United States Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), 24, 25 

United States Peace Corps, 252 

United States Programs Evaluation 
Office (PEO), 37, 42, 266 

urban areas, 79, 93-94, 120-24; agricul- 
ture in, 122; amenities and services in, 
123; electricity in, 123; migration to, 
123; percentage of population in, 121; 
as provincial capitals, 93-94, 122 

USIA. See United States Information 
Agency 

utilities, 173, 184 

Vang Pao, 53, 60, 66, 249, 265, 268, 279- 



359 



Laos: A Country Study 



80, 282 
Vannasin, 238 
Van Tuong. See Vientiane 
Vessantara, 126-28 
Viangchan. S<?<? Vientiane 
Vientiane (city): facilities in, 93; farming 

in, 122; growth of, 121; population of, 

93, 120 

Vientiane, Kingdom of: destruction of, 
9, 263; relations of, with Annam, 10; 
Siamese campaigns against, 9-10; 
under Siamese rule, 10-12; under 
Vietnamese rule, 12 

Vientiane, principality of {see also Can- 
dapuri),xxx, 5, 9, 239 

Vientiane Agreement (1973) , 62-63, 64 

Vientiane Mai (Vientiane News), 238 

Viet Minh, 24; at Geneva Conference 
(1954), 35; invasion by, in 1954, 34, 
264-65; in Laos, 32; military opera- 
tions of, 33-34, 43; withdrawal of, 265 

Vietnam: conflicts with, xxix; immigra- 
tion from, 4; invasions from, 9, 10; 
relations of, with Siam, 12; relations 
with, 239, 263; as territorial threat, 3 

Vietnam, Democratic Republic of: advis- 
ers from, 207-8, 245; aid from, xxxiv, 
197, 251; border with, xxix, 73, 82; 
Hmong in, 110, 262; influence of, 215, 
244-45; intervention by, 240; invasions 
by, xxxi, 42-44, 241, 282; Lao in, 104; 
materiel from, xli, 245, 284; in 
Mekong River Commission, xliii; mili- 
tary aid from, xli, 51 , 52-53, 276; polit- 
ical support from, 48; propaganda by, 
58; relations with, 42, 54, 73, 214, 239, 
240, 244-47, 261, 283; secret police of, 
288; study abroad in, 136; Tai in, 262; 
technical assistance from, 238; trade 
with, 189; training by, 245, 273, 284; 
troops of, in Laos, 58, 65, 73, 240, 245, 
265, 277, 283-84 

Vietnam, North. See Vietnam, Demo- 
cratic Republic of 

Vietnam, People's Army of, Political and 
Military Institute, xli 

Vietnam, Republic of: relations with, 42 

Vietnam, South. See Vietnam, Republic 
of 

Vietnamese people: anti-French activities 
of, 24; education of, 133; in Laotian 
civil service, 23, 227; as refugees, 122 



Vietnamese Communist Party, 213 
Vietnam-Laos Cooperative Commission, 
245 

villages, xxxii, xxxiii, 79, 93-95; con- 
trolled by Pathet Lao, 48, 55-56; coop- 
eration in, 144; location of, 122; party 
branches in, 212; poverty in, 143-44; 
relocation of, 60, 93, 95-96, 113; 
schools in, 134; self-sufficiency in, 
143-44, 145; and social identity, 79; 
social stratification in, 117, 145; social 
welfare in, 142; society, 79; and trade, 
144; mat in, 128, 145 

villages, Hmong: farming in, 112, 113- 
14; geographic distribution of, 111; 
government, 117; houses in, 112; loca- 
tions of, 111; relocation of, 113, 119; 
size of, 111; social stratification in, 
117, 145 

villages, Kammu, 105-6 

villages, Lamet, 105-6 

villages, lowland, 95-96, 98-102, 104; 
education in, 80; government of, 100- 
101; household tasks in, 100; houses 
in, 96, 102; labor exchange in, 101-2; 
projects, 101; religion in, 101, 104; 
self-sufficiency in, 99, 145; social status 
in, 100; watin, 101, 102 

villages, midland, 105-6; agriculture in, 
106-7; geographic distribution of, 
105; government of, 109; religion in, 
109; relocation of, 105; size of, 105 

villages, upland, 110-19; agriculture in, 
111, 112, 113-14; ethnic relations in, 
118; geographic distribution of, 111; 
government of, 118; houses in, 112; 
relocation of, 111, 118; social stratifi- 
cation in, 117-18, 145 

Vixakha Bouxa festival, 126 

Vo Nguyen Giap, 264-65 

wat, 126,128, 145 
Wat Pho, 82 

Whitehouse, Charles S., 71 

widow(er)s, 98-99, 108 

women: in armed forces, 276; education 
of, 108; foreign aid for, 256; health of, 
87; household tasks of, 100, 108-9, 
116, 117; number of, as party mem- 
bers, 209; roles of, 108-9, 116-17 

work force, 151; in agriculture, 154, 158, 
163; in industry, 166; in manufactur- 



360 



Index 



ing, 167; in service sector, 172 
World Bank, 154; aid from, xxxiv-xxxv, 
255-56 

XamNua, 121 

XatLao (The Lao Nation), 63 

Xay Fong, 7 

Xesetdam, 168 

Xieng Dong Xieng Thong, 7 

Xieng Mao (Khammao Vilay), 26, 29, 34 



Xieng Pasason (Voice of the People), 219, 
238 

Yao people. S^Mien people 

Zakarine (Kham Souk), 16 

Zasloff, Joseph J., 290, 291 

Zhong Zhua Her, 280 

Zhou Enlai: at Geneva Conference 

(1954), 35; support for agreements, 

59 



361 



Contributors 



Nicholas C. Auclair is a senior Asian military/political analyst 
with the Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 

MacAlister Brown is Fairleigh S. Dickinson, Jr., Professor of 
Political Science, Williams College, Williamstown, Massa- 
chusetts. 

Arthur J. Dommen is Senior Associate, the Indochina Institute, 
George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. 

Joel M. Halpern is Professor Emeritus of Anthropology at the 
University of Massachusetts, Amherst. 

Susannah Hopkins is a development consultant based in Viet- 
nam, who works for multinational and nongovernmental 
organizations. 

W. Randall Ireson is a rural sociologist and independent devel- 
opment consultant based in Salem, Oregon. 

Andrea Matles Savada is Supervisor, Asia/West Europe Unit, 
Federal Research Division, Library of Congress, Washing- 
ton, D.C. 

Joseph J. Zasloff is Professor of Political Science at the Univer- 
sity of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 



363 



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CCA /lO 


Pakistan 


550-74 


T ToanHn 


C CA /I /C 

550-46 


Panama 


550-Q7 
j jvj — y i 


ui ug uay 


550-156 


Paraguay 


550-71 


Venezuela 


550-185 


Persian Gulf States 


550-32 


Vietnam 


CCA /lO 


Peru 


550-183 


Yemens, The 


JjU — / Z 


r llllippillcb 


550-99 


Yugoslavia 


1^9 
j ju— ioz 


JrUldilU 


550-67 


Zaire 


550-181 


Portiicral 


550-75 


Zambia 


550-160 


Romania 


550-171 


Zimbabwe 


550-37 


Rwanda and Burundi 






550-51 


Saudi Arabia 






550-70 


Senegal 







366 



PIN: 004226-000 



